Reviving Democracy in a Fragmented World
Not Attractive Anymore or Still a Success Story?

Background Paper
# Table of Contents

## Taking Stock of Democracy – Still a Success Story or not Competitive Anymore? ..........6

I  Introduction .................................................................................................................. 6
II  What Makes a Democracy ......................................................................................... 8
   1.  Definition of Democracy ....................................................................................... 8
   2.  A Very Short History of Democracy ...................................................................... 8
   3.  Types of Democracy ............................................................................................. 10
III  Erosive Forces that Threaten Democracy ................................................................. 11
   1.  The World in Flux .................................................................................................. 12
   2.  Corollary Challenges ............................................................................................ 13
IV   Recommendations .................................................................................................... 14
V    References ............................................................................................................... 16

## Decoding the Writings on the Wall: Analyzing Democracy from a Historical Point of View ........................................................................................................ 17

I  1989 - The Beginning of an Illusion ............................................................................ 17
II  Revolutionary Situations of the Past .......................................................................... 17
III  Democracy: Varieties and Metamorphoses .............................................................. 19
IV   Pathologies of Democracy ........................................................................................ 21
   1.  The Pitfalls of Revolutionary Moments ................................................................. 21
   2.  The Shortcomings of Democratic Leadership ....................................................... 21
   3.  Democratic Nations and Globalization .................................................................. 22
   4.  The Challenges of Equality .................................................................................. 23
V    Competent Democracies of the Past ........................................................................ 24
VI   Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 25
VII  Policy Recommendations (Some of Them with Respect to the EU) ....................... 26
VIII References .............................................................................................................. 28

## The Square People – Politics of Protests ..................................................................... 29

I  Introduction .................................................................................................................. 29
II  The Effect of Protest Politics ..................................................................................... 32
III  Reasons for Hope ....................................................................................................... 36
IV  References ................................................................................................................. 37
Arts and Culture: Keeping Democracy Alive or Entertainment for the Establishment?

Preliminary Remarks

The Influence of Art and Culture on Democratic Political Systems

1. The Artists

2. Cultural Politics and Cultural Education

3. The Recipients

4. Culturalization of the Social Realm: Transformation of the Global Sound in the Late Modern Era

Current Aspects of the Crisis of Democracy

1. Crisis of Legitimacy, Trust, Representation

2. Identity Politics and Social Democracy

3. Cultural and Political Education Generate Transnational Democratic Momentum

4. Cultural Difference, Irritation of Western Thinking and Foundations of Post National Politics

Recommendations for Action

References

About the Authors
Overview

The articles included in this background paper Reviving Democracy in a Fragmented World – Not Attractive Anymore or Still a Success Story? have been written in preparation for the 17th Trilogue Salzburg, which focuses on the question of whether republican democracy remains the uncontested and undisputed form of government as has been postulated in the last decades.

The background paper seeks to promote a discussion of how politics, business and the arts define the essence of democracy while also examining its shortcomings. It also takes a closer look at underlying questions of power (distribution), participation and decision-making within democratic and autocratic governments. It addresses the questions of what the minimum standards of democracies are and which deficiencies of the democratic model have led to questioning the model as a whole and which solutions could overcome this deficit. The paper includes seven original pieces of research which examine how we can revive democracy in a fragmented world.

The first article, Taking Stock of Democracy – Still a Success Story or not Competitive Anymore?, provides an overview of the history and phenomenon of democracy. The authors show the existing challenges and shortcomings of democratization. The paper makes a number of recommendations for a revitalization of democracy.

Even if history does not repeat itself, the research paper Decoding the Writings on the Wall: Analyzing Democracy from a Historical Point of View looks back to revolutionary situations in the past. It examines analogies, structural similarities and differences between various historical phenomena. The author formulates recommendations on a general and reflective level based on lessons learned from the past.

The article The Square People – Politics of Protests starts by discussing the growing feeling that democracy as a form of government could have outlived its usefulness in the face of the social, cultural and technological transformations that we are experiencing. It then analyzes why this has happened. The paper examines the effects of protest politics as well as reasons for hope.

Democracy – Its Substance and Meaning: Can One Size Fit All? focusses on the differences and standards of various democratic systems. The article provides an overview of governance and government and the components of a functioning liberal democracy. The author closes with recommendations on what to do.

The author of The Erosion of Democracy in Developing and Transition Countries uses the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) and its three-pronged approach of assessing state stability, investigating participative and constitutional democracy and analyzing democratic consolidation to describe the level of transformation and the quality of democracy all over the world. The BTI measures and compares transition processes in 129 transformation countries with data collected between 2015 and 2017, providing global ratings based on detailed country reports. Using evidence-based findings, the author shows that there has been an erosion of democracy worldwide.

The sixth research paper, Democracy, an Economic Review – Open Market Economies Under Pressure, explores the economic superiority of open market economies. The author argues that although criticism of some economic developments in Western industrialized nations is justifiable, the market-based economic system is still an extremely successful model that is superior to all other existing economic systems. The article closes with economic policy implications.
The last article, Arts and Culture: Keeping Democracy Alive or Entertainment for the Establishment?, describes the influence of art and culture on democratic political systems and focusses on various stakeholders, concluding with some remarks about the culturalization of the social realm. The authors investigate current aspects of the crisis of democracy while sketching out the crisis of legitimacy, trust and representation. They describe challenges stemming from the growing role of identity politics and use two examples to illustrate how cultural and political education are generating new ideas. They also discuss the importance of trans-national educational scenarios. The article concludes with recommendations for the European Union.

This background paper is designed to provide in-depth analyses of various aspects of the two issues that will be examined during the conference sessions, namely Democracy under Pressure: Could Autocratic Models Turn Out to Be More Successful in the Medium or Long Term?, which will focus on the essence of democracy as well as its shortcomings, and Democracy 4.0: What Can Be Done to Provide Fresh Momentum to Liberal Democracies?, which will explore what has to be done to promote the democratic model by politics, business and the arts.
Taking Stock of Democracy – Still a Success Story or not Competitive Anymore?

Jörg Habich | Verena Nowotny | Christina Tillmann

I Introduction

Taking stock of democracy seems to be easy. Democracy doubtlessly was the most successful idea of the 20th century, in spite of its flaws and problems. Democracy is able to adapt to changing environments and has been able to cope with challenges and problems in most cases. As a consequence, the number of democracies has increased and many countries have moved from a non-democratic government to a democratic one over the years. The number has risen from 69 in 1989/1990 to 125 electoral democracies in 2016.¹ Nowadays, the majority of countries are governed by democratic regimes.

Democratic systems are characterized by a variety of criteria, such as an electoral process and pluralism, political participation, civil liberties, the functioning of government, constraints on the power of the executive, and political culture with a guarantee of civil liberties. The victory of the liberal democracies as the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the final form of human government as predicted by Fukuyama seemed theirs for the taking.²

But the right to vote, political participation, freedom of press and media, and the rule of law are under pressure and in retreat globally.

Nowadays, authoritarian countries are potentially challenging liberal democracies by proving that authoritarian regimes might be better at creating economic growth, at least in the short run. Competition is created by these autocratic systems, whose decision-making processes are often faster and more effective than those in traditional democracies. Especially developing countries are studying with interest nations governed by autocratic rule, such as China or Singapore, since these countries have been extremely successful economically and able to cope well with global crises and current challenges.

The developments within both established and young democracies, and the competition from countries that lead and shape their state according to autocratic ideas, are increasingly putting pressure on liberal democracies. Suddenly, autocratic systems are gaining popularity. At the same time, or as a result, there is a growing disinterest in – or a renouncing of – democratic institutions, both nationally and supranationally (e.g. the European Union).

These worrying trends are also confirmed by the results of the latest edition of Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI). Overall, even in the highly developed industrial nations of the OECD and the EU, the quality of democracy has declined over the past few years. Although this is mainly due to particularly negative developments in countries such as Hungary, Poland, Mexico and Turkey, many other countries are also showing some signs of deterioration. This applies not least to the USA. The fact that more than half of the OECD and EU countries have deteriorated to a certain degree compared to the 2014 SGI is in itself worrying. It shows that even within the OECD and the EU the model of liberal democracy is coming under pressure – in some countries to such an extent that central democratic and constitutional standards such as freedom of the media are already severely damaged or undermined. With regard to countries such as Hungary or Turkey, we can no longer speak of consolidated democracies.

Democracy is also under pressure because it is challenging itself. Some are calling for more public participation and new opportunities for citizens’ empowerment as a vital part of democratic governance in order to make democratic processes more democratic. Others are highlighting democracy’s inconsistencies, paradoxes and limits by contrasting it with other forms of government. Liberal democracies that were considered the undisputed role models in the 1990s obviously have a credibility problem.

The rise of populism on the Left and Right in Europe and (US)-America has shown that today’s threats to democracy take place within the very institutions of democracy – via elections, via changes to the constitution and/or via the party system. Those populist politicians share contempt for elites and institutions, depicting checks and balances as suppression of the popular will.

---


4 To be published in October 2018 (www.sgi-network.org).

5 Thanks to Dr. Daniel Schraad-Tischler and the team of Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Sustainable Governance Indicators for valuable comments.
A century after the end of World War I we are confronted with the question of whether democracy is still a success story and if it is no longer competitive. Is the democratic model antiquated?

Winston Churchill’s famous claim seems a bit outdated:

"Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." 

II What Makes a Democracy

1. Definition of Democracy

In general, democracy refers to legal equality, political freedom and rule of law as well as a viable state where all citizens are equal before the law and have equal access to legislative processes. Even when there is no generally accepted definition, there is a widespread consensus that democracy is a dichotomy, or a scalar property displayed by political systems to different degrees. Dahl argues that citizens’ participation in the political process, including effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda and inclusion, as well as competition among political groups, are the key aspects of democracy. The figure “Dimensions of Democracy” shows what is and what is not an essential ingredient of democracy.

![Dimensions of Democracy](image)

These dimensions lead to different kinds of accountable democracies in which democratic systems differ in their electoral mechanisms and their (political) institutions, and it seems an oversimplification to divide regimes into democratic and autocratic.

2. A Very Short History of Democracy

As mentioned, the number of democracies has risen over the centuries and waves or major long-term trends and briefer bouts of turmoil can be seen during that time. The first long wave (1776–1914) was kick-started by ideas in the US with “no taxation without representation” and the French Revolution’s “liberté, égalité, fraternité.” During this period, labor movement, newly founded trade unions and socialist or social-democratic parties as well as women’s movements and nationalist
ideas, like literacy, urbanization and technological progress, played a crucial role in establishing democracy on a national level.⁹

The end of World War I opened a new shift to more democracy and created a new political landscape, leading to the **first positive conjuncture** (1918–1919) of political forces, actors and events. While the pre-war democracies had mostly favorable conditions and remained stable, the impact of the Great Depression led to a negative conjuncture or reverse wave of democratization, especially for the new democracies like the Weimar Republic. The Weimar Republic faced numerous problems:

- Hyperinflation
- Constitutional weaknesses, e.g. the constitution gave the President, the states and the army great power
- Proportional voting, weakening and dividing the Reichstag
- Political extremism from the left and right
- Numerous rebellions

The **second long wave** (1945–1970) began following the Allied victory in World War II and led to a renewed attempt to introduce a system of collective security with the funding of the UN and an agreement on universal human and democratic rights. De-colonization and newly gained independence led to steady growth in the number of democracies.

---

The third long wave (1970–1990) began with the revolution in Portugal and included the transitions in Latin America in the 1980s and Asia Pacific in the late 1980s. It ended with the downfall of practically all the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe within a number of months. The break-up of the Soviet Union led to a variety of new regimes, including new democracies, merely "electoral" or façade democracies and autocratic regimes. From a historical point of view, it was the beginning of an illusion, \(^\text{10}\) since after the Great Recession of 2008 a number of countries threatened essential components of democracy by undermining fair and free elections, curbing the liberal rights of freedom of speech and association, and weakening the rule of law, e.g. judicial independence.

A fourth wave ensued with the Arab Spring, which resulted in a collapse of several autocratic systems in the Middle East and North Africa. The Arab Spring began with the Tunisian Revolution in 2010 and spread forcefully to five other countries: Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. Demonstrations also took place in Morocco, Iraq, Algeria, Iranian Khuzestan, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Sudan along with minor protests in Djibouti, Mauritania, the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia and the Western Sahara.

Only eight years later democracy is facing its most serious crisis in decades. Political rights and civil liberties have deteriorated to their lowest point in more than a decade and democratic success stories are sliding into authoritarian rule. The challenges within democratic states have fueled the rise of populist leaders who appeal to anti-immigrant sentiment and give short shrift to fundamental civil and political liberties. Moreover, young people are losing faith and interest in the idea of democracy. \(^\text{11}\)

3. Types of Democracy

Many authors categorize governmental structures as a multi-dimensional phenomenon that makes it possible to distinguish between democracies and autocracies and hybrid systems like anocracies in between. \(^\text{12}\) Depending on the degree of sovereignty of the people and sovereignty of the state, the following models are distinguished: \(^\text{13}\)

- **Presidential democracy**, head of government is head of state and leads an executive branch that is separate from the legislative branch
- **Parliamentary democracy**, derives its democratic legitimacy from its ability to command the confidence of the legislative branch
- **Democratic party system**, two or more political party systems, where only one party can realistically become the government
- **Representative democracy**, type of democracy founded on the principle of elected officials representing a group of people, as opposed to direct democracy
- **Consensus democracy**, application of consensus decision-making to the process of legislation in a democracy

---

\(^{10}\) Dirk Schönplug. Decoding the Writings on the Wall: Analyzing Democracy from a Historical Point of View. Gütersloh 2018.


- **Identitary democracy**, hypothetical system with complete identity of sovereign and voters which is based on the finding and building of a "general will"

It was taken for granted in the past that there is a correlation between economic well-being and the democratic system. But when market economies have been successful over a period of time, this has often led to the erosion of traditional political institutions and citizens becoming dissatisfied with paternalistic political authority and demanding popular sovereignty.\(^\text{14}\)

To reduce citizens’ dissatisfaction with the democratic system, various options are discussed:\(^\text{15}\)

- **Increasing active involvement** in the democratic project
- **Enhancing the voice** of citizens through formal democratic processes to make substantive contributions to decision-making and to make their opinions heard
- **Bolstering legitimacy and trust** in the democratic process where skepticism of traditional institutions and mechanisms is on the rise, accountability and authority are being questioned, or the political leadership seems to ignore citizens
- **Safeguarding institutions and ensuring the rule of law** in order to maintain a balance between security and liberty, majority and minority rule, and other tensions that are innate to democracies while preventing or at least limiting backsliding and the hollowing out of democratic principles.

### III Erosive Forces that Threaten Democracy

"This was not supposed to happen." This statement, accompanied by a deep sigh, was frequently heard in 2016, the year that brought the world US President Donald Trump, the vote of the British people to leave the European Union, terrorist attacks in the heart of Europe (Brussels, Munich, Berlin, Nice), a failed military coup in Turkey – to mention only some of that turbulent year’s most outstanding events.

It is the same incredulous amazement that is apparent as a response to the current state of liberal democracy. The historian and author Philipp Blom articulated this disbelief in his opening speech at the Salzburg Festival this year – and offered an answer as well:

"But why is this happening right now? At a time when less people suffer hunger; less people die in violent conflicts; and we enjoy more wealth and security in our countries than ever? Because more and more people are becoming scared."\(^\text{16}\)

Ivan Krastev describes the current mood in Europe as a "diffuse concern, not fear."\(^\text{17}\) According to his observation, fearful people tend to be extremely cautious because they are aware that a wrong move will entail dire consequences. Concern, on the contrary, leads to hate speech and ruthless behavior as nobody is afraid of severe consequences.

---


1. The World in Flux

What has changed so fundamentally that people do not believe in liberal democracy anymore or at least have developed serious doubts with regard to its capability to make their lives better? Yascha Mounk cites three constants that have characterized democracy since its founding but that are no longer true today.\(^{18}\) First, during a period of democratic stability, most citizens enjoyed a rapid increase in their living standards. In the US, for example, the income of a typical household doubled from 1935 to 1960, and again from 1960 to 1985. Since then, it has been flat. And it seems rather likely that the downward pressure on the incomes of the West’s middle class will not let up.

Second, all through democracy’s history of stability, one ethnic group has been dominant. Decades of mass migration have radically transformed societies around the world. One hundred years ago, Western Europe was ethnically homogenous whereas Eastern Europe had multicultural societies. Nowadays, the situation is quite the opposite. Only 4 percent of people in Poland and Hungary were not born in these countries; on the other hand, in France, the number of residents of foreign origin reached 20 percent last year. The functioning of democracy may well depend to a certain extent on the homogeneity of the electorate, or on how the power and influence of ethnic majorities and minorities are perceived by the citizens.

Third, mass communication is no longer the preserve of political and financial elites. The rise of the internet, and in particular of social media, has shifted the power balance between political insiders and political outsiders. Manners and respect within the political arena have dramatically deteriorated. As Michael Ignatieff wrote a few years ago, “Politicians need to respect the difference between an enemy and an adversary. An adversary is someone you want to defeat. An enemy is someone you want to destroy.” Presidential candidate John McCain gave a clear example of this distinction when he defended Barack Obama during town hall meetings as a “decent man and citizen.” However, as early as 2008, his efforts to cooperate with the newly elected president were greeted with outright rejection and contempt by the audience when he delivered his conciliatory concession speech.\(^{19}\)

Furthermore, citizens’ alienation from democratic procedures partly has its roots in an increasingly complex legal system that has become a jungle of rules that is almost impossible to navigate without professional help. As Philip K. Howard stated as early as 1994, “We seem to have achieved the worst of both worlds: a system of regulation that goes too far while it also does too little. This paradox is explained by the absence of the one indispensable ingredient of any successful human endeavour: use of judgement.”\(^{20}\) In recent years, the very institutions that are meant to serve as safeguards of democratic procedures have come to seem outdated and dysfunctional. Consequently, public approval of democratic norms and procedures has dropped dramatically; actually, according to the BTI this democracy indicator has deteriorated the most since 2006.\(^{21}\)

Finally, our democracy has trusted too long in the legitimating power of elections alone as the cornerstone of our representative democracy. However, trends such as increasing individualism and pluralism have affected our political culture and citizens expect to be involved in decision-

\(^{18}\) Yascha Mounk. The People vs. Democracy. Why Our Freedom is in Danger and How to Save It. Cambridge 2018.


making processes in between elections as well. Deliberative and direct democracy enjoy broad support in the public. The local level has already reacted to this and offers countless forms of structured dialogues between citizens and politicians. The national level however is still reluctant, even though there are compelling and well-researched examples of citizens’ dialogues on the national level. For example, the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform convening 160 citizens was established by parliament and tasked with designing a new election law, which was then presented to the broad public in a referendum. Dialogues such as this are too rare and their power of increasing democratic legitimacy and giving citizens a structured way to make their voice heard is too often underestimated by political leaders.

2. **Corollary Challenges**

Democracy is a complex fabric; its resilience depends on many different threads that need to be woven together in order to ensure stability. However, several threads have currently become loose or torn, causing challenges in various areas.

*Eat the rich.* For decades, liberal democracy has served as a warrant for economic growth and increasing wealth. Increasing competition because of globalization, the financial crisis of 2008/2009 and stagnating income for the middle class have all cast doubt on this seemingly natural pairing. As a consequence, the rift between the haves and those who have less or who fear losing out has widened; entrepreneurs and (big) business are regarded as exploiters and corrupting politics for their interests only.

*Twitter politics.* In the past, two ingredients were considered essential for politics: predictability and reliability. Apart from Twitter’s most prominent user, the bad habit of reducing complex issues to catchy headlines or bumper sticker messages has found numerous followers of all political parties around the world. Offering simple solutions to complex issues befouls every meaningful debate and makes consensus-building, a necessity, almost impossible.

*Politics of fear and foes.* Authoritarian leaders tend to love crises. A severe crisis justifies extraordinary means (e.g. military rule) and offers a perfect stage for a politician to present himself/herself as a strong leader who is willing to do what it takes. Eventually, the crisis serves to justify tightening the grip on power, allowing autocrats to expand their room to maneuver and protect themselves from perceived enemies.

*Politics of division.* Changing configurations of a nation’s society make it necessary to rethink what citizenship and belonging mean in a modern nation-state. The noble experiment of multi-ethnic democracy can only succeed if all its adherents start to emphasize what unites rather than what divides them. Populist rhetoric that focuses on the “us versus them” theme and establishes scapegoats not only threatens the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic or religious groups within one nation but also make a constructive approach towards future immigration impossible.

*More than one fish in the ocean.* The Chinese Communist Party has broken the democratic world’s monopoly on economic progress. The Chinese elite argue that their model – tight control by the Communist Party, coupled with a relentless effort to recruit talented people into its upper ranks – is more efficient than democracy and less susceptible to gridlock. The tight control exerted by the

---

Chinese regime and condemned by China’s critics is not necessarily regarded as problem by the country’s citizens. As the independent Beijing-based writer Lijia Zhang stated, “Now, while still confined in a cage, it is one that has grown so big for many of us that we can go about our daily lives unaware of its limitations.”23

IV Recommendations

Given the considerable number of challenges and threats to liberal democracy, a hard-headed approach seems most promising. Founders of modern democracy such as James Madison or John Stuart Mill regarded democracy as a powerful but imperfect mechanism: something that needed to be designed carefully, in order to foster human merit but also to check human viciousness, and then kept in good working condition, constantly adjusted and worked upon. In this spirit, the following recommendations for members and bodies of the European Union shall serve as a starting point, not necessarily a final destination.

- **Return of common sense.** The European Union and its member states rightly consider themselves a beacon of rule of law. However, Europe’s citizens cannot appreciate this fundamental ingredient of any democracy if it is buried in obscure bureaucracy, incomprehensible rules and regulations, and complex decision-making. Less regulation that better coordinates how we work and live together, based on common sense and good judgement, would require an honest and sober review of our legal frameworks.

- **Diversifying our democracy.** Elections are at the heart of our representative democracy. However, casting a vote every few years at the ballot box is no longer enough: Citizens expect to be continually involved in political debates and decision-making. This can take the form of “citizen dialogues” in which citizens deliberate and discuss a specific policy question and come up with a recommendation for politics. Or it can be via referendums, in which citizens make the final decision on one very specific policy question themselves. Deliberative and direct democracy can and should enhance our representative democracy. It will increase democratic responsiveness, lead to better results and, hence, increase democratic legitimacy.

- **Establishing effective red lines.** So far, the EU has no effective toolbox for dealing with undemocratic behavior in one of its member states. Article 7 of the EU treaty – invoked once to date, against Poland – will not provide useful and deterrent means to handle the complex situation of a deteriorating democracy in an EU member state.

- **Inclusive patriotism.** Torn between the far right that wants to exclude minorities from membership in a nation and parts of the left that emphasize the differences between citizens of different races and religions to such an extent that the bonds between them seem to dissolve, we need an open discussion of citizens’ rights and responsibilities based on the non-negotiable condition that the state protects the rights of all individuals.

- **Civic education.** Since Plato and Confucius, every philosopher thinking about politics and governance has put particular emphasis on civic education. Curricula at schools and

---

universities are ill-prepared to instill democratic virtue in young students. Education has become increasingly utilitarian, with the result that citizens are alarmingly ill-informed about democratic processes and politics in general.

- **Imagining democracy.** Benedict Anderson coined the famous phrase “imagined community” when he described the nature of a nation. Democracy provides citizens the freedom to rule themselves, to choose their political representatives in a deliberate way and to influence the rules and regulations that determine our way of life. We need to imagine democracy, to rethink its foundations that – for too long – have been reduced to economic success and prosperity.
V References


Decoding the Writings on the Wall: Analyzing Democracy from a Historical Point of View

Daniel Schönpflug

I 1989 - The Beginning of an Illusion

In his last book, published in 1995 briefly before his death, the French historian François Furet analyzed the global events of 1989 as “the passing of an illusion.” To his mind, the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Eastern bloc had to be understood as the endpoint of a long history of worldwide fascination with communist ideology. At about the same time, the American historian Francis Fukuyama went even further in claiming that, after the end of communism, not only Soviet rule, but all the dictatorial forms of political government would be overcome and that liberal democracy would emerge as the triumphant winner of the ideological struggles of the “age of extremes,” as Eric Hobsbawm puts it. Like Fukuyama, prophet of the “end of history,” the protagonists of “democratic peace theory” and, recently, Steven Pinker have seen the year 1989 as the dawning of an age of freedom, peace and prosperity.

Looking back, it is fair to say that the moment of 1989 was not only the passing, but also the beginning of an illusion. After the decades of the Cold War, the West's triumph started with revolutionary movements and groundbreaking events in Eastern European countries. In political terms, “the end of history” seemed to promise “post-socialist transformation” in the states of the former Warsaw pact, which would eventually be followed by democratization on a global scale. In the economic sphere, the fall of communism allowed world markets to reconnect with vast regions, promising huge potential for future growth. In parallel, privatization, deregulation and the reduction of welfare transfers were the measures chosen to increase productivity in many Western countries and to stimulate a dynamic that would supposedly be fueled by the slower but even more groundbreaking surge of the “digital revolution.”

Thirty years later, these dreams of the wonders of the liberal age have been shattered. Instead of an era of peace, wars have broken out in the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia. The world economy has been destabilized by a chain reaction of bank crashes and financial crises that began in 2008. And recently, the process of global democratization not only has slowed, it is even on the retreat. Countries like Russia, Poland and Hungary, which were democratized after 1989, are now governed by authoritarian leaders and illiberal regimes. Others, like Afghanistan, Egypt and Iraq, which have gone through fundamental ruptures induced by foreign interventions or revolutions, are now so instable that all hopes for democracy there in the near future have been crushed. Once fairly stable democracies such as Turkey, India and Venezuela, and even some strongholds of the West like the United States, are now being led by governments that are openly rejecting liberal traditions. In hindsight, we can see quite clearly that 1989 represented the heyday of an illusion that did not last very long. Has history ever seen similar situations, in which liberal beginnings led to illiberal outcomes? Does historical research provide explanations and analytical tools that might help us better understand these shifts, which seem to be multiplying at present in our world? Might there even be lessons that can be learned from past experiences?

II Revolutionary Situations of the Past

History does not repeat itself. But by applying comparative methods, the historian is capable of detecting analogies, structural similarities and differences between various historical phenomena.
Which historical situations were comparable to 1989, in so far as they started with hopes of the spread of liberal-democratic rule and ended with completely different results?

The first case that comes to mind is the complex of events that Robert R. Palmer has characterized as the “age of democratic revolution.” The revolutionary spark was first struck in 1776 in the British colonies of North America. A decade later it was taken up in France, where within a few years an absolutist monarchy was transformed into an egalitarian republic. In 1792, the most important French colony, Saint Domingue in the Caribbean, took up the fight against its oppressor, gained its independence in 1804 and became the Republic of Haiti in 1806. From 1808 onwards, Spain was drawn into the turmoil of revolution and a little later most of its colonies in South America were displaying open resistance to their motherland. The 1820s saw new waves of revolutions in Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, where the population revolted against domination by the Ottoman Empire. This long wave of revolutions marks the first time in history that large parts of the world embraced the liberal dream. The United States and France set the tone for a new era, shaped by visions of liberty, individual sovereignty, equality, justice, virtue, free trade and prosperity. Other nations that could not immediately imitate this example felt they were being left behind. “Them and Not Us,” for example, was the title of a tribute that the German poet Klopstock composed in reaction to the French Declaration of the Rights of Man.

Yet the short- and medium-term consequences of these promising beginnings were decidedly mixed – especially in France, where the bells of freedom had rung the loudest. In 1792, France declared war on Germany; it was the beginning of one of the longest and bloodiest wars in world history, one that lasted for 25 years, spread to four continents and cost between 5 and 6 million lives. In 1793, only four years after the storming of the Bastille, the young French republic was taken over by Jacobin rulers who exposed the country to the Reign of Terror, shedding the blood of some 40,000 French people. Even if the revolutionary terror was short lived, it did not take long until Napoleon Bonaparte transformed the country into a militarized police-state, in which all oppositional forces were censored, spied upon and finally crushed. Other countries which had experienced moments of revolutionary enthusiasm did not fare much better. The slave revolt of Saint Domingue, for example, led to the foundation of a bloody and ineffective regime. And even if many of the former Latin American colonies gained their independence in the course of the 19th century, most of the emerging states were neither liberal nor democratic.

A comparable pattern of “derailment” applies to the wave of revolutions that shook the world in the wake of the First World War. The revolution of February 1917 turned the autocratic empire of the Russian Tsars into a Soviet republic. The experiment started with the establishment of a grassroots democracy for the workers and soldiers of Russia. In 1918/1919, a second series of revolutions followed, crushing three other gigantic political entities, namely the German, the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires. New republics were successively founded on the ruins of these empires. On November 9, 1918, Philipp Scheidemann proclaimed Germany a republic. Two days later, on November 11, Charles I of Austria abdicated amid the turmoil in Vienna. On the same day, Poland was re-established as a republican state, and on November 16, the prime minister of Hungary, Mihály Károlyi, proclaimed the country a republic. On November 18, Latvia became a republican state – following the example of Estonia and Lithuania, which had separated from the Russian Empire earlier in 1918. On January 22, 1919, the union of the two Ukrainian republics was declared, both states having resulted from the revolution of 1917. In Turkey, the revolution of the “Young Turks” led to the foundation of a republic in 1923. All of these newly created nations were originally oriented towards liberal and democratic principles, some of them marrying political liberalism with socialist or communist economic systems.
However, most of the newly founded republics of 1917/1918 were not only fragile and volatile, they very soon developed tendencies towards authoritarianism and illiberalism or even transformed into dictatorships. In the young Soviet republic, the revolution of February 1917 opened the door for the October Revolution of the same year. This put an end to the country’s short democratic experiment by dissolving the constituent assembly in January 1918 that had just been elected by 48 million Russians. Instead of grass-roots democracy, party rule and the Red Terror were established. In Hungary, the recently founded people’s republic came to an end with a military intervention led by Miklós Horthy in November 1919. The early years of the Polish republic were characterized by changing governments and political violence until, in 1926, Józef Piłsudski turned the tide with a coup d’état that created a personal dictatorship. The tendency towards dictatorship was most momentous in Germany and Italy, where right-wing fascist movements attacked the respective states from 1919 on. Some 20 years after the dawn of a new democratic age in 1917/1918, not only had many of the newly founded republics turned into authoritarian, repressive, sometimes openly violent regimes, but a second world war broke out, leading to bloodshed on an even larger scale than during the first: While there were 16 million recorded war-related deaths between 1914 and 1918, there were 85 million between 1939 and 1945.

III Democracy: Varieties and Metamorphoses

In 1789 and 1918, we can thus observe sequences of events and structural shifts that – at least at first sight – resemble what happened in Europe and other parts of the world after 1989. All three moments in history were characterized by political ruptures that initially led to the proliferation of liberal democracies, but the latter more or less quickly transformed into illiberal regimes or full-blown dictatorships. Comparative analysis of these parallel historical situations has revealed two important observations. First, it is obvious that the nature of democracy does not only change fundamentally in the course of history; at any given moment in time, coexisting democratic states also vary considerably. Second, in the three situations discussed above we can observe links between liberal democracies and the authoritarian, illiberal and violent regimes that some of them evolved into. Both observations speak directly to our core questions.

According to the standard definition given by the political scientist Larry Diamond, democracy consists of four key elements: a political system for choosing and replacing the government through free elections; the active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life; protection of the human rights of all citizens; the rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens. But as we shall see, this definition, which seems plausible for understanding the present, is of limited value for analyzing the democracies of the past. The city republics of ancient Greece, in which the concept and practice of democracy was invented, did certainly not fit Diamond’s definition; they were dominated by small aristocracies and excluded the middle and lower classes and the slaves. The parliamentary monarchy of Great Britain had democratic elements, but even after the substantial reform of its electoral system in 1832, voting rights for the House of Commons were not granted to more than 3% of the total population. Even in the revolutionary democratic republics of the 18th century, participation was a privilege reserved for the few: In the early United States, before the reforms of 1828, less than 5% of the population was entitled to vote. And in the First French Republic, with the introduction of “universal suffrage,” approximately 7 million men, a little more than one-fourth of the population, enjoyed voting rights, of which only some 10% actually went to the urns to elect the convention in 1792.

The fact that, before the 20th century, democratic participation was limited to small portions of society even in the most liberal regimes serves as an incentive to broaden the definition of
democracy for the purpose of historical analysis and accept that it has had many manifestations over the long course of history. Looking at the First French Republic again, we understand that it is not only a good example of this trend, but also paradigmatic of how quickly a democracy can turn into a dictatorship. It only took 12 months and the determination of the Comité de salut public to weaken the influence of parliament, to centralize the structures of government and to introduce a system of “revolutionary justice” used to pursue enemies of the regime. Interestingly, the constitution of 1792 was never officially overthrown. Moreover, the main perpetrators of la Terreur were all elected representatives of the republic and insisted they were acting in the name and the interest of the people, justifying their extraordinary measures with the danger that a civil or foreign war could ensue. The “twelve who ruled” even worked on a new Declaration of the Rights of Man and a new, even more democratic constitution that was voted on in a national referendum, but never put into practice. This historical case provides important insights: The French democracy of 1792 was not only vulnerable to authoritarian rule, it even provided the very structures and resources that led to its own abolition. In other words, the illiberal dictatorship of 1793/1794 paradoxically used democratic elements and discourse to create a regime that was undemocratic. A similar point could be made about the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte after 1799: He came into power with a coup d’état but legitimized his new constitution with a referendum and reintroduced universal suffrage in France.

Democracy’s variability and its relatedness to regimes that at first seem to have entirely undemocratic features is even more visible after 1918, when the age of mass democracy finally began. In the context of the new republics of 1917/1918, “liberal” certainly meant “democratic,” but often also a strong leaning towards socialist or communist ideologies. A democratic republic was founded in Germany after the First World War. The Weimar Constitution established a catalogue of fundamental rights for its citizens and a multiparty system, and it enabled 36 of the 60 million Germans living at the time to vote, which also included women. Yet the young German democracy was fragile from the very beginning. The burdens of the Treaty of Versailles, a series of economic crises, a lack of identification of the elites with the new regime, disorder in a parliament with far too many diverging parties and fragile coalitions, inefficiency in the apparatus of a state that proved incapable of addressing the ongoing economic crisis of the time, progressive radicalization of the republic’s enemies on the left and on the right, frequent recourse to violence – all these factors contributed to the weakening of the young republic and to the rise of a dictator. Yet Adolf Hitler was not only an enemy of the Weimar Republic, but in many ways a product as well. Even though he openly campaigned against democracy, he successfully operated within a democratic system. The NSDAP was a well-organized party, one that knew how to deal with its increasing membership, how to address Germans in very successful campaigns and how to score well in elections. Consequently, Hitler came to power in 1933 in a constitutional manner. It was only once his rule was established that he started, step by step, to transform the republic into a dictatorship based on racial exclusion. It is uncomfortable but fair to say that Hitler, in the 1930s and even in the first phase of the Second World War, ruled in the name of the majority of the German people.

To analyze liberal democracy’s variability, vulnerability and potential to transform into other, illiberal regime types, the Israeli historian Jacob Leib Talmon has coined the term “totalitarian democracy.” His famous book looks at revolutionary France, Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, and thus at three cases which are certainly extreme, but which open our eyes to more general phenomena: First, in history democracy has appeared in different forms that range from liberal to authoritarian. Second, liberalism and democracy seem to have specific weaknesses or even built-in mechanisms that, under certain conditions, can lead to the transformation from liberal to authoritarian democracy or
even to self-destruction. Historical research, as we shall see in the following, has identified some of these mechanisms.

IV Pathologies of Democracy

Historical research has enhanced our understanding of the question of why liberal democracies – and particularly young democracies founded in revolutionary moments – are fragile and have a certain potential for self-destruction and for transformation into authoritarian regimes. The overall purpose of historical studies in this field, however, has not been to find universal patterns of historical evolution that can be applied to every empirical case and even to predict future developments. Its aim, first and foremost, has been to analyze singular and specific historical moments and to propose modes of explanation of limited range. This is actually one of the features that distinguishes historical methods from those of political science. But even though historical explanations tend to have a limited range and are context-specific, it is possible to generalize to a certain extent. Concerning our core question about the “pathologies” of liberalism and democracy, four observations drawn from a wide range of historical studies seem particularly important:

1. The Pitfalls of Revolutionary Moments

A first set of explanations lies in the very nature of revolutions. They are, as François Furet has stressed, moments of enthusiasm and illusion. Emotional and ideological agitation is necessary to bring a revolution about, and revolutionaries have often described the beginning of a revolution as a state of collective intoxication that makes sober assessments and planning very difficult. This state of mind allows for the overthrow of an old regime but is not helpful for the creation of new stability; this is one of the reasons why post-revolutionary situations are characterized by a high level of contingency. Moreover, the new political personnel that enters the stage in a revolutionary moment often lacks experience, and new revolutionary regimes cannot rely on traditions and long-established routines that enjoy the trust of the citizens. All the political and administrative routines have to be reinvented, and it is normal that, at least in the first years after a revolution, a new regime lacks competence and efficiency. These factors explain why very young democracies like France in the 1790s or Germany in the 1920s were more likely to fail than Great Britain or the United States in the 20th century, since the latter had centuries of experience and trust on their side.

What makes it even more difficult to control a revolution is the fact that it is, by definition, a moment of conflict and violence. Revolutions mobilize various groups, pitting them against their opponents: champions of the new regime versus its enemies, enthusiasts of change versus nostalgics longing for the old times, winners versus losers who are just waiting for a moment of weakness to reappear. In most revolutions, such as those of 1789, 1917/1918 and 1989, the conflict’s structures are even more complex, as there are also dividing lines between different groups of revolutionaries and between different enemies of change. In revolutionary situations, which are characterized by the overthrow of executive power, these complex conflicts between groups which all claim to be in possession of the truth are prone to violence. Historians have shown how difficult it was in the revolutionary situations of 1789 and 1917/1918 to stop the cycles of violence and counter-violence.

2. The Shortcomings of Democratic Leadership

A second point that historians have stressed has to do with problem-solving competences. The broader the participation is in a political regime, the longer and more complex are the decision-making processes. Especially in times of crisis, the slow and deliberative procedures of democracies do not seem suited to responding to pressing needs and emergencies. This was certainly true for the First French Republic and for the Weimar Republic, with its plethora of rival
parties and its difficulties forming stable governments. To the extent that citizens feel frustrated about a political elite which does not seem to have answers to pressing problems, the likelihood increases that they will be drawn to populism and strong political figures. In revolutionary France, Robespierre and Napoleon appeared as providential figures who successfully claimed to be able to overcome the blockade of never-ending democratic debate. Hitler and Mussolini played similar roles in the 20th century. All of these leaders appeared in situations of crisis and presented themselves as almost superhuman beings capable of uniting and directing all the forces of their respective societies towards combatting the major problems of their time or an external enemy.

3. Democratic Nations and Globalization

It is worthwhile to remember that all three situations of expansion and retraction of liberalism – 1789, 1918, 1989 – happened in times of accelerated globalization. The second half of the 18th century was the high point of triangular trade between Europe, Africa and the Americas, and the inaugural phase of a global industrial revolution that brought new modes of production – such as the plantation economy – to the four corners of the world. These global economies generated income on an unprecedented scale. At the same time, however, they exposed all the actors involved – European entrepreneurs and consumers, colonial administrators, African slave traders and slaves, Caribbean planters – to new challenges and insecurities. The elevated level of economic competition led to an extension of colonial activities, added to the rivalries of European powers and led to armed confrontation, including two large-scale conflicts that have been designated history’s first world wars: the Seven Years War (1756–1763) and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815). In a comparable way, the First and the Second World Wars were consequences of a phase of heightened global competition that started in the 1870s and found its clearest expression in the “scramble for Africa,” in an international arms race and in a particularly volatile world economy.

Since the 1990s, we have entered into yet another phase of globalization that, this time, was ushered in by the vanishing of the Iron Curtain (which opened vast new markets), by the economic, social and political changes often referred to as the “neoliberal revolution” and by the digital revolution which continues to fundamentally impact the functioning of economies all over the globe. It is certainly problematic to compare instances of globalization in three different centuries with their specific economic and technological features and the different extent to which they connected the four corners of the world. But today’s concerns about global competition, about uncontrolled migration and terrorism and about loss of identity are not unprecedented. Even in 19th-century Europe, workers feared the concurrence of cheap labor and products from Asia and immigrants taking their jobs; even then, citizens were concerned about “anarchists” and “freedom fighters” detonating bombs in their cities. But this ambivalence towards globalization was compensated for by the fact that Europeans were convinced that they were part of a superior culture that ruled the world and that they were entitled to dominate and exploit other cultures around the globe. What is new, and particularly worrisome for the Western states and their citizens today, is the fact that they are no longer dominating and controlling the process of globalization like they did in the past. The world’s nation-states simply look incompetent and unable to regulate global investment activities, to punish enterprises that escape national legislation by operating transnationally, to provide security within digital networks that do not have a national anchor or to control the waves of migration taking place on an unprecedented scale. Globalization adds to the shortcomings of democratic rule that have already been discussed and increases the attractiveness of seemingly strong leaders and nationalist, identitarian and populist parties.
4. The Challenges of Equality

As early as the 19th century, the French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville analyzed the complex relationship between liberty and equality. Looking at the French revolutions, he claimed that for the majority of the French equality was more important than liberty. Moreover, he observed that equality has a built-in dynamic: Once the ideal of equality has entered the political realm, it is difficult to bring its momentum to a halt. As the principle of equality bears no exception, ever new groups and individuals see themselves as entitled to equal rights and opportunities. In 1789, *égalité* only meant equal rights for a narrowly defined circle of citizens. The 19th century saw the emergence of social equality – the right to work or to social protection – and Karl Marx’s ideas. The Russian Revolution, at least in theory, built on these ideas, promising to put an end to social injustice and exploitation of humans by humans. Today, we are experiencing the proliferation of claims to legal, political and social rights by minorities.

In its historical evolution, democracy has been inseparable from equality. From the very start, democracy’s successes and failures also depended on the degree to which it was able to fulfill the promise of equal rights and opportunities. This has created tensions ever since the revolutions of the 19th century, when those groups excluded from full citizenship (women, the poor, servants, slaves) demanded to be included. The young republics of the 1920s struggled with the contradiction that, on the one hand, they had proclaimed political and social equality, but, on the other, years of living in a war economy had accentuated the differences between those who had massively profited...
from that economy and the majority of others, who were struggling for survival. The problem of Western democracy today is that in the second half of the 20th century in the West, and particularly in the European welfare states, it was possible to create a level of equality that – under the conditions of heightened global competition – seems impossible to maintain. Philipp Ther in his book *Europe since 1989* has analyzed how the rising pressure on national economies has led to a decrease in social equality in many European states. Particularly the societies of the former Eastern bloc, which had embraced democracy believing in the promises of liberty and social equilibrium, have been shocked by the experience of inequality of an unprecedented nature. Thomas Piketty makes a similar argument for the United States. Taking a different angle, Wendy Brown argues in her book on “neoliberalism’s stealth revolution” that, more than the rise of inequality, the economization of the individual and of public life has contributed to the destruction of democracy.

V Competent Democracies of the Past

Yet even if some democracies have proven to have particular weaknesses and to be vulnerable to failure and to transformation into other regime types, others have shown – even in the same historical moment – astonishing levels of resilience and have survived under extreme stress. Our historical discussion would thus not be complete if, before concluding, we did not take a look at examples of democracy’s strength. The historian Tim B. Müller, in his book on democracy after the First World War, contrasts the rise of authoritarian rule and terror in Germany, the Soviet Union and so many others states in the 1930s to three countries which took very different paths in the same period: the United States, Great Britain and Sweden. In 1929, the US was hit by one of the largest economic crises in its history. The stock exchange crashed and massive unemployment and poverty led to hunger and even starvation, destabilizing American democracy to a degree that made its failure a realistic option. The American president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, was elected into office the same year Adolf Hitler became German chancellor. From the beginning, he was aware of the scope of his challenge and was determined to prescribe “strong medicine” for the American public. His political project resembled a revolution and, in stark contrast to many European states, he reacted to crisis with more, not less democracy and with a higher level of participation and social justice. The “New Deal” was a multifold program. At its core were measures to combat unemployment. They involved a massive increase in government employment and huge investments in infrastructure and public works. New legislation allowed for state control of banks and the stock market. Child labor was banned and a minimum wage introduced. The state even intervened in production processes and began setting prices. In 1935, the Social Security Act introduced unemployment insurance and a retirement plan. The New Deal was nothing less than a reinvention of America and its capitalist economy by a president who was convinced that there is no such thing as an “invisible hand” guided by market forces. What was perhaps as important as the concrete political measures was Roosevelt’s ability to speak to the people. In Congress, in thousands of speeches all over the country and in his famous “fireside chats” on the radio, the president was able to inspire confidence in democracy and in the future of the country.

On the other side of the Atlantic, Great Britain was facing economic and political crisis. The economy had been weak ever since the 1920s, the fascist movement was on the rise and intellectuals like the writer Leonard Woolf even predicted the downfall of the country’s democracy. Several factors helped to stabilize democracy. On the one hand, the creation of a government of “national unity,” i.e. a broad coalition of democratic parties, functioned as a bulwark against the extreme right. On the other hand, until his death in 1936 the king, George V, served as an anchor providing stability. As in the US, the government strengthened support for victims of the crisis, the poor and the unemployed. By devaluing the British pound, exports were stimulated and British
industry strengthened. These measures were accompanied by protectionist policies that were meant to stimulate trade within the British Empire and to shield it from foreign competition. Thus, finding compromises that combined a market and a planned economy, Britain responded to the political and economic challenges of the interwar years by vigorously following “The Middle Way,” as Harold Macmillan, the Conservative politician who later become prime minister, called it.

These examples, to which smaller countries such as Sweden could be added, show that it was possible to deal with the crisis of the 1920s and 1930s in different ways. Whereas some countries resorted to radical and aggressive forms of nationalism and racism, others decided to address the problems of their times with an extension of democratic rule and equality. Interestingly, the economic policies that went along with these initiatives were often not so different from those adopted by countries which took the path towards authoritarianism.

VI Conclusions

The fragility of liberal democracy today and the tendency towards authoritarian and illiberal rule seem to be part of a recurrent historical pattern that has characterized revolutionary moments ever since the birth of modern democracy in the 18th century. In 1789, 1918 and 1989, fundamental political, social and economic change created the conditions for the proliferation of democracy and for its decline into illiberal regimes. This essay allows for a number of general conclusions:

- Democracy, as we understand it today, is not only a rather recent phenomenon, but also one that, at any given moment in history, has only been found in a limited number of countries.

- Throughout history, democracy has existed in many different forms. Even in the 20th century, which finally saw the appearance of mass democracy and rule of law, the ideal type defined by political scientists has been rare, while – on both the left and right sides of the political spectrum – derivative forms exist that have traits or are full-blown expressions of “authoritarian” or “totalitarian” democracies.

- It is undeniable that the different types of democracies are intrinsically related, that they have fluid, genealogical relations to each other and that one form can merge into another.

- This makes it necessary to think about the links between democracy and illiberal forms of government and about the mechanisms that make liberal democracy vulnerable. This paper has explored four of these mechanisms: the specific kinds of illusions and delusions inherent in revolutionary moments, the shortcomings of democratic leadership, the deficits of nation-states in reacting to globalization, and the challenges of equality.

- The examples of the New Deal and Middle Way have shown that democracy is not doomed to fail in crisis, but can react effectively and even be fortified, if it manages to find the right answers to the challenges of its time.
VII Policy Recommendations (Some of Them with Respect to the EU)

It is the purpose of historical research – as has been stressed – to explain specific situations of the past, not to find universal principles or predict the future. But even if history does not repeat itself, that does not mean the past cannot inspire decision makers in the present in dealing with the challenges of our time. Not being an expert on policy-making, I will try to formulate recommendations on a more general and reflective level, taking the pathologies of democracy into consideration.

- It is very important for Western elites to rethink the moment of 1989. With the fall of communism, liberalism was not freed from all its obstacles and democracy did not become a regime-type without alternatives. This is due to the fact that some of democracy’s main problems lie within, not outside of it. Democracy cannot triumph forever; there is no such thing as an “end of history.” It can only survive if it remains – to use Ernest Renan’s famous expression – “a daily plebiscite.” This also applies to the EU, for which the fall of the Iron Curtain was a moment of hope that led to the inclusion of Eastern Europe.

- Looking back at situations of the past that are comparable to our present also helps us understand that the stakes are very high. The revolutionary age of the 18th and 19th centuries saw two world wars, which brought about the rise of a new global power: Great Britain. The most dynamic phase of the 20th century brought about two world wars on an even bigger scale, which redefined the globe and established the United States as a global hegemon. Given the similarities of the three revolutionary situations in world history addressed in this essay, there is also a high risk of new world wars taking place in the ongoing aftermath of 1989. Without any doubt, this would accelerate the ascension of yet another world power: China.

- Those who make foreign policy should be more careful about welcoming, fostering or sustaining revolutions and radical ruptures around the world. The recent developments in the Mediterranean are a good example of the risks of bringing liberal democracy to the world. Neither the military interventions and imposed regime changes in the region, nor the much-welcomed Arab Spring have brought the Mediterranean closer to liberalism, democracy and peace. Quite the contrary, in the Arab World we have witnessed yet another cycle of liberal revolutions that have turned into their opposite.

- Friends of democracy should be aware of the variability of that particular regime type and of the danger of the ineffectiveness of democratic procedures. By fearfully clinging to routines and established processes, a democracy might lack exactly those competences for problem-solving and crisis management that could secure its survival. Successful democracies of the past suggest that in hard times democracies can and must go into a more operative mode – with stronger leaders, more centralization and exceptional measures, but also with a higher level of citizen involvement – in order to avoid devolving into an illiberal regime. Striking a balance is hard: strengthening authority without becoming authoritarian, strengthening participation without becoming ineffective. It will be very interesting to see how Emmanuel Macron masters this kind of experiment in France.

- If we compare the crisis in the years after 1918 to those of today, one of the most striking differences is the absence of deeper economic dislocations. To a degree, we are seeing similar political developments, but they are not driven by crashes, bankruptcies,
unemployment and hunger. In a way that has not been entirely understood to date, the new economic situation created by globalization and digitalization seems to trigger political change. Nation-states have difficulty formulating answers that calm the fears of their citizens and prevent them from turning to those who offer easy solutions. That is why the stakes for a supranational institution like the European Union are particularly high. It is on this level that the threat of high-risk banking and over-speculation could be addressed, that the concerns about rapid changes in the world of labor have to be taken seriously, that a shield against international terrorism could be erected, that data security and privacy protection could be enhanced, that environmental questions could be solved. Only the EU is able to find solutions for the biggest challenge of our time: mass migration, which, if one can judge by the demographic prognosis for Africa, will only increase.

- In many countries of the world, there is a tendency to forget the fundamental bond between democracy and equality. This applies to Europe, but even more so on a global scale. The liberal democratic model of sharing power and decision-making processes cannot function under conditions of social polarization and a very unequal distribution of wealth. The role of the European Union in this respect has been an ambivalent one in the past. On the one hand, the EU only allows for limited democratic participation; Catherine Colliot-Thélène has rightly characterized it as a “democracy without demos.” On the other, it has been too strongly oriented towards growth and economic dynamism, too little towards social protection and social justice.

- History also teaches us that we have to be patient with young democracies. It took almost 100 years to progress from the French Revolution to the first stable democratic republic on French soil. We cannot expect that the same process will happen rapidly and smoothly in the young democracies of Eastern Europe, Asia or Africa.
VIII References


Timothy Snyder. The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America, London 2018.


The Square People – Politics of Protests

Ivan Krastev

I Introduction

"Is our democracy in danger?" asked Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, the authors of the recently published *How Democracies Die*, and added, "It is a question we never thought we'd be asking." “Nothing lasts forever. At some point democracy was always going to pass into the pages of history,” agreed David Runciman, the author of the bestselling *How Democracy Ends* “but until very recently ... very few would have thought it might be taking place before their eyes.”

The discourse of crisis has been the natural discourse on democracy. Contemporaries have always tended to view democracy as being in crisis and on the edge of collapse. What is different today is the growing feeling that democracy as a form of government could have outlived its usefulness in the face of the social, cultural and technological transformations that we are undergoing.

The paradox is that democracy has reached its existential crisis at the very moment when it has triumphed. Contrary to past experience, i.e. at the end of the last century, neither God (tradition) nor revolution (ideology) can grant governments “the moral title to rule.” The will of the people as expressed in free and fair elections has become the only source of legitimate government that modern societies are ready to accept. The global spread of elections (frequently free and sometimes fair) and the universal acceptance of the language of human rights have become the distinctive feature of politics in our time. But while democracy is perceived as the best form of government by the majority of the people in the world, the opinion polls indicate that people living in authoritarian regimes are more likely to believe that their voice matters in the process of decision-making than those living in democracies.

According to a recent survey, the paradoxical effect of the global spread of democracy in the last 50 years is that citizens in a number of supposedly consolidated democracies in North America and Western Europe have grown more critical of their political leaders. They have also become more cynical about the value of democracy as a political system, less hopeful that anything they do might influence public policy and more willing to express support for authoritarian alternatives. The study also shows that "younger generations are less committed to the importance of democracy" and that they are "less likely to be politically engaged."4

In short, the global spread of democracy and the democratization of public life, instead of strengthening democratic regimes, have undermined them, and the question is, why has this happened?

It is now commonly believed that globalization has something to do with it. In his book *The Globalization Paradox*, Harvard political economist Dani Rodrik suggests that we have three options to manage tensions between national democracies and globalization. We can restrict

---

4 Ibid., 10.
democracy in order to gain competitiveness in international markets. We can limit globalization in the hope of building democratic legitimacy at home. Or we can globalize democracy at the cost of national sovereignty. What we cannot have, Rodrik makes clear, is hyper-globalization, democracy and self-determination simultaneously. But this is precisely what most governments want. They want people to have the right to vote yet do not want those votes to sanction populist policies. They want to be able to reduce labor costs and ignore social protests while also refusing to enter the murky waters of publicly endorsing an authoritarian “strong hand.” They favor free trade and interdependence, but they want to be sure that when necessary (in a moment of crisis like the present) they can return to national control of the economy. Instead of choosing between a sovereign democracy, a globalized democracy or a globalization-friendly authoritarianism, political elites try to redefine democracy and sovereignty in order to make possible the impossible. The outcome is unworkable: You end up with democracy without choices, sovereignty without meaning and globalization without legitimacy. In the words of Moisés Naím: “Power has become easier to get, harder to use and easier to lose.”

When looking for political change, the citizen finds himself in a dilemma. He is angry at power but he does not know whom to blame—those in government, those behind the government, the very idea of a government, the market, Brussels (for those who are EU members), and so forth. If a citizen today seeks to criticize, say, rising inequality, where should he turn to find those responsible? The market? The government? New technologies? Could any government succeed in reducing inequality on its own without destroying the country’s competitiveness? It is unclear if it would make more sense to topple the government or pity it.

Another factor behind democracy’s troubles is the growing mobility of the world’s population, which makes the change of one’s country rather than the change of one’s government the preferable strategy for an individual looking for a radical change. In his most famous work, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Albert Hirschman contrasted the two strategies that people have for dealing with poorly performing organizations and institutions. People can either “exit”— that is, vote with their feet and express their displeasure by taking their business elsewhere—or decide to “voice” their concerns by staying put, speaking up and choosing to fight for reform from within. In his reading, exit is the path to reform favored by economists because it is the preferred strategy of the consumer.

Voice represents a different type of activism, one where people cannot or simply do not want to exit because they deeply value the organization in crisis. Instead, they are compelled to improve its performance by participating, offering ideas and taking the risk to oppose those who make decisions. Voice-led activism is constructive by its very nature. It assumes a readiness to take responsibility for what one suggests. It is closely associated with the strategy to change an organization, party or church from within, and it is based on loyalty.

Exit and voice can be complementary under certain conditions. But they can also function as diametric opposites. The availability of exit reduces the pressure on individuals to look for change through voice. And this is what we observe today: In many cases citizens react to dysfunctionalities in their democracies similarly to how consumers react to dissatisfaction with certain commercial

---


products – they prefer to exit (to emigrate) instead of voicing their discontent and fighting for reforms.

The growing fear that democracy can break down in the US, the model democratic country and the geopolitical actor that for the last century has been primarily responsible for democracy’s advancement in the world, is another factor that explains our growing uneasiness when it comes to the future of democracy. As Israeli military historian Azar Gat has argued, democracy’s victory in the last two world wars is better explained not by the intrinsic superiority of the democratic political system but by the fact that the United States happened to be in the democratic camp. It is America’s superiority, and not democracy’s superiority, that explains the outcome of the power struggles of the 20th century.

The emergence of China as a rising superpower representing a model of big data authoritarianism able to compete with world’s most advanced democracies is another factor explaining the growing pessimism surrounding democracy. The latest political developments in China have made us doubt that economic modernization necessarily leads to democratization of society. It is also clear that the new technologies dramatically increase governments’ capacity for social control. Big data authoritarianism is able to compensate for one of the major deficiencies of the old-style authoritarian regimes—namely, the lack of relevant information about what is happening in society. Authoritarian regimes always dreamt of knowing everything people do or think, but their will for total social control has historically backfired because the enormous policing mechanisms they build end up distorting the information they gather. In the end, authoritarian rulers find themselves living in societies they cannot understand. In this sense big data is a dramatic change because it creates surveillance mechanisms that are less influenced by the paranoia of the rulers and because authoritarian regimes do not need police informers, since every citizen is busy informing on herself every time she makes a phone call or buys an item from a shop.

It is in this context of the growing fears about the future of democracy that we will try to evaluate the potential of protest politics to generate answers to some of the major problems democratic regimes are facing today. The capacity for self-correction is at the heart of democracy’s advantage as a political regime. So what should worry us is not that democratic regimes are besieged by problems, but that they sometimes fail to act on their failures. Thus, the question is, how can the mushrooming protest movements help democracy to re-invent itself and contribute to restoring trust in democratic institutions?

The last decade, characterized by declining trust in democratic institutions, was also a decade marked by an almost unprecedented wave of civic activism and the emergence of new political actors. While in the last years most of the attention has been focused on the impact of the rising populist parties, I will focus here on the impact of the big protest movement that did not end in creating a major political party and that functioned as an alternative to representative politics. What is the potential of protests to restore trust in democracy and democratic institutions? Unfortunately, my answer is that their potential is limited. When we summarize the impact of the protest movements, we must conclude that the power of protest is negative.

Regardless of the myriad demonstrations of civic courage and political idealism and the inspiring videos and rich expressions of countercultural imagination, in the final account the protests failed

---

to come up with solutions for societies trapped between 21st-century economies, 20th-century politics and 19th-century institutions.

II The Effect of Protest Politics

The current protest wave has transformed democratic politics but not always in the way protesters hoped for.

The discontented ranks of those whom US columnist Thomas Friedman calls “the square people” have been a major part of our democratic experience. In the last decade, more than 90 countries around the world witnessed major mass protests. Millions of people have turned out in public to mount sizeable, sustained protests that ignore political parties, distrust the mainstream media, have few if any specific leaders and mostly leave formal organization aside, relying instead on the Internet and ad hoc assemblies for collective debate and decision-making.

This new wave of vocal dissatisfaction is not gathered behind any particular ideology or clear set of demands. It consists mostly of young people “aspiring to a higher standard of living and more liberty … connected to one another either by massing in squares or through virtual squares or both, and united less by a common program and more by a shared direction they want their societies to go.”

Each angry demonstration has been angry in its own way and for its own local reasons, but the protests add up to a worldwide phenomenon that has changed many of our ideas about what the future will look like. The protests have been massive affairs. From July through October 2011, Israel was witness to the largest grassroots mobilization in its history. More than two million people took part in the Spanish protests that same year, and more than three million joined the Brazilian protests of 2013. “There can be little doubt,” wrote Google’s Eric Schmidt, “that the new future will be full of revolutionary movements, as communication technologies enable new connections and generate more room for expression.” But, he added, “We will see fewer revolutionary outcomes.”

Protesters showed open hostility toward institutions and voiced their mistrust of both the market and the state. The protests are driven not by unrepresented groups that want to enter the institutions, but rather by a new generation of rebels who aspire to do without existing institutions altogether. “It wasn’t because occupiers brought the politicians specific demands and proposals” that they made a difference, insisted Occupy Wall Street activist David Graeber. “Instead, they’d created a crisis of legitimacy within the entire system by providing a glimpse of what real democracy might be like.” The protests assert the subjectivity of the people at the very moment when they lack the opportunity to make big political choices. Even when they are not advocating anything concrete, the protests assert the possibility of change and thus do something that elections once did—keep the future open. People who occupy public spaces get a sense of power that is absent in the voting booth. They also create community. People who take an active part in such protests customarily make them a part of their political identity. Yet those who take to the streets remember not their defeat but their sense of power.

---

10 Ibid.
Mistrusting institutions, the protesters were flatly uninterested in taking power. Their revolt was not against the government, but against being governed. In a way, the new protest movements are inspired by mistrust in the elites, empowered by mistrust in leadership, constrained by mistrust of organizations and defeated by the protesters’ inability to trust even each other: “This is an obvious but unspoken cultural difference between modern youth protest movements and those of the past. … Anybody who sounds like a career politician, anybody who attempts to use rhetoric, or espouses an ideology, is greeted with visceral distaste.”

But while the protests succeeded in fueling the anti-institutional imagination of some, they fueled other citizens’ fears of chaos and anarchy, allowing governments to portray the protesters’ urge for direct democracy as a threat to public order. The much-debated success of the right-wing populist parties in the world was also the outcome of the failure of the left-leaning protest mobilization of the previous period. Surprisingly for many, new authoritarians ended up as the biggest beneficiaries of the protest wave of the last decade. Most striking about the protest wave has been less the way protesters in different corners of the world have mimicked each other, but rather the nearly identical response of governments we view as fundamentally different. In places like Russia and Turkey, it was as if the responses emanated from a common script. If the protests were well organized, they were passed off and discredited as “unspontaneous.” As for the conspiracy theories, it was as if they had been fashioned collaboratively. Erdoğan blamed the protests on the interest-rates lobby in Turkey; Putin on foreign agents underwritten by the American embassy. In all these countries, foreign-funded NGOs became the bogeymen. The message of the respective governments was not so much “trust us”—most of them knew that this would be a fool’s errand—but “do not trust anybody.”

Paradoxically, the protests have also contributed to the declining influence of the NGOs as an agent of social and political change. The anti-institutional message of the protests drives the younger generation toward spontaneous, Internet-centered activism and discourages more formal organizational thinking. Since many governments deny the spontaneous nature of the protests and seek to pin blame on a handful of masterminds, NGOs are an easy culprit. Not surprisingly, the protests inspired governments in several cases to introduce anti-NGO laws.

Why have protest movements failed to meet some of the expectations that they would be able to reinvent democracy at the beginning of the 21st century?

In my view three factors are of critical importance:

First is the blind belief in the democratizing power of new communication technologies. In trying to understand the failure of the connected generation to reinvent democracy, it is worth reflecting on the findings of Zeynep Tufekci, one of the most insightful analysts of the politics of social media. Tufekci opened a recent talk at MIT’s Media Lab with a photograph of the Hillary Step just below the summit of Mount Everest. Taken on a day that four people perished on the mountain, the picture shows the massive crowding that makes Everest perilous for climbers as they are forced to wait for others to finish before room opens up on the narrow trail.

Because of new technology and the use of Sherpas, more and more people who aren’t expert climbers are streaming to Everest. Full-service trips (for a cool $65,000) get you to the base camp.

---

and much of the way up the mountain. But the guides still cannot adequately prepare people to climb to the peak. People have proposed installing a ladder at the Hillary Step, at almost 9,000 meters above sea level, to reduce the risk. But the fundamental problem isn’t the absence of a ladder; it’s the exceptional difficulty of hiking at such a high altitude. The mountaineering community has suggested a reasonable solution: requiring people to climb seven other high peaks before they take on Everest.

This is Tufekci’s analogy for Internet-enabled activism. In discussing the Internet and collective action, political commentators usually focus on the increased opportunities for coordination and community-building. But in Tufekci’s view, the wonders of the Internet are also a curse for the building of effective political movements. Social movements, like inexperienced mountaineers getting to base camp without adequately acclimatizing to exceptionally high altitudes, show how some of the Internet’s benefits can have significant handicaps as side effects. The result is that we are seeing increasing numbers of movements, but they may not have impact or endurance because they come to the public’s attention too early in their lifetimes. Movements get stuck at saying “no,” she argues, because they've never needed to develop a capacity for representation and can only coalesce around the negative rather than building an affirmative agenda.

The second factor is making transparency the goal rather than simply the instrument of protest politics. Transparency is the new political religion shared by a majority of civic activists and an increasing number of democratic governments. The transparency movement embodies the hope that a combination of new technologies, publicly accessible data and fresh civic activism can more effectively assist people to control their representatives. What makes transparency so attractive for different civic groups is the exciting premise that when people “know,” they will take action and demand their rights. And it is fair to admit that the advancement of the transparency movement in many areas has demonstrated impressive results. Governmental legislation that requires companies to disclose the risks related to their products have empowered customers and made life safer. Demand for disclosure has also transformed the relations between doctors and patients, teachers and students. Now patients have a greater capacity to keep doctors accountable, and parents can more effectively decide which school to select for their children. The new transparency movement has empowered the customers.

Thus, it is logical to assume that, stripped of the privilege of secrecy, governments will be irreversibly changed. They will become more honest. Where the government maintains too many secrets, democracy becomes brittle, even when competitive elections produce, ex ante, uncertain outcomes. Only informed citizens can keep governments accountable. In short, it is unsurprising that democracy activists have invested so much hope in transparency itself restoring trust in democratic institutions. As American legal scholar and activist Lawrence Lessig stated in his essay “Against Transparency”: “How could anyone be against transparency? Its virtues and its utilities seem so crushingly obvious.” But while the virtues of transparency are obvious, the risks should not be ignored, as Lessig powerfully argues.

Yet the notion that transparency will restore public trust in democracy rests on several problematic assumptions, primarily the presupposition that “if only people knew” everything would be different. It is not so simple. The end of government secrecy does not mean the birth of the informed citizen, nor does more control necessarily suggest more trust in public institutions. For instance, when

---

American voters learned that the US had started a war with Iraq without proof of weapons of mass destruction, they still re-elected the president who led the way. Donald Trump is the ultimate example of the fact that, in a politically polarized world, access to facts does not change opinions. Contrary to the expectations of the transparency movement—that full disclosure of government information will make public discourse more rational and less paranoid—the reality is that more transparency could also fuel conspiracy theories. There is nothing more suspicious than the claim of absolute transparency. In other words, the rise of the transparency movement has the potential to remake democratic politics, but we should be sure we are in agreement as to the direction of the change. Is the transparency movement capable of restoring trust in democratic institutions, or is it, alternatively, going to make “mistrust” the official idiom of democracy?

The sad story of WikiLeaks is the best example of transparency turned into an instrument of manipulation.

The **third factor** is protesters falling in love with direct democracy. The digital revolution put democracy on a Red Bull diet. It fueled growing expectations that the rise of modern technology would mark the return of democracy to a more authentic form. In the view of digital natives, democracy doesn’t have to be representative any longer.

The love of direct democracy is best manifested in the public endorsement of referendums as the way to restore trust in democracy. The electorate is “a sovereign whose vocabulary is limited to two words: “Yes” and ‘No,’” wrote the American political scientist E. E. Schattschneider.16 He is basically right. Citizens tend to believe that only by saying “no” and, much more rarely, “yes,” will their voices be heard by the ruling class. Consequently, when support for traditional political parties has plummeted and confidence in democratic institutions is in question, referendum fever has become the natural response.

The question of the legitimacy of referendums is one of democracy’s oldest debates. Advocates of direct democracy argue that they are the most reasonable and transparent way for citizens to influence public policies beyond electing a government. In their view, referendums produce clear mandates (something elections generally can’t do), stimulate public debate and educate people, thereby achieving the democratic dream of a society of informed citizens.

The opponents of direct democracy disagree. They insist that referendums are not the best way to empower people but the most perverse way to manipulate them. In the words of Margaret Thatcher, referendums are a device of “dictators and demagogues.” They dangerously simplify complex policy issues and often lead to incoherent policies because referendums look at issues in isolation, the result being that people may approve measures that contradict each other. It is generally believed that if citizens were asked on the same day to vote for an increase in social spending and for tax cuts, they might support both (while politicians know full well that cutting taxes will make it impossible to increase social spending). The critics of direct democracy also argue that referendums are most often driven by emotions and not by arguments. They deny that referendums foster civic engagement. The evidence bears this out. As referendums have proliferated, the median turnout for nationwide referendums across Europe has fallen from 71 percent in the early 1990s to 41 percent in the past few years.

---

Several referendums in Europe in the last years, Brexit being the most important of them, have called into question the conviction that referendums can cure the ills of representative democracy. Representative democracy was never just a transitional stage between the direct democracy of the ancients and the point-and-click democracy of the future. It had merits of its own. It secured for us the unparalleled advantages of the separation of powers and guaranteed the liberal nature of democratic power.

### III Reasons for Hope

Paradoxically, if we trust opinion polls it is the electoral success of the populist parties that has mostly contributed to the increased trust in democracy and the EU. The rise of the populist parties has convinced many that radical change is possible within the democratic system. Trump voters and Five Star and Northern League supporters in Italy are the best example of these born-again adherents of democracy. It has also reminded many citizens of the role democratic institutions play in securing our freedom and prosperity. Thus, while five years ago the streets were occupied by people who believed that they do not need democratic institutions to exercise their power as citizens, today in Washington or Warsaw people are demonstrating in defense of independent courts and independent media. It is the changing nature of the protests that makes me believe that democracy will be back.
IV References


Democracy – Its Substance and Meaning: Can One Size fit All?

Seán Cleary

I Introduction

Of course, “one size” of democracy cannot, and should not, fit all! We are familiar with two variations, notably direct democracy\(^1\) and representative democracy\(^2\), and three democratic systems, parliamentary\(^3\), presidential\(^4\) and mixed\(^5\), the last combining elements of the former two. In parliamentary systems, election to the lower house may be based on “first past the post” principles, electing members to constituencies, or on those of proportional representation.

Some parliamentary systems combine elements of both to ensure that a representative is accountable to voters in a constituency and that the distribution of votes between parties is reflected in the composition of the (lower) house.\(^6\)

---

1. This is rare today in all but small local communities as a means of constitutional government. The institution of referendum, or plebiscite, however, which is used extensively in Switzerland and many other countries (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Referendums_by_country, accessed June 14, 2018) and in 24 US states, as well as those of initiative and recall, are examples of direct democracy.
2. Representative democracy is the most common form today. This arrangement establishes an intermediary between the individual and the executive and legislative policy actions of the state. Through elections, representatives are elected and assigned the task of making decisions on behalf of the group of citizens that they represent.
3. Parliamentary systems are anchored in the legislative branch of government. One can see representative but distinct examples in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. The voters elect parliamentary representatives in national elections. The party that wins the largest number of seats selects the head of government – the Federal Chancellor in Germany, the Prime Minister in the United Kingdom. The executive power is divided between a Head of State – a Federal President in Germany, and a constitutional monarch in the United Kingdom – and the Head of Government – the Federal Chancellor, and the Prime Minister. The Head of Government sets the legislative and policy agenda. The Head of State is the ceremonial representative of the country. Neither the Federal President, not the British Queen, proposes, revises or vetoes any laws. Neither controls the actions of the Head of Government, and neither can remove her from office. The relationship between the executive branch (the Head of Government, and her Cabinet) and the legislature is generally cooperative, although the legislature is supreme. Because the Head of Government is selected by members of his party or a coalition including his party, there is broad alignment on policy. The Head of Government, not the legislature, appoints and dismisses members of the Cabinet, but the legislature can pass a vote of no-confidence on the Head of Government. Again, there are variations between countries: Unlike the United Kingdom, in Germany, the “konstruktives Misstrauensvotum” allows the Bundestag to withdraw confidence from the Chancellor only if there is a positive majority for a prospective successor, enabling her to govern. This precedent has found favor in other countries, including Albania, Belgium, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Slovenia and Spain.
4. Presidential systems, exemplified by the United States, tend to concentrate power in the executive branch. They may be less representative of the popular will but are perhaps more stable than parliamentary systems. The results of the legislative elections have no direct bearing on the composition of the executive branch, as the voters elect each independently. In the United States, one party may gain a majority in Congress (either in the House of Representatives or the Senate, or both) while the other party wins the presidency.
5. France is an example of a semi-presidential or “mixed” system in which a President exists alongside a Prime Minister and a Cabinet, with the latter two responsible to the legislature. This mixed system differs from a parliamentary system in that it has a popularly elected Head of State, who is no ceremonial figurehead; and from a presidential system in that the Cabinet, although appointed by the President, is responsible to the legislature, which can force the Prime Minister and Cabinet to resign through a motion of no confidence. The Weimar Republic (1919–1933) was a semi-presidential system, although the term originated in an article by Hubert Beuve-Méry in 1959 and was popularized by Maurice Duverger two decades later. Both were describing the French Fifth Republic established constitutionally in 1958.
6. Elections to the Bundestag in the Federal Republic of Germany display these characteristics. In summary, half of the members of the Bundestag are elected directly from 299 constituencies in first-past-the-post elections; the other half are elected from the parties’ lists in the Laender to achieve proportional representation in the Bundestag as far as possible. Each voter has two votes in the Bundestag elections, the first for a constituency representative, the second on a party list, which determines the relative strengths of the parties in the
Proportional representation ensures that the popular vote is reflected fairly in the legislature, but predisposes to the emergence of many parties\(^7\), especially if thresholds for entry into the legislature are low.\(^8\) Meanwhile, as the composition of constituencies is susceptible to manipulation – often known as gerrymandering\(^9\) – to favor the party in power and able to delineate boundaries, a variety of rules have been developed to discourage, and punish, attempts at such manipulation.

Finally, not all representative democracies are centered in republics\(^10\) although these were their origin; many parliamentary democracies thrive today in constitutional monarchies.\(^11\)

So, with that simple question disposed of, let us ask why it matters.

## Governance and Government

As the extracts from The Analects of Confucius (after 479 BCE), Aristotle’s Politics (350 BCE) and the Declaration of Independence (1776 CE) make clear, the system of governance that we style “democracy” was not regarded as prudent or desirable before the 20\(^{th}\) century. Indeed, it was associated with “mob rule” or “rule by the masses,” a circumstance which, before the advent of widespread education, and the assumption that this would enable prudent judgement, was tantamount to anarchy. Plato, in the Republic, reflects Socrates as suggesting not only that in democracy “…anarchy finds a way into private houses, and ends by getting among the animals and infecting them,” but that “…tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty.”\(^12\)
In the ancient Chinese tradition, Confucius assumed that rule was exercised by one man, but his *Analects* provide precepts for the conduct of all in society vis-à-vis one another. Confucius argues that an excellent example by a leader, an understanding of the respective roles and stations of each person in society, and the practice of rituals to reflect these, will induce the people to observe propriety (禮) and “…order themselves harmoniously.”

*“When the citizens at large govern for the public good, it is called by the name common to all governments (politeia), government (politeia).”*

Aristotle, Politics, Bk. III 1279a

In his *Politics*, Aristotle distinguishes between six constitutions, classified by the scale of rulership, and the effect of the rule. A constitution is just when it benefits all citizens in the *polis* and unjust when it benefits only those in power. Rule by one person may thus constitute a *monarchy* if the ruler governs for the benefit of all, and a *tyranny* if he serves only himself. Likewise, a small governing elite constitutes an *aristocracy* if all citizens benefit, and an *oligarchy* if the elite rules selfishly. Wise and inclusive rule by all citizens gives us a *polity*: selfish rule by the majority constitutes a *democracy*. A citizen is one who may participate in the deliberative or judicial administration of a state, which comprises a body of citizens sufficient for the purposes of life.

Aristotle suggested that a *polity* may be least susceptible to corruption if the laws enjoy primacy over the governors. He advocates distributive justice, with benefits conferred upon citizens according to the contribution that each makes to the well-being of the *polis*. The key premise of his analysis is that it is the purpose and effect of the system – the welfare of all citizens – that determines whether it is just or unjust. The quantum of rulers is less important.

*“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. – That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, – That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.”*

*In Congress, July 4, 1776*

Thomas Jefferson, who wrote the draft of the *Declaration of Independence* was, likewise, no “democrat” in our present sense, but a “republican” who argued that citizens bore a civic duty to aid the state in resisting corruption, monarchism and aristocracy. Female suffrage was far from his

14 Aristotle, Politics, c. 350 BCE, translated by Benjamin Jowett.
15 Henry Maine observed on the Athenian polity in the Golden Age: “The splendour which attracted the original genius of the then civilized world to Athens was provided by the severe taxation of a thousand subject cities, and the skilled labourers who worked under Phidias, and who built the Parthenon, were slaves.” Maine, Sir Henry Summer, *Popular Government: Four Essays*, London 1885, p. 42ff.
mind: In his draft of the Constitution of Virginia in 1776, the same year in which the Declaration of Independence was adopted, Jefferson proposed that:

“All male persons of full age and sane mind having a freehold estate in [one fourth of an acre] of land in any town, or in [25] acres of land in the country, and all elected persons resident in the colony who shall have paid scot and lot [taxes] to government the last [two years] shall have right to give their vote in the election of their respective representatives.”

Jefferson was not seeking to entrench economic privilege. Those without land were entitled to it:

“Every person of full age neither owning nor having owned [50] acres of land, shall be entitled to an appropriation of [50] acres or to so much as shall make up what he owns or has owned [50] acres in full and absolute dominion.”

He believed that an effective republican government rested on the active participation of persons who owned property and assumed the responsibilities of citizenship. The values underpinning this were to be expressed through an organized political party, in Jefferson’s case, the Republican Party, in contradistinction to the Federalist Party of Alexander Hamilton.

Hofstadter observed:

“It seems hardly enough to say that [Jefferson] thought that a nation of farmers, educated, informed and blessed with free institutions was the best suited to a democratic republic, without adding that he did not think any other kind of society a good risk to maintain Republican government. In a nation of large cities, well developed manufactures and commerce, and a numerous working class, popular republicanism would be an impossibility – or at best an improbability.”

Little had changed when the Union was created in 1789, with George Washington as its first President. J.P. Greene notes:

“Free people of African and Amerindian descent, like women and children, were not thought to have the discretion requisite for the responsible exercise of citizenship. For the time being, the American commitment to equality could be limited to citizens, that is, to white independent males.”

Miller estimates that of the 3,250,000 persons in the 13 states after the Revolution (other than native Americans who were not tallied) perhaps 120,000 could meet the qualifications of gender, religion and property needed to vote.

---

Zinn observes, moreover:

"[The Constitution did not] provide for popular elections except in the case of the House of Representatives, where the qualifications were set by the state legislatures (which required property-holding for voting in almost all the states), and excluded women, Indians and slaves. The Constitution provided for Senators to be elected by the state legislators, for the President to be elected by electors chosen by the state legislators, and for the Supreme Court to be appointed by the President." 21

While the electoral qualification was eroded progressively in the next 18 decades – from the enactment of an extended franchise in Maryland in 1801; through the 14th amendment22 passed in 1866 and ratified by 1870; the 15th amendment which prohibited abridgement of voting rights on grounds of race or prior servitude in 1870; the 19th amendment admitting women in 192023; and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 – social commentators maintained the link between voting rights and civic duty until the Civil War.24 The belief of the Founding Fathers of the 13 united States that the responsibilities of government would be exercised properly only by those who, as landowners or taxpayers, had a stake in an orderly society, was sustained by the belief that all, but only, those who contributed to the welfare of the polity, should elect and direct it.

This theme extends from Confucius’ emphasis on the central importance of propriety, recognizing the proper roles of each in a harmonious society; through the rights and duties of Athenian citizenship; and the renaissance of republicanism in the 18th century; to the thesis of the English constitutionalist A.V. Dicey25, that for every right there is a corresponding responsibility. In its simplest form, it underpinned constitutional law and theory until the end of World War II.

III The Rise of the New Paradigm

The past two-and-a-third centuries have seen the political map of Europe redrawn many times, and the growth of the United States from 13 to 50 states by conquest, purchase and pacification. The

22 The 14th amendment, addressing citizenship rights and equal protection of the laws, proposed to address the condition of former slaves after the Civil War. The amendment was bitterly contested in the states of the Confederacy, which were required to ratify it to regain representation in Congress. The most important and most frequently litigated provision is the first section: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
23 Efforts to effect the enfranchisement of women took off in the mid-19th century, with a Convention of Women in Ohio in the spring of 1850, followed six months later by a Women’s Rights Convention in Massachusetts. A petition of women, adopted at a public meeting at Sheffield, claiming the elective franchise, was presented to the House of Lords by the Earl of Carlisle on February 13, 1851. Harriett Taylor Mill championed the cause in the United Kingdom, arguing that the authors of the US Declaration of Independence could not have intended that the equality and inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness were restricted to the male sex. The campaign continued for over a century in the West, until women in Switzerland gained the right to vote in federal elections in February 1971, and the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland required Appenzell Innerrhoden to grant women the vote on local issues in 1991. The Principality of Liechtenstein extended the vote to women in 1984.
24 Cf. Richard Hofstadter, op. cit. p. 128: “I go for all sharing the privileges of the government who assist in bearing its burdens. Consequently, I go for admitting all whites to the right of suffrage who pay taxes or bear arms…”, Abraham Lincoln (1836).
25 Albert Venn Dicey, KC, FBA (February 4, 1835 – April 7, 1922), British jurist, constitutional theorist, and author of Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885). Dicey became Vinerian Professor of English Law at Oxford and popularized the phrase “rule of law.”
origins of these changes lay in the crisis of absolute (or largely unrestricted) monarchy, and the alliance of monarchy with clergy and nobility at the expense of commoners. The institutions of the agrarian era, based on kinship and hierarchy – clan membership, feudal aristocracy and monarchy – and ownership of land as the index of wealth, became dysfunctional in the late 17th and 18th centuries as cities multiplied, and the rising power of merchants and bankers disrupted the estates of the realm, the social hierarchy that had underpinned Christian Europe from medieval times.

The Ancien Régime, premised on a centralized monarchy, the clergy (the First Estate), the nobility – noblesse d’épée and noblesse de robe – (the Second Estate), and urban wage-laborers and rural peasants (the Third Estate), survived until the French Revolution of 1789. En route to that crisis, however, Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Hume and Bentham, building on Descartes’ proposition that cogito, ergo sum, provided ethical and logical rationales for political change in a radically transformed social landscape. Their views fueled the American and French revolutions, enabled la Terreur between September 5, 1793 and July 27, 1794, and opened Europe for the ascendancy of Napoleon, and his containment thereafter at Vienna in 1815. John Stuart Mill, Hegel, and Marx pressed the logic forward, reflecting a new social reality driven by the Industrial Revolution, and presaging the collapse of empires (though the Austro-Hungarians and the Ottomans passed from the scene only in 1918–22), the birth of nations, and the October Revolution and the Bolsheviks’ assumption of power in Russia in 1917.

A countervailing trend was triggered in Europe by Napoleon's conquests when the Great Powers united to defeat the revolutionary upstart. A balance of European power, based on state legitimacy and limits, was established at Vienna in 1815 through the diplomacy of Metternich and Castlereagh.

---

26 Throughout much of European history until the end of the 18th century, the divine right of kings was the theological justification for monarchical power. Many European monarchs including those of Russia claimed supreme autocratic power by divine right. Despite the grant of Magna Carta Libertatum in 1215, confirmed into English statutory law in 1297, James VI of Scotland (James I of England) and his son Charles I sought to import the principle of divine monarchical right. Fears that Charles I was attempting to establish absolutist government on European lines triggered the English Civil War, in what has entered English history as the Glorious Revolution of 1688, leading to the overthrow of King James II of England (James VII of Scotland) by English Parliamentarians allied with the Dutch stadtholder William III, Prince of Orange, and William’s ascension to the throne as William III of England, with his wife, Mary II, James’s daughter, after the Declaration of Rights, leading to the Bill of Rights of 1689. By the 19th century, the Divine Right was obsolete theory in the Western world, although it continued in Russia until the February Bourgeois Democratic Revolution in 1917.


29 Charles Louis De Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, De l'esprit des lois. Geneva 1748.


33 Descartes, René, Les Règles pour la Direction de l’Esprit, 1628; Le Discours de la Méthode,1637.

34 During the Reign of Terror, at least 300,000 suspects were arrested; 17,000 were officially executed, and perhaps 10,000 died in prison or without trial.


36 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Wissenschaft der Logik, 1812, 1813, 1816; Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 1817; Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Leipzig 1821.

37 Karl Marx. Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Introduction, 1843; The German Ideology (with Friedrich Engels), 1845; The Communist Manifesto (with Friedrich Engels), 1848; Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, 1859; Das Kapital, vol 1, 1867.
providing some stability until 1914. Napoleon had bequeathed codified systems of law\textsuperscript{38} to continental Europe, however, establishing a legal framework that still shapes the present.

Britain, more pragmatic and privileged by its insular location, read the lessons of the social and industrial revolution better than the European continental states. The 1832 Parliamentary Reform Act created a middle-class electorate in the cities, and the Reform and Redistribution Acts of 1867 and 1884–85 extended the vote to most working men in both rural and urban areas. Effective management of the "modern age" enabled the survival, in modified form, of the British monarchy, a Parliament of Lords and Commons, courts, parliamentary convention and legal precedent, and the established church.

The United States, born out of the concepts of the modern era, faced a less daunting transition. It progressively redefined the accidents of its character, reinterpreting and amending the Constitution, but remaining true to its founding principles. The traumatic Civil War defined its modern form as an industrial state; and its insular character afforded it, in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the same privilege as Britain enjoyed in the 19\textsuperscript{th} of remaining aloof from continental wars until it could intervene decisively.

While Britain and France, victorious in the great wars of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, were devastated in fighting them, the US emerged stronger from both. Woodrow Wilson sought to create a utopian system after World War I. The League of Nations failed, however, because of the punitive reparations imposed on Germany, and the Nazis’ exploitation of German resentment in the aftermath of economic collapse, to fuel xenophobia and anti-Semitism.\textsuperscript{39} Fear of communism promoted the rise of Fascism and Falangism in southern Europe, and the League’s impotence in the face of Mussolini’s aggression against Abyssinia sealed its fate, paving the way for Hitler’s invasion of Poland and the second Great War of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

Roosevelt’s entry into World War II after Pearl Harbor swung the tide against Germany and Japan. As the war was fought on the territory of others, the US grew stronger economically. The country’s dominance until the end of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century was due to its having shaped the post-World War II era, whose pillars – the United Nations, NATO, the IMF, the World Bank and GATT (succeeded by the WTO) – reflect the values and interests of the country whose economy constituted 50 percent of global GDP in 1946. Washington was not unchallenged: Stalin’s expansion into Central Europe produced a peer competitor and Mao Tse-tung’s victory over the Nationalists in China paved the way for China’s consolidation, even if it required Deng Xiaoping’s reversal of Mao’s economic policies in 1978 to enable its resurgence. These tensions continued until the Warsaw Pact fractured after the Wall fell in Germany in 1989, and the USSR imploded in 1991.

\textsuperscript{38} The Code Napoléon, officially Code civil des Français, established under Napoléon I in 1804. The Napoleonic Code was preceded by the Codex Maximiliananus bavaricus civilis (Bavaria, 1756), the Allgemeines Landrecht (Prussia, 1794), and the West Galician Code (Galicia, 1797), but was the first modern legal code with a pan-European scope. It shaped the law across Europe in and after the Napoleonic Wars, and influenced governments in the Middle East seeking to implement legal reforms thereafter.

\textsuperscript{39} The disastrous clash engendered by the interplay between the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 and rising German nationalism, sharpened by the reparations imposed on the Weimar Republic at Versailles; the disastrous German hyperinflation of 1923; the Brüning austerity program in 1930–32 after the global financial crash which deepened unemployment and deflation, and triggered the rise of Adolf Hitler and National Socialism in Germany, other forms of fascism in southern Europe, and the Second World War. Britain, Bolsheviks, foreign bankers, speculators and Jews were stirred into a bubbling cauldron of fear and hatred in Germany that visited an extraordinary catastrophe on Europe and the world and culminated in the use of atomic weapons by the United States to force the surrender of Japan; and the division of Europe into NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
It was a remarkable moment, but one that was poorly understood. A triumphalist sense was abroad. Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last Man* reflected the spirit in the West. Fukuyama argued that “…a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy had emerged…over the past few years…[and that] liberal democracy may constitute the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’ and ‘…the final form of human government’.” To interrogate that extraordinary thesis, one must ask: What is *liberal democracy*?

**IV Liberal Democracy**

What we usually refer to as “democracy” today is *liberal democracy*, a political system marked by constitutional entrenchment of:

- fundamental human rights, including rights of person; and freedom of belief and speech, of assembly and of political organization;
- the rule of law and equality before the law;
- the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers; and
- free elections with universal adult suffrage.

*Liberal democracy* is *representative democracy* in which the ability of the elected representatives to exercise power is subject to the *rule of law*, under a *constitution* that protects the rights and freedoms of individuals and constrains the majority from overriding the interests of minorities. It is premised on acceptance by all parties of the legitimacy of the state and the political system, entrenchment of the sovereignty of the people, equal rights to participate in social institutions and the economy, and political competition.

> “Many forms of Government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time....”
> 
> Winston Churchill, 1947

Free elections do not guarantee a transition from autocratic rule to democracy. A wider shift in political culture and entrenchment of the institutions of democratic government are needed. There are many examples of countries being unable to sustain democracy without emergence of a political culture of constitutional *constraints on state power* based on entrenchment of the *rule of law* and acceptance of the *rights of individuals against the state*.

The concept of a *loyal opposition* is central. All parties in a liberal democracy accept the *legitimacy of the state*, and the *principles and values of the political system*. Political parties disagree on how best to advance national welfare and constituency interests, but their advocacy is moderated by acceptance of the *legitimacy of the political system* and the right of other parties to advocate their positions. Parties whose positions do not secure majority support in the polls accept the judgment of the electorate and allow a peaceful transfer of power, knowing that they will not lose their lives, liberty or economic opportunities and can still participate in public life. Their “loyalty” in opposition is not to the policies their opponents will implement, but to the legitimacy of the state and the

---

democratic process. Experience teaches that it is difficult to achieve this in societies where transitions have taken place through violence.

Perhaps the most important element of a functioning liberal democracy, however, is the application throughout society of the *rule of law*, the framework of fundamental rights and the rules established to protect them, to enable a fair society that permits human advancement. There are four principal components:

- **Accountability**: The government, its principal office bearers, officials and agents, as well as private persons and entities, are all subject to, and accountable under, the law.
- **Clarity**: The laws are clear, public and just; they protect fundamental rights, including the security of person and property; and are applied equally to all.
- **Accessibility**: The processes of enactment, administration and enforcement of the laws are accessible and equitable.
- **Efficacy**: Justice is delivered in a timely manner by competent, ethical, independent officials who are sufficient in number, properly resourced, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.

No polity in which the *rule of law* is not systematically applied can be described as a *(liberal)* democracy. The thought is not new: Aristotle’s advocacy of *politeia* was premised on the primacy of the *laws* over the *governors*. The defining element of (liberal) democratic polities is a constitution that protects the rights and freedoms of individuals and constrains both the government, and the majority that it represents, from acting solely in their self-interest.

Fareed Zakaria introduced the concept of “illiberal democracy” in an article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1997, citing a concern expressed by Richard Holbrooke that free and fair elections in Bosnia in September 1996 might lead to the election of “racists, fascists, separatists, who are publicly opposed to [peace and reintegration].” A year later, Zakaria recorded:

“Democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been reelected or reaffirmed through referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms. From Peru to the Palestinian Authority, from Sierra Leone to Slovakia, from Pakistan to the Philippines, we see the rise of a disturbing phenomenon in international life – illiberal democracy.”

As both Holbrooke and Zakaria observed two decades ago, while electoral democracy and civil liberties are intertwined in *liberal democracies*, democracy without constitutional liberalism can, and often does, lead to the erosion of liberty, and ethnic domination.

---


V The Weakening of the Appeal of Liberal Democracy

In its annual publication, *Freedom in the World 2018*, Freedom House\(^{45}\) has noted:

“Democracy faced its most serious crisis in decades in 2017 as its basic tenets—including guarantees of free and fair elections, the rights of minorities, freedom of the press, and the rule of law—came under attack around the world.

“Seventy-one countries suffered net declines in political rights and civil liberties, with only 35 registering gains. This marked the 12th consecutive year of decline in global freedom.”\(^{46}\)

Since 2006, moreover, the *Economist Intelligence Unit* has published an annual *Democracy Index*.\(^{47}\) In the 2017 Index\(^ {48} \) the average global score fell from 5.52 in 2016 to 5.48 (on a scale of 0 to 10). Overall, 89 countries saw their aggregate scores fall from 2016, more than three times the

---

\(^{45}\) A leading US organization whose programs support human rights and democracy advocates in promoting open government, human rights, civil society and the free flow of information and ideas through training, international exchange, grant giving and networking. It has 14 offices and programs in over 30 countries. Funding for programs comes from grants from USAID and the US State Department, and the governments of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, as well as from the EU; and from private foundations.


\(^{47}\) The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy rates 60 indicators, grouped into five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Each category has a rating on a scale of 0 to 10 and the overall index is the simple average of the five category indexes. The category indexes are based on the sum of the indicator scores in the category, converted to a 0 to 10 scale. Adjustments to the category scores are made if countries do not score a 1 in these critical areas for democracy: free and fair national elections; voter security; the influence of foreign powers on government; the capability of the civil service to implement policies. If the scores for the first three questions are 0 (or 0.5), one point (0.5 points) is deducted from the index in the relevant category (either the electoral process and pluralism or the functioning of government). If the score for 4 is 0, one point is deducted from the functioning of government category index. The index values are used to place countries within one of four types of regime: Full democracies score greater than 8; flawed democracies score greater than 6, and less than or equal to 8; hybrid regimes score greater than 4, and less than or equal to 6; and authoritarian regimes score less than or equal to 4.

27 that recorded an improvement. This is the worst performance since 2010–11. The other 51 countries stagnated, with scores unchanged from 2016.

While 49.3 percent of the world’s population, in 76 countries, lives in a democracy of some sort, only 4.5 percent, in 19 countries, inhabit a “full democracy,” down from 8.9 percent in 2015. The US was demoted from a “full democracy” to a “flawed democracy” in 2016. Around one-third of the world’s population, in 52 countries, lives under authoritarian rule, with a large share in China. The other 39 countries are “hybrid regimes,” accommodating 16.7 percent of the global population.

### Democracy Index 2017, by Regime Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>No. of Countries</th>
<th>% of Countries</th>
<th>% of World Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full democracies</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flawed democracies</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid regimes</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian regimes</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. “World” population refers to the total population of the 167 countries covered by the Index. Since this includes only micro states, this is nearly equal to the entire estimated world population.

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.

No region recorded an improvement in its average score compared with 2016. The regional score for North America (Canada and the US) remained the same. All other regions regressed, with Asia and Australasia, the best performer in recent years, showing a fall in its regional average score for the first time since 2010, chiefly due to significant declines in the scores for India and Indonesia.

### Democracy Index 2006-17, by Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia &amp; Australasia</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>5.61</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>5.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>5.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>8.56</td>
<td>8.56</td>
<td>8.56</td>
<td>8.59</td>
<td>8.59</td>
<td>8.59</td>
<td>8.59</td>
<td>8.63</td>
<td>8.64</td>
<td>8.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>4.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World average</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>5.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.
The EIU report cites Larry Diamond’s\(^\text{49}\) suggestion that the world is experiencing a “democracy recession” even in Western Europe, reflected in falling participation in elections and politics; weaknesses in the functioning of government; declining trust in institutions\(^\text{50}\); shrinking appeal of mainstream parties; the growing influence of unelected, unaccountable institutions and expert bodies; a widening gap between political elites and electorates; a decline in media freedoms; and the erosion of civil liberties.

To understand why this is happening, one must examine the social purpose of governance systems, including liberal democracy.

_Political systems_ allow individuals, with different interests, to live together in society. The political system of a society reflects its political culture, notably the values\(^\text{51}\) of its members, and the norms\(^\text{52}\) they employ to promote appropriate behavior. All political systems have six functions: (i) to allow for the expression of diverse needs and interests; (ii) to aggregate similar needs and interests and facilitate reconciliation with those that diverge; (iii) to clarify the normative context within which expression, aggregation and reconciliation will occur; (iv) to elevate certain norms to the status of laws\(^\text{53}\) and to attach penal sanction to their violation\(^\text{54}\); (v) to provide institutions to implement the

---

\(^{49}\) Senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, and director of the institute’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

\(^{50}\) This is reflected in the 2018 Edelman Trust Barometer (https://www.edelman.com/trust-barometer, accessed June 7, 2018), in which a majority of the general population in all surveyed countries other than China, Indonesia, India, the UAE, Singapore, Mexico, the Netherlands and Malaysia, distrusts their national institutions. The report suggests that globally, 20 of the 28 markets surveyed are characterized by distrust, up one from 2017. Trust among the informed public, with higher levels of income and education, declined slightly from 60 percent to 59 percent, thrusting this group into neutral territory from its earlier trusting status. The US saw the steepest declines, with a 37-point aggregate drop in trust across all institutions. The loss of trust was most severe among the informed public – a 23-point fall on the Trust Index – nearly erasing the “mass-class” divide that once stood between this segment of the US population and the country’s far-less-trusting mass population. At the opposite end of the spectrum, China experienced a 27-point gain, more than any other market.

\(^{51}\) Ethical, ideological and aesthetic values are embedded in individuals by nurture, schooling and experience, serving to guide personal behavior and maintain equilibrium. Certain physiologically determined values are common to most humans, including the desire to avoid pain, to seek pleasure and to acquire assets for survival. Others, including ethical values, are aligned with individual beliefs and communities, and thus vary across cultures and between individuals. The values of persons within groups, societies and cultures are largely common to their members, being transmitted through schooling and reinforced by social norms. Values that are shared by the members of a group are associated with circumstances that its members consider important for their identity and survival. Values thus both derive from, and inform, the norms of a society or group.

\(^{52}\) (Social) norms are the explicit or implicit cues within a society that clarify and enforce appropriate values, beliefs, attitudes and behavior. They represent collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity. Deference to social norms within a group enables acceptance by other members, while flouting them results in criticism, ostracism and sanctions, and may lead to expulsion. Within a group, norms promote coherent behavior, allowing members to predict the responses of others. Social norms vary between groups and evolve over time, often differing from one age group to another. Most individuals today belong to many social groups at the same time. Some normative behaviors expected of members in one group may differ from those expected in another, and some of the norms of any group may differ from the personal values of a member when (s)he is outside that group. As long as the contrast is not too great, however, individuals can reconcile the differences.

\(^{53}\) Law is a system of codified social norms, applicable to the whole of a society and enforced through its institutions. The law clarifies the rights and responsibilities of members, balancing their interests, and regulating the behavior of individuals and groups in line with that balance. The society to which the law applies, in our era, is usually the persons present on the national territory of the lawmaker, and subject to the jurisdiction of its courts. There are some exceptions to national jurisdiction, including diplomatic and consular immunity, public international law and the extraterritorial reach of certain taxation regimes.

\(^{54}\) The legislative function.
laws\textsuperscript{55}; and (vi) to adjudicate, through courts with widespread legitimacy, cases in which rights are disputed, either between persons, or between one or more persons and the state\textsuperscript{56}.

The social norms of each (national) society thus underpin its political system.\textsuperscript{57} When a national executive, a legislature or a judiciary deviates from the norms of the society it governs, social tensions erupt. These may either displace the government, or force political reform. Politics, more generally, is the means by which economic and social goods are allocated authoritatively. In most societies today, economics addresses the workings of markets – which allocate goods and services relatively efficiently without governmental intervention – although macroeconomic analysis, especially on fiscal and monetary policy, aims to guide policymakers in political decisions in the interests of citizens. Politics, economics and society are thus simply elements of a system that enable constructive coexistence between people without family ties, who must cooperate and compete, without conflict, to ensure their individual and collective welfare.

It is easier to achieve common welfare, and coordinate collective action for social purposes, at smaller scales; larger scales pose greater challenges. It is relatively easy to achieve harmony on the scale of a village; possible in a town or city; feasible at a national scale in culturally homogeneous, often smaller, states; more difficult at regional scales; and very difficult globally. Failure occurs when the scale is too large to accommodate the diverse interests of sub-national groups, or national states, especially when values diverge, making agreement on compromises and trade-offs difficult, and inhibiting agreement on normative formulae to distribute benefits equitably. Dani Rodrik pointed cogently to the tensions between economic globalization, national governments and democratic systems in 2011.\textsuperscript{58}

The progressive integration of nation states into a global economy in recent decades has led to constraints on the authority and sovereignty of states, weakening trust in governments. Both individuals’ sense of responsibility to institutions, and government’s acceptance of accountability to citizens and stakeholders, have declined. Digital technologies effecting economic connectivity through global financial systems, transnational supply chains, integrated energy networks, and global broadcasting and advertising consortia, have weakened the ability of national governments to deliver on their campaign promises and promote the interests of their citizens. Civic disaffection follows naturally, leading many to express cynicism and defect from voting. These tensions at the national level also exacerbate the difficulty of enabling collective action at transnational scales.

\textsuperscript{55} The executive function.

\textsuperscript{56} The judicial function.

\textsuperscript{57} “Nations are not primarily ruled by laws: less by violence. Whatever original energy may be supposed either in force or regulation, the operation of both is, in truth, merely instrumental. Nations are governed by the same methods, and on the same principles, by which an individual without authority is often able to govern those who are his equals or his superiors; by a knowledge of their temper, and by a judicious management of it; I mean when public affairs are steadily and quietly conducted; not when government is nothing but a continued scuffle between the magistrate and the multitude; in which sometimes the other is uppermost; in which they alternately yield and prevail in a series of contemptible victories and scandalous submissions. The temper of the people amongst whom he presides ought therefore to be the first study of a statesman. And the knowledge of this temper it is by no means impossible for him to attain, if he has not an interest in being ignorant of what it is his duty to learn.” Burke, Edmund, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents.

This is apparent in democratic polities in the advanced economies, and in the developing world. Membership of political parties and participation in elections has either fallen, or flattened, in all European countries in the past 40 years, while the “third wave” of democratization in Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America, apparent between 1975 and 2005, has stalled, with evidence of regression from freedom in the past decade.

Social media have transformed social, political and media landscapes, creating virtual communities, enabling instant feedback, disrupting traditional media, enhancing expectations and disintermediating political parties as means to satisfy needs. As most city-dwellers are overwhelmed by information flows, noise tends to cancel out signal, and prejudice to displace reason. Distinguishing fact from opinion is more difficult. By exacerbating the echo chamber effect born of competing, mutually exclusive assertions by partisan broadcast media decades ago, and by enabling algorithmic manipulation of verbal and visual information through You Tube, Twitter, Instagram and Facebook, digital media platforms inhibit congruent perception, interpretation and translation into policy. Political polarization, and the rise of populism, are natural consequences.

The efficacy of social media in mobilizing political protest in Tunis, Cairo, Istanbul, Rio de Janeiro, Bangkok, Kiev, Hong Kong and Johannesburg, and in coordinating protests through the Occupy movement a decade ago, is evidence of their disruptive power, but none of these campaigns defined remedial programs, or generated identifiable leaders or institutions. We have weakened the authority of our political systems, without enabling their improvement or replacement. Social media provide access to information without context, and prompt an illusion of expertise, leading to engagement with less reflection than is needed to contribute constructively. Most of these platforms privilege emotion and expression, but discourage analysis and insight.

The implications for democratic institutions are obvious. Our democratic constitutions provide for representative government through election of persons to executive and legislative posts for fixed terms, to implement campaign promises. This is not unqualified: Some countries permit referenda and initiatives; recall elections allow citizens to remove an official from office; and impeachment of a sitting President is possible in defined circumstances. Parliamentary systems permit votes of no confidence, requiring an office-bearer to tender his or her resignation. But social media have enabled new revolts from Egypt to Brazil and South Korea in recent years. Even well-intentioned governments, required to respond urgently to mass demonstrations, are not given time for mature consideration. Succumbing to popular pressure, exacerbated by social media, weakens the

---


60 In Freedom in the World, Freedom House assesses the rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals, rather than governments or government performance. Political rights and civil liberties can be affected by both state and nonstate actors, including insurgents and other armed groups. Freedom House does not believe that legal guarantees of rights are sufficient for on-the-ground fulfillment of those rights. While both laws and actual practices are factored into scoring decisions, greater emphasis is placed on implementation.

61 Edmund Burke remarked on the role of “party” in this context before the French Revolution, when “democratic” practices were first emerging in the United Kingdom: “Party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed. For my part, I find it impossible to conceive that anyone who believes in his own politics, or thinks them to be of any weight, should refuse to adopt the means of having them reduced into practice. It is the business of the speculative philosopher in action to find out proper means towards those ends, and to employ them with effect.” Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), Sir Philip Magnus ed., Prose of Edmund Burke, 1948.

62 E.g. Fox News and MSNBC in the United States.
authority of representative governments; while suppressing demonstrations forcefully, destroys their legitimacy.

Trivialization of political discourse, with reliance on “tweets,” and communication professionals who mold candidates’ positions to the constituencies needed to secure nomination and election have opened the door for populism. Thoughtful analysis of socio-economic circumstances or geopolitical challenges is increasingly rare. Neither stylized debates, broadcast as info-entertainment, nor the stream of “tweets” and video-clips on social media, enable insight, or permit voters to judge prudently which candidate will best serve the commonweal. Stereotypes are reinforced by commentators more concerned with ratings than integrity. Truth is the first victim, with reputation in its wake. Civil discourse63 is becoming rare64, as the norms requiring it are thrown overboard.

Voters are frustrated with their politico-economic systems. Populism is on the rise among persons disempowered by the workings of global markets, and angry at the inability of national governments to secure their welfare. The progressive and near-universal adoption of free-market economic systems in the past 50 years has boosted domestic productivity and international trade and investment and created a global industrial and financial system. But the power of most governments to influence the welfare of their citizens has been reduced. Liberalization of capital flows for investment (and speculation) and the reduction of trade union power has led to relocation of manufacturing and service facilities to low-cost, high-productivity locations, and transformed the labor structure of many advanced economies. All this has transformed democratic politics, and governments and the political class are struggling to adapt.

VI Structural Effects

This is a problem on two levels. First, global governance is structurally weaker. No shared concept of a future global order will emerge from the G7\textsuperscript{65} or the G20\textsuperscript{66}. Despite the importance of a common vision, the cultural preferences of the elites, and the rhetoric of the populist forces on the right and the left, will frustrate that possibility.\textsuperscript{67} Neo-liberalism is in retreat, and neo-nationalism on the rise.\textsuperscript{68} The interplay between long-range geo-economic trends\textsuperscript{69}, geopolitical tensions\textsuperscript{70} and domestic social inequality and anger, exacerbated by the radical technological transformation of work and education now underway\textsuperscript{71}, is fracturing national societies and weakening the institutions of representative democracy.\textsuperscript{72} The nationalistic, nativist\textsuperscript{73} populism that emerged in the United States in 2016\textsuperscript{74} is already familiar in Russia and Turkey, in parts of Latin America, Africa, the Arab region and South Asia, and has been rising in both Western and Eastern Europe for over a decade.

Analyzing populism in Europe, Takis Pappas\textsuperscript{75} suggests that there are three distinct revolutionary challenges to democracy: antidemocrats\textsuperscript{76}, who oppose the representative democratic system;

\textsuperscript{65} The 44th G7 Summit from June 8–9, 2018 in Quebec exemplifies the difficulty. Apart from Mr. Trump’s suggestion that he would push for the reinstatement of Russia, backed by the new Italian government, sharp disagreements on trade led to the summit being dubbed the “G6+1” by France and some parts of the media.

\textsuperscript{66} The G20 summit under the German Presidency in Hamburg 2017 achieved less than most that preceded it, again due to the US President’s opposition to conventional nostrums. But there are other structural constraints: The G20 has no institutional character, no charter, no budget, no permanent secretariat and no system of governance. Its members are almost as diverse as the global community, with no common ideology or philosophy and no common purpose. Its (notional) mandate overlaps with that of the IMF, the World Bank and several UN Specialized Agencies. In the absence of an institutional purpose, and as the G20 Presidency rotates annually from country to country, the “G20 Troika” – comprising the past, current and following G20 Presidency – is meant to promote consistency, but there are few established mechanisms that allow for systematic pursuit of policy proposals from one G20 Presidency to the next, for analysis and assessment. Policy themes developed around each summit are often abandoned, or at least deprioritized, during the next Presidency.


\textsuperscript{69} The center of economic gravity is shifting inexorably in the medium term from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

\textsuperscript{70} Primarily between the eastern Mediterranean to Central Asia; in East and South-East Asia; and on the periphery of Russia, but also in non-kinetic fields including cyber-warfare, see https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303893191_Geopolitical_Scenarios_2030, accessed June 15, 2018.

\textsuperscript{71} This is captured in the phrase “the Fourth Industrial Revolution,” wording which wholly underestimates the impact of the functional, normative, epistemological and ontological transformation now underway. See http://www.academia.edu/33518577/KSC_4th_Industrial_Revolution, accessed June 15, 2018.


\textsuperscript{73} The Oxford English Dictionary defines “nativism” as “the policy of protecting the interests of native-born or established inhabitants against those of immigrants.”

\textsuperscript{74} Amy Chua has described this as “political tribalism”, stating: “Political tribalism is fracturing the United States, transforming the country into a place where people from one tribe see others not just as the opposition but also as immoral, evil, and un-American. If a way out exists, it will have to address both economics and culture.” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-06-14/tribal-world, accessed June 23, 2018.


\textsuperscript{76} European antidemocratic parties rely on the votes of blue-collar workers and others who see themselves as victims of globalization, and who have abandoned mainstream parties, the European project and representative democracy. (Hanspete Kriesi et al., West European Politics in the Age of Globalization, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). They have strong leadership cults and are on the extreme right and left flanks of European politics. Antidemocrats of the right typically advocate ultranationalism – even racist – ideologies, focus on security issues, are hostile to the EU and strongly oppose immigration. Antidemocrats of the left advocate proletarian dictatorship, condemn European unification and are committed to internationalism for all working
nativists\textsuperscript{77}, who oppose deeper European integration\textsuperscript{78}; and populists\textsuperscript{79}, who, while democratic, oppose liberalism.\textsuperscript{80}

To understand the threat of populism to liberal democracy, one must examine populist political campaigns and governments. Populist campaigns achieve legitimacy by manipulating reality symbolically and locating social grievances in a structural narrative with well-defined protagonists and antagonists with distinct identities, thus defining the need for intervention. Populist campaigns claim to be on the side of light (or progress) against the forces of darkness (or backwardness).\textsuperscript{81} Once in power, successful populist governments incorporate key figures and groups into structural alliances, where information asymmetries allow them to cultivate a diversified base, promising different benefits to different groups.\textsuperscript{82} Some special interest groups are vested people. Both advocate state control of the economy: Rightists emphasize national economic autarky while leftists stress collectivism. Examples on the right include France’s National Front (FN) in its early years under Jean-Marie Le Pen; Greece’s Golden Dawn (GD); the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik); Belgium’s Vlaams Blok (VB) (and later after its banning) Vlaams Belang; and the neo-fascist British National Party (BNP). On the far left, Pappas names the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), the successor of the Czechoslovak Communist Party; France’s Left Front, a cluster of factions around the French Communist Party; Spain’s United Left (IU); the Communist Party of Greece (KKE); and Germany’s Die Linke, the successor to the Socialist Unity Party of the GDR. (Pappas, op. cit.)

Nativism is triggered by the fear of imported change, and complements xenophobia, rising where diversity increases sharply before stabilizing and declining as assimilation occurs. In contemporary Europe, nativism has been triggered by immigration. (Pappas, op. cit.)

European nativism is evident in politically liberal, economically affluent, and relatively culturally homogenous states – Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Germany. Important nativist parties include Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ); the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV); the Danish People’s Party (DF); Norway’s Progress Party (FrP); the Sweden Democrats (SD); the Finns (PS, formerly known as the True Finns); the Swiss People’s Party (SVP); the UK Independence Party (UKIP); and the Alternative for Germany (AfD). The French FN projects a broader-based, nativist project. Nativism’s protest relates to immigration and multiculturalism, which it sees as threats to well-ordered, ethnoculturally coherent societies, liberal-democratic values and the sustainability of the welfare state. They are thus seen by many middle-class Europeans, including “highly educated, highly civilized, scientists, doctors [and] lawyers,” as champions of the conservative perspective of constitutional legality, liberal parliamentary democracy and law and order. (Pappas, op. cit.)

Pappas defines populism as “democratic illiberalism,” denoting political parties that are both democratic and illiberal. Populist parties, in his usage, thus identify with democracy, and endorse illiberal tactics. He cites the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) of Andreas Papandreou, a member of the Greek elite with US training and naval war service; Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, which later merged into the People of Freedom coalition; Hungary’s Fidesz, born as a liberal party that moved right and transformed into a radical, populist party. Viktor Orbán won a landslide in 2010 and recast Hungary’s constitution. In Slovakia, Robert Fico’s Direction (Smer) party merged with others in 2005, becoming Smer–Social Democracy (Smer-SD), and after winning the 2006 election, formed a coalition government with a populist and an ultranationalist party. In 2012, Smer-SD won an absolute majority of seats and form the first single-party government in Slovakia since 1993. Both left- and right-wing populism in Europe grew after the global financial crisis. In Greece, the crisis led to the collapse of the old party system in 2012 and to the victory of the populist Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) in January 2015, which went into coalition with a nationalist right-populist party, the Independent Greeks (ANEL). In Spain, the left-populist Podemos (We Can) emerged in 2014 and allied with the IU in the June 2016 general election, emerging as the third-largest party. Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS), founded in 2001 by Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczyński, won power in 2015 and weakened the Constitutional Tribunal, tightened media controls, proposed new presidential decree powers and clamped down on immigrants and social minorities. (Pappas, op. cit.)

These phenomena undoubtedly have distinct causes, normative assumptions, and consequences, but Pappas’ analysis is less persuasive, however, in his discussion of the motivation and political norms of the nativist and populist parties. Nativism may be better conceived as reflecting a normative political objective of certain parties and their supporters, and populism as describing an instrumental approach, or means, to achieve these, or other, objectives.

Blumenschein, Fernando and Navarro, Diego, Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America and Regional Governance Dynamics (First Draft), Fundação Getulio Vargas, August 15, 2016.

with symbolic roles to bolster the legitimacy of the leader. Some populist governments thus achieve legitimacy that proves resilient with their supporters, even in adverse circumstances. Mr. Putin, Mr. Erdogan, and Mr. Trump offer examples.

Populist politics is often disconnected from policy. Its legitimacy reflects the priority of symbols over substance, with ideology being replaced by a *scenario of power*. Populism thrives when many people feel marginalized, with their livelihoods and identities threatened. And populist politics in one cause breeds antithetical campaigns by others who feel threatened by the populist(s). The protests and clashes in US cities after Mr. Trump’s election, and “Black Lives Matter” marches over a longer period are examples. That path can rend the social fabric, destroying civic tolerance. Minorities – the “other” in every society – are most at risk.

In Europe to date, populists have routinely won elections only in the post-communist east. Of 15 Eastern European countries, populist parties hold power in seven, belong to the ruling coalition in two more, and are the main opposition force in three. While populist parties captured 20 percent or more of the vote in only two Eastern European countries in 2000, they have done so in ten by 2018. In Poland, populist parties have gone from winning 0.1 percent of the vote in 2000 to holding a parliamentary majority in the PiS party’s current government. In Hungary, support for Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s *Fidesz* party has at times exceeded 70 percent.

After the US election in November 2016, a *New York Times* article described Mr. Trump’s victory as a “stunning repudiation of the Establishment,” calling it “a decisive demonstration of power by a largely overlooked coalition of mostly blue-collar white and working-class voters who felt that the promise of the United States had slipped their grasp amid decades of globalization and multiculturalism.”

### VII. Addressing the Challenge – What can we do?

Pappas posits that antidemocratic parties should be countered by *a resolute state that uses legal and constitutional means to restrict extremist behavior*. He cites Germany’s *Basic Law* and the decisions of Belgium’s Court of Appeals in Ghent and the Greek Constitutional Court as examples. He argues that *a policy response is needed to contain nativist parties that exploit or respond to citizens’ fears of immigration, globalization and European integration*, observing that “…there can be no doubt that solutions to the migration crisis, Greece’s debt problem, and terrorism would take the wind out of contemporary nativism’s sails.” He warns, however, that if the political class cannot do this, *nativism* will continue to rise.

He sees *populism*, which negates political liberalism, as the most menacing threat, as it thrives where political institutions are weak, and societies are polarized. Populism is contagious, leading other parties to emulate the success of the populists at the ballot box, further degrading liberal...
institutions and increasing social tensions. He cites Greece, Hungary and Poland as warning examples.\textsuperscript{86}

The particulars of populism, including its nativist and illiberal forms, differ from country to country, but the discontent is wide and deep throughout the “developed world,” and in parts of the “developing world.” The trend will accelerate as we automate, digitize and transform our economies. Many more traditional blue- (and white-) collar jobs will be lost each year. Human societies, and our educational and social institutions, adapt more slowly than technology, and we are ill-prepared for the social and political consequences\textsuperscript{87}

The 2016 US election made clear that Mr. Trump’s populist narrative (“…you’re feeling pain; I can make it go away and make America great again…”), while simplistic and unsupported by policies, resonated strongly with almost half of the US electorate.\textsuperscript{88} It and its analogues around the world are shaking the foundations of representative democracy, just as the Industrial Revolution of the late 18\textsuperscript{th} and early 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries upended empires and monarchies in continental Europe, and drove radical extension of the franchise in Britain. Our failure to respond adequately to this challenge is increasingly dangerous.\textsuperscript{89} To avoid an institutional crisis on national and regional levels, we must address the reality, and the sources, of acute inequality; restore possibilities for upward mobility for the bright but less privileged; provide social safety nets for those who cannot be reskilled and accommodated in labor markets in the next two decades; invest in transforming education and skills-training to permit horizontal mobility and lifelong learning; and build social capital and cohesion to enable collaboration and burden-sharing as we transition. To do this, we need suitable fiscal and social policies.\textsuperscript{90} We must also address the need of many people – often older, or more economically vulnerable individuals – to associate primarily, at least in their neighborhoods, with people of the same, or a similar culture.\textsuperscript{91}

If we are to preserve the rule of law and the principles of liberal democracy, we must achieve an approximation of fact-based knowledge in the political landscape. This has always been

\textsuperscript{86} Pappas argues that the European project has had three tasks: consolidating pluralist democracy; forging a multi-ethnic and multicultural union of peoples and states; and advancing political liberalism. Karl Popper’s “open society,” Isaiah Berlin’s “negative liberty,” John Rawls’ “overlapping consensus,” and Ronald Dworkin’s assertion that equality is the “sovereign virtue” earlier shaped political discourse and policy. But times have changed. Europe’s commitment to multiculturalism is under stress due to Islamist terror attacks and the tide of refugees and migrants from Africa, the Levant and Central Asia. Liberalism is in retreat in Greece, Hungary and Poland. Rising numbers of European voters, even in France, the Benelux countries, Germany and Scandinavia, are fearful and mistrustful, just as they are in the United States.

\textsuperscript{87} https://www.amazon.com/review/R2A7EGWXGUKHZ5/ref=cm_cr_dp_title?ie=UTF8&ASIN=1944835008&channel=detail-glance&nodeID=283155&store=books.

\textsuperscript{88} 61,201,031 votes (47 percent of the electorate) were cast for Mr. Trump in the 2016 election, giving him 306 electoral college votes and the Presidency. Mrs. Clinton secured 62,523,126 (4 percent of the electorate) and 232 electoral college votes. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_election,_2016, accessed June 16, 2018.


\textsuperscript{90} Preoccupation with the need to respond to these urgent domestic imperatives risks making collaboration on “common goods” – climate, the oceans and the environment more generally – as well as intelligent responses to terrorism, violent extremism and organized crime, more difficult. The progressive demise of international trade regimes, if unchecked, will dislocate global value chains, slow growth further and increase geopolitical stress. This challenge is not purely national. It is global, and the agenda of all our institutions must be refocused to address it urgently.

challenging. Very few people in London, four decades ago, regularly read both the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph. Polarization of media perspectives is longstanding and continuing\textsuperscript{92}, but the media landscape has become more fragmented.\textsuperscript{93} The echo-chamber effect in both broadcast media and, increasingly, social media, where messaging is narrowly targeted, is having a profound impact on political and institutional behavior.\textsuperscript{94} Within social media landscapes, the effects of data aggregation and algorithmic manipulation of messaging are reinforcing both preference and prejudice.\textsuperscript{95} We need to address this more effectively, through education, incentives and regulation.

We must recognize, however, that political institutions emerge from social, economic and cultural contexts. The institutions of representative (liberal) democracy emerged in Europe, the United States and the British Empire, and later, Commonwealth, from the Age of Reason, the European Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, displacing absolute monarchy and the Estates of the Realm, to accommodate a rising and increasingly educated bourgeoisie. The leitmotiv of the republicans of the newly united States of America was that all men were created equal and endowed with inalienable rights; that governments should secure the enjoyment of those rights; and that if a government opposed them, the people had the right to alter or abolish it, and to institute a government that was more likely to effect their safety and happiness. That is an enduring responsibility on a sovereign people. None of those who contributed to the institutions and political systems that emerged at the end of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century envisaged their survival for all time. In a new context today, it falls to us, the people, to reconceptualize and reshape our dysfunctional institutions, and to institute such “new Government as seems most likely to enable our safety and happiness.”

The declining relevance of national governments in securing and advancing the welfare of citizens, in a globalized world, and the disintermediation of political parties as instruments of influence, by social media, are significant threats to representative democracy. Many citizens, especially the digital natives of the millennial generation, have come to believe that they can influence outcomes more effectively by digital engagement than through any established political process. Advances in data analytics, digital communication systems and machine learning enable us to transcend some of the constraints of radiational representative democracy and re-create direct democracy at substantially larger, virtual scales. The Athenian agora [\acr{\text{á}γορά}] was the center of the athletic, artistic, commercial and political life of the city. Digital agoras, combining data analytics and machine-learning algorithms, already enable us to link citizens, at multiple scales, from the local, through the national to the global, in many different ways, to enrich the democratic experience. NESTA\textsuperscript{96} has highlighted six pioneers in digital democracy from Europe, through Latin America to Asia.\textsuperscript{97}


\textsuperscript{94} For a US example, see https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixedgov/2018/02/21/why-is-the-senate-broken, accessed June 23, 2018.


The prime challenge to political institutions is to craft effective means, seen as legitimate by citizens, to address social and economic challenges, in timeframes that meet both current and emerging expectations. There is a great tension between the assumption of many younger citizens that problems can be solved by digital search, social mobilization and the crowdsourcing of ideas, design parameters, prototypes and operating systems, and the slow, even dysfunctional process of consultation through parliamentary hearings, “White Papers,” draft legislation and debate and amendment in legislative assemblies. More effective deployment of digital solutions employing deep data analysis and machine-learning algorithms is needed to allow legislative, executive and judicial bodies to strengthen governance and adjudication in increasingly fast-paced times. Balancing speed with integrity and transparency, to ensure legitimacy, will be most demanding.

Just as representative (liberal) democracy in national (or pluri-national) states and an economic system of largely free markets, albeit with social objectives determined by elected governments, emerged from the detritus of empire in an age of rapid urbanization and transformation of social and class systems in the 19th and 20th centuries, so new forms of spatial configuration of ever more mobile human communities are emerging from our increasingly connected, digital age. Social and institutional transitions of this sort have always been disruptive, and the speed and scale of that which we are now entering guarantees significant turbulence. We thus need to design adaptive social, economic and political systems that are capable of organic evolution, are subject to popular validation, and will be resilient to shocks. Resilient systems display autonomy, redundancy, distributed architectures, formal communication and negotiation protocols, and are designed to fail to safe-states, to enhance operational continuity and enable disaster recovery. These are important design considerations as we grapple with the creation of new systems.

The technological transformation now underway will afford us the tools to address many of these challenges, but it also poses epistemological and ontological questions that humanity has never faced. The meaning of knowledge, traditionally conceived of as “information-in-context”; the attributes of consciousness, traditionally conceived of as an exclusively human attribute; and the meaning and significance of human identity, beyond personal, social or national identities, are being, and will all be, challenged.

The vTaiwan process is a platform to engage experts and members of the public in large-scale deliberations on specific topics through several stages: an “objective” stage to crowdsource evidence; a “reflective” stage using the mass deliberation tool Polis, to enable “rough consensus.” Finally, key stakeholders are invited to a live-streamed, face-to-face meeting to draw up recommendations to decision makers. The consultation is transcribed, summarized and published in a structured and searchable format.

The Internet is an example, having been designed as a robust communication network capable of surviving a nuclear war, and thus nodal, and based on packet-switching, not circuits.

As in nuclear reactors.

The phrase “Fourth Industrial Revolution” is widely used, but is not appropriate, as the transformation – involving an extraordinary confluence of research and applications arising from information technology, biotechnology, nanotechnology and, increasingly, neuro-technologies, including those for cognitive enhancement, and potentially transhumanism – extends well beyond industrial applications.

These, and related questions have been canvassed widely in the past few years, but perhaps nowhere better than in Yuval Noah Harari’s Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (2016); see https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/aug/24/homo-deus-by-yuval-noah-harari-review, accessed June 24, 2018.
VIII References


Edmond Burke. Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), ed. Sir Philip Magnus, Prose of Edmund Burke. 1948.


Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Wissenschaft der Logik, 1812, 1813, 1816; Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 1817; Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Leipzig 1821.


Karl Marx. Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Introduction. 1843.

Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels. The German Ideology. 1845.

Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto. 1848.


The Erosion of Democracy in Developing and Transition Countries

Hauke Hartmann

I Introduction

Political transformation as measured by the BTI 2018 has, on average, reached a new low around the globe. In more and more countries, rulers are strategically undermining control mechanisms in order to secure power and maintain patronage systems and opportunities for self-enrichment. At the same time, protests are growing against social inequality, mismanagement and corruption.

As normative transformation goals, democracy and the market economy have never been so contested – or so threatened by degradation from within. Clearly, if democratic systems do not offer a robust framework for ensuring rule of law and opportunities for political participation, and if market-based economies do not guarantee fair and reliable rules of competition and social inclusion, then not only will they lose their appeal, they will devolve into illiberal, patronage-driven structures. Against this background, populistic and authoritarian criticisms of democratic processes, institutions and ultimately norms will gain credibility.

The following text starts out by introducing the most important investigative parameters used to assess the political status and quality of democracy in 129 developing and transformation countries (excluding Western nations that were already members of the OECD in 1989). On this basis, the erosion of democracy worldwide is analyzed and the question addressed in what sense this development represents a global “retreat of democracy.” The prevailing antidemocratic positions are then depicted and discussed. In conclusion, suggestions are made as to how the European Union, as one of the main democratic actors on the international stage, can counteract the erosion in the quality of democracy and promote a liberal order and democratization.

II The Investigative Framework of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index

The origins of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) are closely associated with the understanding that the processes of social change do not only move in one direction. Indeed, transformational processes towards democracy and a market economy can certainly regress or stagnate. After the euphoria that followed the end of the Cold War and the twofold transformation – political and economic – that unfolded in numerous countries in Eastern, East-Central and Southeast Europe, it did not take long to come to the sobering realization that the trend of liberalization was reversible.

The “end of history” that was predicted at the time had not yet arrived.¹ By the mid-1990s, events such as the Russian constitutional crisis and the unsuccessful US Marine operation in Mogadishu, Somalia highlighted the complexity and reversibility of democratization processes and efforts to bring stability. It was during this period of rethinking the new world order that the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s founder Reinhard Mohn initiated the efforts to develop a Transformation Index. The aim was to gain a more thorough understanding of the dynamics of transformation processes and to identify by means of international comparison successful cases of social transformation that could serve as examples of good practice and help devise recommendations for democratization and transformation management. As such, the BTI combines two outlooks. The first is a continued

confidence in the universal applicability and superiority of the social models of a democracy based on the rule of law and a market economy flanked by sociopolitical safeguards. The second is a more sober and skeptical understanding of actual transformation processes that considers the complex interdependencies between democratization and economic liberalization – including the possibility of blockades and failure.

As a consequence of these origins, the BTI is a more diversified index than many comparable instruments, which enables it to evaluate and compare complex transformation trends in a detailed, differentiated way. There are a range of different requirements associated with successful political transformation and democratization. A comprehensive array of indicators should be used when examining these requirements. A similar principle applies to the erosion of the quality of democracy, which can also affect various domains within the political order. Numerous country reports and data analyses of the BTI show that political regression can happen for a range of reasons and can follow various paths. As such, it will be helpful here to first provide a brief outline of the investigative parameters used in the BTI.

The normative framework for political transformation on which the BTI assessments are based is that of a democracy based on the rule of law. The qualification “based on the rule of law” clarifies that this model requires more than just free and fair elections and additional political participation rights. Thus, the BTI adds a constitutional element to the influential Dahlian concept of polyarchy (rule of many) – a concept that primarily focuses on all citizens having the opportunity for political participation and on the free competition for political power, and therefore on the associated political freedoms (freedom of expression, freedom of information, freedom of the press, the right of association and the right to vote or to stand as a candidate).\(^2\) In accordance with the narrower concept of polyarchy, 52 of the 58 countries that are classified as autocracies in the BTI 2018 are categorized as such because the freedom and fairness of elections no longer meets democratic standards. But in addition, the BTI also acknowledges that functional constitutional democracies must be embedded – there must be horizontal accountability and a separation of powers, and the democratically elected representatives must have effective power to govern. This concept of “embedded democracy” can be used to identify a range of limitations of existing democracies, which are categorized as “defective democracies” in the BTI.\(^3\) Four types of defective democracies can be identified. As the following table “Types of Defective Democracies” illustrates, they are classified according to the most prevalent defect.\(^4\)

---


This typology of democratic deficits should not be regarded as being static or exclusive. It is, however, useful for identifying the most prevalent systemic weaknesses. In practice, hybrid types are often found and defects can mutually reinforce each other. The concept is most useful for analyzing the interdependencies between the various defects and it may also help with identifying the creeping process of autocratization from within. For instance, before the AKP governments took office in Turkey, the veto held by the military council meant that the country’s democracy could be described as an enclave democracy. After a successful democratization period, it then showed increasingly repressive tendencies – especially after the failed coup of 2016 – and became an illiberal democracy. Today, following a constitutional referendum and another election victory for Erdoğan in June 2018, it would not only be described as illiberal but also as delegative. Indeed, the combination of both defects means that the Turkish political system may have already crossed the threshold and become an autocracy.

In order to be able to present the quality of democracy in a comprehensive, differentiated way, the Transformation Index accordingly not only measures political participation rights (voting rights, freedom of expression, rights of association and assembly) and the effective power to govern but also assesses the rule of law (separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, prosecution of office abuse and protection of civil rights). Any erosion of the quality of democracy with respect to core democratic institutions can thus be identified and quantified with precision.

In recent years, the Arab Spring illustrated yet again that although these democratic institutions are indispensable, in and of themselves they are not sufficient to establish a sustainable democratic order. Two additional criteria must also be fulfilled. The first is stable stateness, which is supported by a functioning administration and a well-established state monopoly on the use of force. The second is the consolidation of democratic order by developing effective and accepted democratic institutions and by integrating a stable, balanced representation of social concerns into political decision-making processes. The first aspect is foundational to the process of political transformation. The second relates to the institutional and social consolidation of democracy.

On the subject of stateness, just one year after the Arab Spring had begun, the political scientist Eberhard Kienle warned that only Egypt and Tunisia would have sufficient state stability and identity to introduce the process of democratization with any prospect of success. The first election in Libya following the fall of Gaddafi in July 2012, for example, was one of the freest and fairest votes held in the Arab world in the last 15 years. At the same time, however, the stateness was so fragile,

---

the administration and jurisdiction so underdeveloped and civil rights protection so inadequate that the BTI continued to classify Libya as an autocracy – even before destabilizing tribal and regional forces resulted in the country becoming a failed state. Events in Afghanistan and the Central African Republic have unfolded in a similar way in recent years.

The analysis of democratic consolidation addresses the opposite end of the spectrum of political development, examining political and social integration and the stability of democratic institutions. Negative trends in these areas can be either a trigger for or a symptom of a more widespread erosion of the quality of democracy. For example, in some more developed democracies in Latin America and Southeast Europe (Brazil, Costa Rica, Romania, Slovenia), BTI scores for aspects such as the stability of the party system or the approval of democratic norms and procedures are decreasing, despite the relative stability of the democratic institutional structures.

According to the normative and conceptual framework of the BTI, a political system should be stable, participatory, constitutional, effective and representative. These premises form the basis of this indicator framework, which the BTI uses in its assessment of 129 developing and transition countries, see Figure "Political Transformation Indicators in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index."

### III Analysis

1. Political Transformation Trends

By using the three-pronged approach of assessing state stability, investigating participation rights and rule of law, and analyzing democratic consolidation, the BTI is able to record three important phenomena that affect the level of political transformation and the quality of democracy all over the world. These phenomena are state failure, the weakening of institutions and consolidation setbacks.

---

State failure is not a major contributing factor to the current continuation of the negative political trend. Nevertheless, following the collapses in Libya and Syria, state order has now also fully disintegrated in South Sudan and Yemen. As a result, no central state powers are in a position to deal with the humanitarian catastrophes in these countries. This list of countries also includes the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia, all of which have been categorized as failed states by the BTI since the mid-2000s. Generally speaking, however, the total number of failed states has remained relatively constant at seven or eight. This is because former problematic cases such as Côte d’Ivoire have now stabilized. The number of fragile or very fragile states has also remained fairly similar, at between 10 and 13 states. As such, there are consistently around 20 states that have problematically low levels of stateness. Of course, it is alarming that around 15 percent of all countries assessed by the BTI have an insecure state monopoly on the use of force and a limited state administration. But again, this number is stable, it does not explain the negative political trend that has been continuing globally for many years.

The prevailing perception in Europe that there has been a significant increase in state fragility can instead be explained by the particularly intense awareness of the instability in the European neighborhood. With the exception of Algeria, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates, in the last ten years there have been marginal to significant declines in stateness in every Arab state. Eastern European countries such as Ukraine and Moldova are also less stable. Furthermore, the interference of religious dogmas in the legal system and in political institutions has increased in just under half of all countries assessed by the BTI. This is the stateness indicator that has deteriorated the most by far. The increased role of religion in politics is by no means exclusive to Arab states or Muslim-majority societies. Nevertheless, there are clear regional hotspots. The list of 42 countries where religion currently has at least a perceptible level of political influence and where it is opposing pluralist, democratic legislation includes all of the Arab states in addition to countries that are primarily located in West Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia. This kind of development has the potential to bring destabilization where there are heightened identity conflicts, as shown to an alarming degree in recent years by terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda in the Arab world and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

At first glance, no dramatic consolidation setbacks are discernible either. At a global level, the average scores for the “stability of democratic institutions” and “political and social integration” criteria have only changed slightly. As above, however, it is worth breaking down this highly aggregated data by region and subject matter. By doing so, a lack of trust in and commitment to established politics becomes evident. Meanwhile, values for civil society are tending to improve. These observations are significant for stability analyses and debates about populism. Although there has been low-level improvement to the performance of democratic institutions over the last twelve years, the level of commitment to them among political players has decreased. There have been positive trends concerning the self-organizing ability of civil society, levels of social trust, the ability of interest groups to mediate and their willingness to cooperate. At the same time, public approval of democratic norms and procedures has dropped dramatically. With a negative value of -0.59 points (on a scale of one to ten), it is the democracy indicator that has deteriorated the most since 2006 (after “association and assembly rights”).

---

Consolidation setbacks primarily affect countries and regions where democratic institutions are already relatively well established. For example, the decline in the level of commitment to democratic institutions is particularly noticeable in East-Central and Southeast Europe, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Hungary (-3 in both) as well as in Macedonia, Poland and Slovakia (-2 in all three). From different qualitative levels, scores for the approval of democracy have fallen significantly in Latin American countries such as Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama and Peru (-2 in all four). Although the causes of this disenchantment with democracy vary from country to country, in nearly every region there are two main accusations being levelled at the established political elite. The first is that rather than serving the common good, they are corrupt, seeking primarily to secure their status. The second is that they are therefore uninterested in introducing effective measures for eliminating the prosperity gap between rich and poor (Latin America) or between the West and the East (East-Central and Southeast Europe). Although these two accusations are also part of a populist and therefore anti-elite, polarizing narrative, this does not change the fact that they are demonstrably justifiable – as exemplified in numerous countries in Latin America and East-Central and Southeast Europe. The political elites and administrations of many Latin American countries are riddled with corruption, as was made particularly clear by the Odebrecht scandal that recently permeated the whole region. Similar statements can also be made for Southeast Europe, particularly for Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, where there is a lack of effective prosecution of
office abuse and too few effective anti-corruption policies. Furthermore, by interregional comparison, Latin America still has one of the highest levels of social inequality and is second only to Southern Africa, where the gulf between rich and poor is even wider. Since the end of the commodity boom in Latin America, the prosperity gap has been widening again. In East-Central and Southeast Europe, the large majority of citizens has been burdened with the effects of three economic transformations (from planned economy to market economy, regarding the fulfilment of EU accession criteria and concerning the structural adjustments following the global financial crisis). They are still waiting for their share in the prosperity associated with becoming EU members or accession candidates.

The global average scores show that regression in political transformation levels primarily stems from the weakening of democratic institutions. The true drivers of the negative political trend are the erosion of political participation rights and of the rule of law in democratic states, in combination with the regression of previously moderate autocracies into more severe, highly repressive dictatorships. These developments make more of an impact on the global “retreat of democracy” than the system change from democracy to autocracy. The BTI 2018 records five regimes that have become autocratic – Bangladesh, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Uganda – compared to two fragile processes of democratization (in Burkina Faso and Sri Lanka). Although this means that autocracies have reached an all-time high in the current Transformation Index, both in terms of the actual number (58 autocracies) and the percentage they represent (45%), all of the new autocracies have been exhibiting a continuous downhill trend for some years now. Of these countries re-categorized as an autocracy, none has experienced an abrupt change to a dictatorship. Instead, all went through a longstanding, ongoing and intensifying erosion of democratic standards. The scale of this process of erosion is now so large, particularly in the areas of free, fair elections and the separation of powers, that these countries can no longer be classified as democracies.

The five new autocracies in the BTI 2018 have crossed a threshold. A range of defective democracies is also approaching this threshold, although with varying degrees of democratic quality. These states include Honduras, Hungary, Moldova, Niger, the Philippines and Turkey – and one might even add Poland. Furthermore, countries such as Macedonia, Mexico and South Africa have been reporting substantial losses in the quality of democracy for a long time. All cases considered, it becomes clear that defective democracies – with increasing limitations on the rule of law and opportunities for political participation – contribute significantly to the global negative trend in political transformation.

---

In recent years, particularly in response to the Arab Spring and Euromaidan, regressive political transformation in the direction of autocracy has also contributed to the institutional loss of quality in democracies. More than two thirds of autocratic governments harshly suppress political opposition and place such severe limitations on remaining civil liberties that their political systems can now only be described as hard autocracies. Where there was a tendency some years ago to allow a certain level of dissent and pluralism – from allowing opposition parties to stand for election to tolerating selected opposition media and non-governmental organizations – numerous regimes are now once again using clearly repressive methods to inhibit open, societal discourse. The arbitrary detention of human rights activists and journalists has increased. There have also been more bans on demonstrations and more laws placing limitations on civil society organizations. This often takes place under the pretext of fighting terrorism or of preventing foreign interference in domestic matters. The main regional focuses are the Middle East and North Africa. Other important regions include Southeast Africa, where there is significant political regression and conflicts that are partly ethnically charged, and the hardened autocracies of Central Asia, which are often shaped by family dynasties.
In 44 percent of the 119 countries that have been continuously assessed since 2006, the overall democracy trend is distinctly negative, at more than a quarter of a point on the one-to-ten scale that depicts the status of political transformation. In 14 of these 52 countries, there is clear political regression (a negative value between 0.50 and 1.00) and in 18 of these countries, regression is massive (a negative value of one point or more). This means that in at least one fifth of all countries, the level of political transformation has declined to such an extent that it resulted in very grave democratic deficiencies or the introduction of an autocracy. Neither qualitatively nor quantitatively, there has been anything resembling an equally powerful positive trend towards democratization or liberalization.

The most serious developments are the impingements on electoral freedom, the erosion of the separation of powers and the increased limits being placed on opposition and civil society activities. Since 2006, no aspect of political transformation has seen as much regression as the area of...
association and assembly rights. Also, freedom of expression and civil rights have been increasingly and significantly curtailed. This “shrinking space” is being supplemented by a “manipulated space,” which seeks to maintain sovereignty over public discourse in a controlled system by providing targeted support for organizations loyal to the government and by discrediting critics of the government as foreign agents. The methods of interference, marginalization and isolation – for example, complicated registration systems, banning foreign support or placing legal restraints on civil society activities – are remarkably similar around the world. This suggests improved authoritarian policy learning and an international transfer regarding strategies of repression and manipulation.

A “retreat of democracy” can hardly be assessed by simply counting the number of democracies and autocracies over time. This approach would not show a rapid recent rise in authoritarian systems, nor would it fit with the historical trend analysis which reveals that only since the end of the Cold War and until now have the majority of states around the world been subject to democratic rule. Also, an increasing state fragility and the associated destabilization of democracy is not empirically detectable either. Rather, an important consideration here is the influence of religious dogmas on the legal system and on political institutions. This influence has risen rapidly and usually has an illiberal effect. This finding fits with the fact the BTI reveals a clearly perceptible global rise in conflict intensity in recent years. This rise is not due to an increase in open, military conflict but is instead linked to the increasing polarization of societies along ethnic, religious and social lines. This polarization, which the BTI also shows by depicting deconsolidation trends in democratic societies, is particularly detrimental to the commitment to democratic institutions and to the approval of democratic norms and procedures, especially in Latin America, East-Central and Southeast Europe and in many of the countries in Southern and Eastern Africa that are still ruled democratically. On the one hand, increasing polarization and growing skepticism towards democratic norms and procedures are the result of dissatisfaction with poorly functioning political institutions. On the other hand, these factors are catalysts that further accelerate the erosion of political participation rights and the rule of law in democracies, while also facilitating or even justifying the increased levels of repression in autocracies.

2. Antidemocratic Positions

Considering the increasing polarization of societies and the decrease in commitment to democratic norms and processes, there is, next to the institutional aspect, also a discursive dimension weighing into the “retreat of democracy.” The first thing to note here is that following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its model of state-socialist development (with a planned economy), there has been no attractive and comprehensive alternative ideological concept to democratic transformation (with a market economy). Even the successful and influential Chinese development model is still referred to by China’s state media as “enlightened Chinese democracy.” In all but a few autocracies, the political ruling powers provide pro forma constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights and install what look like participative processes. Open repression is only the last resort for safeguarding power. Instead, elections are held from time to time. These elections are neither free nor fair but their credibility is verified by “international election observers” which are either founded by, financed by or allied with the state in question. Governments from Morocco to Russia have begun to either found their own civil society organizations or to invite existing NGOs to cooperate politically by joining umbrella organizations that provide them with huge levels of financial support. This makes

---


the organizations politically dependent on the government but also gives the impression that the government has the support of civil society. It is often the case in autocracies – and in defective democracies such as Hungary and Turkey – that media outlets are not simply closed down. Instead, they are bought out by companies that are close to the government and then brought into line politically.

Despite the lack of a convincing authoritarian alternative concept, the BTI data depicts a perceptible shift in the discourse towards a greater acceptance of positions that are illiberal and skeptical of democracy. For instance, in the wake of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, all over the world there was an increased willingness to subordinate individual rights if this was deemed necessary for collective security. This illiberal argument is also used by numerous dictators, especially in Arab states, in order to legitimize repression or call in support from external sources. Furthermore, leading emerging markets – whose self-confidence is growing due to the shifting balance of global economic power – are protesting against what they assert to be the patronizing or even interventionist attitude of democratic states and international organizations. For example, on the initiative of China, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization called for the “democratization of international relations” by strengthening the principle of national sovereignty and non-intervention. Another example is the way that, in reference to Western decadence, the Russian government insisted that greater consideration be given to the “traditional values” of national culture and religion, which should be differentiated from universal rights – a caveat that was successfully added at the 2012 Human Rights Council, for instance.\(^\text{11}\)

Nevertheless, antidemocratic positions are shown to be most effective when they focus on supposed or actual deficits in the functionality or performance of liberal democracies. In recent years, populist movements, parties and governments have levelled anti-elitist critique at the corrupt practices and the lack of equal opportunities associated with the democratic political establishment. At the same time, dictatorships in developing nations have pointed to their own economic and social successes and advocated strict state leadership as a foundation for overcoming poverty and inequality.

**Populist Critique of Democracy**

All streams of **populism** are characterized by the demand for greater equality of opportunity and the mantra of “society before individuals.” Left-wing populist movements and parties are particularly common in Latin America. They form or formed the government in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela. In the name of the people, they condemn the high degree of social injustice, which they claim came about because the political and economic elites lacked commitment to reform and selfishly sought to secure their own status.\(^\text{12}\) A right-wing populist “illiberal drift,” however, is widespread in East-Central and Southeast Europe. It is particularly well-represented by the governments of Macedonia, Poland and Hungary.\(^\text{13}\) Decidedly anti-elitist characteristics are present here too and the homogenous will of the people is postulated. Reference is made to the systemically corrupt structure of the old, post-communist nomenklatura system that, it is claimed, is still in force – a system that has no regard for the interests of the man on the street.

---

and would betray national interests to Brussels, foreign companies or international trade organizations. While the impact of left-wing populism in Latin America tends to move in the direction of social inclusion, which can take on both authoritarian (Venezuela) and democratizing (Bolivia) features, European right-wing populists generally embody authoritarian, traditionalist and nationalist values, which tend to encourage the exclusion and discrimination of minorities.  

The reasons for the successful mobilization of support for populists differ from country to country. In Hungary, the success was directly related to the dissatisfaction at the incompetence and mismanagement of the previous government. In Turkey, it originally stemmed from the resistance shown to the hardened, Mafia-like informal power structures formed by an alliance of politicians, companies and the military. The success of populists in Venezuela was due to their protests against deeply unjust structures and mass poverty. Indeed, as the political theorist Benjamín Arditi has aptly noted, populism is a style of politics that is akin to an uninvited guest at a dinner party who is slightly drunk and talks frankly about uncomfortable truths. Nevertheless, while populist leaders claim to advocate for the "common man", the way they mobilize support is strictly hierarchical. In the context of demonstrations, protest rallies and elections, a top-down approach is evident. The lack of a democratic internal structure within populist movements, the disregard for representative policy formation, the preference for direct, plebiscitarian decision-making – and the associated personality-based and anti-establishment concept of political leadership – do not in and of themselves provide sufficient grounds for categorizing populism as anti-democratic. To do so, there must also be a claim to represent the "true will of the people", which in practice leads to a disregard for political opposition and the marginalization of minorities. By conceptualizing the population as homogenous, populism is necessarily anti-pluralist and, therefore, as emphasized by the political scientist Jan-Werner Müller, also anti-democratic. This is because in democracies, the will of the people is not discernable a priori, but is instead the product of pluralist decision-making processes.

As numerous BTI country reports show, the anti-democratic, illiberal character of populists becomes evident when they gain political power. They see their electoral victory not only as a change of government but also as a regime change – a revolution at the ballot boxes. They therefore interpret their electoral mandate as an imperative mandate to thoroughly dismantle the political system that is supposedly still controlled by the old political elites. Although the individual steps taken may vary in sequence and intensity, there is a typical chronology in which populist, authoritarian governments dismantle democratic institutions. This chronology generally begins with the weakening of the supervisory bodies that were designed to hold the government accountable. As the populist executive in most cases has the backing of a clear parliamentary majority and is thus relatively unchecked by the legislative, the judiciary generally is the first target. Under Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian government provided the Polish PiS-led government with a blueprint of how to partially disempower the constitutional court, appoint judges who are loyal to the party, introduce an age limit for incumbent judges, and curtail judiciary independence. The second step is usually an attack on the freedom of the media. With the aim of dominating the discourse and minimizing criticism, restrictive media legislation is passed (Ecuador, Hungary, Poland), critical newspapers

---

are closed down or bought out by entrepreneurs close to the government (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Turkey), social media channels and online platforms are subjected to cyberattacks or simply banned (Ecuador, Turkey), and critical journalists are threatened. Former European Commissioner for Justice Viviane Reding, who is now a member of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Board of Trustees, summarized the initial dynamics of populist regimes in a nutshell: “Any attack on the constitutional state always begins with an attack on the constitutional court.” During an interview, she said that what came next were attacks on media outlets – first the public ones and then the private ones. “This is the Putin-Orbán-Kaczyński logic,” she added.

The third step consists of attempts to influence civil society by using massive threats (Philippines), limiting foreign support (Hungary, India) or by specifically promoting organizations that are close to the government. The fourth step is to manipulate the electoral system. A range of approaches are used strategically to secure the ruling party’s electoral victory and significantly diminish the power of the opposition. These include re-drawing constituency boundaries, changing electoral laws regarding seat allocation or election funding, re-structuring the electoral authorities, weakening the opposition’s capabilities by reducing media access, and passing anti-terrorism legislation. Finally, the fifth step is to try to prevent the prospective strengthening of the opposition by changing the constitution. Populist governments often attempt to enshrine the “will of the people” in the constitution. Examples include elevating specific political goals to the level of constitutional law (Hungary), removing term limits (numerous countries in Africa and Latin America) and making fundamental changes to the political system in order to disempower the “old” elites (Bolivia, Ecuador).

This strategy of concentrating and securing power is generally communicated openly and reasoned in normative terms. The argument used in Turkey and the Philippines, for example, is as follows: Repression is predominantly used against the “enemies of the people,” so the domination of media outlets or the banning of demonstrations can be legitimized at a higher level – namely that of fulfilling the true wishes of the people. This logic states that it is the concentration of power, without separation of powers or control mechanisms, that enables the government to do its job (for example that of “draining the swamp”) as freely and effectively as possible. After all, by this logic the reasons for securing power are not selfish; securing power is necessary for the fulfilment of the electoral mandate because the fight against the corruption and mismanagement of the old system is not yet over.

Nevertheless, beyond the populist rhetoric, observations and empirical evidence show that neither a higher concentration of power nor an anti-elitist emphasis contributes to a more effective fight against corruption, for instance. The approach to government taken by Hungary’s Prime Minister Orbán and Turkey’s President Erdoğan is to fight a supposedly defensive war against the return of corrupt politicians or the power-hungry military, still influential and pulling strings behind the scenes. This approach promotes social polarization, which secures the rulers’ power and brands all opponents and critics as potential enemies of the state. By weakening or abolishing all supervisory bodies, this approach also makes it harder to prosecute cases of office abuse and to achieve transparency and accountability. In both countries, it is evident that there is a planned development of business networks loyal to the government. These businesses are given preferential treatment during tendering processes and when economic policy decisions are made. This is another reason

---

why both countries are listed among the seven states that Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, which includes data from the BTI, has downgraded the most since 2012 (Transparency International 2018).

Authoritarian Critique of Democracy
Crises relating to the legitimacy and performance of liberal democracies play into the hands of populists and autocrats all over the world. Even today, the discourse in Latin America still makes reference to the devastating social consequences of the “Washington Consensus” policy developed by the Western-dominated IMF and World Bank, which involved structural adjustment programs, austerity policies and cuts to social programs. The global economic crisis, which was caused by Western banks, is used as evidence for a lack of economic governance and is dubbed the “great Western financial collapse.” As a result of the Eurozone crisis, the EU’s ongoing inability to make decisions on key social and economic policy issues, and the insecure membership prospects of numerous countries in Southeast Europe, the attraction of Brussels is diminishing and populist powers are forming governments – including in many longstanding EU member states such as Greece and Italy. The role of the USA as a leading example of democracy has diminished due to the populist and erratic governmental style of President Trump. The quality of democracy is also being eroded in many of the OECD countries. This is captured in detail by the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI). All of these difficulties and unresolved problems are construed as a sign of the decadence and exhaustion of “The West.” They provide authoritarian rulers with an opportunity to present themselves as an alternative development model.

In this context, authoritarianism is being advocated as a successful route for economic development. China is now pointing more aggressively to the economic successes it has enjoyed in recent years, which are indeed impressive. They include consistently high levels of growth, technological advances and a significant and rapid increase in the level of socio-economic development which has lifted hundreds of millions of people from poverty. China argues that this success can be traced back to strict, authoritarian governance, which made it all possible through state-directed industrial policy, rural industrialization and liberalized foreign trade. It could well be argued that the Asian countries of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan pursued the very same kind of economically successful governmental steering before and also after their democratization. Nonetheless, authoritarianism is singled out and praised as an efficient, consistent alternative that facilitates reliable planning and is therefore more successful. Another point that often overlooked in this context is the fact that key aspects of China’s economic success are particular to China. The country has a meritocratic promotion system and it combines economic and administrative decentralization with a system of political centralization that is functional and secures loyalty. These aspects have nothing to do with the authoritarian government as such, and they also cannot simply be replicated in other countries. Instead, Chinese state media present the country’s governmental system as an example for other developing countries to follow if they wish to combine economic progress with social cohesion. A commentary published by the state news agency Xinhua begins as follows: “[C]rises and chaos swamp Western liberal democracy.” It adds that “[t]he Chinese system leads to social unity rather than the divisions which come as an unavoidable consequence


of the adversarial nature of Western democracy today. Endless political backbiting, bickering and policy reversals, which make the hallmarks of liberal democracy, have retarded economic and social progress and ignored the interests of most citizens.”

Malaysia offers another authoritarian model in Southeast Asia – although it may currently be undergoing democratization. Authoritarian development models as exemplified by China and Malaysia are also popular in Eastern and Southern Africa (South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia). They seem to show how long-term state planning and implementation can ease growing social tensions, even if this comes at the expense of political freedoms. In 2014, the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was already making reference to there being “a race underway to find the method of community organisation, the state, which is most capable of making a nation and a community internationally competitive.” He then explicitly named the “stars of the international analysts today [like] Singapore, China, India, Russia and Turkey.” By making this positive reference, he was distancing himself from liberal democracy as the model for transformation. Instead, he proclaimed that Hungary was pursuing “an illiberal state, a non-liberal state” that does not specifically oppose the fundamental principles of liberalism, such as freedom, but “does not make this ideology the central element of state organisation, but instead includes a different, special, national approach.”

This unsubstantiated reference to the supposed benefits of an autocratic, strictly governed development model can be countered with three fundamental observations.

The first is that the list of successful modernizing dictatorships is short – and has become even shorter in recent years. Only four of the 26 countries listed in the BTI 2018 as the most developed market economies are autocracies: Malaysia, Qatar, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates. Gulf States such as Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman, however, were no longer included in this group of countries, due to insufficient diversification, sharp drops in economic performance or widespread mismanagement. This means that the list of showcase authoritarian economies is in fact rather short, even if consideration is given to the low and mid-level economies that are catching up (Rwanda and China respectively).

The second is that even the successful authoritarian modernizers experience periods of weaker growth and are confronted with limitations of their existing growth models, the functionality of which is their only source of legitimization. It is becoming more and more obvious in these cases that, ironically, the lack of transparency, accountability and participatory approaches is contributing to the lack of correction of undesirable developments. It is also negatively affecting the sustainability of the implementation and ongoing progress of development strategies. The main challenge facing many modernizing dictatorships is dealing with the consequences of clientelism. In Singapore, which remains one of the world’s front runners in the area of anti-corruption policy, observers comment that the dynastic ruling elite is consolidating around the Lee family and that more and more questions are being asked concerning the inefficiency of the state-owned Temasek Holdings business conglomerate. Meanwhile, Malaysia has been shaken by a high-level corruption scandal.

---

during which the then prime minister was accused of transferring around $700 million from the Malaysia Development Berhad development fund into his private accounts. When the Panama Papers were made public, international media outlets published reports about China that provided insight into the enormous sums of money that leading party officials, including the family of the head of state, Xi Jinping, had hoarded away in foreign bank accounts. China’s large-scale anti-corruption campaign, meanwhile, seems to have been just as much about a party purge as it was about prosecuting abuse of office. In Rwanda, the fastest rising star among the modernizing dictatorships, the corruption prosecution against leading military figures revealed that the practices of office abuse in the area of illegal mining had been known about for years but the politically opportune moment for prosecution had only just come about.

The third observation concerns a comparison of the economic and social performance of all of the democracies and autocracies assessed by the BTI. Autocracies compare very unfavorably. Although only 26 of the 71 democracies in the BTI 2018 were given a social inclusion score of six points or higher, which denotes a moderate or good level of socio-economic development, even fewer countries (9) in the smaller group of 58 autocracies were given six or more points. Positive examples here are Belarus, Cuba, Kuwait, Russia and Thailand, in addition to Malaysia, Qatar, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates. Despite these positive outliers, the average score for autocracies is 3.55, which is more than a whole point lower than the social inclusion score for democracies (4.85). The comparison of the systems in the area of economic performance yields similar findings. The macroeconomic figures for 55 of the 71 democracies are categorized as satisfactory to good (six points or higher), whereas only 27 of the 58 autocracies fall into these categories. The average score for autocracies is 5.00, which is 1.55 points below the score for democracies.

Nevertheless, these observations are no cause for democratic triumphalism. In some of the larger economies in democratic countries, such as Brazil, Hungary, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa and Turkey, economic transformation is stagnating or in rapid regression. Yet in these cases too, the
economic downturn has been accompanied by a decline in the quality of democracy, along with widespread office abuse and glaring mismanagement.

As such, it should not be taken as a given that democratically ruled countries will pursue more socially inclusive policies just because there is usually at least relatively free competition to win over the electorate. In the same way, it should not be assumed that a viable foundation for democratic rule can only exist if there is a certain level of economic and social development. In many cases, a much more complex underlying interplay may exist between these two factors, alongside other country-specific influences. Even with this cursory overview of the performance of various political systems, it can be said with some degree of certainty that in the overwhelming majority of cases, authoritarian governmental structures are not positively effecting the sustainable development of market economies and social inclusion.

By collating the analysis, it can be seen that we are not looking at the global “retreat of democracy” in terms of a sudden increase in the number of countries ruled by autocratic governments. Rather, the quality of democracy is being eroded all over the world, particularly with respect to political participation and the rule of law. Commitment to democratic institutions and approval of democracy are some of the consolidation indicators that have deteriorated most in recent years. The deficits in the functionality and performance of democracies represent one reason for this development. Another reason is the influence of anti-democratic critics with populist and authoritarian origins. Populists who are in power seek to decisively undermine the supervisory bodies that constrain their power. They initially weaken the rule of law and then move on to the participatory elements. Their achievements in government, however, do not compare well with their anti-elitist promises. Many populist leaders devote themselves more and more to the goal of retaining power and developing new clientelistic structures of the kind they previously promised to abolish. The authoritarian model for development, which promises that strict state leadership will bring more efficiency and prosperity, does not tend to perform well either. In most of the autocracies assessed by the BTI, with the exception of a few successful cases, there are high levels of social inequality, economic performance is poor and corruption is rife. Bearing in mind that these alternative concepts have had very little success in practice, it is astonishing how much impact they can have on apparently insecure democratic societies. Deliberations about how to reinforce democracy around the world should therefore include the re-telling of a positive, self-assured democratic narrative.

**Conclusions**

Under President Trump the USA has at least partly abdicated its role as a leading democratic power and rediscovered isolationist positions such as “America First.” Its value-led foreign policy has been superseded by financial, entrepreneurial considerations and developing nations are being referred to with unmasked contempt as “shithole countries.” In light of these developments, the role of the European Union, which is one of the most influential democratic powers at an international level, is particularly important. As set out in the Analysis section, the challenge that the EU faces is threefold. It entails discourse, self-correction and the promotion of transformation.

The discursive challenge is that of proactively presenting the benefits of a democracy based on the rule of law and of regional cooperation of democratic states – as a community of values rather than simply a free trade zone or an isolationist bloc for retaining prosperity – in a way that is both self-assured and self-assuring. There needs to be a fresh retelling of the success story of democracy and of Europe, not as a propaganda counteroffensive against populist and authoritarian positions but within a self-critical yet appreciative reflective process. In this process, democrats and
Europeans can make use of an extensive, tried and tested arsenal of discourse options, particularly those that are held at the ready by institutes for political education and by foundations associated with political parties. Furthermore, civil society initiatives such as “Pulse of Europe” are taking their pro-European and democratic views to the streets, which justifies hope in the ability of democrats to mobilize support. As the political scientist Wolfgang Merkel recently emphasized, however, it will be of elementary importance when tackling this discursive challenge that more liberally minded “cosmopolitans […] do not [exhibit the] cognitive and moral arrogance of better-educated people and exclude communitarian positions from the discourse […] by designating them as morally inadmissible.”

The fact that globalization has led to more intra-societal inequality cannot simply be dismissed. Nor can the fact that the supranational expansion of political spheres has contributed to a reduction in democratic governability. Furthermore, there is the risk that by marginalizing communitarian positions, the “pluralistically legitimate concern of not wanting to be excluded from the political discourse” will morph into culturally identitarian, xenophobic, right-wing populism.

Indeed, the reference that right-wing populists make to the “true” will of the people is about as anti-pluralist as the technocratic insistence that there is “no alternative” to the trends in globalization, digitalization and migration.

There is a representation gap here with regard to communitarian skeptics, some of whom are of a more social democratic orientation and are proponents of a socially inclusive, cohesive society. This gap must be bridged by conveying – in a convincing way – the message that they too will be heard and considered in the democratic order and that their needs will also be represented at the European level. A cornerstone of this discursive self-assurance should therefore consist of self-criticism concerning European democratic deficits, the erosion of the principle of subsidiarity, and bureaucratic over-regulation. This must also be accompanied by the willingness to make reforms.

The challenge of self-criticism is directly linked to the process of reflection. Democratic states and the European Union need to prove their ability to act and must not leave a gap between rhetoric and governance that is large enough for populists to exploit. They not only need to act in response to the urgent problems (such as the glaring prosperity gaps between nations and the growing inequality within societies) and unresolved issues (such as European migration policy), but also in response to the anti-democratic tendencies in their own ranks. The fact that the European Commission has already initiated punitive proceedings against Poland according to Article 7 of the EU treaty in response to the way rule of law has been undermined is therefore a welcome development. In theory, this could result in the withdrawal of the country’s voting rights in the EU, although in practice, Hungary will block unanimous action. For this reason, the European Commission is already planning a link between the allocation of funds to member states and compliance with constitutional standards from 2021 onwards. This procedure can only be blocked by a qualified majority of 15 member states whose combined population constitutes at least 65 percent of the EU population. Although this could represent a sharp instrument against constitutional violations, it is ultimately only a budgetary trick. Bearing in mind, among other factors, the pending potential expansion, which would see pre-accession countries in Southeast Europe joining its ranks, the EU needs a canon of values that is not subject to a majority and that is capable of imposing sanctions. This set of values should not be restricted to rule of law matters but should also take into consideration restrictions on political participation.


Finally, the challenge of promoting transformation continues to center around bringing the European Union’s own political aims and interests in line with the normative aims of the European community of values in its immediate neighborhood and further afield. This is not the place to outline and discuss the main instruments of Europe’s foreign policy, security policy and development policy, to elaborate on the European Neighbourhood Policy or to acknowledge the numerous successful democratization projects to which the EU has given ongoing support. Instead, with the above analysis in mind, this paper simply intends to give a warning regarding the potentially contradictory nature of the goals and their prioritization.

The migration partnerships, the agreement to take back or retain refugees, and the discussions surrounding “safe countries of origin” have already made it clear that the EU’s political interests concerning migration and its measures to promote stability do not line up with the premise of promoting democracy. By supporting hard autocracies such as Ethiopia and Eritrea, the EU is contradicting the normative goals that it has set itself for taking a value-oriented approach to foreign policy. As such, it is helpful to bring to mind the three key political dimensions investigated by the BTI – stateness, participatory democracy based on the rule of law, and democratic consolidation – in order develop a sensitivity to the tensions within these goals. Despite significant successes in supporting the crafting of constitutions, implementing judicial reform and monitoring elections, it is the constituent factors of democratization – that is, the establishment and consolidation of democratic institutions – that tend to be problematic when it comes to providing external support for democracy. This is because these institutions relate directly to local power struggles and the political order and are primarily the prerogative of the sovereign. If local political decision makers do not want to actively pursue the establishment and consolidation of democratic institutions of their own accord, then external efforts to support democratization will soon reach their limits. The enabling factors of democratization like stabilization and consolidation, in turn, allow for a broader scope of cooperation – even with authoritarian rulers and, in cases where political and social integration are being promoted, also with non-governmental players. Nevertheless, more and more authoritarian regimes have identified this vulnerability and have safeguarded against it by implementing restrictive measures. In these circumstances, if there are no democratically legitimized partners who are seeking to consolidate the rule of law or widen opportunities for political participation, external players can certainly focus on stabilization and supporting civil society. These stabilizing or civil society measures should not, however, counteract the constituent elements by helping to stabilize or legitimize regimes that are repressive, or simply authoritarian and populist. Furthermore, they should by no means capitalize on the supposed advantages of authoritarianism, as has been observed in the context of refugee policy.
V   References


Democracy, an Economic Review – Open Market Economies Under Pressure
Thieß Petersen

I Introduction
The political model of a liberal and cosmopolitan democracy is coming under increasing pressure in many Western industrialized nations. This also applies to the economic model prevalent in liberal democracies, which is based on core elements such as private property, competition, open markets and the international division of labor. Although criticism of some economic developments in Western industrialized nations is justifiable, the market-based economic system is still an extremely successful model that is superior to all other existing economic systems.

1. Core Elements of an Open Market Economy
The economic systems found in highly developed industrialized nations such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States are all market economies exhibiting different characteristics. Nevertheless, these countries share a number of core elements inherent to a market economy. The most important are private property combined with the principle of liability; competition among many suppliers in open markets with flexible prices; and an institutional framework set by the government for organizing economic processes based on the division of labor.

Core Elements of an Open Market Economy

Private Property with Liability and Freedom of Contract
Every society needs property rights, i.e. rules that determine who may use a certain object (also to generate income), who may transfer it to others (sell, rent or give it away) and who may modify it. Private property thus also includes freedom of contract. It allows each member of society to enter into binding agreements on the exchange of property rights with other persons. In societies organized as market economies, these rights essentially lie with individual citizens.
This form of property ownership has several economic advantages which, however, can only come to fruition if the principle of liability also applies. This principle must ultimately be understood as a system of rewards and punishments:

- If a person uses his property, which includes his labor, to provide goods or services that are valued by other members of society, the person will earn a relatively high income. This income is the basis for a high level of material prosperity. If, in addition, the person treats his property with care, he can earn this income on an ongoing basis.

- If, however, a person uses the property at his disposal to provide goods or services that consumers do not want, he will not earn an income or only a very limited one. This will have a negative effect on the person’s material wealth. If the person uses his property to cause damage to others, he must pay to redress the damage he has caused, which will reduce his disposable income and his prosperity.

Private property in combination with the principle of liability is thus a driver ensuring the provision of goods and services, increases in efficiency and quality, and prudent use of scarce resources.

**Competition on Open Markets with Flexible Prices**

Production processes based on the division of labor are what generate a high level of economic prosperity. That means that every person or region specializes in the production steps or products for which they have the greatest relative productivity advantages compared to the rest of the world. This ensures that a society can use the productive resources at its disposal to bring forth the greatest possible quantity of goods and services for its citizens. This also means that the larger the market, the greater the opportunities for the (international) division of labor and the associated gains in specialization. Economically successful market economies are therefore those that integrate into the global economy and take advantage of the potential offered by the international division of labor.1

If people no longer produce only what they need themselves, but instead make use of the division of labor to provide goods and services for others, then what consumers plan to consume must be brought into line with what producers intend to produce. Theoretical reflections and historical experience both show that markets with flexible prices do the best job of coordinating these two aspects. Flexible prices fulfill a number of functions in this context:2

- A flexible price ensures that the factors of production present in a society are distributed in such a way that they provide consumers with the greatest possible benefit. For example, suppliers of goods that are highly valued by consumers are able to pay higher wages. Labor will thus be directed toward those sectors producing these goods. Ultimately, more of the goods highly valued by consumers will be produced.

- To put it in negative terms, the price has a sanctioning effect: Prices fall for those products not desired by consumers. Profits decline as well, so that the owners of capital experience a loss of income. If the price falls so far that it no longer covers the cost of production, losses occur. The price thus ensures that companies that do not offer what consumers want will disappear from the market.

---


• Closely linked to the incentivizing and sanctioning function is the innovation effect. In a competitively organized market, every company must fear being squeezed out of the market by its competitors if the latter can offer goods at a lower price. Each company therefore has an incentive to reduce its costs of production through technological advances and thus not be driven out of the market. Falling prices for goods produced by competitors force every company to innovate in order to either improve the quality of its product or to reduce the costs – and, with them, the price – of its product. For consumers, this means that, as the result of advancing technology, they can consume greater amounts of goods while paying a lower price. This increases people’s material well-being.

• The price’s coordinating function in effect means that the price reconciles supply and demand in such a way that companies’ production plans correspond to consumers’ consumption plans. If, for example, suppliers produce a product that does not reflect customers’ desires, the result is an excess supply. The subsequent fall in price would signal to suppliers that they should limit production of this good. That, in turn, would bring production and consumption plans back into alignment.

If the positive effects of a flexible price as described above are actually to occur, no market participant can have power over the market. If individual suppliers (or even demanders) are so large that they are, for all intents and purposes, monopolists, they could exploit their market power. A sole vendor of a product can, for example, set the price at which he sells his product. Since there are no other competitors to which consumers can turn, the price mechanism becomes ineffective. The monopolist could then offer a smaller quantity goods while demanding a higher price. The resulting increase in profits would take place at the expense of consumers. In macroeconomic terms, what results are known as welfare losses.

**Governmental Framework for Organizing Economic Processes Based on the Division of Labor**

Every market economy needs a minimum of framework conditions set by the government if economic processes based on the division of labor are to run smoothly. These conditions include having a legal framework in place that guarantees enforcement of contracts and property rights. The government must also provide a minimum level of public goods (above all infrastructure in the areas of transport, education, health, energy and water supplies, and internal and external security).

Intervention in the price system is needed if market prices do not include all costs and benefits. If the market price does not cover the total cost to society of, for example, environmental pollution resulting from greenhouse gas emissions, then the overall social costs are higher than the costs covered by the market price. This contravenes the liability principle. In this case, which economists call a negative external effect, the government must increase the price by imposing a tax. The amount of the tax corresponds to the overall economic damage caused by greenhouse gas emissions.

Finally, the government must redistribute income if the income distribution achieved by the market does not reflect society’s preferences. This includes ensuring the welfare of those whose market income is not sufficient to lead a decent life. There are no objective criteria for determining the extent of the government’s redistribution efforts. For example, in terms of social preferences there is a lower threshold in Germany for what is considered an acceptable level of income and wealth inequality compared to the United States, which means there is a greater redistribution of income in Germany.
2. Interim Conclusion

Every society faces the fundamental question of how to deal with the fact that people have unlimited needs, but only a limited amount of goods and services are available to satisfy them. The aim is to reduce the tension between unlimited needs and limited resources as much as possible. In order to achieve this goal, a society is faced with numerous questions: Which products should be manufactured? Who will manufacture these products and how? And for whom will the products be manufactured, i.e. how are the scarce goods to be distributed among the members of society?

These questions can be answered either centrally via governmental plans and decision-making or decentrally via markets and prices. Both theoretical considerations and real-life experience suggest that markets and prices can answer these questions better than central plans. The core elements of an open market economy outlined above ensure that companies adapt to the wishes of consumers while also ensuring economic dynamics. The result is an improvement in the material prosperity of a society over time. The focus is on citizens in their role as consumers: Consumers benefit from a market economy by being able to buy a growing quantity of goods and services at falling prices. Historical experience shows that centrally planned economies are not in a position to achieve this.

II Economic Superiority of Open Market Economies

Growing criticism of the globally oriented market-based economic system found in Western industrialized nations has led to doubts about the superiority of the market economy. Yet market economies with the core elements outlined above are still proving to be the superior economic system. Here are three examples.

1. The Historical Example of Korea

Korea provides a historical example of the economic superiority of liberal democracy’s market-based economic institutions. In the summer of 1945, Korea was divided into the South, administered by the United States, and the North, administered by the Soviet Union.

- A market economy based on private property was introduced in South Korea. The South Korean government ensures an effective educational system is in place, along with a well-functioning banking system that facilitates saving and lending. Private property has a positive, incentivizing effect for the country’s citizens. They can be confident that performance, entrepreneurial risk and investments in their competencies will pay off. All of these activities lead to higher incomes which result in a higher material standard of living for individual citizens and their families.

- North Korea, in contrast, has a command economy that allows neither private property nor official markets. Incentives to produce and to innovate are therefore lacking. Instead of markets and prices coordinating economic activity, corruption and black markets are the rule. Without economic progress, the government is not in a position to provide effective infrastructure.

The economic successes are clear: The people of South Korea have now reached a standard of living equal to that of Portugal and Spain. The standard of living in North Korea is ten times lower.

3 For the following, see Daron Acemoglu, and James A. Robinson. Warum Nationen scheitern. 2nd ed. Frankfurt am Main 2014, pp. 100–108.
than in the South, corresponding to that of economies in sub-Saharan Africa. The low level of material prosperity corresponds to a low non-material standard of living. The average life expectancy in North Korea, for example, is some ten years shorter than in South Korea.

The two countries had a shared history until 1945, which means the economic differences cannot be explained by cultural or religious differences. Geographic factors, moreover, cannot be the cause. South Korea’s considerably better economic development compared to the North can be traced back instead to the two nations’ different economic institutions.

2. Key Socio-Economic Indicators

In recent decades, a number of autocratic societies have exhibited high rates of economic growth – far above those seen in Western economies, a phenomenon which could be interpreted as demonstrating the weakness of Western market economies.

Yet it must be noted that Western industrialized nations continue to enjoy the highest levels of material prosperity. This becomes clear if, as an indicator of economic performance, one looks at gross domestic product (GDP), i.e. the value of all the goods and services produced in a country within one year (see Figure “Gross Domestic Product per Capita (Constant Prices) in Selected Countries”). For example, when adjusted for differences in purchasing power, the real (meaning adjusted for inflation) GDP per capita that Turkey and Russia achieved in 2017 corresponds to the per capita figures that Germany, France, Italy and the US exhibited as early as 1980.
The high level of material prosperity in Western industrialized nations thus also leads to an improvement in non-material living conditions. This can be seen, for example, in health-related indicators such as infant mortality. In developed industrialized nations such as Germany, France and Italy, the infant mortality rate is currently (2017) between 3.0 and 3.5 deaths per 1,000 births and in Japan only 1.9 deaths. In Russia the corresponding figure is 6.0, in Turkey and China 10.0 and in Venezuela 12.5.4

---

Finally, the ‘Human Development Report 2016’ (more recent data not available) shows that Western market economies also perform better in indicators of life expectancy and the length of school attendance.
3. Global Migration: Voting with their Feet
Perhaps the strongest argument at present for the superiority of an open market economy is the destination chosen by international migrants. Regardless of whether people are leaving their native countries due to armed conflict, persecution, environmental pressures or poverty, the nations that international migrants are trying to reach are the Western liberal democracies with their market economies, and not countries such as Russia, Turkey, Hungary and China – at least when people are free to choose their destination countries.

Refugees by Hosting Countries in 2016

III Criticism of Economic Development in Western Industrialized Nations
A central element of Western industrialized market economies is the openness of markets, an essential factor for the international division of labor. The inclusion of industrialized nations in the global division of labor – including a cross-border exchange of goods, services, capital, workers, technologies and knowledge – increases GDP and, with it, the material well-being of all countries involved.\(^5\)

As a correlation of this economic globalization, the opening of borders for goods, services and production factors also changes the level of scarcity in each participating country and, with it, prices. Price adjustments lead to diminished income opportunities for certain social groups. In Western

industrialized nations, this applies above all to the workforce, whose wages tend to move toward the global average as a result of the international division of labor and the growing accessibility of markets.

1. Globalization and Worldwide Wage Convergence

There are two key mechanisms that tend to reduce employment and wages in developed economies with open borders:

- Immigration of labor from less developed economies: Wages are considerably higher in developed industrialized nations than in less developed economies. This serves as an incentive for workers in countries with lower wages to emigrate to the developed economies. In the ideal global labor market, in which changing one's place of employment and residence is possible without any transaction costs, migratory movements of this sort lead to identical wages in all of the world's regions. This global wage would lie between the higher wages found in industrialized countries such as Germany and the US and those in Asian low-wage countries. This would mean lower pay for employees in developed economies, since their wages would fall to the global average.

- Imports of goods from low-wage countries: As the international division of labor occurs, a global realignment of wages also takes place since individual economies begin specializing in certain products and those products are subsequently traded among countries. Due to the low wages found in populous countries such as China and India, those economies have an international competitive advantage in the production of labor-intensive goods. They thus specialize in manufacturing these products. This, in turn, increases the demand for labor, since greater production volumes require more labor. The higher demand for labor causes wages to rise. Highly developed economies such as Germany and the US, conversely, concentrate on producing capital- and technology-intensive products. Thus, they limit the production of labor-intensive products and the demand for labor falls. The reduced demand for labor results in lower wages. Under ideal conditions, wages would converge worldwide, as would interest rates, i.e. the price of capital as a production factor. This development is also known as factor price equalization.\footnote{See Horst Siebert. Außenwirtschaft. 7th ed. Stuttgart 2000, pp. 62–67.}

These basic economic considerations thus lead to the conclusion that opening borders for goods, services and factors of production in developed economies results in a decline in employment and wages. These labor market developments are reinforced by technological progress taking place in competitively organized markets.

2. Labor-Saving Technological Progress and Global Wage Convergence

Employment- and wage-reducing effects also result from technological advances, which replace human labor in developed economies with capital and technology. This technological progress stems from the need to reduce costs as described above: In a market economy based on competition, companies must permanently reduce their costs of production in order to remain competitive with other players and not be forced out of the market. An effective way to reduce costs is to deploy modern technologies, which increase overall productivity and thus lower production costs. Because wages are relatively high in developed industrialized countries, these economies have an incentive to reduce labor costs by availing themselves of technological advances. In highly
developed economies such as Germany, these advances become evident as one production factor, capital, replaces another, labor. This results in a decline in employment, downward pressure on wages and an increase in income for the production factor of capital.

In less developed economies, on the other hand, the considerable supply of labor means there is no great economic incentive to implement measures that would achieve labor-saving technological progress. Consequently, there is no downward pressure on wages and employment.

The need to reduce costs – and the associated incentive to realize labor-saving technological progress – applies even in an economy that is completely isolated from the rest of the world. Globalization, however, increases the pressure to cut costs since it leads to a considerable rise in the number of potential competitors.

### 3. Empirical Evidence of the Impact Globalization and Technological Progress on the Labor Market

Empirical evidence of the wage-reducing effect international migration has in Western industrialized nations is relatively weak. For example, the negative impact of immigrant workers on the job market in Germany has been negligible.\(^7\) This is undoubtedly because labor migration in Germany is very limited. The influx of workers is therefore too small to produce noticeable macroeconomic effects. However, the impact is different if subsections are examined instead of the job market as a whole. An analysis of how migrant workers affect wage levels in different industries (e.g. manufacturing versus simple services) shows that the influx of workers from abroad is causing wages in the simple services sector in particular to fall.\(^8\)

---


Conversely, evidence of the wage-cutting effects of trade with low-wage countries is much stronger. There are numerous empirical studies showing that imports from low-wage countries — especially China and Eastern Europe — tend to lower employment and wage levels in industrialized nations such as Germany and the US.⁹

Studies on the labor market effects of technological progress also show the consequences described above for employment and wage levels in developed economies.¹⁰ The use of robots has — until now — only had a minor impact on the job market. For example, one study that examined the influence of robots on regional labor markets in the US between 1990 and 2007 comes to the conclusion that a newly deployed industrial robot eliminates three to six jobs. That represents a loss of 360,000 to 670,000 jobs for the US economy as a whole. Every additional robot per 1,000 workers reduces wages by 0.25 to 0.5 percent.¹¹ This wage pressure is likely to increase over time, however.

The few studies outlined here on how the labor market is affected by the international division of labor, the associated cross-border trade and the increased deployment of capital and technology in production processes have been confirmed by numerous other studies. For developed economies such as Germany, this has an impact on the distribution of income and opportunities for social participation. In brief, two trends can be identified for earned income:

- In terms of professional qualifications, those individuals who have undergone little or no occupational training will see a decline in their income and employment prospects.

- In terms of economic sectors, employees in manufacturing in particular are affected by lower employment and wage levels, since that is where many routine manual tasks can be replaced by machines and robots, and since the manufacturing sector workforce in low-wage countries competes with these employees.

These two aspects have an impact on living conditions for people in developed economies. On the one hand, there are actual losses in employment and income for some individuals in the groups described above. On the other, those individuals who might be impacted in the future start to fear that they could soon be without a job or have a reduced income — something that might even be the more important factor underlying the growing criticism of liberal, cosmopolitan democracy. The result is greater economic uncertainty for these individuals. Globalization adds to this uncertainty to the extent that it becomes difficult if not impossible for national governments to regulate global markets. This economic uncertainty gives rise in turn to growing criticism of the economic system found in liberal, cosmopolitan democracies.

---


¹¹ See Daron Acemoglu, and James A. Robinson. Warum Nationen scheitern. 2nd ed. Frankfurt am Main 2014.
4. Populist Response by Autocrats

There are two basic approaches to dealing with the negative economic consequences of globalization and technological progress on certain social groups in developed economies: first, preventing globalization-induced income changes through economic isolation and preventing or at least forestalling technological advances and the associated structural change; second, compensatory measures for those individuals whose employment and income opportunities are diminished due to globalization and technology.

Populist governments often choose the first approach. Their economic policies frequently exhibit the following characteristics (excerpted from Petersen 2018):

- Populist economic policy wants to make it possible for people to live beyond their means here and now. To solve economic problems, the government implements simple, fast-acting measures while disregarding the medium- and long-term costs. Necessary economic reforms are ignored in order not to endanger the government’s popularity.

- The costs of this short-term increase in prosperity are left to burden future generations, who will have to repay debts to foreign creditors and face the reduced long-term growth caused by the lack of technological progress and structural change.

- Economic actors are divided into the native population, whose prosperity and jobs are threatened by the prevailing economic system, and a small opposing group of profiteers (domestic political and economic elites as well as foreigners).

This economic policy’s most important instruments include massive tax cuts and permanent increases in debt-driven public-sector expenditures; high trade barriers on imports coupled with subsidies for businesses exporting goods and services; massive intervention in the pricing system through the introduction of subsidies and price ceilings and floors; and indebtedness of the entire economy to foreign creditors. These steps violate basic principles of the market economy. The interventions in the pricing system interfere with the role prices play as outlined in Section 1.3, thereby overriding the market mechanism at least in part. Burdening the entire economy with debt invalidates the principle of liability to the extent that people living today purchase goods and services from abroad, for which future generations will have to pay by consuming less. Limits on imports result in higher prices for the affected goods and services. This, in turn, reduces the purchasing power of domestic consumers and increases production costs for domestic businesses.

Thus, past experiences with this sort of economic policy – known mostly from its implementation in Latin American countries in the 1970s and 1980s – all ended in economic disaster: 12

- Tax cuts and greater government spending gave a short-term boost to growth and employment while increasing public debt. High domestic demand could not be met by domestic production, which led to higher credit-financed imports and to incurring debts abroad.

---

Increases in demand led to higher prices. Growing current account deficits caused a devaluation of domestic currencies which made imports more expensive. Greater inflation led to wage increases (wage-price spiral). Government subsidies mitigated the losses in purchasing power caused by inflation. This, however, increased both government deficits and the debt owed to foreign creditors.

Government efforts to curb inflation and prevent currency devaluations were unsuccessful, however. Current account deficits grew, as did foreign and public debt. Real wages fell since nominal wage increases could not keep pace with inflation. Capital flight led to less investment. Production and employment declined and GDP shrank. The growing shortage of foreign currency and worsening credit ratings limited import opportunities. Everyday goods and services became scarce as a result.

Hyperinflation and increasing debt ultimately led to massive economic collapse and to failed governments. Financial support from abroad, e.g. from the IMF, was necessary to get the affected economies going once again.

Current manifestations of such an economic policy will have more or less the same results. In Turkey, the consequences of the massive government intervention in the economy are already visible. Greater public spending, tax cuts and government loan subsidies and credit guarantees led to a short-term economic boom. The negative repercussions of this policy are now being felt, with the country’s growing public debt tarnishing its credit rating. The devaluation of the Turkish lira is causing the inflation rate to rise rapidly. Inflation and devaluation are leading to capital flight, which is having a negative impact on investment and production.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13} See Thieß Petersen. Turkey’s economy – to boom or not to boom?. Blog post on GED-Home. December 27, 2017.
Economic policy in the United States also has populist elements. Massive tax cuts combined with planned higher government spending will lead to an increase in public debt. Punitive tariffs on imports are reducing the purchasing power of the country’s consumers and the competitiveness of its companies. Over the short term, this will increase economic growth in the US. Over the medium- and long-term, however, the growth-dampening effects will predominate.

Thus, a policy based on economic isolation and massive government intervention in the market is not capable of generating long-term economic prosperity for a country.

5. Economic Policy Implications

Despite all the legitimate criticism about the effects economic globalization and technological progress in developed countries are having on various groups and regions, an open, competitively organized market economy remains an extremely efficient economic system.

At the same time, the negative effects on employment and income described above cannot be ignored. This is true not for reasons having to do with social justice, but social acceptance. Certain groups of people in developed economies such as Germany suffer disadvantages in terms of income and employment because of advancing globalization and technological progress. However, whether or not justice demands that they should be compensated for those disadvantages is, ultimately, a value judgement.

Declining social acceptance of the social and economic system, in contrast, represents an objective threat to the system’s long-term functioning. Without this acceptance a number of dangers loom, including social tensions, strikes and protests, not to mention an increase in property crime and other illegal activity. Not only is there reason to expect a decline in acceptance by those individuals who actually experience reduced income and employment opportunities (e.g. loss of a job, involuntary reduction in daily working hours, reduced wages), but also by those people who fear that they or their families might be negatively impacted.

As described in Section 4, a departure from market-based principles would be the wrong way forward. It would make more sense to retain an open, dynamic market economy and continue benefitting from the advantages of specialization and the productivity increases made possible by the international division of labor and technological progress. To ensure that social acceptance does not decline, the gains from globalization and technological advances must be broadly distributed throughout society. Many policy areas will have to be involved to achieve this goal: the tax transfer system, the entire educational system, structural and regional policies and all areas relating to social security.

This way forward leads to an inclusive solution, since it aims to ensure everyone in society benefits from the advantages of an international division of labor and technological progress. The goal is thus to achieve a more equitable distribution of the greater opportunities for social, political, and economic participation that result from open economies. If these efforts are not successful, political and societal tensions could arise, putting more pressure on the entire social and economic system present in liberal democracies.

6. The EU’s Options for Taking Action

In view of the noted advantages offered by a market economy and considering how globalization and technological progress are affecting labor markets in Western industrialized nations, the EU has, in my opinion, two basic options for taking action.
On the one hand, it would be advisable to strengthen the central principles of the market economy in order to increase growth and innovation in Europe. The following measures should be considered, especially in view of the international division of labor: completion of the European single market (above all in the areas of trade in services, cross-border mobility of labor, and the digital single market) and conclusion of regional free-trade agreements (primarily with countries whose economic systems are also based on market principles).

On the other hand, the dividends resulting from globalization and technology must be distributed in Europe in such a way that everyone, if possible, benefits from them. This would include implementing measures that increase the mobility of the EU’s citizens for professional purposes, making it possible for them to move into those sectors that are benefiting most from the international division of labor. One instrument that has existed since 2006 is the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, which aids workers who have lost their jobs because of changes in global trading patterns. It funds measures such as needs-based training and retraining; support for people looking for work; career counseling and coaching; and assistance for business start-ups.14

---

IV References


Daron Acemoglu, and James A. Robinson. Warum Nationen scheitern. 2nd ed. Frankfurt am Main 2014.


Arts and Culture: Keeping Democracy Alive or Entertainment for the Establishment?

Sabine Dengel | Thomas Krüger

I Preliminary Remarks

Our reflections first describe the influence of art and culture on democratic political systems. In this section, we will focus on various stakeholders as we consider the arts, culture, artistic and cultural institutions and practices, and the recipients of art and culture; we will conclude with some remarks about the culturalization of the social realm. In the second section, we investigate current aspects of the crisis of democracy and sketch out aspects of the crisis of legitimacy, trust and representation; describe the challenges of the growing role of identity politics; and use two examples to illustrate how cultural and political education are generating new ideas as well as the importance of trans-national educational scenarios. Finally, we provide recommendations for action that are addressed to stakeholders at the European level.

In our considerations, we assume that art and culture are always realized within a general set of social conditions. In optimal cases, art and culture are not controlled and regimented by hegemonic agents but instead serve as independent generative forces. Art and culture are capable of transcending borders, thereby making it possible to conceive of the impossible, opening up new perspectives and creating new space for expression. On the other hand, art and culture can also be instrumentalized, used to pay homage to and legitimize regimes. They do not exist in a vacuum but instead are context-dependent. Under the conditions of repressive and authoritarian political practices, insisting on the autonomy of artistic and cultural creation is risky, but art and culture thereby also gain critical, and sometimes even utopian, relevance.

In our discussion, we do not seek to “politicize” and thereby fix the context of art and culture. There are always dimensions of artistic and cultural creation that extend beyond the realm of the political, especially with regard to aesthetics. However, those dimensions are not relevant for our considerations here. We seek to provide commentary on and contextualize a few questions that arise with respect to this year’s Trilogue Salzburg:

Is culture an early warning system for the erosion of democracy? Are the conditions of production and the acceptance of art an early warning system? Are art and culture prerequisites for a functional level of dialogue and communication, and thus for democracy as well? How can they generate momentum toward new ways of thinking about democratic systems today? What lessons can we learn from the basis of a cultural perspective, and what recommendations can we deduce from those lessons?

We are especially interested in the following key questions:

- What are, from a cultural perspective, the minimal standards for a democratic system/a democratic republic that serves all people?
- What deficiencies, characteristics or qualities of the democratic model would cause the entire model to be called into question?
- What are (or should be) the fundamental rules of power, participation and decision-making processes?
- What can we learn from art and culture in order to improve today’s democracies?
II The Influence of Art and Culture on Democratic Political Systems

Culture matters! There is a general consensus that art and politics have a reciprocal relationship with each other. In contemporary art, art often displays a political dimension as well as an aesthetic one; this tendency serves to emphasize the political relevance of artistic articulation. On the one hand, artistic practice serves to reveal political contexts and relationships, but it also pursues its own political objectives, such as the creation of spaces for artistic creation or societal participation. These days, artistic practice is often a realm in which alternative political experimentation and action can occur.\(^1\) On the one hand, politics can also be understood as a specific cultural form with its own conventions of expression and specific political consequences; that cultural form coincides with the general trend toward culturalization (see below).

The scope implied by these projects makes it clear that the over-arching question of the influence of art and culture on democratic systems cannot be answered without presuppositions. Every political theorist will choose a different approach, depending on his or her orientation. In the context of systems-theoretical considerations, the answer would likely be that there is no influence. If the question is that of “influence on politics,” the question of scope would be primary: Influence on content? Influence on processes? Influence on structures? Are we talking about culturalization of politics or politicization of culture?

A more difficult task is explaining what “art” and “culture” are intended to mean below. We suggest clearly distinguishing the phenomena of art and culture from one another. In our consideration of art, we take a perspective that looks at the stakeholders and their potential for constructively working, by means of artifacts (artworks), on current problems in democracy; we do not focus on the art system. We likewise view the phenomenon of “culture” by focusing on how stakeholders from the fields of cultural politics, cultural institutions and civil society influence political content, processes and structures. Finally, we want to take a look at the agency of the recipients of art and culture; here we take our cue from the discourse on reception aesthetics in the field of literary theory.

Furthermore, we find that considering “culture” as a socially structuring phenomenon is meaningful because this context enables us to discuss the society-spanning influence of cultural apparatuses and narratives, and culturalizing tendencies in the late modern era in particular. We thus talk about the background, the atmosphere or the specific social “sound” against or in which art, politics and society articulate themselves.

1. The Artists

Representatives of political and cultural education generally find their professions capturing public or political attention primarily when societal crisis phenomena or increased public awareness of crisis become evident. Similarly, when questions get asked about the potential of art, it is safe to

---

\(^1\) There are numerous examples of projects that illustrate this: In 2014, the “Geheimagentur” (“Secret Agency”) ensemble launched a transnational convention called “The Art of Being Many” that brought together real-democracy activists from many parts of Europe and the world at the Kampnagel theatre in Hamburg. The convention was devoted to new techniques and aesthetics, strategies and theories of assembling. The gathering addressed the timing, sounds and affects of gatherings, the movement and materiality of collective decisions. The objective was to try out, experience and sample -- not just to discuss. What is the “State of the Art of Being Many”? Another contemporary example is a project called “Artfremde Einrichtung. Die Kultureinrichtung als Allmende” (“Appropriation of the institution: The cultural institution as common space”) by zeitraumexit ("timespaceexit"), an independent theatre group based in Mannheim. In this project, the theatre was handed over for four weeks at a time, following voting by a public assembly, to citizens for realization of their own performances.
assume that the political realm is already in big trouble. But it's usually hard to say what exactly the question is that art answers, claims to answer or could answer. We wish to formulate and test a number of hypotheses in order to use art to counter the currently discernible problems or “weaknesses” of democracy. We suggest the following here:

Thesis 1 – Art does not want to be useful, but it can be political
Art, which has struggled for its autonomy and had that autonomy validated in Western democratic societies since the Romantic era, does not like to be assessed on the basis of functional aspects or considerations of usefulness. Until the very recent past, most artists insisted on art’s (albeit mostly fictive) aesthetic autonomy and purpose-free nature. As a result of the specific German historical development of the understanding of culture and education, art was doubly apolitical in the 19th century: Culture and education, in contrast to the enlightened French way of understanding them, were seen as tools for achieving inner sublimation, spiritual and moral self-development and refinement of the personality. These realms were used polemically against modernity’s alleged challenges in the social, political and spiritual realms. At issue was not just a negative political freedom, i.e. freedom from political grasping. For many representatives of German culture, (democratic) political activity per se was considered suspicious; one can find exaggerated expressions of this in Thomas Mann’s “Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man” and his arguments with the “civilization literati.” In the most recent phase, shaped by neoliberalism, both art and cultural education have therefore largely refused to engage in utilitarian thinking, even though representatives of politics and government have, via well-funded support programs, at least formulated the hope that access to culture and creative engagement with art have positive personal and sociopolitical consequences and can thereby help attenuate the deficits that the economization of the educational system has systematically produced. The current boom in school-based and extracurricular cultural education is among the phenomena that can be classified this way. Artists have been getting much more political in recent years, as described in the sections below, but the spaces they develop are not necessarily therefore pedagogical or political spaces per se. Section 1.4 elaborates on the idea that today, even aesthetic experience without political intent already has political implications.

Thesis 2 - Artists can come up with counter-cultures and alternative visions of society
The systems theorist Dirk Baecker recently recalled Heiner Müller’s well-known observation: “And for me, art’s role is to make reality impossible.”2 This statement contains some weighty notions about art’s potential. For one thing, artists as cultural producers are mentioned in the same breath as intellectuals, with their ability to provide culturally relevant interpretations of reality. Ideally, the representatives of the “vision business” are obligated to a “standpoint of norms and values that claim universal validity”3 and bear no political responsibility. According to Pierre Bourdieu’s fundamental determination,

“an intellectual is... a bidimensional being. In order to deserve to be called an intellectual, a cultural producer must meet two requirements: on the one hand, he must belong to an intellectually autonomous world (a field), i.e. one that is free from religious, political, economic, etc. powers, and respect that field’s special laws; moreover, he must also bring the specific

comence and authority acquired within that intellectual field to a political action that must take place outside of the intellectual field in the narrower sense.4

Democracy needs autonomous references in order to call itself into question and be able to develop perspectives on that basis. The representatives of non-democratic political systems, or systems that are on the way there, usually permit only affirmative voices and work to eliminate autonomous realms. Artists are only left with a choice between making a “courty gesture” or entering the cultural opposition, or else the option of invisibility.

**Thesis 3 - Artists’ references to democratically created politics or political systems are ambivalent**

It’s no secret that numerous artists have let themselves be harnessed to totalitarian propagandist fantasies by the protagonists of Germany’s recent non-democratic political systems. Until the mid-20th century, a good number of cultural producers viewed the ideal of the French intellectual à la Clemenceau as an irrelevant and generally undesired measuring stick, but more recently there have been perceptible changes. There has been increasing academic discussion of the phenomena of “post-politics,” 5, “anti-politics,” 6 or “crisis of representation” 7 since Colin Crouch’s publication of his theory of “post-democracy,” 8 and the number of artists addressing political subjects as individuals or in their artistic work, and who consider these subjects using their own particular media, has also been growing. The big art exhibitions of recent years, like the 2015 Venice Biennale 9 and Documenta 2017, involved a hitherto unseen number of high-quality and high-intensity political artwork. Examples of political work that has had an especially pronounced effect on the public include that of the Swiss artist Milo Rau or the “Center for Political Beauty” founded by Philipp Ruch. In the Yearbook of Cultural Politics that appeared in the fall of 2018, Rau writes as follows about his projects “Kongo Tribunal” and “General Assembly”:

"Realism -- realistic politics, realistic art -- can thus only be this: Listening to those voices who know something, and thus putting own’s own view of things into motion. Things that seem right to us from a distance, enclosed in our own logic, are often completely wrong. The present by nature appears compelling to contemporaries, even hermetic, especially in today’s world, in which everything could be said to be “preordained,” since it’s set up for profit. ... The present, all the brilliance of our days, everyday life and in the end the meaning of life of billions of people and trillions of other living beings is reduced, in the age of finance capitalism, to being merely a transitional space in which the future is to unfold. After all, the future has been sold before it even takes place -- our task, the task of civil society, is to reclaim it.... However, the only way of breaking out of the totality of current time is to view it from a distance. Whether from the future, looking back at oneself with a utopian eye -- or, the other way around, looking in the past for comparable moments, for epochal breaks that are equally absurd and nightmarish. After all, at the beginning of every revolution there is an anti-narcissistic reflection, so to speak, a reflection of oneself in that which has become completely foreign, in the past, in that which has failed."

---

6 With that term, the thought is expressed that current protest is not primarily directed against established politics but rather against the "deeper conviction that politics as such is meaningless" (see Frank Furedi: Politics of Fear. Beyond left and Right, London 2005, p. 29, based on: Ingolfur Blühdorn. Simulative Demokratie. Neue Politik nach der postdemokratischen Wende ("Simulative Democracy. New Politics after the Post-Democratic Transformation"), Berlin 2013, p. 24).
8 Colin Crouch. Post-Democracy. Frankfurt am Main 2008
9 One of the politically most charged works was the re-enacted installation “Untitled” by Cuban artist Tania Bruguera, which strikingly staged the topic of repressed freedom of opinion in her country.
Changes to structures and symbolic actions like the expansion of Documenta 2017 to the Athens location are also clearly political in nature. To be distinguished from this is the phenomenon, associated for example with poverty, social marginalization or racism, of artists taking on roles within the social or political order. Since the migrations of the 2015-2016 years, they are increasingly helping refugees in seek jobs, look for places to live and acquire funds, and accompanying people to various authorities. The “Silesian 27,” who under their leader Barbara Meyer view themselves as an “art laboratory for young people who want to change the world,” have increasingly networked with refugee assistance organizations in order to offer training as well as newly set-up social services. One example is a project called CUCULA – Refugees Company for Crafts and Design. One of many other examples, albeit an outstanding one, is Neue Nachbarschaft/Moabit e. V., a Berlin-based organization founded by Belarusian artist Marina Naprushkina, who since 2013 has been using a wide range of approaches to work with people seeking refuge. The stated goal is the creation

“of a social and artistic platform for exchange, learning and engagement for neighbors from around the world. We are learning from one another rather than helping... Our goal is to influence society, to actively help shape it, to create new possibilities for political and social togetherness that will be free of hierarchy.... Our work is done on a volunteer basis.”

Artists, by understanding their own work as “social sculpture,” address deficits in politics by filling in for and taking care of tasks that are incumbent upon the state and society. The problems that are triggered by the state’s withdrawal or refusal to act provoke a more charged form of political aesthetics that pushes the limits of artistic activity and thus aims to expand the spaces in which political action occurs.

**Thesis 4 - Art can support democracy, but also questions it**

Both types of “politicization” of artists are equally suitable for both supporting and questioning the democratic political system. On the one hand it becomes clear that democratic politics alone, within the framework of the nation-state, can no longer address or solve the global challenges of the present, like climate change, human rights violations during war, global refugee movements, organized crime, the dangers of finance capitalism, etc. It needs transnational models of politics. On the other hand, democratic politics now also depends on support and participation by civil society even within its nation-state framework; that support and participation must go beyond the level traditionally desired on the basis of the representative democracy model. However, this need not necessarily be interpreted as an indicator of the erosion of democracy, since democracy is still the only form of government in the world that can handle at all efficiently the problems we face and that offers its citizens a reasonable amount of quality of life, health care, public safety, welfare and social support as well as cultural and educational opportunities that non-democratic political systems cannot even dream of. A central aspect here is the necessity of distinguishing between art that sticks its finger in the wound and art that leaves its own field and treads on the ground of political activity. Even if this occurs with the best intentions for democracy, the various ways of seeking to fulfill governmental tasks constitute a tendency that could also contribute to weakening democratic political systems in the long run. The “third sector” supports and supplements the state’s tasks, but it cannot replace them.

**Thesis 5 - Art can negate the world, generate freedom**

The quotation cited above by the dramatist Heiner Müller, which asserts that art’s role is to make reality impossible, points to the concept of negation, which is of interest in both philosophy and sociology. Jean Paul Sartre, in his main ontological work “Being and Nothingness,” had considered the necessity of negation as a constitutive moment for being (“a being that is what it is not and is

http://neuenachbarschaft.de/info/.
not what it is”) and emphasized in particular consciousness’ ability to “nihilate.” Grossly simplified, “nihilation” implies that because of their existential feeling of lack, people seek to overcome a current condition and replace it with a different one, thereby referencing the future and its possibilities: A person is not just what he or she is, but will be something different in the future.\(^\text{11}\) This presence of nothing or of not-yet, to leave Sartre’s language, is the fundamental condition for being able to be. Negation can inspire destruction, elimination, a new beginning or be a constitutive element of social systems’ self-correction. As examples of the latter, systems theorist Dirk Baecker lists the following: opposition in politics, competition in business, doubt in religion, falsification in science.\(^\text{12}\) In art, it’s mainly about the ability to consider “everything” to be false. Using theatre as an example, Baecker shows that the ability to make reality impossible depends on interaction; “circumstances [are] presented... that can only be negated thanks to specific encounters, thanks to dramatic developments, thanks to clever intrigue.” And this social interaction must be critical:

> “Art’s role lies in finding it true that everything is false, and thereby giving us as individuals and in interaction the breathing room and the desire to start again, differently. The longing remains to be able to find it true that something is true, to find it possible that something is real. This longing is fulfilled in interaction precisely when it is freed for negation...”\(^\text{13}\)

What results for our topic from dealing with negation, with the act of finding things false? Sartre, especially after the second world war, is concerned with demonstrating opportunities for human freedom on the basis of existential responsibility. Consciousness is referenced to its possibilities. Through their ability to negate, through their relationship to not-yet and no-longer, people have choice, invent themselves, have the ability to be free and also bear responsibility. With regard to art, the discussion concerns the potential for developing utopia on the basis of negation and thereby envisioning alternative worlds. Political scientist Maria do Mar Castro Varela also takes up the thinking of Ernst Bloch when she speaks about utopia, positing that we have to call the system into question without already being able to pull a different, better model out of the hat.\(^\text{14}\)

**Thesis 6 - Art can reflect the world, create worlds**

On the one hand, these days we move within surroundings that are the result of technical, political or artistic strategies and processes and that place certain expectations of people. On the other hand, there are already realms that have left human reception or participation behind. Examples of this are designed artificial worlds, already practically taken for granted, in which people move, live and work, worlds that they use and by which they are used. These include self-driving cars, smart homes, vacation resorts, shopping malls, gentrified neighborhoods, downtowns designed based on economic imperatives, aestheticized workplaces, consumption and wellness industry establishments, and culture. All of these worlds “do something” with people. All architecture, every atmosphere shapes peoples’ moods and also shapes them socially, urges them into roles and actions. These phenomena are generally associated with cultural capitalism, which has blossomed primarily since the point in time when markets became “saturated” and the intention became to sell people lifestyle components and identity characteristics rather than just products. Sociologist Heinz Bude, in his current book “Adorno für Ruinenkinder” (“Adorno for Children of the Ruins”), writes that


\(^{12}\) Baecker, op. cit., 2017, p.22.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 27 et seq.

the term “capitalism” in the context of the 1968 student movement stood metaphorically for the belief that “something wasn’t right” in the realms of society and politics.\textsuperscript{15} It had negative associations, while the term “cultural capitalism,” the primary task of which is to transmit positive affects and stimuli, is usually used merely with a tired smile today. However, artificial-immersive worlds push the unspectacular realistic world of democratic political encounters into the background. The authoritarian nature that inscribes itself into these artificial worlds is hardly even perceived anymore. This observation leads philosopher Byung Chul Han to observe that, if a system were to attack freedom, people would certainly resist -- but the current system does not attack freedom, it just instrumentalizes it.\textsuperscript{16} For example, in the use of images, words and/or crafted objects that recall the collective memories of the bourgeois freedoms of the 19th century. Supported by the “transparent,” i.e. generally not visible, potential of digitization, which is what makes possible these environments for people and society that are designed based on completely new criteria, the world of the global West has become a feel-good atmosphere for those members of the public with deep pockets, who have essentially tuned out society’s underbelly. This has become a central subject for art in recent years. Starting from a consideration of the phenomena that accompany offers of virtual immersion, i.e. opportunities to dive into digital worlds, many artists now focus on the dark sides of commercially inspired world-building. Performance artist Johannes Paul Räther, for example, develops avatars for himself with whom he enters economically coded immersive worlds, sharing a critical viewpoint with his public as “companions.” Occasionally, this can even lead to police evacuation orders, as occurred in the Apple Store on the Kurfürstendamm in Berlin, because it becomes impossible to distinguish between art and reality.\textsuperscript{17} The “Immersion” program of the Berliner Festspiele event provides numerous other examples and public discussions; over the course of three years, the festival is focusing on artwork that sharpens awareness of the authoritarian and disciplining aspects of world-making.

2. Cultural Politics and Cultural Education

Cultural institutions and practices are almost inestimably significant to our considerations here. This is true with respect to the many cultural institutions with their wide range of funders as well as with respect to their curatorial and pedagogical transmission practices and academic and extracurricular cultural education. Here too, we offer two theses to help provide some insight into the relevance of the agents of culture and cultural politics.

\textbf{Thesis 1 - Political art needs “political” cultural politics}  

Cultural politics not only creates the framework within which art and culture happen, in the process using a wide range of practices to make decisions about and promote those happenings. It also proposes societal models. This is especially true for the “New Cultural Politics” developed in Germany since the 1970s, the two protagonists of which, Hilmar Hoffmann and Hermann Glaser, recently passed away. Within its scope, this movement dealt from the very beginning with modernity’s social transformation processes. The current transformation processes in the late modern era raise the question of how the agents of culture and cultural politics adapt to an increasingly heterogeneous society on the one hand and to the new inequalities on the other.


Knowledge transmission practices that are fine-tuned to particular target groups, along with low-threshold access to cultural institutions, play a key role in this process. Across Europe, one can observe increasing attention being given within institutions to cultural education aspects. The price that cultural facilities would otherwise have to pay would be very high. Focusing on a privileged core public inevitably leads over the long term to a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of a society in which many interest groups are asserting their needs. But the internal transformation and modernization processes of societies are not the only relevant topic today. Konrad Paul Liessmann, a philosopher based in Vienna, explains in his current book “Bildung als Provokation” (“Education as Provocation”) that it is primarily the territorial state and the nation, the people of a country as an imagined body of free citizens, as a “collective within borders that obtained its sovereignty as a political subject from those borders,”\(^{18}\) that have given up their omnipresent relevance. The dissolution of borders and the specific transnational and global mobilities of “culture” have long made clear that the division between “inside” and “outside” can scarcely be asserted in this realm anymore, even if political responsibilities are still governed by this dichotomy from the past.\(^{19}\) The mobility of people, a wide range of ideas and cultural economics, on the other hand, are countered by the post-national cultural and educational politics that are taking shape, such as the ideas currently being formulated, with European art and culture foundations as models, by entities including the German Foreign Office and its intermediaries. As the state withdraws from the business of engaging in representation politics, for example through guided artist exchanges, and instead gives the agents themselves plenty of space to act, new freedoms and responsibilities arise for civil society, which in turn generate new forms of legitimacy. This applies in particular in places where artists can no longer work in democratically secured environments and are subject to repression and/or withdrawal of financial support. Transnational legitimacy is nourished in part by support from a transnational public and an art system that operates transnationally, as was recently shown, for example, by the discussions at the “Active Part of Art” conference that the Bundesakademie für kulturelle Bildung (German Federal Academy for Cultural Education) held in cooperation with the German Federal Agency for Civic Education and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Kunstvereine (Working Group of German Art Organizations) in Wolfenbüttel.\(^{20}\)

**Thesis 2 - Democracy needs resistant cultural and educational agents**

Democracy needs criticism like we need oxygen to breathe. Unlike in authoritarian political models, where the protagonists first seek to silence and control intellectuals, artists and critical journalists, democracy is a future- and discourse-oriented political system model that has to constructively develop further on the basis of criticism and discussion. For this reason, in difficult times, democracy also needs critical and corrective voices from the realm of culture: Artists, representatives of cultural facilities, cultural policymakers and free agents. Two years ago, the long-serving late president of the Deutscher Museumsbund (German Museum Association) and Director of the Victoria and Alberta Museum in London, Martin Roth, sparked a vigorous discussion with an article in the ZEIT in which he accused representatives of cultural institutions of “hiding their faces” in times of re-nationalization and growing racism and xenophobia:

> "National museums, national theaters, and opera houses are not unpolitical. Anyone who thinks they are is exposing those institutions to political influence. Among their tasks is representing

---

\(^{18}\) See also Konrad Paul Liessmann. Bildung als Provokation (“Education as Provocation”), Vienna 2017, p. 172 et seq.


\(^{20}\) [https://www.bundesakademie.de/programm/__dokumentationen/the-active-part-of-art](https://www.bundesakademie.de/programm/__dokumentationen/the-active-part-of-art).
the moral and ethical dimension of their work in public. Museums and collections are to some extent resistant by nature, or they would not have survived the countless changes to the system in Europe. I am therefore very surprised that in Germany practically no one from the realms of culture and art is standing up to the increasing nationalism, the xenophobic hate. In the town of Bautzen, in the state of Saxony, neo-Nazis harass young migrants, and what do the police do? They put the migrants under house arrest. Where are the voices of warning from the realm of culture?”

Sparked in part by that article, many stakeholders from the realms of art and culture redirected themselves and discussed questions of political positioning, decolonizing their institutions, social inequalities or opening up their buildings into the cities. An especially interesting aspect of the article was that Roth accentuated the “resistant” nature that has been inherent to museum collections or theatre repertoires since the era of the Enlightenment. In this way, he wrote, the hegemonic, Western-biased practices and productions of knowledges could be interrogated. This change in perspective away from individual agents and toward institutions is especially noteworthy for two reasons. For one thing, it contains the thesis that “subjects of culture” inherently involve (socio-)political statements. Here, cultural education can find and critically discuss points of departure for dealing with cultural products in a way that is also politically relevant. On the other hand, talking about institutions is also important because they have the job of representing societal experiences and societal will. When there is talk about representation deficits in the political system, it is usually also about groups of people not feeling represented by institutions, for example with regard to their interests or their allegiances and identities. For this reason, cultural institutions now also discuss how access can be opened up for under-represented groups to both the offerings of and positions within institutions. However, representation also has a significant symbolic role: The trust that institutions and their representatives arrange things for the common good is fundamental for legitimizing democracy. This also includes cultural facilities being aware that they “administer” not just cultural products but also associated attitudes and feelings. The (interpretive) power that inheres in cultural institutions must not be under-estimated politically. The role assigned in a democracy to critical cultural institutions and their representatives is important in this context. In addition to acting as institutionalized regulators of democracy, they also, as institutions of the democracy, represent key population groups for the democracy. The more social milieus define themselves via cultural parameters, the more important their (political) representation by cultural institutions becomes. However, many cultural facilities have significant catching up to do in this area with respect to their personnel and organizational development.

3. The Recipients

However, meanings are not produced solely by artists through their works and the institutions and political practices that support them. The extent to which recipients themselves (readers, viewers, listeners) influence and help produce meanings and the context-dependent transformations implicit in those meanings is often under-estimated. This also applies to political opinion formation processes. In the academy, these questions are dealt with in the discourse of reception aesthetics, which considers people’s perceptions of cultural and artistic works, in contrast to structuralism, which argues solely on the basis of the works themselves. The Constance School, led by Wolfgang Iser and Robert Jauß, established this debate in the German-speaking world. In the English-


22 This topic was addressed, for example, in the three-part series of colloquia on “colonial repercussion” held by the Akademie der Künste in Berlin and the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung in early 2018.
speaking world, it is known as “reader response criticism.” In a well-known essay called “Coding, Decoding” (1977), communications scholar and ground-breaker in the field of Cultural Studies Stuart Hall explained that a message or text is never determined by the sender alone, and the receiving parties are never just passive recipients.\textsuperscript{23} Literary scholar Wolfgang Iser theorizes about the relational work that the reader does by imbuing “empty spaces” with meaning and thereby allowing a holistic work to come into being.\textsuperscript{24} This question has long been reflected and mirrored in the arts. There is a famous example at the conclusion of Toni Morrison’s vibrant novel “Jazz” about a love that has to fail because it does not know its roots. She ends her novel with a surprising reference:

“...That I want you to love me too and to show me that you do. That I love how you hold me, how close you let me be to you. I like your fingers there and there, they lift and turn me. I have been watching your face for a long time and missed your eyes when you left me. Speaking with you and hearing you answer -- that is the most beautiful thing. But I can’t say that aloud; I can’t tell anyone that I waited all my life for it and the being chosen to wait is the reason I can even do it. If I could, I would say it. Would say: Bring me there, make me new. You have the freedom to let you do it, because look, look. Look where your hands are. Now.”\textsuperscript{25}

Toni Morrison empowers her readers. They hold the book in their hands. It is a sign of the times that the empowered recipients today understand themselves increasingly as co-creatives, as co-producers who turn passive reception into active participation. Not long ago, the German cultural press accused the curators of Documenta 14 (2017) of poor aesthetic quality and obtrusively didactic and graceless presentation. Visitors, on the other hand, engaged in a highly political discourse with and about the works of art, thereby coming with an entirely different impression. The London-based collective Forensic Architecture achieved particular attention for its work about the NSU (National Socialist Underground) murder in the city of Kassel. The work incorporated all available sources to painstakingly reconstructed in a digital fashion and played a key role in interrogating the investigative process and the role of the secret service.\textsuperscript{26} An area of the exhibition called “Schöne Aussicht” (“Beautiful View”) funneled visitors through an installation called “Rose Valland Institute” and made by German artist Maria Eichhorn, who dealt with looted art and questions of provenance.\textsuperscript{27} Already shaken up by this work, visitors were then led to view a large number of other pieces, some of them older, for example from the era of the Eastern bloc, and there discovered the relevance of those works for themselves, perhaps for the first time. The example of Documenta 14 clearly shows that recipients today play a key role in assessing the political relevance of art and culture. It has become impossible to think about the role that art and culture play as stabilizers of democratic societies without thinking about the reception side of the equation. Attempts to investigate and potentially activate the stabilizing role of art and culture on shaky democratic societies can no longer succeed without the potential co-creativity and the collaborative practices of a public that has developed self-awareness.

\textsuperscript{24} Wolfgang Iser. Die Appellstruktur der Texte. Unbestimmtheit als Wirkungsbedingung literarischer Prosa (“The Appeal Structure of Texts. Indeterminacy as a Condition of Effect of Literary Prose”). Constance 1971, p. 6 et seq., later also in Umberto Eco “Lector in Fabula” 1979, where he develops the concept of the model reader who fills up these empty spaces with his or her knowledge of the world.
\textsuperscript{25} Toni Morrison. Jazz, Reinbeck 1993, p. 250.
\textsuperscript{26} https://www.forensic-architecture.org.
\textsuperscript{27} https://www.monopol-magazin.de/raubkunst-documenta-14-kassel.
4. Culturalization of the Social Realm: Transformation of the Global Sound in the Late Modern Era

The nature and extent of the reciprocal relationships between art and politics become evident against a specific backdrop -- that of the culturalization of the social realm. Culturalization implies that politics reacts with “cultural" arguments or decisions to societal concerns. One example is the homeland ministries that have recently been founded in Germany. But culturalization also means that people and social groups define themselves via cultural characteristics. This is expressed in the great significance of the phenomenon of “identity." In contrast, earlier social structuration criteria such as income and wealth have become secondary. Political conflicts form along the boundaries of cultural allegiances. Sociologist Andreas Reckwitz has investigated this phenomenon with his theory of the singularization of the social realm. In his earlier work as well, he had already observed the increasing significance of the cultural realm in Western societies since the 1970s. The insight on which his work is based relates to the transformation from modernity to late modernity. Traditional industrial modernity is associated with processes of standardization and orientation toward a model of generality. Politically and socially, this was expressed in a middle-class self-image that was based on the criterion of equality. In the world of work, as well as that of products and consumption, people oriented themselves toward a general societal standard; everyone wanted a washing machine, a television and a car. Politics handed down decisions that were “good for all." Historical development into late modernity involves a change spurred in part by the lack of stimulus and affect that was generated by the standardization of modernity. Today, the “new middle classes" seek that which is innovative, special and unique. Individuals now achieve their social positions via cultural decisions about what to do with the income they have obtained. In order to reach a favorable position within society, people have to eat food that is culturally “right," live in the “right" neighborhood, take the “right" vacations and send their children to the “right" schools. “Right" is defined by whether the selected cultural options have a high societal status, which in turn depends in part on their cultural quality and their singularity. As a result of digitization and the development of social media, aesthetic and especially visual qualities play a key role in this competition within cultural markets. People don't buy what they need; instead, they seek to equip themselves with the utensils that will make their own singularity, their own lifestyle, visible. This desire, considered historically, harkens back to Romanticism. Reckwitz shows that today even terrorist attacks have the character of aesthetic performances, with primarily visual qualities. There is no lack of criticism concerning this world of Western “hyper-individualists” who construct themselves in a culturally capitalistic way. But it is interesting that such criticism itself also, to a great extent, shapes itself in a cultural way. Reckwitz calls them “cultural essentialists": identity-based movements, or groups that construct themselves as collectives and carry out “an extremely active re-evaluation directed against the way of living they have 'found' to exist in the modern area." They model “the world in the form... of antagonism between inside and outside, between ingroup and outgroup, which is also a dualism between valuable and worthless.” This process, at its core a racializing one, thus does not operate in a way that is “dynamic and mobile; instead it seeks to maintain internally the unambiguous nature of valuable assets -- sets of beliefs, symbols, national history, the ordeals of a group with shared origins - while also carrying out a rigorous devaluation externally: one’s own, superior nation against the foreign ones (nationalism), one’s own religion against the non-believers (fundamentalism), the people against the cosmopolitan elites (right-wing populism)." Status is bestowed not on the new but rather on the old, on tradition, on the collective’s

---

origins, “which expresses itself in a corresponding reference to the narratives of history or to historical moral codes. The collective and history are used to help essentialize culture.”

Other scholars, like Wolfgang Merkel, confirm that the cultural conflicts between these cultural regimes, which he describes using the terms “cosmopolitans” and “communitarians,” are a global phenomenon in which national borders play almost no role at all.

III Current Aspects of the Crisis of Democracy

1. Crisis of Legitimacy, Trust, Representation

Wolfgang Merkel, of the Berlin Social Science Center, emphatically notes in his more recent publications that a significant problem for current democracies stems from deficits of representation: “In the last two to three decades, a growing group of citizens has been taking shape that does not feel represented economically, discursively or culturally by the established parties.”

Representation, as is implied here, always has several dimensions. On the one hand, in a democracy the interests of population groups always need to be met politically, otherwise the non-represented groups withdraw their trust and approval from the democracy. Democracy appears either in the form of its institutions or of its leading protagonists (“elites”). These interests, however, are not always clear economic, environmental, legal, social or political demands, but also include cultural desires such as recognition, appreciation, consideration of collective, subjective feelings and perceptions. The culturalization processes described above are also characterized by a renewed emphasis on the affective dimension of politics. Only on the surface do cosmopolitan viewpoints seem to coincide here with factual, technocratic politics. On the contrary, the political styles and political articulation of population groups in both cases have significant affective components that become visible in the public realm. It is therefore not surprising that the theoretical approach of researching culture politically, developed after the second world war by the Chicago School and early systems theory and since then declared dead, is currently undergoing a renaissance. The pioneers of political research on culture, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, had emphasized the role of the subjective dimension of politics in stabilizing political systems. They defined political culture and the totality of political orientations in a population, and these orientations are cognitive as well as affective and evaluative. In plain English this implies that positive feelings toward and assessments of the political system, its institutions and representatives are indispensable for the legitimacy of political system. But political theory of culture was also interested in political structures, asserting that only when political culture and political structures are congruent does a political system no longer need to fight for its life. Democratic political cultures, then, can only be reflected in democratically designed political structures. The opportunities for political participation in Germany may well, in light of ever-more complex political problems that transcend national borders, already be scarce. But with regard to the European Union, there has not even been an attempt to think through and establish democratic political structures. The

European Union needs to reconsider the fundamental rules of power, participation and decision-making processes if it wants to be more than just an administrator of its member states’ primarily economic and security-related interests.

2. Identity Politics and Social Democracy

The politicians of the traditional party landscape reacted to the singularizing tendencies in the culturalized society of late modernity with offers that were tailored to the needs of the milieus and groups that were singularizing themselves. “Western societies have experienced a profound cultural shift in the past four decades,” explains Wolfgang Merkel. “New ways of life, same-sex marriages, equal opportunity for women, multi-culturalism and environmental issues dominate the discourse. In social democratic parties, these questions have crowded out the issue of the distribution of wealth.” The earlier principle of “politics for all” has changed into a situation in which even though politics still has sought or seeks to serve society, it is an increasingly pluralistic society in which groups with special needs must be increasingly taken into consideration. The criteria on which such politics is based are not primarily cultural criteria, and the resulting policies are called “identity politics.” The conflict described above, between cosmopolitans and communitarians, takes shape in a special way in this realm, because it has not only accentuated contrasts but also revealed marked asymmetries, and it thereby reveals a moral face: “Progressiveness is increasingly defined in cultural terms. Cosmopolitan elites occupy the top positions in business, government, parties and the media. The cosmopolitan discourse of those who rule has become the dominant discourse. Criticism of it has often been morally delegitimized in the public sphere. This discursive refusal has recklessly allowed right-wing populists to appropriate the term political correctness as a weapon,” 34 continues Merkel. Political theorist Jan Werner Müller introduces a consideration into this discussion that differs from conventional arguments. Using the example of Hillary Clinton, whose defeat in the presidential election is often explained by a failure to talk more about the general good and less about the situation of marginalized groups, Müller describes a misunderstanding about the function of democracy: The public good, he says, is not an objective fact, but is instead always the result of discourse and argument. He asserts that it is generally accepted that representation refers to reproduction of interests and identities. An argument is made accordingly that right-wing populists understand the problems of “ordinary people,” that they essentially fill a gap in representation, which implies that this gap simply already exists. Müller, on the other hand, considers it plausible that self-perception with regard to ideas, interests and identities is to some extent actually formed by the available forms of representation. He writes that although representation is not based on random values, views or interests, in fact identities are indeed variable, as can be observed with swing voters in particular. 35 Müller’s interpretation implies, with respect to politics, that the forms of representation on offer bear more responsibility for the representational transaction than is generally assumed. Politics, he says, does not just reflect orientations and interests but is also involved in their formulation. This relationship may also apply to the specific cultural character of supply and demand. The establishment of homeland ministries could, in this sense, be viewed as a cultural “answer” to culturalized interests or as mirrors of interests that are initially formulated through that process.

34 Ibid., p. 11.
35 Jan Werner Müller. Professor of political theory at Princeton, on June 4, 2018 at the bpb conference “Was ist Identität?” (“What is Identity?”), Cologne; documentation of the conference will be published soon at www.bpb.de/kulturellebildung.
Thesis 1 - Democracy’s strength lies in its “weakness”
Even though “leftist” or emancipatory identity politics definitely offers adequate answers to the culturally determined society of late modernity, it is opposed by those political forces for whose adherents the (cultural) homogeneity of a “people” forms the main basis for legitimizing their existence -- even though they too, as shown above, find their way to one another via cultural arguments. According to Reckwitz, these are the cultural essentialists described above, identity-based movements that inform their narratives of cohesion with ideas about a shared history, tradition, cultural inheritance, values and a culture that is particular to that people or that group, and about fighting modernity and liberalism. Structural racism is not a problem for such groups. They represent identities with a decidedly anti-pluralistic orientation. Political questions are reduced to questions of cultural identity. These groups react very sensitively to moods within society, and functionalize the realm of emotions, which the politics of enlightened modernity did not mobilize -- for reasons including the fact that the protagonists of the totalitarian systems that came before had based their regimes on emotionalized politics, or “psychopolitics,” as it is called today in right-wing populist circles. Despite all attempts to close themselves off to the outside, such politics will not be fruitful, if only because it will not be possible to create an identity of interests, even in society as it is. Philosopher Konrad Paul Liessmann explains this concept by using the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) as an example of an original milieu-based party that also to a great extent shaped its own milieu:

“Something like a counter-model to bourgeois society was supposed to be woven into that society: a dense network of implementing organizations, social and economic institutions, cultural and educational facilities, adult education entities, health care organizations, leisure and athletic offerings and, last but not least, communication platforms and its own media... All of this was supposed to make possible a way of life and a way of feeling that would allow individual members not just to anchor themselves in a particular social and cultural ecosystem but also to plan and pursue life and career trajectories within that ecosystem and outside of the capitalist competition-based society.”

The disappearance of these offerings is, in Liessmann’s opinion, associated with the dissolution of the milieu that is built around similar interests -- its members no longer have collective identities to pursue. However, politics that just has the struggle for equal opportunities on its agenda in fact offers too little to those who have drawn the shorter straw in the attempt to reach higher positions in an opportunity-based society. It is not yet possible to conclusively evaluate how this situation ultimately affects the parties and parliamentary democracy. The breach between cosmopolitans and communitarians, in any case, runs straight through the SPD’s remaining adherents. However, it is likely indisputable that a successful guarantee of minimal standards for a democratic system/a democratic republic that serves all people must still be based on politics oriented toward cultural identities and needs. What at first looks like the weakness of democracy in its late modern formulation is essentially already an expression of its ability to adapt to abrupt social transformation processes.

Thesis 2 - Democracy stands on paradoxical foundations
Politics, however, must also engage in dialogue with the members of a pluralistic society about those areas in which equality and neutrality are the constitutive elements of democracy. The example of equal rights shows that this is not an easy path. While equal human and civil rights will be acceptable for most, although difficult to implement, minorities need special protections, which

36 This is the central thesis Jan Werner Müller’s essay “Was ist Populismus?” (“What is Populism”). Berlin 2016.
38 Ibid., p. 175 et seq.
sometimes give them advantages that others judge to be indicators of inequality and even injustice. During a conference held by the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (German Federal Agency for Civil Education) in June of 2018 on the topic of identity, philosopher Heike Delitz sketched out a democratic paradox. Modern democracy, she said, is based on two extra-societal and imagined foundations that contradict one another: Human dignity and sovereignty of the people. While human dignity is thought of as universal, the notion of a people’s sovereignty needs the exclusion of (groups of) people in order to define “the people.” This tension can, in her opinion, always be only partially dissolved by hegemonic positioning in favor of one of the two aspects. In Delitz’ view, the fact that democracy is based on these two contradictory bases can be explained by the fact that democracy orients itself using monarchy’s structural logic: “At a time when the absolute sovereign embodied in his person, in his body the entire society and was legitimized from the outside to do so, in that situation the revolutionaries took over this matrix of power,” i.e. the idea about how society is represented. And they replaced God with human nature, and the king’s sovereignty with the sovereignty of the people.”

3. Cultural and Political Education Generate Transnational Democratic Momentum

It would make sense for the question of art’s and culture’s effects on democratic political systems to be supplemented by the question of cultural education’s socio-political effects. The realms of culture and education are in many respects closely interwoven. Often, they are structurally situated in the same department in democracies. Stakeholders within the government and civil society from the areas of art, culture and education face similar challenges if they want to use transnational activities to generate democratic momentum. In doing so, ideally cultural or political education will not be exported as some of the greatest hits of Western thought but will instead be permitted to further unfold their emancipatory powers and critical potential even outside of a particular nation’s borders. If cultural and political education offerings are understood as invitations to self-education, and if they open up autonomous spaces for experiments and creativity, then uncontrolled effects occur that also have societal consequences. One example of this is a program of the Bremen Chamber Orchestra that was first rehearsed in a national context as a “future lab” and then initiated, in collaboration with the Kamel Lazaar Foundation, as a socio-cultural project in Tunisia under the title “Future Lab Tunisia.” The chamber orchestra’s original pilot project in Bremen based its work on a number of quality criteria, with the goal of confirming them in the course of the practical work. Against a backdrop of the idea of being closer to a lived world, the orchestra moved its rehearsal location to the Bremen-Ost school in Osterholz-Tenever, which is considered a disadvantaged neighborhood, and developed opportunities for students and neighborhood residents to take part in participative musical formats that made it possible for the participants to experience their own effectiveness and new forms of social togetherness. The idea of designing oneself in a liberating way, albeit in a way that also involved taking responsibility for one’s own needs and those of the neighborhood, was at the heart of the projects. The future lab received numerous awards.

The transfer of the concept to Tunisia was based on a call for proposals by the Tunisian Ministry of Education that offered the opportunity to use a public school in a residential neighborhood of Tunis as a project site. Recently, a concert hall was completed on the school grounds, and in June of this year the Tunisian Symphony Orchestra moved into it. A wide range of institutions and stakeholders, all of whom already viewed the project both as a way of creating inter-connections in

---

39 Delitz on June 4, 2018; documentation of the conference will be published soon at www.bpb.de/kulturellebildung.

40 E.g. the “Zukunftssaward” (“Future Award”), the “Vision Award” and the “German Engagement Prize of the BMFSFJ (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth).
art and education and as communitarian action with a socio-political intent, were involved in the design and construction. As in the example in Bremen, the idea was to make possible lived togetherness by citizens, students and artists, as well as involvement in participatorily-designed music formats that allow people to experience their own effectiveness; the gatherings served as social anchors and provided opportunities for regular group rehearsals and performances. One format, “Melody of Life,” involves critical reflection on one’s own biography and artistic consideration of one’s own personal issues and conflicts. The encounters between artists and students are not set up to be pedagogical encounters, but instead open up spaces for self-education with a professional partner. Based on this model, collaborative work also took place with neighborhood residents as agents and developers of a “neighborhood opera” that addresses neighborhood issues and incorporates socio-spatial resources into the non-formal project setting, which is set up with great attention to detail. The work is about using art to appropriate world, but also about self-determined and interest-guided transformation of world, i.e. society through networked creative activity. Involvement by a wide range of stakeholders on site is key here; their involvement gives them street cred and allows them to be perceived as local contact people for further activities above and beyond the initiative. The artistic program is supplemented by exchanges between German and Tunisian students, educators and artists, each of which is linked to musical events. This leads to the creation of transnational audiences that in turn create resonances in Tunisian society. The program acquired a wide range of institutions as supporters while it was taking place, including the Goethe Institute, the German Embassy, the Deutsche Welle Akademie, the Gustav Stresemann Institute and the Tunisian organization L’Art Rue. The program points to important ideas about what can be considered a cutting-edge approach to post-national, transcultural education, because it blurs the borders between artists and audience or participants and is based on the central principle of co-creativity, which also becomes sociopolitically effective.

4. Cultural Difference, Irritation of Western Thinking and Foundations of Post National Politics

Implicitly, we have underlaid these descriptions with a concept of culture that has more to do with the ways people live than with the idea of different (world) cultures that are determined ethnically, religiously, historically or ideologically. At the same time, we have proposed a concept of education that calls itself “intercultural” and is thus based on the idea of “cultures” that are different from one another and border along the outside. We have not at all addressed the idea, long widespread and to some extent still current today, that global conflicts take place between “cultures” understood in this way. Terms like “cultural pluralism” or “cultural difference” can be traced back to the idea that people have developed different ways of living, and different notions of how to live a right and good life, because of their different historical, political, social, economic, religious and mental experiences, subjective determinants like education, origin and cultural capital, and characteristics like sexual orientation, race and sex. In the last fifty years, extremely extensive cultural pluralization processes have taken place, and not just due to global mobility and migration, but also within nationally formed societies with a certain amount of continuity. At the same time, global cultural capitalism also causes ways of life within global milieus to become ever less differentiated. Although the idea that national borders are not cultural borders has now become well established in Europe, there has still been no lasting disruption of the assumption that Europe should organize its future along a historically generated set of traditions, values and interpretations of the world -- that is, cultural factors.. A society that calls itself an “open society” thus needs, if we interpret the most recent conflicts about refugee policies correctly, to be closed off to the outside in order to enjoy human rights and bourgeois freedoms -- left in peace by those who are culturally “different.” This interpretation initially appears plausible. When viewed more closely, however, things have been amiss with freedom for quite a long time already, and this presumably does not have a whole
lot to do with immigration. Despite constantly growing wealth, there is a shortage of almost all the assets that the first theorists of democracy, in early Greece, considered fundamental: time, leisure, reflection, education, development of one’s personality, discourse, political self-realization and emancipation. The reasons for these shortages are presumably to be found in a borderless and hypertrophic economy that can no longer be sufficiently curbed by the political administrators of democracy.

However, we would like to encourage consideration of non-Western ways of seeing. These could even include perspectives from southern or eastern Europe. For education providers, this is of supreme importance, because the education practices that have been handed down to them contribute to deepening social rifts by proposing people or “target groups” as not-equal, different and possibly deficient subjects. Educational offerings generate and reproduce power relationships to such an extent that people who belong to majority cultures identify, mark and simultaneously devalue minorities by assigning identity categories as part of their educational concept, and also to a great extent prescribe what is to be understood by “culture,” “education” or “the political.” Alternative practices of knowledge have been and are still suppressed or not acknowledged, and institutions and systems of education and knowledge are often very difficult to change. In recent years, new concepts of education and knowledge transmission are being formulated under the not uncontroversial rubric of “transcultural education” or “transcultural transmission of knowledge”; these concepts consider aspects of cultural ambiguity, non-translatability, fluidity, openness, inter-connection, mixing and hybridization as well as border-crossing. With regard to methodology, this often has to do with withdrawing one’s own positions and developing empathy, with co-creativity and egalitarian collaboration as well as with unlearning traditional interpretations and developing new narratives. With regard to institutions, it’s about eliminating structural barriers and privileges that block members of minority groups not just from accessing key positions but even from accessing entry-level positions within the systems of culture and education. With regard to bodies, first exploratory forms of access would need to be created to investigate how years or even centuries of marginalization affect body conditioning, and how power asymmetries are thereby fixed even further. One highly interesting example in that field is a partial project of the three-year trans-disciplinary program “Untie to Tie” (2017–2020) at the ifa-Galerie Berlin, led by curator Alya Sebti, which invites people to join a discourse about colonial legacies, movement, migration and environment. In its second section, “Movement.Bewegung” (2018–2019), diversity and plurality are understood as fundamental characteristics of design through which the present becomes perceptible as a constantly changing reality. “The program challenges people to think beyond mental and territorial colonial borders. Movement and migration are understood as natural, ongoing phenomena, as emancipatory processes that promote interpersonal interactions.” In laboratories with school pupils, for example, there is artistic investigation of incorporated power structures that take effect in institutions like schools or governmental agencies, as well as of strategies for unlearning or restructuring. Participants work on alternative body images in workshops in order to allow other forms of criticism or resistance to be generated. Performances are also created “that address the relationship between body and societal power and presence, especially the way in which women’s spatial presence manifests in dramatic plots and daily actions.”


42 https://www.ifa.de/kunst/untie-to-tie.html.
gained currency in recent years that centuries of “mindfucking”\textsuperscript{43} are partially responsible for what is terms educational disadvantaging, then it is time now for thinking in a new way about education, in a way that includes aspects related to the politics of the body. The examples do not just point to the importance of unlearning hegemonic Eurocentrism in education, but also to the political potential of such unlearning. Development of new societal and political narratives cannot be the only focus, but such narratives can be a constitutive part of a change in focus that moves toward the future. The image of Rome falling has often been chosen in recent years to describe society and politics in Europe. If Europe wants to remain vibrant and dynamic, regression and defensive rejection of mobility of any kind cannot be constructive approaches. As the two examples of forward-looking cultural education suggest, Europe’s challenge is essentially about democracy, human dignity and the willingness to take risks and experiment.

\section*{IV Recommendations for Action}

- In our opinion, the interrelationship between art and culture has little to contribute to backward-looking models of Europe. Art and culture develop their autonomous and delimiting power in the process of becoming. And becoming, because of Europe’s normative codes, essentially means “daring more democracy” in and for Europe. This applies to the internal condition of Europe and its institutions as well as to the needs of trans-European educational and cultural practices, which subject their diversity to the aforementioned shared normative values.

- The logic of past cultural-political practices of national governments, based on which they separated domestic cultural policy from foreign cultural policy, would then have to be revised. Only in this way can the potential of art and culture fully develop strength for a more democratic Europe. However, the separation of interior and exterior must also be interrogated at the European level, for example when the question of decolonizing hegemonic Western European politics is raised.

- Education and transmission of knowledge in particular can, against the backdrop of the observed co-creativity, make a decisive contribution to bringing Europe into “reach” for its citizens. For this, it is important to strive for relevant promotion of European transcultural and political education and transmission of knowledge within institutions and programs.

- If art and culture constitute a resource for creating a Europe that believes in itself again, then the case must be made for much stronger commitment to promoting artistic and cultural practice. In addition to the principle of subsidiarity, various forms of co-production and collaboration must play especially important roles in the policies of that promotion.

- The more comprehensively that expanded autonomous realms are created and secured in which art and culture can unfold, the greater their contribution, including their critical potential, toward a more democratic Europe. However, these realms must be shaped, by forces including education and transmission of knowledge, into societally resonant spaces.

- Participation by European citizens as co-creatives of a diverse European artistic and cultural landscape is a key resource. This will require promotion of mobility (e.g. expansion of Interrail) and promotion of participation (e.g. European Culture Card with discounts for visiting facilities and events in the member countries where one is not domiciled). The growing heterogeneity of European societies must be taken into account in this process. The politics of art and culture, and the instruments used to promote them, should be positioned self-reflectively and inclusively and should resist the logic of identity politics.
References


Jan Werner Müller, Professor of political theory at Princeton, on June 4, 2018 at the bpb conference “Was ist Identität?” (“What is Identity?”), Cologne; documentation of the conference will be published soon at www.bpb.de/kulturellebildung.


### About the Authors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliations and Roles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seán CLEARY</strong></td>
<td>Managing Director at Centre of Advanced Governance; Executive Vice-Chair of FutureWorld Foundation; Chairman, Strategic Concepts (Pty) Ltd; Member of the Board, Salzburg Global Seminar; Chairman: Advisory Board, Global Economic Symposium; Strategic Adviser, World Economic Forum. Faculty member, Parmenides Foundation; Lecturer on global corporate strategy, conflict resolution and development; Chair, Working Group on Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Organizations, South African National Peace Accord; Trustee: SA Foundation for Conciliation; Peace and Reconstruction Foundation. He was a Diplomat and Chief Director of the Office of the Administrator-General, Namibia. He holds qualifications in social science and law from the University of South Africa, and a Master’s degree in Business Administration from Brunel University, UK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dr. Sabine DENGEL</strong></td>
<td>Studied political science, sociology, social psychology and philosophie at the Universität des Saarlandes and earned her PhD for a study on political education in the German Kaisererreich, in National Socialism and in the GDR. After employments in research and teaching in the academy, in urban development and as freelance project manager for political and civic education, she is since 2008 consultant for civic and cultural education for the Federal Agency for Civic Education (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung/bpb). Since 2018, she directs the project group “civic education and culture”. Her work focuses on modern political theory, theories of civic and cultural education, (historical) educational research, democracy theory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dr. Jörg HABICH</strong></td>
<td>Senior Project Manager and responsible for the Leaders’ Dialogues at the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh. Additionally to the Trilogue Salzburg, his area of responsibility comprises the Forum Bellevue zur Zukunft der Demokratie, a discussion on the future of democracy hosted by German Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier in cooperation with the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Since joining the foundation, he has led a range of projects on labor law, the labor market, crisis management and various other topics. Studied Business Administration with a focus on Human Resource Management and Organizational Theory at the University of Paderborn. He has a doctoral degree in Business Administration from the University of Paderborn and is the author of books and articles on global challenges, leadership and management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Background Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Hauke HARTMANN</td>
<td>Senior Expert at the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh. He joined the Bertelsmann Stiftung in 1999 and directs the Transformation Index BTI measuring the quality of democracy, market economy and governance in 129 developing countries. His research is centered on democratization and human rights, with a regional focus on Arab and Latin American countries. He was a Fellow at the Yale Center for International and Area Studies and received his Ph.D. for his thesis on US human rights policy under President Carter from Free University of Berlin. He holds an M.A. in North American Studies (John F. Kennedy Institute Berlin) and in Latin American and Caribbean Studies (State University of New York) and previously worked for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan KRASTEV</td>
<td>Chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia and permanent fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna. He is a founding board member of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a member of the Board of Trustees of The International Crisis Group and is a contributing opinion writer for the New York Times. In 2018-2019 he is appointed as the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the John W. Kluge Center, Library of Congress. His latest books in English are “After Europe” (UPenn Press, May 2017) “Democracy Disrupted. The Global Politics on Protest” (UPenn Press, May 2014); “In Mistrust We Trust: Can Democracy Survive When We Don't Trust Our Leaders?” (TED Books, 2013). He is a co-author with Stephen Holmes of a forthcoming book &quot;The Light that Failed&quot; (with Penguin) on perils of the politics of imitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas KRÜGER</td>
<td>Director of the German Federal Agency for Civic Education since 2000. After being a founding member of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in the former GDR, and becoming the executive director of the SDP in Berlin (East), Thomas Krüger became deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in Berlin (East/West). Subsequently, he was the city's Senator for Youth and Family Affairs (1991-1994) and a member of the German Parliament, the Bundestag (1994-1998). Thomas Krüger was and still is a member of various cultural committees, such as the German Federal Film Board (FFA – Filmförderungsanstalt 1995-1999), the Internationale Stadtschlosskommission, member of the Jury of the Capital Cultural Fund (Hauptstadtkulturfonds), 2005-2009, member of the Supervisory Board of the „Initiative Musik“ (2007–2011), member of the Jury of contemporary music (Musikfonds) (since 2017), member of the board of the Council of Cultural Education (since 2018).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Verena NOWOTNY    | Partner at Gaisberg Consulting, a communications agency based in Vienna. With more than 20 years of international experience in the areas of strategic communications and public affairs, she supports corporate business, start-ups and institutions with positioning and with acute and preventative crisis communications. Verena Nowotny worked for many years as the foreign policy press spokesperson for former Austrian
Federal Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel. Thereafter she lived and worked in Shanghai, then moved on to New York where she served as spokesperson for Austria’s non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council. She holds a Master’s degree in political management from the George Washington University (Washington, DC).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dr. Thieß PETERSEN</th>
<th>Senior Advisor at the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh. He joined the Bertelsmann Stiftung in 2004 and specializes in macroeconomic studies and economics. He studied economics in Paderborn and Kiel before joining the Institute for Theoretical Economics at Christian Albrechts University in Kiel as a research assistant. He then became a research assistant and lecturer in economics at the University of Applied Sciences in Heide. After that he was a project adviser at the DAG Forum Schleswig-Holstein in Kiel, later becoming the forum’s managing director. In addition to his work for the Bertelsmann Stiftung, he is a lecturer at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), where he specializes in macroeconomics, economic growth and public finance.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professor Dr. Daniel SCHÖNPFLUG</td>
<td>Professor of history at the Free University, Berlin, and Academic Coordinator of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin. His main fields of research are the history of revolutions and of terrorism in 18.-20. century Europe. He has been a guest professor at the Sorbonne, a Fellow at the German Historical Institute in London and at Harvard University. In 2010 he was awarded the Gay-Lussac-Humboldt Price by the French Ministry of Research and Education. As the author of filmscripts and newspaper articles, as expert and consultant on radio and television programs, he has also successfully brought history to a wider public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christina TILLMANN</td>
<td>Director at the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh. She joined the Bertelsmann Stiftung in 2008 and co-directs the program “Future of Democracy”. The program analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of democracy in Germany, the EU and in International Organizations and develops recommendations to increase the democratic legitimacy on all these levels. Her research is centered on democracy, political participation and political reforms. Prior to joining the Bertelsmann Stiftung, she was a political strategy consultant. She studied in Germany and the US and holds M.A. degrees in political science and public law (University of Münster) and public administration (University of Administrative Science, Speyer).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Address | Contact

Bertelsmann Stiftung  
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256  
33311 Gütersloh  
Telefon +49 5241 81-0

Dr. Jörg Habich  
Senior Project Manager  
Phone +49 5241 81-81277  
Fax +49 5241 81-681277  
joerg.habich@bertelsmann-stiftung.de