

## Relaunch of the “EU’s Southern Neighbourhood Policy”

Qualitative analysis of a non-representative survey among selected experts /  
Last updated in February 2021

### Overview

In December 2020, the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s European programme project “Strategies for the EU Neighbourhood” conducted an anonymous and non-representative survey among 20 selected experts from the ten countries of the EU's Southern Neighbourhood (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia) using the online application LimeSurvey.

The aim of the survey was two-fold:

- a) to obtain first-hand information from 20 proven experts from the Southern Neighbourhood on how they assess relations between their country and the EU, and
- b) to identify issues of common interests that might help to advance the formats and instruments of the Southern Neighbourhood policy in the future.

The survey also included questions on the evaluation of existing regional formats in the Mediterranean region, such as the Union for the Mediterranean, the cooperation of their countries with the EU in comparison to international organisations, individual EU member states and other non-European countries, the experts’ suggestions on how jointly to deal with the consequences of the Corona pandemic as well as what an increased German engagement in the Mediterranean could look like.

The 20 selected experts reflect a wide range of experience and expertise in politics, society, business, and academia.

### Background of this initiative

In 2021, the European Union wants to make its neighbourhood policy in the Southern Mediterranean more dynamic: A "more democratic, stable, green and prosperous Southern Neighbourhood" is noted as a priority in the [European Council conclusions](#) of December 11, 2020.

On February 9, 2021, a [Joint Communication](#) (accompanied by a [Joint Staff Working Document](#)) to the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions was published. Five key policy areas are proposed:

- 1) Human development, good governance and the rule of law
- 2) Strengthen resilience, build prosperity and seize the digital transition
- 3) Peace and security
- 4) Migration and mobility
- 5) Green transition: climate resilience, energy, and environment.

This analysis will also compare the assessments of the experts with the priorities and the key policy areas mentioned in these two official documents.

## Assessments

### Bilateral cooperation of the EU with the ENPCs-South

The activities of bilateral cooperation of the ENPCs-South with the EU are considered important and positive (Figure 1): The neighbouring countries benefit from bilateral cooperation with Brussels and the Association Agreements (AAs) make the EU a more relevant partner (Figure 2). Experts from Libya and Syria would also like to see an Association Agreement for their country.

**Do you think your country has benefited from the Partnership and Association Agreement?**




Figure 1

**Does the Agreement make the EU a more relevant partner for your country?**




Figure 2

The table in *Attachment 1* gives an overview of which common goals the experts define with regard to the bilateral cooperation of the ten ENPCs-South with the EU. Topics related to economy and stability dominate. Figure 3 relates these goals in relation to the new four priorities (a “democratic, stable, green, prosperous Southern Neighbourhood”) noted in the European Council decision of December 11, 2020.

**What are common goals in the bilateral cooperation between your country and the EU?**




Figure 3: Democracy, stability, sustainability and economy mirror the four priorities set by the European Council’s declaration on December 11, 2020. **Democracy** (incl. rule of law, human rights and good governance); **Stability** (incl. conflict resolution, peace, counterterrorism, political dialogue and regional cooperation); **Sustainability** (incl. sustainability, environmental protection and energy); **Prosperity/Economy** (incl. economy, trade, jobs, agriculture); **Other suggestions** (incl. migration, mobility, education, civil society, people-to-people, capacity building and more).

Figure 4 relates these goals to the new five key policy areas (“Human Development, Economy, Peace, Migration, Climate”) noted in the Joint Communication of February 9, 2021. It is noteworthy that the experts, when reflecting on the goals of bilateral cooperation, do not prioritise the issue of "migration and mobility" as a separate aspect, but instead focus their attention on socio-economic welfare and commitment to peace and security.

**What are common goals in the bilateral cooperation between your country and the EU?**




Figure 4: The five key policy areas of the Joint Communication on February 9, 2021: **Human Development and Good Governance** (incl. democracy, rule of law, Human rights, education, civil society, people-to-people, culture, research, health care); **Economy and Digital Transition** (incl. trade, jobs, agriculture, SMEs, women economic empowerment); **Peace and Security** (incl. stability, conflict resolution, political dialogue, regional cooperation, cyber threats), **Migration and Mobility**; **Climate and Energy** (incl. environment, green transition, sustainability, biodiversity, food security).

## Bilateral practical cooperation with the EU

The practical cooperation of the ENPCs-South with the EU is considered positive in comparison to cooperation with international organisations or non-EU states (the GCC, USA, Russia, Turkey and China are explicitly mentioned) (Figures 5, 6). Some experts report positive personal experiences in implementing EU projects; however, the majority urge greater synergies and more coordination as well as stronger monitoring in project implementation to minimise corruption and increase quality.

**How does cooperation with the EU compare to cooperation with international organisations?**




Figure 5

**How does cooperation with the EU compare to cooperation with non-EU countries?**




Figure 6

Even though among the experts the EU is mentioned as the most important cooperation partner, the majority of them point out that the bilateral Association Agreements do not create a level playing field in all areas. Here are some indications from respondents' answers:

“There is an imbalance in the economic level of development between the two shores of the Mediterranean.”

“Most of the agreement focused on trade liberalisation without addressing the development of the manufacturing sector, tackling non-tariff measures, bilateral investment and services.”

“The EU is clearly in the driving seat.”

“The agreement does not provide for a level playing field in the areas mentioned in the association agreement. This is for the following two main reasons: 1. the production units in Morocco are much smaller than the European ones; 2. there is a significant gap in the qualification of human resources in Morocco and in EU countries. However, the association agreement does not provide for any compensation to face these two difficulties, which are largely responsible for the low competitiveness of Moroccan products on European markets. And even more, on Moroccan domestic one.”

“Technically, Tunisia's AA with the EU covers important policy and economic areas in which Tunisia can create a level-playing field with EU-States. However, a core challenge is the established elite structure in Tunisia that has been less eager to reform the public sector, often for personal reasons.”

“This is a weak point of the Association Agreement. The concept of level playing field is seen from a restrictive eurocentric perspective.”

## The work of the Anna Lindh Foundation

The Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF), based in Alexandria (Egypt) and registered with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, is an inter-governmental

institution bringing together civil society and citizens across the Mediterranean to build trust and improve mutual understanding. Since 2005, the ALF has launched and supported activities across different sectors impacting on mutual perceptions as well as developing a region-wide network of over 4,000 civil society organisations in 42 countries covering the EU and all countries around the Mediterranean.

The assessment of the work of the network of civil society organisations in the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) ranges from "not visible" to "very important"; those familiar with the work of the ALF highlight positive projects such as the promotion of women in East Jerusalem or the support of debate culture among young people (YoungArabVoices).

"I have been a big fan of the Anna Lindh Foundation since I was a teenager. With its office at the Bibliotheca Alexandrina, the Anna Lindh Foundation has become a main pillar of cultural and social exchange in Egypt. It has brought up a number of talented leaders and cultural contributors and helped build a solid bridge between cultures of the Mediterranean."

"The Anna Lindh Foundation had the programme "Young Arab Voices" in 2013 in Libya. More than 100 young Libyans in Tripoli and Benghazi were trained in debating skills and 15 debates were conducted with an audience of over 1000. The topics of the debates varied from the role of young people in the development of Libya to the controversial political isolation law."

"As far as I am following it has limited effect."

"Effective but working on a small scale. Needs to cover activities for more vulnerable people."

### The mission and work of the Union for the Mediterranean

As in the case with the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), most experts demand projects that have more proximity to the people and activities that concentrate on fewer projects to make sure that they are well implemented (Figure 7).




Figure 7

The following selected assessments reflect a wide range of different opinions:

"Supporting citizens projects, especially in the field of Human Rights, political participation and political reforms, is much needed."

"Many projects and initiatives led by the UfM are developed with civil society organisations.

Two examples:

1. Med4jobs initiative for job creation for youth

2. Euromed University for Fès (to date: 2,000 students from 25 nationalities across the region). Funded with 70 mln by the European Investment Bank and 18 million Euros grants from the European Commission.”

“The support of the Union for the Mediterranean to the mostly needed water deceleration project in Gaza is a proof that UfM delivers on its mission to enhance citizens' projects.”

“While it is important to gather as many stakeholders as possible, to ensure the coverage of every need that falls into the UfM scope, the projects have to be hands-on and have a tangible result for the stakeholders. People meant to be reached with the project have to see the outcome and 'feel' the result.”

“I think what we should assess more the impact and the quality rather than the 'quantity' or the numbers of projects. When exploring the situation in each single country (maybe except for Tunisia) on the Eastern and Southern sides of the Mediterranean, we see that the situation is deteriorating on most political and economic levels, either due to conflicts or to severe financial and economic crises or to the return of authoritarian rulers after failed transitions.”

“What we need is to increase the visibility of the UfM activities and to do more. The UfM is not an NGO. It is a member driven organisation. It cannot work properly if its member states do not support it.”

### The UfM’s regional performance

Experts from Tunisia, Palestine and Jordan, in particular, emphasise the importance of regional cooperation. The Union for the Mediterranean's role in promoting regional cooperation is seen as important in its claim but most experts assess the UfM’s regional performance very critically when it comes to practical implementation (Figure 8).




Figure 8

The following selected assessments reflect a wide range of different opinions:

“The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) needs to be totally rethought and reshaped and revived.”

“The UfM was a promising project. The regional situation in the Middle East and the EU’s weak foreign policy didn't allow it to develop. Conflicts, refugee crises and inter-European rivalries fragilized the process that seems absent today.”

“The UfM is important for its meetings between Arab officials and Israeli officials.”

“I think the UfM is a very good forum for regional exchanges. There should be more communication on the organisation's activities and the member states should be more involved in promoting domestically and regionally its activities.”

“There is near to no visibility. The EU itself is not investing sufficient effort in the UfM.”

---

“The UfM is doing a good job in terms of providing a forum to discuss Euro-Med issues.”

“The cooperation between the different states is very low, the divergence of interests is increasing. Tensions for example between Egypt and Turkey are rising.”

“less bureaucracy and more action needed”

---

Beyond these different and quite critical estimations two-thirds of the experts support a budget specifically dedicated to the UfM to increase accountability and credibility.

The experts list conflicts and power-political reasons as important obstacles to foster regional cooperation. Some voices positively emphasise that the UfM at least enables meetings of Israeli and Arab as well as Moroccan and Algerian officials. Other respondents expect a more active European role even in contributing to achieving peace in the region.

### Different regional formats

Surprisingly, UN formats on conflict resolution receive little support, but half of the experts emphasise the 5+5 format (Dialogue on Migration in the Western Mediterranean consisting of Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta on the European side and Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya on the North African side). Some assessments about this regional forum are (as seen below):

#### Selected Assessments about the 5+5 Dialogue Format on Migration in the Western Mediterranean:

“This regional forum has a forward-looking agenda on information exchange, joint management of international borders, agreed forms of labour migration, migration for development, and protection of the rights of migrants.”

“This format has shown relative effectiveness in the management of the migration issue and in regional security issues, especially since it has enabled, among other things, Moroccan and Algerian officials to meet and work together.”

“The 5+5 format is very limited and cannot be adopted as a format in the Eastern Mediterranean, for political reasons. The need is hence to reform existing formats and institutions and to rebuild credibility through political decisions, conflict resolutions and dialogue.”

“It is important to promote the dialogue, that the dialogue parties have a neutral partner. The EU is a neutral partner, because the EU as EU is a new construct and something else than single EU member states.”

---

In addition, regarding different formats that could enhance more regional cooperation it is suggested that the EU should promote intra-Maghreb cooperation. A voice from Libya suggests the formation of an EU-North Africa free trade area. An expert from Israel points to the importance of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, initiated in 1994 and currently involving seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia).

## Concrete projects and initiatives jointly to work on in the Southern Neighbourhood

Many experts emphasise "soft power" issues when it comes to proposing concrete projects for further bilateral cooperation of their ENPC with the EU or the Union for the Mediterranean (see *Attachment 2* for more details. The table lists practical project initiatives subdivided by countries and priorities). On top, they note foreign direct investments, SMEs, science and technology, jobs, human rights and peace.

If one were to rank these 77 project proposals, most of them would be concentrated in the four complexes: (1) economy / labour / innovation, (2) rule of law / governance / civil society, (3) education / people-to-people, (4) environmental protection / renewable energy.

Figure 9 reflects this set of project proposals in relation to the new four priorities (a "democratic, more stable, greener and more prosperous" neighbourhood) as noted in the European Council decision of December 11, 2020. Figure 10 relates these goals to the new five key policy areas noted in the Joint Communication of February 9, 2021 ("Human Development, Economy, Peace, Migration, Climate").




Figure 9: Democracy, stability, sustainability and economy mirror the four priorities set by the European Council's declaration on December 11, 2020 (see also Figure 3, p. 6). **Democracy** (incl. rule of law, human rights and good governance); **Stability** (incl. conflict resolution, peace, counterterrorism, political dialogue and regional cooperation); **Sustainability** (incl. sustainability, environmental protection and energy); **Prosperity/Economy** (incl. economy, trade, jobs, agriculture); **Other suggestions** (incl. migration, mobility, education, civil society, people-to-people, capacity building and more).

What projects and initiatives are of special importance for your country?




Figure 10: The five key policy areas of the Joint Communication on February 9, 2021: **Human Development and Good Governance** (incl. democracy, rule of law, Human rights, education, civil society, people-to-people, culture, research, health care); **Economy and Digital Transition** (incl. trade, jobs, agriculture, SMEs, women economic empowerment); **Peace and Security** (incl. stability, conflict resolution, political dialogue, regional cooperation, cyber threats), **Migration and Mobility**; **Climate and Energy** (incl. environment, green transition, sustainability, biodiversity, food security).

Interestingly, these project priority proposals reflect almost all policy objectives of the European Neighbourhood East / "Eastern Partnership" (referring to the [Joint Communication](#) of the European Commission and the High Representative from March 19, 2020 and the [European Council Conclusions](#) on the Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy beyond 2020 from May 11, 2020).

Still worth mentioning are references to the importance of "green topics" as agriculture and reforestation as well as trans-Mediterranean exchange between universities / mobility of professors and students. An Egyptian expert suggests linking SMEs to FDI from EU countries in the manufacturing sector through clusters in order to improve trade and economic arrangements in association agreements. A Lebanese expert considers it important for the EU to help reform the Lebanese electoral law.

Noticeable are increased references to the importance of the rule of law, good and legitimate governance, capable administration, strong civil society for the success of the implementation of the AAs with the EU and the social and economic development of the ENPCs. The inclusion of representatives from business and civil society in appropriate formats to deepen the partnership is suggested.

All experts would like to see **a stronger role for Germany** in promoting development in the Southern Neighbourhood countries. Of note is the demand for German experience in strengthening the rule of law, local governance capacity, social entrepreneurship and linking NGOs and businesses with German counterparts (see *Attachment 3* for more details, the table lists concrete project initiatives addressed to Germany).

With regard to the **management of the Corona crisis**, among many proposals, support for the improvement of services of the public health sector and a technology

transfer are highlighted (see *Attachment 4* for more details, the table lists concrete project initiatives).

In conclusion, according to the experts, the European Neighbourhood Policy South can most effectively strengthen regional integration in the Southern Mediterranean in the fields of action related to the improvement of economy and stability. The table in *Attachment 5* lists 41 priority fields of action proposed by the experts. Translating these 41 priority fields of action into the five key policy areas suggested by the Joint Communication (see figure 11), 90 percent of the proposals focus on the three key policy areas of (1) human development / good governance, (2) economy / digital transition and (3) peace / security.




Figure 11: The five key policy areas of the Joint Communication on February 9, 2021: **Human Development and Good Governance** (incl. democracy, rule of law, Human rights, education, civil society, people-to-people, culture, research, health care); **Economy and Digital Transition** (incl. trade, jobs, agriculture, SMEs, women economic empowerment); **Peace and Security** (incl. stability, conflict resolution, political dialogue, regional cooperation, cyber threats), **Migration and Mobility**; **Climate and Energy** (incl. environment, green transition, sustainability, biodiversity, food security).

### Further observations

The proposals also reflect that despite geographical proximity, historical ties and the desire for more regional cooperation, the situation in and the needs of the ten ENPCs are very heterogeneous.

The experts' assessments and the range of their proposals for enhanced cooperation with Europe underline that the EU is the preferred partner for the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood. This holds also true in view of the growing influence of Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Russia and China, which some experts perceive as challenging. This observation is an appeal to the Brussels institutions and the governments of the EU-27 to bring more economic and political weight to bear in order more decisively to advance the transformation to democracy, stability, prosperity and sustainability in the immediate neighbourhood of the European Union – South and East.

Finally, the experts' assessments show how closely the problems in the neighbourhood are interwoven with the stability and welfare of the EU. In the light of the debate on enhanced transatlantic cooperation with the new US administration, it becomes clear that the test case for the EU to bear more global responsibility lies in its immediate Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood.

Responsible:

Christian Hanelt, Senior Expert, Email: [christian.hanelt@bertelsmann-stiftung.de](mailto:christian.hanelt@bertelsmann-stiftung.de)

Stefani Weiss, Senior Expert, Email: [Stefani.Weiss@bertelsmann-stiftung.de](mailto:Stefani.Weiss@bertelsmann-stiftung.de)

#### PROJECT DESCRIPTION:

“Strategies for the EU Neighbourhood”, European Programme, Bertelsmann Stiftung: Current crises and conflicts in the EU’s neighbourhood are having a destabilizing effect on the EU and its Member States. We aim to develop proposed solutions for how a European Neighbourhood Policy can effectively influence transformation processes in neighbouring countries in order to increase security, stability and prosperity for all sides.

## Attachments

### Attachment 1: *What are common goals in the bilateral cooperation between your country and the EU?*

Selection of common objectives ranked by order of importance

Country	1 <sup>st</sup> most important objective	2 <sup>nd</sup> most important objective	3 <sup>rd</sup> most important objective	4 <sup>th</sup> most important objective
<b>Algeria</b>	peace and stability of the Mediterranean region	economic cooperation (association agreement)	balanced mobility	political dialogue
<b>Egypt</b>	stability; trade; a forum for political dialogue	controlling migration; FDI (Foreign Direct Investment); economic and social dialogue; support for Egypt	economic development; aid; cooperation for peace and stability in the region	education; movement of trade
<b>Israel</b>	research; technology; trade	trade and services; scientific research	energy; political dialogue	people-to-people contacts; economic cooperation
<b>Jordan</b>	joint projects and investment; build a real partnership; enhance economic and trade ties	improve stability and deepening political understanding amongst members countries; see a more active European role in contributing to achieving peace in the region	enhance regional cooperation; benefit from Europe's experience in integration	knowledge transfer; help the region in adopting rules of better conduct in human rights and democracy
<b>Lebanon</b>	economic and financial sustainability; political cooperation	political and administrative reform; economic development and attracting investments	infrastructure reconstruction; supporting Lebanon in dealing with the refugee crises	SSR (Security Sector Reform)
<b>Libya</b>	strengthen security, e.g. border security	re-establish interior security and bodies; trade	creation of free trade zone between North Africa and the EU; education	improvement of education system to regional standard/benchmark, including skill development; migration
<b>Morocco</b>	strengthen the rule of law and good governance; stable, win-win and forward-looking partnerships	socio-economic development; political dialogue and strengthening of civil society	fight against irregular immigration; job creation	joint competitiveness; fight against terrorism;
<b>Palestine</b>	water declination	employment	energy	environment
<b>Syria</b>	stabilisation of the country; professional training of high civil servants	scientific cooperation; help the conflict parties to find a political solution	avoid uncontrolled migration; economic assistance	rebuilding of the country after the war; preservation of cultural archaeological heritage
<b>Tunisia</b>	open markets; economic development on both sides; improving the governance across major areas (economic, fiscal, security, education and social structure)	supporting a sustainable growth; supporting institutions; job creation	reducing, particularly, youth unemployment, which comes along with brain-drain at the moment; supporting innovation and digitalisation	improving the cohesion between old and young Tunisians; mobility; cultural exchange

**Attachment 2: What projects and initiatives are of special importance for your country?**

Selection of project ideas ranked by order of importance

Country	Most important	2 <sup>nd</sup> most important	3 <sup>rd</sup> most important	4 <sup>th</sup> most important
<b>Algeria</b>	FDI (Foreign Direct Investment)	migration; mobility	counter terrorism	environment
<b>Egypt</b>	human rights; popular participation; creating clusters for SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises); initiatives in the field of climate change	addressing non-tariff measures; cooperation in the field of human rights; human development education	ecological sustainable growth; boosting exchanges between the universities of the two shores of the Mediterranean; programmes for talented newcomers in politics	public health; including trade in services in the agreement; funds and programmes to support young entrepreneurs
<b>Israel</b>	science and technology projects; people-to-people initiatives	academic mobility programmes (for students and faculty); energy projects	environmental protection of the Mediterranean; educational and training projects	cultural projects/exchange
<b>Jordan</b>	tourism; science and technology	environment; vocational training	agriculture; helping municipalities build capacity to provide better and expanded services	management of SMEs; education
<b>Lebanon</b>	human rights and freedoms; supporting schooling structures and local communities hosting refugees	civil society encouragement; supporting the independence of the judiciary	education and culture; administrative decentralisation	reforming the electoral system; innovation and technology
<b>Libya</b>	security and border control	trade; improvement of elementary education	improvement of medical infrastructure; education	migration; improvement of citizenship and relation of state to citizen and vice versa
<b>Morocco</b>	strengthen education and health systems as well as social protection; job creation	SME's; strengthen sustainable agriculture and fishery resources	establish a solid industrial production system; education	sustainable development; encourage the production of renewable energy resources
<b>Palestine</b>	job creation projects	clean energy projects	water supply projects	environment projects
<b>Syria</b>	comprehensive peace initiative; professional training in post-conflict transition fields	strengthening of public health sector; reform of the judiciary and capacity building of judges	comprehensive security (citizen-oriented); strengthening of food self-sufficiency	building of an effective administration; local administration
<b>Tunisia</b>	supporting special industries (Olive Oil Programme) and identifying new industries; define a clear strategy and prepare capacity and governance to implement	macro-financial assistance to support the government; water desalination; simplify administration since it's is becoming a blocker of growth in the country	education exchange; combat desertification; activate innovation and tech ecosystem exchange and collaboration	partnership with the European Investment Bank; renewable energy manage impact of Covid-19 crisis

Attachment 3: *What role should Germany play?*

Country	Selection of responses
<b>Algeria</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ According to a long-standing relationship between Germany and Algeria, Germany as a strategic partner in Europe could balance the role of French influence in the economic field in Algeria.</li> <li>▪ More German industrial delocalisation and more direct investment will be much helpful and appreciated as Algeria is trying to diversify its partners and its economy shifting from the oil and gas economy.</li> </ul>
<b>Egypt</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ more pressure on the government through a higher amount of investment with clear conditions in terms of human rights etc.</li> <li>▪ Germany managed to develop regional value chains with eastern European countries: similar value chains need to be developed with countries from the southern shore</li> <li>▪ Germany has many institutions that have strong bonds with the southern Mediterranean countries and institutions, from governmental to non-governmental, educational, cultural and technical service. It would be important to activate different players to achieve a new regional awakening.</li> </ul>
<b>Israel</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Germany is a stabilizing force in this region and should assume a leadership role</li> <li>▪ display interest in the South</li> </ul>
<b>Jordan</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Germany is instrumental in the EU and can lead initiatives that may potentially enhance collaboration in key sectors, especially in manufacturing and infrastructure</li> <li>▪ consider qualifying skilled manpower</li> <li>▪ joint investments and market access in products that deepen collaboration as a first step to further steps in the future</li> <li>▪ focus on social enterprise and the concept of inclusive growth and adopt policies towards that end</li> <li>▪ provide institutional assistance, so Jordanian institutions can benefit from German knowledge and experience in formulating economic recovery programmes</li> </ul>
<b>Lebanon</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ more involvement on political issues, with a focus on administrative decentralisation</li> <li>▪ increased involvement in defence and security sectors (to some extent)</li> <li>▪ Germany has been highly praised in the region for its human rights and refugee policies, for its cultural tolerance and for its economic support of many reform projects through foundations and concerned ministries</li> <li>▪ supporting decentralisation, local development, and the independence of the judiciary could be important contributions to complement economic cooperation and exchanges</li> </ul>
<b>Libya</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ direct cooperation between municipalities and security bodies</li> <li>▪ field of security, especially SSR (Security Sector Reform) and DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration), with a focus on mine action and removal of war remnants and rehabilitation</li> <li>▪ field of migration management and cooperation to ensure humanitarian and human rights obligations are met under different international laws and regulations with specific support on combatting smuggling and trafficking and expansion of foreign labour force support</li> <li>▪ field of education, to increase the agreements to support the educational system, educational exchange and exchange of knowledge on research, especially medical research, while allowing for expansion in the cooperation between higher education institutions and universities</li> </ul>
<b>Morocco</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Germany has technical and economic power and infrastructures to help Morocco to strengthen its capacities in the sectors of agriculture, renewable energies as well as in all that relates to the pharmaceutical and medical industries</li> <li>▪ It could also support Morocco more in its policies in the fields of water, sanitation, or forest protection / strengthening.</li> <li>▪ Many important initiatives have already been implemented recently (Hydrogen, Green Economy...). Morocco and Germany can be the core engine to a newly designed Euro-Med-African partnership.</li> </ul>
<b>Palestine</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Germany can play a bigger role in giving health advice and medical support, including for a vaccine</li> </ul>
<b>Syria</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Germany is recognized as more neutral than other EU countries and more neutral than the EU itself. It could play a mediation role between the conflict parties because its role would be accepted from all sides.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Germany could help with technical and reform advising to rebuild the health sector after the war</li> <li>Given that Germany took the largest number of Syrian refugees, it can help organize the Syrian diaspora in Europe to become a strategic actor and contribute over time to the recovery of Syria.</li> </ul>
<b>Tunisia</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Germany has the economic infrastructure to connect Tunisian companies with the (Southern) EU market via German value-chains</li> <li>with a large education sector, German research institutions can foster a larger participation of Tunisian research and education institutions</li> </ul>

*Attachment 4: In view of the challenges that the Covid-19-pandemic and its socio-economic consequences present for Europe and the region: What fields of cooperation should be prioritized in order to strengthen cooperation between the EU and members of the Southern Neighbourhood?*

Country	Selection of responses
<b>Algeria</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>transfer of knowledge and technology in the pharmaceutical industry</li> </ul>
<b>Egypt</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>development of the health sector: at the infrastructural level (hospitals, clinics, etc.), the skills level (helping to improve the skills of nurses and doctors), coverage (to include vulnerable and poor people)</li> <li>new cooperations and exchange in the field of health service and epidemiology becomes essential</li> <li>crisis has immensely affected travels and the movement of citizens in the region: important to find ways to ease restrictions and enable business, study and tourist travels again</li> </ul>
<b>Israel</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>health security</li> <li>science and technology</li> <li>fields of cooperation should be determined in dialogue between the EU and its southern partners - respectively</li> </ul>
<b>Jordan</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>identify the most affected sectors and try to keep private business afloat</li> <li>economic recovery and getting more people to work</li> <li>providing business owners affordable credit to sustain their businesses until recovery is solid</li> <li>enhance health capabilities and build institutions</li> <li>offer some concessional funding to help mitigate the negative impact of Covid-19</li> </ul>
<b>Lebanon</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>health sector</li> <li>human rights and refugee/foreign workers rights</li> <li>education and schooling</li> <li>the judiciary system</li> </ul>
<b>Libya</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>improving the health care system and municipality administration to cope with pandemics and unexpected events</li> <li>field of economic support with interlinks to combatting terrorism and money laundering, while ensuring fair and transparent management of state resources, with emphasis on supporting the banking system in Libya</li> <li>field of education to increase the agreements to support the educational system, educational exchange and exchange of knowledge on research, especially medical research, while allowing for expansion in the cooperation between higher education institutions and universities</li> </ul>
<b>Morocco</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>health care system</li> <li>education system</li> <li>new technologies of information and communication</li> <li>Morocco should be part of the Green Deal as well as part of the EU value chain for production</li> </ul>
<b>Palestine</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>providing advice, expertise and medical equipment to countries in need</li> </ul>
<b>Syria</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>health care</li> <li>support and protection for independent mediator to ensure reliable information on the pandemic now and other issues more generally</li> </ul>
<b>Tunisia</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>better coordination between countries on both shores to face health challenges together</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ financial and institutional support to improve Tunisia's economic performance that is far behind its potential</li> <li>▪ supporting the modernization of public institutions and the democratization</li> <li>▪ save SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises)</li> <li>▪ support businesses to rethink their positioning in global value chains</li> </ul>
--	---

*Attachment 5: In what way can or should EU Neighbourhood Policy contribute to fostering regional integration? What would be the priority fields of action?*

Country	Selection of responses
<b>Algeria</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 3M (Mobility, Market, Money) strategy has to be developed</li> <li>▪ key priorities: mobility and more FDI (Foreign Direct Investment)</li> </ul>
<b>Egypt</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ connect civil society institutions - except more pressure for regional education via a strengthened common foreign and security policy and again rethink the UfM (Union for the Mediterranean)</li> <li>▪ The EU-Middle East trade relations represent a promising opportunity for Arab countries to increase their access to the EU market, to create more opportunities for exports diversification, employment and overall growth and socio-economic development. Nevertheless, the impact of the Association Agreements between the EU and Arab countries has been rather limited to a shallow form of integration with minimal impact.</li> <li>▪ making trade policy more and better connected to the industrial policy</li> <li>▪ demilitarisation, peace and stability</li> </ul>
<b>Israel</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ ENP should launch a new regional (small-scaled) forum for cooperation in the above-mentioned fields of cooperation</li> <li>▪ ENP cannot foster regional integration. In any case - over the past 25 years - it was never really about Med integration - but about raising standards in the south to dissuade migration to Europe</li> </ul>
<b>Jordan</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ qualifying private sector firms to access the EU market, in trying to focus on key issues that inhibits collaboration. So far, limited success has been achieved to enhance regional cooperation by joint activities (such as Agadir).</li> <li>▪ data flows and information</li> <li>▪ go beyond the traditional format and slogans to what could be described as a product-based form of collaboration with specific stakeholders</li> <li>▪ encourage countries of the south to adopt policies conducive to integration within the region and with Europe</li> </ul>
<b>Lebanon</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ continue working in the fields where cooperation already exists</li> <li>▪ elaborate a long run approach in which conflict resolution based on international law, mediations and serious peace processes, respect of human rights and the independence of the judiciary are central</li> <li>▪ this will diminish crises, tensions and create a better environment for stability and development + reduce the security concerns and the risks for new refugee crises.</li> </ul>
<b>Libya</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ ENP can contribute more by allowing for a more detailed and state-oriented action plan: the various Southern neighbourhood states of the EU have undergone different political change and several reforms; the culture of the people is different in each state and the focus is also different. Therefore, a one-size-fits-all agenda is likely to be ineffective</li> <li>▪ The more the plan is tailored for each state based on a specific dialogue, the more it can fill in the gaps and prove effectiveness (however, a few topics remain of the same regional interest and that can be focused on as well).</li> <li>▪ cooperation in the security sector, mainly in the areas of conflict-prevention, counter-terrorism and anti-radicalization policies</li> <li>▪ cooperation in the migration and mobility field</li> <li>▪ cooperation on economic, social development, energy security and climate action</li> <li>▪ cooperation on human rights and space for civil society</li> </ul>
<b>Morocco</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The ENP should insist in a stronger manner on regional integration. The dominance of bilateral activity does not serve that purpose. It should be more balanced and there should be a "regional bonus".</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ ENP should help promote regional integration by giving more space to civil society and its organisations</li> <li>▪ Providing more space for the preparation of cooperation projects with states than for their implementation or monitoring</li> <li>▪ ENP should place greater emphasis on the cultural and human aspects of any joint partnership initiative</li> <li>▪ education and scientific research, in particular medical research</li> <li>▪ sustainable agriculture and renewable energies</li> <li>▪ new information and communication techniques</li> <li>▪ All this, of course, within a political and institutional framework that protects human rights and which is fair to all components of the society.</li> </ul>
<b>Palestine</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ democratization</li> <li>▪ economic development</li> </ul>
<b>Syria</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Regional cooperation could only function if the EU could guarantee a balance of interests.</li> <li>▪ On the other side, the regional powers could not guarantee this balance without a neutral partner like the EU. However, this balance could not be achieved without economic, political, and administrative development projects. The EU should continue working on these fields.</li> <li>▪ support local government structures, judiciary and parliaments</li> </ul>
<b>Tunisia</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A core challenge for Tunisia are the developments in Libya. Integrating Tunisia with Egypt and Libya in the coming years is difficult.</li> <li>▪ priority has to be set on stabilizing the national economy and supporting the young democratic structure</li> <li>▪ more open markets for agricultural products from the South and for services</li> <li>▪ respect the freedom of movement of persons</li> <li>▪ employment</li> <li>▪ digital economy</li> <li>▪ culture exchange</li> </ul>