Migration and Globalization – Forms, Patterns and Effects
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I Introduction

Starting with the slow outward movement of our common African ancestors, migration is as old as humanity itself and played an important role in the evolution of culture and civilization. Without migrants spreading their various cultures, languages, religions, customs, ideas and ways of life, the course of world history most certainly would have evolved quite differently. As the global population increased from 3.7 billion in 1970 to 7.2 billion today, globalization, economic inequalities and demographic developments have contributed to sizeable migratory flows, predominantly from the Global South to the Global North. Europe is faced today with a conflict zone stretching across the Middle East and North Africa, and with several fragile countries, rapidly growing populations, rising urbanization and huge economic inequalities in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.

Europe is currently faced with daunting challenges: monitoring and protecting its borders, managing migration flows, attracting skilled labor to address its economic needs, managing tension with migrant communities (especially Muslim ones) to protect social cohesion and stability and integrating those communities to the greatest extent possible. There appears to be a divergence between the economic rationale, on the one hand, and the social cohesion and internal security rationales, on the other, in the context of a European migration policy. In principle, demand for labor might encourage a more liberal attitude toward economic migrants from the Global South, and/or the development of new guest-worker arrangements with North African and other states in Europe’s extended southern neighborhood, on a national or European level. As a result of current trends, European economies may benefit while social cohesion and internal stability may deteriorate. Migration pressures are expected to become more acute in the future.

This evolving refugee/migration crisis, if not successfully managed, may become an existential threat for an EU already weakened by euroskepticism, the financial crisis and Brexit. There seems to be a new division inside the Union, between a German-led group supporting a European solution to the refugee problem and the Visegrad group and like-minded countries, as well as far-right political parties across Europe, arguing in favor of fences and a Europe-fortress mentality.

Using a scenario-based approach, this paper will briefly explore the relationship between globalization and migration, and the impact of globalization and other main trends and drivers on population movements. Then it will make an effort to answer two key questions: (1) What are the emerging or new patterns of migration? (2) What do future scenarios of migration look like and what do they imply? In this context, a number of more specific issues will be addressed, including the impact of globalization on migration, brain-drain phenomena and integration policies.

The paper will conclude with a summary of main findings and a short list of policy recommendations as to how decision makers in the EU could incorporate best practices and ideas into policy-making and how the Union should pursue or deal with the effects of globalization and migration to respond to current and emerging challenges.
II Global and European Trends and Drivers\(^1\) Affecting Migration

The pace and direction (in order to cover not only the "core" but also the "gap") of globalization is only one of several trends and drivers influencing population movements, albeit an important one. Others include (a) global and regional demographic trends (especially regional population increase/decrease and the pace of urbanization); (b) the state of the global economy (will the rise of the rest continue? If yes, this may significantly affect South-South migration); (c) the number and intensity of regional, interstate and intrastate conflicts; and (d) the impact of climate change. It is also argued that the "migration weapon" has been used by transit states (like Iran or Turkey) and non-western great powers (like Russia) to instrumentalize the flows for political reasons. If this is indeed the case, similar actions may be repeated in the future.

In addition to the above "push" factors, there are "pull" factors at play, such as the policies of receiving countries (with emphasis on European ones, for the purposes of this paper). Relevant factors will be both quantitative (total size of flows to Europe, as well as numbers per receiving country) and qualitative (skills, country of origin and other characteristics of migrants). Other relevant factors will be the state of the EU (integration vs. disintegration, economic and demographic factors, the rise of populism and the salience of security issues [terrorism + radicalization], as well as migration and integration policies at the European and national level.

\(^1\) NATO defines a trend as the evolution of repetitive events. Consequently, trends show how the components (domains) are changing. (FSE 2025, p. 11) According to the DCDC, a trend is a discernible pattern of change (Global Strategic Trends Out to 2040, p. 6). According to the DCDC, a driver is a factor that directly influences or causes change (Global Strategic Trends Out to 2040, Strategic Trends Programme, UK Ministry of Defence, 4th edition, January 2010, p. 6). For NATO, a driver designates the course of an event that results in a specific trend into a component (Future Security Environment (FSE) 2025, Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation, Norfolk, Virginia, June 2007, p. 11). Jair van der Lijn defines drivers as underlying causes or incentives for an actor or phenomenon (Jair van der Lijn, Crystal Balling Future Threats 2020–2030: Security Foresights of "Actors" and "Drivers" in Perspective, Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 2, June 2011, p. 149).
1. Globalization and Migration

“Globalization is truly the megatrend of our times” and its impact is being increasingly – although unequally – felt in almost every region of the world. Anthony Gidens defined globalization as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. Globalization, interchangeably treated as a process, a condition, a system, a force and an age, can also be described as the expansion and intensification of social relations and consciousness across world time and world space. Most experts would agree that globalization as a process has been ongoing for more than 500 years, as it is linked to the 16th century emergence of capitalism in Europe and the subsequent expansion of the capitalist world-system around the globe. It should be noted that the process has reached its peak during the past 25 years (facilitated by the end of the Cold War).

For several years now, distant events have been having a deeper impact on our lives. The boundaries between domestic matters and global affairs have become increasingly blurred and local developments may come to have enormous global consequences. The term globalization is often being used to describe this interconnectedness between the global and local levels. Although few would dispute the fact that globalization has led to a substantial reduction of global disparities in wealth and well-being between the Global North and the Global South, there is also little doubt that sizeable groups inside countries have not benefited from globalization (“the losers” of globalization).

Furthermore, there is a clear connection between globalization and population movements, especially migratory ones. The two spheres unavoidably overlap and are interconnected. Globalization causes migration and migration contributes to the intensification of socioeconomic and political relations across borders. Globalization has indeed dislocated millions of people and set in motion population movements that are now hard for anyone to control. This represents a
serious political challenge to nation-states, which often can no longer effectively regulate who crosses their borders, either because they are unable to enforce immigration laws or lack the resolve to do so, raising the critical question of whether national boundaries are on the way to obsolescence.

A certain level of uncertainty exists around the extent to which globalization and technological change will continue to have an impact on future migration trends. Technology and economic development make it increasingly easy for migrants to travel inexpensively, to learn about available routes and to stay in touch with family and community members abroad, but the level of use and absorption is difficult to measure. Continuing globalization is likely to support migration trends as well, as the expansion of media, languages and businesses facilitates interactions across borders. Telecommuting and outsourcing, however, may act as a restraint on migration.

Brexit, the Trump election and strong anti-globalization voices in various European countries have led to speculation that the globalization era may be coming to a sudden end or that, at a minimum, globalization’s tempo is decelerating and its role declining. Our working assumption is that globalization may, perhaps, slow-down as a global trend or be temporarily and partially reversed in some regions of the world, but a return to the pre-globalization era is highly unlikely – unless, of course, a game changer (“black swan”) of global dimensions takes place.

2. Global and Regional Demographic Trends

The global population in 2016 was estimated at 7.5 billion and is thought to be increasing by approximately 80 million (1.15%) every year. There is a general consensus among experts that global population growth will continue, almost exclusively in middle-income and lower-income countries, and world population will grow to between 8 and 9.6 billion by 2050. In the period 2010–2020, roughly 98% of the increase will be taking place in developing countries and six countries will account for half of the projected increase: India, China (although it will also be faced with problems caused by an ageing population), Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh and Indonesia. At the same time, over 20 countries, mostly in Europe, have declining populations. This number could reach 44 by 2050.
In 2016, the population of the EU-28 was estimated at 510.1 million (minus 64 million, if one excludes the UK). Over the past decade, it grew on average by 1.36 million people (0.27%) per year, with growth unequally distributed across member states. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as those hit worst by the economic and financial crisis, are experiencing a population decline, while others are faring relatively better. In 2013, about 20% to 25% of the population increase was “natural,” while net migration accounted for most of the rest (although migration levels vary from year to year).

According to the UN’s lower variant, the EU-27 population in 2030 could be around 2% lower than the 2010 population (possible changes in the levels of migration cannot be easily factored into such estimates). Another disconcerting forecast is that whereas median age in 1980 was 34 in Europe and 33 in Japan, in 2030 it will be 44.7 in the EU-27, 52 in Japan and only 39.5 in the US (up from 37 in 2010). The global median age will be 33.2, whereas in Africa it will be 21.3. It is also projected that in the EU-27 of 2060, the over-80s will equal the proportion of young people (0–14) at around 15%. The 15–64 age group will shrink to 57% of the population, whilst those aged 65–80 will substantially expand to 28%. In fact, most of the EU member states will become post-mature states.

At the same time, the expanding use of artificial intelligence-related technologies (robotics) will lead to the loss of an unknown number of middle-class jobs and the creation of (an almost certainly smaller number of) high-skill ones. The current trend in developed economies is to move away from labor-intensive sectors, but the full transition to a new economic model is not yet visible.

The long-term trend of urbanization is expected to continue globally, regardless of countries’ income levels (although the change will be much more visible in the Global South), as a result of economic opportunities in cities, modernization of transport, population growth and a variety of involuntary conditions. Predictions suggest slightly more than half the world’s population will live in
cities, and over 300 cities in the developing world (middle-income and low-income countries) will have more than 1 million inhabitants. It is expected that approximately 65% or more of the world’s population will live in cities by 2050. Urbanization is likely to be driven by population momentum, the expansion of urban areas and the arrival of new migrants (internal and external). Although experts agree that urbanization will continue to be a major driver of internal migration (thus, in some cases, increasing state fragility), the situation is less clear regarding its impact on international migration. While urbanization will probably not have identical consequences for various countries and regions, it looks quite likely that a combination of population increase in major urban centers in the South and slow economic growth and lack of employment there may contribute to higher South-North and (perhaps) South-South migratory movements.

3. State of Global Economy

Although there is no consensus on the “decline of the West,” few would dispute the “rise of the rest.” Over the past three decades there has been impressive economic growth in the developing world, which resulted in decreasing inequality between countries, including a significant reduction in poverty rates (especially rates of extreme poverty). There is now a growing global middle class which already includes more than two billion people. Despite the remarkable progress, economic inequalities continue to be substantial and distribution and access to resources (energy, food, freshwater) will remain uneven. Furthermore, there is concern about the fragility of many low-income developing states, as well as about the impact of mega-cities on economic development and migration trends.

The main trend in Africa, a key region for Europe because of its geographic proximity and demographic growth, is increased investment in and exploitation of the continent’s rich resource base by various extra-regional state and non-state actors. Because of its oil and mineral wealth, Africa will elicit much greater commercial attention and become the focus of a large number of international investors. However, it is highly uncertain that future African governments will succeed where most have thus far failed: in transforming this wealth into sustainable development.

4. Number and Intensity of Regional, Interstate and Intrastate Conflicts

Political upheaval in regions such as the Middle East, the Maghreb, the Sahel and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia is heavily affecting refugee and migration trends in Europe. According to the IISS, the number of interstate and intrastate conflicts (as well as cases of hybrid warfare) has in fact decreased, from around 70 in 2001 to just 42 in 2014 (albeit with a substantially higher number of fatalities) and 40 in 2016 (with a small decline in fatalities). However, some of these conflicts have been persistent and intractable, with local animosities being exploited by third countries in pursuit of geopolitical or commercial interests. The emergence of new hotspots has resulted in a higher demand for humanitarian relief efforts and in growing numbers of internally displaced persons worldwide, as well as waves of refugees heading towards the economically developed and politically stable countries of Europe and North America (but also neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, in the case of refugees from Syria). The capacity of the international community to address such conflicts has evolved in rather contradictory ways.

Furthermore, the increasingly complex and fragmented nature of the current international system may allow for the creation of “black holes” (ungoverned spaces). The emergence of such fragile, unstable, dysfunctional or failed territories/states can have important destabilizing consequences not only for neighboring states but also much further away. In some cases, such states may also constitute “black holes” for the whole international system. There are a number of states in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa which may be classified in the above categories. In some
cases, they may constitute safe heavens for a wide variety of criminal activities, with only local or limited regional impact. In other cases, such as Somalia (piracy), the impact is much wider.

It would be rather futile to try to make a prediction about the future of conflict, including the number of flashpoints and the efficiency of international conflict management mechanisms, other than to say that it will remain a feature of international and regional politics and, thus, a significant contributing factor to population movements towards safer areas.

5. Climate Change

Environmental issues will increasingly affect economic, social and political developments throughout the world. Even if one doesn’t endorse Jared Diamond’s warning that “we are on an unsustainable course driving toward global societal change” and our collective demographic, societal and environmental problems are “like time-bombs with fuses of less than 50 years”, the consequences will nevertheless be severe. The impact of climate change will be even more acute in vulnerable regions and groups that face multiple stresses at the same time: pre-existing conflict; poverty and unequal access to resources; weak institutions; food insecurity; and incidence of diseases.

Although there is still uncertainty about the exact magnitude, rate and geographical impact of climate change, President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement may have extremely disturbing consequences for global efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change. As a rule, wealthier countries and individuals will be better able to adapt to the impacts of climate change. In the developing world, even a relatively mild climatic shift can trigger or exacerbate food shortages, water scarcity, destructive weather events, the spread of diseases, human migration and natural resource competition. These crises are all the more dangerous because they are interwoven and self-perpetuating. It is expected that the combination of population increase and density and permanent loss of territory as a result of flooding (for example, in countries such as Bangladesh and Vietnam) or other climate change-related effects will force significant numbers of people (estimates range from 50 to 200 million by 2050) into internal or external migration.
## Global migration trends and drivers (evolution of “push” factors)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trends + drivers</th>
<th>Pessimistic scenario</th>
<th>Medium scenario</th>
<th>Optimistic scenario</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Globalization</strong></td>
<td>Countries start closing their borders to the movement of goods and people; protectionism returns with a vengeance and this has a strong negative impact on economic growth for most countries and unemployment rises; as a result, migratory flows increase (mostly South to North) Business as usual; globalization remains a dominant trend, but huge inequalities inside countries and between regions (‘core’ and ‘gap’) remain; migratory flows (mostly South to North) continue largely unaffected</td>
<td>Inequalities inside countries and regions are being addressed somewhat successfully (expanding the ‘core’ and ‘shrinking’ the gap); migratory flows decline, they are mostly South-South and flows to the North are generally regulated</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic Developments (2050)</strong></td>
<td>Population increase in developing countries in Europe’s broader neighborhood (according to UN high scenario) continues and is a major contributing factor to the increase of migratory flows to the EU</td>
<td>Population gradually stabilizes in the South (UN medium scenario) and its contribution to migratory flows to the EU is manageable, provided the Union develops the right set of policies</td>
<td>There is a degree of convergence between population increase in the developing world and population decrease + ageing in Europe; therefore demographics’ contribution to migratory flows is quite limited</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>State of global economy (examined in conjunction with globalization)</strong></td>
<td>General deceleration of the global economy contributes to increased migratory flows mainly from South to North and to some ‘rising’ countries in the South</td>
<td>Economic growth in selected countries in the South; economic developments in Africa and in some highly populated Asian countries are less than impressive and migratory flows from those countries to the North or the more developed South continue</td>
<td>The ‘rest’ continue to rise and the impact is spreading across the South; South to South migration increases, migration South to North decreases, migratory flows decline in absolute numbers</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conflicts</strong></td>
<td>Significant increase in the number of conflicts and a growing number of weak/failed states contribute to greater flows of refugees to safe destinations</td>
<td>Slight increase or decrease in the number of conflicts; little change from current levels of refugee flows</td>
<td>Significant reduction in the number of conflicts in combination with more efficient conflict management by the international community; as a result, visible reduction in the number of refugees</td>
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<td><strong>Climate change</strong></td>
<td>International mitigation efforts fail; massive waves of displaced people (environmental refugees/migrants) numbering in the tens of hundreds of millions; the majority will initially move to neighboring countries (thus exacerbating existing problems), but the flows to Europe will be significant</td>
<td>Moderately successful international mitigation efforts; current numbers of environmental refugees/migrants will keep rising; although it is quite difficult at this stage to provide any accurate estimates, Europe should expect a fairly substantial number of new arrivals</td>
<td>International mitigation efforts are generally successful; there is a steady stream but no avalanche of environmental refugees/migrants</td>
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**Overall impact on migration**

- **Very substantial increase of migratory flows**
- **Significant increase**
- **Small increase in migratory flows (more visible in the South to North direction)**

Source: author’s own illustration.
Any scenario-drafting will have to take into account the fact that Europe will be significantly short of labor for at least the next 25 years due to the general ageing of European populations and negative demographic growth in most European countries (with the notable exceptions of France and the UK). At the same time, the population in North Africa and the Middle East is projected to double from 240 million in the early 1990s to almost 500 million by the year 2020 and will continue rising until 2050. (It is interesting to note that the population ratio between the northern and the southern shores of the Mediterranean changed from 2-to-1 in the 1980s to 1-to-2 in the second decade of the 21st century.) The projected population increase is even more staggering in much of sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia.

Demographic pressures of this magnitude are producing relentless urbanization and social and economic strains, and a steady stream of migrants seeking jobs and social services (a process which starts well to the south of the Mediterranean). Flows of migrants/refugees are expected to further increase as a result of various conflicts and, in the near future, climate change. A quick end to the Syrian drama with a political solution through diplomatic efforts – however unlikely this may seem in the immediate future – will certainly reduce the current number of asylum seekers (and a number of refugees may decide to return, provided the highly challenging task of reconciliation and reconstruction is successfully carried out). Yet migration flows because of economic, environmental and security reasons will remain, for the foreseeable future, a major, even critical challenge for

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<tr>
<th>Evolution of Europe's pull factors</th>
<th>Pessimistic scenario</th>
<th>Medium scenario</th>
<th>Optimistic scenario</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic change</strong></td>
<td>Demographic decline in most EU member states accelerates; Europe urgently needs to import skilled labour</td>
<td>Continuation of current trends; Europe needs to import skilled labour</td>
<td>Most efficient improvement; Limited need to import skilled labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State of the EU</strong></td>
<td>Integration slow even more; the EU looks more like a free market than a Union of states; there are 27 national migration policies with little coordination at the EU level</td>
<td>Business as usual; continuing difficulties in agreeing to a common EU migration policy; there is, however, a higher degree of coordination and cooperation among the majority of member states</td>
<td>Integration process picks up speed; the EU develops a common EU migration policy (including a common asylum policy) and burden sharing allows the Union to successfully manage the migration challenge</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>State of the economy</strong></td>
<td>Negative or low growth in most member states</td>
<td>Sight overall improvement but the EU is still lagging behind its main competitors</td>
<td>Significant (at least by EU standards) growth; visible gains in the field of competitiveness (which may achieved, however, at the expense of social welfare policies)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>State of the society</strong></td>
<td>Populism, xenophobia/islamophobia are on the rise; jihadist terrorism remains a threat to European internal security; increased radicalization in many EU member states</td>
<td>Support for populism and feelings of xenophobia/islamophobia remain rather strong, but not a dominant trend in European societies; Relations with immigrant communities remain fragile; occasional terrorist incidents continue to take place; but radical elements remain relatively marginalized</td>
<td>Support for populism and xenophobia/islamophobia are declining; Terrorist incidents and violent radicalization are very rare; There is significant improvement in relations and systematic cooperation with immigrant communities</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Integration of migrant communities</strong></td>
<td>Ghettolization phenomena continue and even intensify as a result, violent radicalization increases</td>
<td>No noticeable change as integration remains a challenge for most EU member states and violent radicalization is not exactly rare</td>
<td>More successful integration of immigrant communities; violent radicalization cases are extremely rare</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Overall consequences for migration</strong></td>
<td>Pull factors are weakening; Europe will not be an attractive destination for high-skill migrants; migration management will be a critical challenge</td>
<td>No visible change; Europe remains a relatively attractive destination for high-skilled migrants and a quite attractive destination for low-skilled migrants; migration management difficult but not impossible</td>
<td>Pull factors become stronger; there is no significant threat for Europe's social cohesion and internal security; Europe becomes a very attractive destination for high-skilled migrants; migration management relatively easier</td>
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Europe, which will need to develop an efficient long-term migration management policy. On the basis of the above, one can outline three scenarios: (a) pessimistic (negative change); (b) medium (little or no change); and (c) optimistic (positive change). Both external and domestic drivers will be included in this analysis, as well as possible policy choices by the EU. All the above scenarios can be depicted in a rather complex three-dimensional matrix. It is hoped that such an analysis may be helpful for policy makers as they try to minimize the likelihood of the pessimistic scenario and increase the probability of the optimistic.

### Scenarios Regarding Europe's Migration Policies

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Pessimistic</td>
<td>EU countries continue to strongly disagree about a common migration policy. The rift is so deep that a number of member-states, mostly from Central and Eastern Europe, hold referenda and even threaten to leave the Union if EU institutions apply sanctions against them. Cooperation across the EU is very limited and takes place only on a bilateral and small group level. The sheer number of refugees/migrants overwhelms Europe, who tries unsuccessfully to close its borders. A number of countries even decide to use deadly force to stop waves of refugees/migrants from crossing their borders.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>There is some progress in controlling and protecting Europe’s borders and limited agreement on a common migration policy, but disagreement continues on burden sharing. Overall, the Union remains deeply divided on the issue of migration.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Optimistic</td>
<td>EU countries manage to agree to a European migration policy, including a common asylum policy, a fully functional European Borderguard/Coastguard agency and a burden-sharing mechanism (which will include a functioning resettlement policy and sufficient economic, technical and other assistance to frontline states, as well as to key countries in the Southern neighborhood).</td>
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The EU will also be faced with a difficult predicament as a result of demographic trends: the fact that an increasing retired population will need to be funded by a shrinking workforce will exert significant pressures on public pensions and healthcare systems. In the future, Europe will need to attract migrants both to offset the ageing of its population and to meet the demand for high-skilled workers. However, competition with other developed and emerging economies in attracting skilled migrants may become increasingly difficult. Also, EU citizens may come to regard migrants as economic competitors, not contributors due to high unemployment rates.

However, as mentioned in the introduction, the economic rationale for skilled workers may find itself in conflict with the social cohesion and security rationales as European countries have been faced with significant difficulties in their efforts to integrate Muslim minorities into the social mainstream and the relationship between immigrant Muslim communities and the majority populations has often been problematic. Although it should not be perceived as a zero-sum game, achieving a satisfactory synthesis between economics, social cohesion and security will not be an easy endeavor.

### III Demographic Trends and Migration – Two Critical Future Challenges for the EU

(second in importance only to the survival of the European integration project)

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Globalization will continue to be an important driver for migration, but not the only or the most important one. Efforts to mitigate climate change will be the determining factor in the number of environmental migrants/refugees; moreover, the number, intensity and management of conflicts will be the key factor that will determine the size of the refugee flows. Migration trends will be affected not only by globalization, but also by the state of the global economy and the pull factors in countries of destination. If globalization continues unabated, it will initially contribute to the increase in migration flows. Economic development in parts of the Global South will direct migratory flows in this direction as well. Above a certain level of arrivals, however, destination countries both in the Global North and the Global South will be forced to try to exercise more control over their borders, thereby imposing limited restrictions on the process of globalization until migration flows decline to manageable levels. As a general rule, the effects of migration follow an inverse-U shape, with gains from moderate migration and losses from high migration. For countries of origin the problem is far less severe, unless there is serious brain drain.

A number of scenarios have been outlined in this paper, each with a different degree of probability. We think the most likely one will include the following developments: Globalization will continue, perhaps at a slightly slower pace, and current demographic trends will not change for at least the next 20 years (decline in Europe, growth in the Global South, high growth in some countries, especially in Africa). There will be more South-South migration, but substantial flows of migrants
(+refugees) to Europe will continue for several more years. The need for skilled labor in Europe will increase (despite some brain drain from the European South and the increasing use of AI technologies) and there will be competition with other developed economies (North America, Australia) and, to a smaller extent, rising economies to attract talent. In addition, although it is hoped that the migration debate will not become overtly securitized, there will be an important security dimension because of concerns about jihadist terrorism, increasing radicalization of Muslim communities and rising xenophobia/Islamophobia in many EU countries. Finally, disagreements between EU member states on a common migration policy will almost certainly continue and the debate will remain toxic.

Due to the complexity of the problems noted above and their often unpredictable interactions, there are no easy, quick or one-dimensional solutions. There is also considerable uncertainty about the evolution of the regional security environment as a result of the several unknown variables in the respective security equations. Any new strategy for migration and refugee management will therefore need to focus mainly on the world beyond the EU’s borders in an attempt to address the root causes of migratory flows by mitigating climate change, helping to broker an end to various conflicts in Europe’s southern neighborhood and providing people with opportunities as close to home as possible through implementation of a comprehensive preventive strategy.

IV Recommendations

As there is no magic bullet to deal with Europe’s migration challenge (or its demographic crisis), an effective management policy will of necessity be multidimensional and should have the following components (not necessarily in this order):

- The most efficient but also the most difficult measure to implement for reducing population flows is the timely provision of developmental assistance to countries of origin (preventive approach) in combination with efforts to promote good governance.

- More intensive and effective conflict-resolution efforts in Europe’s broader southern neighborhood should be made to prevent, resolve or manage interstate and intrastate conflicts (with a special emphasis on preventing the emergence of weak/fragile/failed states).

- A carrot-and-stick approach should be adopted towards countries of origin to encourage them to accept the repatriation of larger numbers of economic migrants.

- Effective integration policies for migrants should be introduced in European societies (something that would also attract high-skilled migrants). The role of education is key, but the challenges will most likely be substantial as not all refugees may be able or even willing to be sufficiently integrated. Numbers are also important, as the integration capacity of European societies is not unlimited and social cohesion and internal security may be negatively affected.

- Incentives (such as economic benefits or an increase in social welfare support) may alleviate Europe’s demographic problem. However, even where applied – such as in some of the Nordic countries – results have not been highly satisfactory. Furthermore, to become more competitive, the EU cannot afford a large-scale increase in social expenditures (a decrease may in fact be necessary). Therefore, the EU’s efforts to address its demographic
deficit by achieving a higher birth rate can help, but cannot solve, the problem all by themselves. Elderly, youth and female participation in the labor force may also make a contribution to addressing the problem.

- More efficient protection of the EU’s external borders is needed, as is better coordination and efficiency on issues of internal security. Necessary measures would include the significant strengthening of the European Border and Coast Guard, the development of a system of high-technology sensors to protect the most sensitive of the EU’s borders, various initiatives designed to promote more effective cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and the establishment of an EU information clearing house.

- A High-Level Migration Council (composed of senior former policy makers, statesmen and experts) should be created to draft a long-term migration strategy for the EU.