

Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.)

# Transformation Index BTI 2026

Governance in International Comparison



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# Foreword

The findings of the BTI are as clear as they are sobering: Democracy continues to erode worldwide, and the trend toward autocratization persists. Democracy is increasingly being called into question even in countries whose governments formally remain democratically legitimized.

At the same time, the BTI provides compelling evidence that functioning democracies deliver better governance. They exhibit stronger steering capability, a greater readiness to learn and adapt, and a clearer commitment to consensus-building. Of the 35 states the BTI classifies as demonstrating good or very good governance, 31 are democracies. Over the long term, they are also more successful economically. Singapore, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are the only autocracies that – alongside 20 democracies – have established advanced market economies underpinned by meaningful social policy frameworks. By contrast, among the 56 countries in which the principles of a socially inclusive market economy are either absent or only weakly embedded, just nine are democracies. Where political power is effectively constrained, participation safeguarded and public authority oriented toward the common good, stability, prosperity and social cohesion are more likely to prevail. Why, then, are authoritarian models gaining traction across the world?

The causes are complex and mutually reinforcing.

First, geopolitical confrontation, geoeconomic realignment, technological disruptions, the impact of climate change, and intensifying social polarization have generated a pervasive sense of uncertainty. Many citizens feel they have lost control over their economic and social futures, while governments face mounting pressure to demonstrate decisiveness and effectiveness. In such an environment, authoritarian promises of order, clarity and swift decision-making tend to resonate with voters.

Second, even within democracies, the imperative of political survival increasingly overshadows commitment to the public interest. When elites seek above all to secure their own power, public trust and democratic legitimacy suffer. At the same time, optimistic political narratives have become scarce. In periods of profound uncertainty, there is a lack of credible and compelling visions of the future that provide direction and inspire confidence.

Third, persistent social inequality, entrenched corruption and visible shortcomings in policy delivery make anti-elite and authoritarian forces increasingly electable in democracies. Where citizens perceive their concerns to be ignored and structural challenges to remain unresolved, they are more inclined to support actors who present themselves as alternatives to a discredited “establishment” – even when these actors openly challenge liberal-democratic norms and the rule of law.

Fourth, the influence of autocratic actors has expanded significantly in recent years. Autocracies are actively supporting authoritarian practices abroad – weakening independent institutions and political participation, restricting media and assembly freedoms, and exporting technologies for digital surveillance. Disinformation campaigns and targeted foreign interference further intensify these pressures. Democracy thus confronts not only internal strains but also growing external headwinds.

Democratic actors require a strategic, long-term response to the growing influence of authoritarian tendencies – across political, societal and international arenas. That this can succeed is evidenced by the 27 countries that have strengthened or preserved their democratic quality over the past decade. These include consolidated democracies, such as the Baltic states, Botswana, Chile, Slovenia and Taiwan; EU accession candidates Albania and North Macedonia; and the Dominican Republic, Lesotho, Malaysia and Nepal. The BTI’s country reports document clear instances of democratic resilience and renewal, demonstrating that backsliding is not irreversible when reform forces act with resolve and inclusiveness.

At the heart of such efforts lies the **articulation of credible, forward-looking narratives**. Democracies must demonstrate their capacity to deliver outcomes, address complex challenges and adapt when policies fall short. Taiwan and Estonia illustrate how this is possible – by offering credible paths to security, prosperity and sustainability that provide a compelling alternative to powerful authoritarian neighbors.

Democracies need **stronger international coordination** to pool resources, share lessons and counter authoritarian influence more effectively. And democratic reformers require more

targeted external support, and lessons from re-democratization should be shared more systematically. One promising avenue lies in the increasingly similar strategies of young people from the globally connected Generation Z who have been instrumental in mobilizing mass protests in countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal and Serbia and in turning social mobilization into political change.

Democratic actors should make **strategic and inclusive use of moments of political opening**. Crises can accelerate authoritarian consolidation – but they can also create opportunities for institutional renewal. Bangladesh and Guatemala suggest that meaningful political change becomes possible when civic resistance – including local and Indigenous grassroots movements – converges with reform-minded leadership and favorable political momentum, demonstrating how democratic backsliding can be reversed. Dismantling entrenched authoritarian structures in polarized societies is particularly arduous. Brazil and Poland offer cautious grounds for optimism while underscoring the complexity of re-democratization. Durable renewal cannot be achieved through illiberal means.

Finally, **democratic durability depends on resilient institutions**. Independent judiciaries, free media and effective parliamentary oversight form the backbone of democratic stability and require robust political, legal and financial safeguards. Through digital innovations, rule-of-law reforms and broad citizen participation, countries such as Estonia and Uruguay show that democratic self-defense is not at odds with openness, but a condition for sustaining it. Democracies must also fortify themselves against disinformation and digital manipulation. Brazil, Latvia and Moldova provide instructive examples of how this can be achieved – by safeguarding the integrity of elections through measures to combat the spread of fake news, criminalizing the use of deepfakes in election campaigns, and strategically expanding cybersecurity.

The Transformation Index supports the development of effective democratic counterstrategies by identifying, analyzing and systematically comparing such experiences. It functions as both a seismograph of political developments and a compass for those committed to strengthening democratic governance.

The findings make clear that democratic quality rests on state capacity, institutional integrity, social inclusion, and the ability to resolve conflicts peacefully and fairly. The task before us is to renew and deepen democracy – so that its advantages become tangible in everyday life through credible problem-solving, fair participation, reliable institutions and forward-looking governance.

Democracy is demanding. It offers no shortcuts, no simple formulas and no permanent guarantees. That very demanding character is its enduring strength. The BTI underscores the gravity of the present challenges. But it also demonstrates that autocratization is not destiny. Where democratic actors proceed strategically, mobilize societal support and draw on international solidarity, decline can be halted – and new avenues for democratic renewal can emerge.

*Daniela Schwarzer*


Daniela Schwarzer  
Member of the Executive Board  
Bertelsmann Stiftung



# The BTI 2026 at a Glance



# The BTI 2026 at a Glance



### ➔ 1. Stateness

**Basic administration** → Public service delivery has deteriorated markedly over the past decade, especially in autocracies and regressing democracies. While a stabilized Iraq recorded progress, reliable access to water, electricity and sanitation remains unsecured in 50 countries.

### ➔ 3. Rule of law

**Independent judiciaries** → remain under pressure, not only in countries ruled by military regimes or affected by civil war. Political interference in the courts is also increasing under democratically elected governments, including in Ecuador, Mexico and Slovakia.

### ➔ 6. Level of socioeconomic development

**Socioeconomic barriers** → have steadily expanded worldwide over the past 20 years. Socioeconomic grievances – as seen in Bangladesh, Madagascar and Nepal – have triggered protests and political upheaval, underscoring the link between economic instability and political fragility.

### ➔ 8. Monetary and fiscal stability

**Fiscal stability** → improved in 34 countries. Lower inflation and debt reduction have enabled short-term macroeconomic stabilization. In countries such as Argentina, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, austerity comes at the expense of social welfare, education and sustainability.

### ➔ 14. Steering capability

**Prioritization** → has improved markedly. In 34 countries, governments set and pursue policy goals more effectively than two years ago. Improved policy design in Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Poland and Syria shows that prioritization can function even in highly polarized contexts.

### ➔ 16. Consensus-building

**Consensus on goals** → Consensus on democracy and a market economy has declined further. In more than 50 countries – including China, India, Russia and South Africa – support for open and liberal development is weaker today than at the start of the decade.

### ➔ 2. Political participation

**Freedom of expression** → with an average score of 4.63, ranks as the lowest-rated indicator in this category for the fourth consecutive assessment. In 36 countries, free speech and media pluralism have been further restricted – most sharply in Burkina Faso, Georgia and Niger.

### ➔ 4. Stability of democratic institutions

**Performance of democratic institutions** → has deteriorated in 21 countries compared to the BTI 2024. In some cases, governments have deliberately hollowed out key institutions. Even more advanced democracies – such as Costa Rica, Romania and South Korea – face setbacks driven by polarization and partisan gridlock.

### ➔ 7. Organization of the market and competition

**Competition policy** → is increasingly distorted. In the absence of fair market rules, clientelism, patronage and the informal sector prevail. 71 countries show minimal safeguards against monopolies, compared with 66 countries that have at least formally established – and largely implemented – antitrust regulations.

### ➔ 12. Sustainability

**Education policy/R&D** → remain inadequate worldwide. Fiscal constraints and spending discipline make education the long-term casualty of short-term austerity. In half of all BTI countries (≤ 4 points), this undermines sustainable innovation and adaptive capacity.

### ➔ 15. Resource efficiency

**Anti-corruption policy** → remains the lowest-rated aspect of governance. Only 29 governments have established comprehensive integrity mechanisms that function well or adequately (scores 10 to 6). In more than 100 countries, corruption is addressed insufficiently – or not at all.

### ➔ 17. International cooperation

**Regional cooperation** → is in sharp decline. Authoritarian states – such as Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Niger and Venezuela – are driving this trend, projecting their repressive domestic friend-versus-foe logic onto increasingly confrontational or isolationist neighborhood policies.

#### Political transformation

Global Ø	5.15 (e.g., Serbia)
Top-ranking country	Uruguay
Positive trend	Lesotho, Poland, Syria
Negative trend	Burkina Faso, Georgia, Niger
Regime distribution	→ 60 democracies → 77 autocracies

#### Economic transformation

Global Ø	5.34 (e.g., Tanzania)
Top-ranking country	Slovenia
Positive trend	Iraq, Poland, Slovenia
Negative trend	Bolivia, Cuba, Sudan
State of development	→ 23 highly advanced / advanced → 58 limited → 56 very limited / rudimentary

#### Governance

Global Ø	4.58 (e.g., Bolivia)
Top-ranking country	Taiwan
Positive trend	Brazil, Poland, Syria
Negative trend	Afghanistan, Georgia, Niger
Quality of governance	→ 35 countries with very good / good governance → 47 countries with moderate governance → 55 countries with weak / failed governance

Political transformation

# Repression meets resistance

Two-thirds of the countries assessed since 2006 are less democratic today than they were 20 years ago. Since then, the global average for free and fair elections and protections for freedom of expression and the press has fallen to its lowest level on record. At the same time, executive power has become more concentrated, and the number of hard-line autocracies has reached a new high.

However, mass protests and election outcomes alike show that civil society and citizen engagement can safeguard democratic institutions and hold governments accountable. Reform efforts in Guatemala and Poland demonstrate that rebuilding damaged democracies is difficult – but possible.



- ▲ Movement to a higher category (each arrow denotes a single category)
- ▼ Movement to a lower category (each arrow denotes a single category)
- failing states

**16** Democracies in consolidation  
Score 10 to 8

Uruguay	9.90
Estonia	9.60
Taiwan	9.60
Lithuania	9.40
Chile	9.25
Slovenia	9.25
Czechia	9.15
Latvia	9.15
Costa Rica	8.90
Croatia	8.55
Botswana	8.45
Poland ▲	8.40
Slovakia	8.20
Trinidad and Tobago	8.20
Jamaica	8.00
South Korea	8.00

**35** Defective democracies  
Score < 8 to 6

Mauritius	7.85
Timor-Leste	7.85
Ghana	7.75
Albania	7.70
North Macedonia	7.65
Brazil	7.50
Dominican Republic	7.40
Montenegro	7.40
Argentina	7.35
Gambia	7.30
Mongolia	7.25
Bhutan	7.20
Romania	7.10
South Africa	7.10
Armenia	6.90
Bulgaria	6.90
Kosovo	6.90
Senegal	6.90


Ukraine	6.85
Namibia	6.80
Malawi	6.75
Moldova	6.70
Bolivia	6.55
Colombia	6.55
Sri Lanka	6.55
Lesotho ▲	6.50
Paraguay	6.50
Nepal	6.45
Panama	6.35
Liberia	6.30
Ecuador	6.25
Hungary	6.20
India	6.10
Zambia	6.10
Malaysia ▲	6.00

**9** Highly defective democracies  
Score < 6

Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.95
Indonesia ▼	5.95
Peru	5.85
Kenya	5.75
Mexico	5.60
Sierra Leone	5.50
Philippines	5.25
Lebanon	4.95
Honduras	4.75

**25** Moderate autocracies  
Score ≥ 4

Singapore	5.47
Benin	5.43
Serbia ▼▼	5.18
Papua New Guinea	5.02
El Salvador	4.97



**52 Hard-line autocracies**

Score < 4

Iraq	4.92
Côte d'Ivoire	4.83
Tanzania	4.75
Bangladesh	4.72
Guinea-Bissau	4.68
Kyrgyzstan	4.60
Uganda	4.48
Angola	4.45
Algeria	4.40
Togo	4.40
Georgia ▼	4.37
Mauritania	4.37
Tunisia	4.33
Madagascar	4.22
Jordan	4.20
Türkiye	4.18
Nigeria	4.15
Gabon	4.10
Guatemala ▲	4.10
United Arab Emirates	4.00

Mozambique ▼	3.93
Thailand	3.92
Guinea ▼	3.90
Zimbabwe	3.85
Kuwait ▼	3.78
Qatar	3.75
Uzbekistan	3.75
Kazakhstan	3.73
Rwanda	3.73
Central African Republic	3.65
Vietnam	3.58
Cameroon	3.57
Congo. DR ●	3.57
Djibouti	3.52
Morocco	3.52
Belarus	3.45
Burundi	3.45
Eswatini	3.43

Egypt	3.42
Ethiopia	3.40
Azerbaijan	3.35
Congo. Rep.	3.35
Pakistan	3.25
Bahrain	3.22
Russia	3.22
China	3.18
Laos	3.12
Venezuela	3.07
Cuba	3.05
Equatorial Guinea	2.98
Cambodia	2.93
Mali	2.92
Nicaragua	2.92
Syria ●	2.87
Tajikistan	2.87
Oman	2.85

Burkina Faso	2.82
Iran	2.78
Niger ▼▼▼	2.78
Saudi Arabia	2.78
Turkmenistan	2.70
North Korea	2.60
South Sudan ●	2.52
Chad	2.47
Haiti ●	2.38
Libya ●	2.12
Eritrea	2.02
Afghanistan	1.82
Somalia ●	1.72
Sudan ●	1.63
Myanmar ●	1.55
Yemen ●	1.50

Economic transformation

# Unstable development

Even after the pandemic and inflation shock, a broad economic recovery has yet to take hold. Half of the countries assessed have not returned to their pre-COVID 2020 level of economic transformation.

Fiscal stability achieved through austerity measures often comes at the expense of social welfare, education and sustainability. Free and fair market systems remain rare, while poverty and inequality drive widespread exclusion – fueling significant protests in many countries.

- ▲ Movement to a higher category (each arrow denotes a single category)
- ▼ Movement to a lower category (each arrow denotes a single category)



**15** Highly advanced  
Score 10 to 8

Slovenia	9.79
Taiwan	9.50
Estonia	9.36
Czechia	9.29
Lithuania	9.04
Singapore	8.89
Latvia	8.79
Poland	8.75
Croatia	8.61
South Korea	8.57
Chile	8.43
Slovakia	8.36
Uruguay	8.36
Costa Rica ▲	8.07
United Arab Emirates	8.00

**58** Limited  
Score < 7 to 5


Brazil	6.96
Botswana	6.93
Kuwait ▼	6.82
Armenia	6.79
Serbia	6.79
Hungary	6.75
Saudi Arabia	6.75
Peru	6.71
Trinidad and Tobago	6.61
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6.57
Dominican Republic	6.57
Panama	6.39
Paraguay	6.32
Colombia	6.29
Kosovo	6.21
Mongolia	6.21
Jamaica	6.18
China	6.14
Kazakhstan	6.14
Thailand	6.11
Mexico	6.04
Moldova	6.04
El Salvador	6.00
Indonesia	6.00
Bahrain	5.96
Georgia	5.96
Ukraine	5.93

Vietnam	5.93
Argentina	5.86
India	5.86
Jordan	5.86
Kenya	5.86
Philippines	5.86
Bhutan	5.79
Oman	5.75
South Africa	5.71
Ecuador	5.68
Lesotho	5.64
Türkiye	5.64
Ghana	5.50
Sri Lanka	5.50
Azerbaijan	5.46
Benin	5.46
Kyrgyzstan	5.46
Algeria	5.39
Rwanda	5.39
Gambia	5.36
Tanzania	5.32
Côte d'Ivoire	5.29
Gabon	5.29
Morocco	5.29
Belarus	5.18
Guatemala	5.14
Namibia	5.14

**8** Advanced  
Score < 8 to 7

Qatar	7.61
Romania	7.54
Bulgaria	7.50
Montenegro	7.50
Malaysia	7.32
Mauritius	7.25
North Macedonia	7.18
Albania	7.11

Uganda	5.07
Tunisia	5.04
Uzbekistan ▲	5.04
Honduras	5.00



**40** Very limited  
Score < 5 to 3

Senegal	4.96	Madagascar	4.36
Russia	4.86	Egypt	4.32
Cambodia	4.82	Iraq	4.32
Bangladesh	4.79	Malawi	4.32
Nepal	4.71	Mauritania	4.29
Nicaragua	4.68	Guinea	4.25
Togo	4.64	Sierra Leone	4.25
Angola	4.57	Ethiopia	4.11
Bolivia ▼	4.57	Mali	4.11
Cameroon	4.54	Liberia	4.07
Mozambique	4.54	Niger	3.96
Papua New Guinea	4.54	Laos	3.93
Timor-Leste	4.54	Guinea-Bissau	3.89
Djibouti	4.50	Nigeria	3.82
Burkina Faso	4.46	Pakistan	3.79
Zambia	4.39	Lebanon	3.71

**16** Rudimentary  
Score < 3

Zimbabwe	2.93
Cuba ▼	2.89
Venezuela	2.71
Turkmenistan	2.68
Haiti	2.61
Libya	2.50
Iran	2.29
Afghanistan	2.07
Somalia	1.89
South Sudan	1.86
Myanmar	1.64
North Korea	1.61
Syria	1.57
Sudan	1.29
Yemen	1.25
Eritrea	1.07

Eswatini	3.64
Tajikistan	3.57
Burundi	3.46
Congo. Rep.	3.46
Equatorial Guinea	3.18
Central African Republic	3.11
Chad	3.07
Congo. DR	3.07

## Governance

# More confrontation, at home and abroad

The erosion of consensus-oriented governance continues. Twenty years ago, 37% of the governments assessed tolerated or fueled escalating ethnic, religious, social or political conflict. Today, that share is 58%. Growing domestic polarization is mirrored in increasingly confrontational behavior at the regional and international levels.

This trend is driven primarily by autocracies, many of which are marked by wasteful spending and poor coordination. Just five out of 77 autocracies pursue effective anti-corruption policies.



**28 Good**  
Score < 7 to 5.6

Singapore	6.96
Botswana	6.84
Poland ▲	6.76
Albania	6.71
Costa Rica ▼	6.70
Bhutan	6.69
Slovenia	6.69
Senegal	6.68
United Arab Emirates	6.67
Ukraine	6.58
Croatia	6.45
South Korea	6.44
Ghana	6.41
Gambia	6.27
Dominican Republic	6.22
Mauritius	6.13
North Macedonia	6.07
Trinidad and Tobago	5.99
Qatar	5.98
Moldova	5.91
Paraguay	5.91
Mongolia	5.90
Montenegro	5.90
Benin	5.80
Timor-Leste	5.78
Bulgaria	5.72
Brazil ▲▲	5.69
South Africa ▲	5.60

**47 Moderate**  
Score < 5.6 to 4.3


Jamaica ▼	5.53
Malaysia	5.53
Côte d'Ivoire ▼	5.52
Slovakia ▼	5.37
Panama	5.36
Lesotho	5.30
Djibouti	5.29
Indonesia	5.27
India	5.18
Tanzania	5.13
Armenia	5.10
Iraq	5.10
Kenya	5.10
Malawi	5.10
Rwanda	5.09
Colombia ▼	5.08
Zambia	5.04
Papua New Guinea	5.03
Liberia	5.02
Sri Lanka	5.00
Argentina	4.97
China	4.93
Jordan	4.81
Kosovo	4.81
Romania	4.81
Namibia	4.80
Bangladesh ▲	4.79
Gabon	4.79
Togo	4.77

Nepal	4.73
Vietnam	4.71
Kuwait	4.67
Madagascar	4.64
Mexico	4.61
Bolivia	4.58
Sierra Leone	4.56
Guinea	4.55
Saudi Arabia	4.50
Algeria	4.48
Angola	4.48
Guatemala ▲	4.48
Peru	4.45
Ecuador	4.44
Nigeria ▲	4.44
Kazakhstan	4.42
Laos ▲	4.37
Philippines	4.34

- ▲ Movement to a higher category (each arrow denotes a single category)
- ▼ Movement to a lower category (each arrow denotes a single category)

**7 Very good**  
Score 10 to 7

Taiwan	7.49
Uruguay	7.46
Lithuania	7.38
Estonia	7.22
Latvia	7.22
Chile	7.07
Czechia ▲	7.04



**33 Weak**

Score < 4.3 to 3

El Salvador	4.28
Morocco ▼	4.26
Mauritania	4.25
Central African Republic	4.22
Georgia ▼	4.21
Kyrgyzstan	4.21
Mozambique	4.16
Uzbekistan	4.10
Uganda	4.09
Honduras ▼	4.07
Tunisia ▼	4.05
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4.03
Bahrain	3.99
Serbia ▼	3.96
Cameroon	3.95
Oman	3.94
Thailand	3.92


Ethiopia	3.85
Burkina Faso ▼	3.80
Cuba	3.80
Azerbaijan	3.77
Egypt	3.74
Guinea-Bissau	3.70
Niger ▼	3.69
Equatorial Guinea	3.50
Hungary	3.45
Syria ▲	3.42
Türkiye	3.40
Pakistan	3.35
Burundi	3.21
Mali	3.21
Tajikistan	3.09
Cambodia	3.03

**22 Failed**

Score < 3

Zimbabwe	2.94
Congo. Rep.	2.91
Lebanon	2.88
Congo. DR	2.65
Haiti	2.62
Eswatini	2.61
Nicaragua	2.61
Somalia	2.48
Russia	2.41
Libya	2.40
Belarus	2.36
Chad	2.22
Turkmenistan	2.18
Afghanistan ▼	2.14
South Sudan	2.01
Iran	1.79

Venezuela	1.57
Yemen	1.45
Myanmar	1.30
North Korea	1.14
Sudan	1.06
Eritrea	1.05



# Acknowledgments

The BTI 2026 is a product of an international collaboration of more than 300 people who have contributed in various ways to its development, creation, evaluation and communication. A project of this magnitude could never succeed without the expertise, enthusiasm, creativity and attention to detail of all those involved.

Over the years, the BTI team has benefitted from the support, advocacy and counsel of many transformation experts and practitioners. But we extend special thanks and gratitude to our council of scholarly advisers, the BTI board, which is unequalled in its commitment to providing us with rigorous and collegial support.

Within the BTI board, the regional coordinators deserve special mention, as they monitor not only the creation and review process for each report, but are also responsible for the calibration of results within their region and, together with us, across regions.

The country experts play a key role in creating the BTI, as it is their knowledge and experience that our cross-national analysis is built upon. Their commitment to an extensive production and review process, and the critical feedback they provide along the way, have helped build a better and more accurate Transformation Index. The more than 5,000 pages of excellent country analyses form the very backbone of the BTI.

The quality and accuracy of the language in these in-depth reports for 137 countries and seven world regions is of considerable importance. A special thanks goes to managing editor Barbara Serfozo and her team for their tireless and diligent efforts in taking on – for the 11th time – the challenge of editing the large volume of BTI reports. And we very much appreciate Josh Ward's meticulous care in proofreading this volume.

Ensuring the integrity and consistency of country-report sections and scores has been an enormous effort supported by a group of highly skilled young academic professionals. We wish to thank Simon Ahrens, Nils Bertsch, Lars Hebisch, David Hellge, Max Hennemuth, Moritz Marpe, Benedikt Powalla, Marzia Raza, Muhammad Salman and Niklas Waldner for their timely and attentive support in this process; Anna Hengge for her thorough review of the synopsis texts and the final quality check of the country reports; and our intern, Lena Herholz, for her committed, reliable and diligent support.

We place considerable value on ensuring full transparency of our analytic process and providing clear and intuitive access to our data. Our tool to this end, the Transformation Atlas, provides an interactive visualization of thousands of scores as well as broader results of our analysis. Thanks to the creativity and assiduous dedication of information architect Dieter Dol-

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The scope and complexity of an instrument like the BTI must undergo continual development and improvement. We are committed to the regular evaluation of our methodology and process, and will always benefit from the critique, suggestions and input of a variety of individuals. We thank you all and look forward to your continued feedback and further constructive dialogue.

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