



# Europe's Choice

Populist attitudes and voting intentions  
in the 2019 European election

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Robert Vehrkamp, Christopher Wratil



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## About the study

This study is based on a cross-national online survey. The national samples of respondents are representative of the population eligible to vote in the 2019 European elections in each of the twelve European countries surveyed. The survey was conducted by YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung in a single wave in January 2019. A total of 23,725 respondents from twelve EU member states were interviewed (Denmark: 1,973; Germany: 1,995; France: 1,949; Greece: 2,027; United Kingdom: 2,133; Italy: 1,952; Netherlands: 1,924; Austria: 1,984; Poland: 1,911; Sweden: 1,976; Spain: 1,949; Hungary: 1,952).

During sampling, quotas were used for age, gender, education and region of residence, based on census data from the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat). In addition, for most of the results of this study, responses were adjusted on the basis of census data using survey weights to correct differences in age, gender, education and region of residence between the samples and the voting populations in the twelve EU countries. For cross-national analyses, respondents in all twelve countries were always given the same weighting – regardless of the population size of the countries. The results can thus be transferred to the electorate in the twelve European countries. The statistical uncertainty of the results varies depending on the analysis and is directly reported in the form of confidence intervals in parts of this study. For the descriptive survey results, it is generally in the range of typical national population surveys (approx. +/- 3 percentage points) and in some cases our measurements are much more precise due to the high number of observations on which cross-national statements are based.

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## Foreword

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The rise of populist movements and parties has not only shaped national elections in many European countries in recent years, but is also shaping the 2019 European elections. In comparison with previous years, new lines of division have emerged and political disputes have become more strongly polarised in the run-up to these elections: “for” or “against” Europe? Should there be more European integration or a Europe of nation states? Should we be “against” the further development of the common democratic institutions of the European Union, as left-wing and right-wing populists demand, or should we be “for” such development, along with the mainstream parties?

These new lines of division will also shape the new European Parliament: the parties which are critical of democracy and Europe, on the left and right populist margins, will confront the pro-European mainstream parties. Populists on the left and right, however, are only united by their criticism of EU democracy and their Euroscepticism. They are deeply divided on substantive issues. Nevertheless, without the extreme populist margins, a pan-European consensus and positive majorities in the new European Parliament are only possible with a grand coalition among mainstream parties. If this bridge cannot be built, negative majorities will lead to self-imposed gridlock and stagnation in Europe. The stronger the populist-extreme margins become, the more likely such a scenario will be.

But what are the causes of populism?

Why are more and more people turning to populist forces and parties in many European democracies?

How should mainstream parties respond to the rampant populism on the left and right?


Public debate on these questions has produced numerous well-founded proposals. However, empirical studies on the causes of populism in western democracies have so far been scarce. Closing this research gap is one of the main objectives of this study.

A total of 23,725 respondents from twelve EU member states were interviewed in a multinational online survey in January 2019. The survey was conducted on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung by the public opinion research institute YouGov. We would like to thank the three authors, Prof. Dr. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (Universidad Diego Portales), Dr. Robert Vehrkamp (Bertelsmann Stiftung) and Dr. Christopher Wratil (Harvard University), for analysing the data and preparing this study.

The results show the importance of good representation for the success of democracy. Representation deficits, as perceived subjectively by voters, activate and intensify their populist attitudes. People who do not feel adequately represented in their attitudes and interests by mainstream parties become susceptible to populist attitudes and views. Inadequate representation by parties can therefore lead to an increase in populist attitudes in democracies.

As a promising strategy against populism, it follows that good representation helps. The efforts of politicians, governments and political parties to address, include and represent the various positions and interests in society as well as possible are therefore a promising means against populism. But good representation is not a one-way street. Parties play an active role in forming the opinions of their voters, and shaping the discourse as they raise questions, describe problems and offer solutions.

Elections and election campaigns are a particular opportunity for this. Parties can and should use democratic elections and election campaigns to improve their voters' sense of representation by addressing and discussing important issues in controversial and constructive terms. The results of this study show that in doing so they make a contribution to curbing populism. An opportunity that should be seized by mainstream parties across Europe.


A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large, stylized 'A' followed by a horizontal line and a vertical stroke.

**Aart De Geus**

Chairman of the Bertelsmann Stiftung Executive Board

## An overview of voter turnout in the European elections

### Voter turnout in the European elections 2019



### Turnout, registered voters and seats in the European Parliament in 2019

EU MEMBER STATES	VOTER TURNOUT (in percent)	REGISTERED VOTERS (in millions)	SEATS IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2019	EU MEMBER STATES	VOTER TURNOUT (in percent)	REGISTERED VOTERS (in millions)	SEATS IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2019
Belgium	88.5	8.1	21	Luxembourg	84.2	0.3	6
Bulgaria	32.6	6.3	17	Malta	72.7	0.3	6
Denmark	66.0	4.2	13	Netherlands	41.9	13.2	26
Germany	61.4	61.6	96	Austria	59.8	6.4	18
Estonia	37.6	0.9	6	Poland	45.7	30.1	51
Finland	40.7	4.5	13	Portugal	30.8	10.8	21
France	50.1	47.3	74	Romania	51.1	18.3	32
Greece	58.7	10.1	21	Sweden	55.3	7.6	20
United Kingdom	36.9	46.5*	73	Slovakia	22.7	4.4	13
Ireland	49.7	3.2*	11	Slovenia	28.9	1.7	8
Italy	54.5	51.0	73	Spain	60.7	35.6	54
Croatia	29.9	3.7	11	Czech Republic	28.7	8.3	21
Latvia	33.5	1.4	8	Hungary	43.4	8.0	21
Lithuania	53.5	2.5	11	Cyprus	45.0	0.6	6
				Total	50.6	397.0	751

\*Data for the United Kingdom and Ireland was not yet available. Figures showing registered voters in 2014 were used instead.


Source: Own illustration on the basis of data from the European Parliament (2014 and 2019) on the constitutive session on July 2 2019. Data on registered voters was provided by the offices for statistics in individual member states.

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## An overview of voter turnout in European elections from 1979 to 2019

Voter turnout in percent



\*Elections took place outside the usual election cycle in Greece in 1981, in Spain in 1987, in Sweden in 1995 and in Austria in 1996.


\*\*The voting intention is the average across the twelve European countries surveyed for this report (see question 3 in the statistical appendix).

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Illustration of voter turnout based on data from the European Parliament (2014 and 2019).

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## Overview of the results of the European elections 2019

### Distribution of seats between fractions in the European Parliament




Changes to the share of seats since the 2014 European elections in brackets.

Source: Own illustration on the basis of data from the European Parliament (2014 and 2019) on the constitutive session on July 2 2019.

EPP:	Group of the European People's Party
S&D:	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament
Renew Europe:	Renew Europe group (former Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe + Renaissance + USR PLUS)
Greens/EFA:	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
ECR:	European Conservatives and Reformists Group
ID:	Identity and Democracy Group
GUE/NGL:	Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left

### Proportion of seats won by each group of the European Parliament

In percent



Changes to the share of seats since the 2014 European elections in brackets.


Source: Own illustration on the basis of data from the European Parliament (2014 and 2019) on the constitutive session on July 2 2019.

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## Overview of the results of the European elections in the twelve countries

### Proportion of votes across all voters

In percent, changes to the share of seats since the 2014 European elections in brackets




Source: Own illustration on the basis of data from the European Parliament (2014 and 2019).

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## Overview of the results of the European elections in the twelve countries

### Proportion of votes across all voters

In percent, changes to the share of seats since the 2014 European elections in brackets




Source: Own illustration on the basis of data from the European Parliament (2014 and 2019).

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## Proportion of votes across all voters

In percent, changes to the share of seats since the 2014 European elections in brackets



Source: Own illustration on the basis of data from the European Parliament (2014 and 2019).

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# Executive Summary

## Europe's Choice

### Populist attitudes and voting intentions in the 2019 European election

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Representation gaps cause populism: those who feel that they are poorly represented are more populist in their thinking and at the polls. The same also applies to the 2019 European elections. However, populist citizens only agree on two things: they are sceptical towards Europe and dissatisfied with EU democracy. When it comes to substantive political issues, left-wing and right-wing populist voters are even more divided than the voters of the mainstream parties. This makes it more difficult to form new majorities in the next European Parliament.

“For” or “against” Europe? Dissatisfied with democracy and “against” the EU, like the populists on the left and right, or “pro” EU, like the moderate, mainstream parties? These divisions will shape the 2019 European election campaign, but do they also reflect voters’ preferences? The results of a representative 12-country survey on the European elections in 2019 show that this is not the case. If it were up to the voters, the divisions in the new European Parliament would run not only between populist and mainstream parties, but also between economically and culturally left-wing and right-wing camps.

Left-wing and right-wing populists only agree on their dissatisfaction with democracy and their EU scepticism. On substantive issues, they are even more deeply divided than the electorates of mainstream parties. In their economic and cultural preferences, left-wing populist voters agree much more strongly with socialist, social democratic and green voters. Meanwhile, the preferences of right-wing populist voters are more similar to those supporting the Christian democrats and conservatives. Only liberal voters sympathise with the right on economic questions and with the left on cultural questions.

For the new European Parliament, this means that without the populist parties at the margins, consensus and positive majorities are only possible through a grand coalition of most of the parties of the mainstream left-right spectrum. If this bridge cannot be built, negative majorities might lead to a self-imposed gridlock and stagnation in Europe. The stronger the populist-extreme forces become, the more likely it is that such a scenario becomes a reality. But Europe still has a choice.

## Representation and Populism

Does a lack of representation intensify populist views?


Does the perception that their own positions and interests are not adequately represented by the parties make people more populist?

There has been plenty of speculation about these questions, much of it theoretically well-founded. Empirical evidence of a causal relationship between representation and populist attitudes has so far been scarce. Closing this research gap is one of the objectives of this study.

In order to investigate the causal relationship between representation and populism empirically, we have designed and conducted an innovative survey experiment for this study.

The primary goal of the experiment was to randomly change people's feelings of representation, in order to measure the extent to which populist attitudes are affected by a perceived lack of representation. For this purpose, respondents were first asked about their positions on various questions which play a role in public debate on the European elections. They were then shown randomly chosen party scenarios, which differed according to whether and how much their own position on a topic was represented by the parties of their country in the European election campaign. Respondents could then indicate the extent to which they felt represented by the parties of their country in this scenario. Finally, they were asked their opinion on various typical populist statements in order to ascertain the level

**The representation effect – worse representation means more populism**



Method: Structural equation models (SEM).  
Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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of their individual populism. Using this experimental setup, we were then able to determine statistically whether perceived representation influences the level of populist attitudes:

Do people who feel poorly represented express more support for populist statements?

The short answer to this question is: yes – at least those respondents who were not populist already.

The results of the analysis show that representation gaps can activate and reinforce populism. Poorer representation by political parties in a democracy can lead to an increase in populist attitudes.

For the fight against populism, these results mean that good representation can help limit the spread of populist attitudes. If parties endeavour to reflect the various positions and interests in society and to represent them in the political process, they thereby contribute to countering the further spread of populist attitudes in representative democracies.

But what does this mean when it comes to dealing with populist attitudes in the run-up to the 2019 European elections?

Given these results on the connection between representation and populist attitudes, two things in particular seem important to us:

- On the one hand, our analysis shows that the parties' efforts to ensure that voters feel represented are worthwhile. Representation counts! It is an important contribution against the further spread of populist attitudes among voters, and is therefore a goal which is worth every effort.
- On the other hand, election campaigns are always a special opportunity to improve representation: by taking up and defining important issues, and by discussing them in controversial terms, political parties can improve voters' sense of representation in election campaigns, and hinder the spread of populist attitudes.

But do voters make their voting decisions for or against a party? Do they vote for the party that best represents their interests, attitudes and preferences? Or are they more likely to vote against other parties whom they do not support at all and whose electoral success they want to prevent? We have examined these questions by empirically measuring and interpreting positive and negative party identities.




## The (forgotten) relevance of negative partisanship

There is no doubt that voters are showing declining levels of identification with mainstream political parties across Europe. But how are voters' behaviour and decisions influenced by negative party identities, i.e. the explicit rejection of parties?

So far, there has been little empirical research on this subject in Europe. For this reason, in this study we have developed measures of negative and positive party identities for the twelve countries examined. A positive party identity is attributed to those respondents who state that they “definitely” would vote for a particular party in European, national, and regional elections. Conversely, we classify people as having a negative party identity if they have indicated for each of the three elections that they will “definitely not” vote for that party.

The figure below shows the average level of positive and negative party identities for each of the six main European party groups we have analysed:



It turns out:

- Positive party identities are much less widespread than negative party identities. This may indicate that many citizens do not opt first and foremost for the party to which they feel most attached, but rather react against parties that they most strongly oppose. They may then vote for the party that seems to promise them the best protection against the parties they most strongly oppose and whose electoral success they therefore want to prevent at all costs.
- The level of positive partisanship of the two traditional party groups of the mainstream spectrum (i.e. social democratic and socialist parties as well as Christian democratic and conservative parties) is almost identical but significantly lower than the positive partisanship of right-wing populists and right-wing extremists. Populist radical right and extreme right parties face the highest proportion of voters with a positive party identity: 10.3 percent of the eligible voters interviewed in the twelve European countries surveyed identify positively with a right-wing populist or far-right party.
- The two party groups on the left and right margins not only face relatively high levels of positive party identities, but at the same time also have a particularly high level of negative party identities (52.2 and 52.8 percent respectively). In other words, these party groups not only have a solid base of voters, but also have a large number of sharp critics. This also shows that the adaptation of the ideas and rhetoric of these two party groups may be a risky strategy for mainstream parties, since a majority of voters firmly reject them.

Our results are also highly relevant to the 2019 European election campaign: against the background of decreasing positive partisanship throughout Europe, the mobilisation of negative identities could play an increasingly important role. Precisely in the confrontation between mainstream and populist parties, the mobilisation of negative identities in Europe seems to be becoming increasingly important: populist parties are mobilising against the mainstream parties, while mainstream parties increasingly rely on the (counter)mobilisation of voters against the populist parties.

Which divisions result from this among voters, and how are they likely to shape the 2019 European elections and the new European Parliament?

## Divided EU Parliament: populists against the mainstream?

Are the European elections above all a struggle between mainstream parties and populist parties, between “pro-Europeans” and “Eurosceptics”, or even between “supporters” and “opponents” of democracy?

The overall picture shows that when it comes to attitudes towards the political system – that is, populist attitudes, satisfaction with democracy in the EU and support for membership of the EU – the divisions between party supporters are very different from those related to economic and cultural questions.


- Looking at populist attitudes and attitudes towards the EU system, we find a clear polarisation between the supporters of mainstream parties (Christian democrats, conservatives, social democrats, liberals and greens) on the one hand and the supporters of populist and extremist parties – left and right – on the other. While the supporters of mainstream parties are predominantly satisfied with democracy and EU membership and show a low level of populist attitudes, the supporters of populist and extremist parties are more strongly opposed to EU membership, more dissatisfied with EU democracy, and more populist.
- On economic and cultural questions, meanwhile, a more classic ideological left-right divide can be seen, with the supporters of conservative, populist radical right and extreme right parties at one end and the supporters of green, social democratic and socialist parties as well as populist radical left and extreme left parties at the other.

The divide between the supporters of mainstream parties and those of populist and radical parties is very clear when it comes to support for EU membership. In line with other parts of the study, agreement with eight typical populist statements was used to measure how populist respondents were. This allows us to locate the supporters of the European party groups in a space defined by populism/Euroscepticism:

The four quadrants of the populism/Euroscepticism space reveal very clearly that the populist/pro-European quadrant and the non-populist/Eurosceptic quadrant are completely unoccupied. None of the party groups analysed is more populist than the average and at the same time more pro-European than the average, or less populist than the average and at the same time more Eurosceptic than the average.

The supporters of all party groups are thus located exclusively in the two remaining quadrants in the top right (= less populist and more pro-European than the average) or in the bottom left (= more populist and more Eurosceptic than the average).

## A divided EU Parliament? – Euroscepticism



Note: The dots show the weighted average for the voters of each party group, the axes show the weighted average of the whole electorate.  
Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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The voters of all mainstream party groups can be found in the non-populist, Europe-friendly quadrant. Green and liberal voters are the least populist and most pro-European, while supporters of the group of Christian democratic and conservative parties are a little less populist than pro-European, compared to the average across the electorate. Socialist and social-democratic voters, meanwhile, are a little more remarkable in their pro-European position than their position on the populism dimension.

In the populist-Eurosceptic quadrant, on the other hand, we find the voters of left- and right-wing populist and radical parties. While their degree of populism is similarly high, they differ in the extent of their Euroscepticism: the supporters of populist radical left and extreme left parties are much less Eurosceptic than those of the populist radical right and extreme right parties. Nevertheless, the supporters of both party groups are more Eurosceptic than the average of all voters and than the voters of all mainstream party groups.

When we consider how satisfied people are with the functioning of democracy in the EU, rather than support for EU membership, almost exactly the same picture emerges.

In summary, then, the divide between mainstream parties and “populists and extremists” is very striking both on the question of support for EU membership and on general satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the EU. These attitudes to the political system reveal two clearly separate party camps: the supporters of the mainstream parties stand in contrast to the populist and extremist camp on the left and right margins, who are Eurosceptic and dissatisfied with democracy in the EU.

This is precisely the distinction between the “pro-Europeans” and “Eurosceptics” as well as the “mainstream” and “populist” parties that has increasingly been invoked in the current European election campaign, shaping political rhetoric.


But how similar are those who vote for populists on the left and right when it comes to economic and cultural issues?

In other words: How uniform is their vision for the future direction of European policy?

## Left against right I – the economic dimension

To answer these questions, it is helpful to look at the voters of the party groups before the 2019 European elections according to their economic and cultural left-right preferences. For this purpose, two additive indices were generated in this study, which locate the preferences and attitudes of the party supporters on an economic and a cultural dimension.

### Economic left or right?



Note: The dots show the weighted average for the voters of each party group.  
Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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As the illustration on p. 21 shows, at the far left of the economic spectrum are the supporters of populist radical left and extreme left parties, with an average index value of 4.79. Right next to them are the supporters of the green parties (4.87), and soon after that come the supporters of the social democratic and socialist parties (5.16). These three party groups are clearly to the left of the average of all eligible voters (5.61). By contrast, supporters of populist radical right and extreme right parties (5.95), liberal parties (5.99), and Christian democratic and conservative parties (6.32) are clearly to the right of the average.

The overall depiction of the economic left-right dimension thus shows clearly that camps have been formed by the supporters of the two party groups regarded as being “left-wing” and the green party group on the left, as well as the two “right-wing” party groups and the liberal parties on the right.

This is also illustrated by the distance arrows between the different party groups, the length of which indicates how strongly the preferences of the voters of different party groups differ from one another. The preferences of the voters of the mainstream party groups are furthest apart in the figure, as the index value of Christian democratic and conservative party supporters deviates by 1.45 points from that of the greens. The second largest distance on the economic left-right dimension is between the supporters of the two populist and radical party groups: here, the political distance between the supporters of populist radical left and extreme left parties and the supporters of populist radical right and extreme right parties is 1.16 index points, which is likewise very considerable. A different picture emerges on the left and right side of the economic spectrum. There, the gap in political positions between voters in the economically left-wing and the economically right-wing party camps is only 0.37 index points on each side.

In summary, this means that the economic preferences of the party supporters of the two populist and radical party groups differ more than three times as much from each other as those of the supporters within the economically left and within the economically right party camps.

### European social spending: Europe's heart beats on the left


A similar picture emerges when considering preferences toward European social policy as an example of the economic left-right dimension. In fact, European social policy is almost as important for voters in Europe as asylum policy: in ten of the twelve countries surveyed it is one of the three most important issues. Opinions on social policy, however, remain strongly ideological: the majority of supporters of left-wing parties are in favour of an increase and the majority of right-wing party supporters are in favour of a reduction in EU social spending. The strongest support for more EU social spending is among supporters of populist radical left and extreme left parties (56 percent), the weakest among Christian democratic and conservative party supporters (20 percent) and voters of populist radical right and extreme right parties (24 percent).

In social policy questions – as an example for almost all the substantive political issues examined – the division is not between “mainstream” and “populist” parties, but between the “right” and the “left”. This is most evident among supporters of populist radical left and extreme left parties: despite their general scepticism about the EU, the majority (56 percent) want more and not less EU spending on social affairs. The opposite pole is formed by those who vote for populist radical right and extreme right parties, 37 percent of whom are in favour of less and only 24 percent in favour of more social spending by the EU. But even among the supporters of all right-wing parties, almost two thirds of respondents do not want to cut the EU’s current level of spending on social matters. There is no European party group whose voters fundamentally question current EU spending on social affairs.

#### European social spending: Europe's heart beats on the left



##### Attitudes to European social spending by voters of the party groups




Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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## Left against right II – the cultural dimension

A similar but not completely identical picture can be seen for the cultural left-right dimension in the figure below:



The locations of the respective supporters of the European party groups are first depicted on a cultural dimension from left to right. And here, too, a clear picture emerges: to the far left of this dimension, there are the green parties, whose voters have an average index value of 2.40 when it comes to cultural preferences. Not far away are the supporters of the social democratic and socialist parties (2.94), the populist radical left and extreme left parties (3.02) and the liberal parties (3.08). The supporters of these four party groups are thus clearly to the left of the average of the whole electorate (3.60). To the right, on the other hand, are the supporters of Christian democratic and conservative parties (3.79) and, to the far right, the voters of populist radical right and extreme right parties (4.55). In cultural terms, the supporters of the liberal parties therefore position themselves clearly to the left of the average. The supporters of the liberal parties are thus the only group to defy clear overarching left-right classification, since they appear economically right-wing and culturally left-wing.

Thus, in cultural left-right preferences, there is once again a contrast between the supporters of the two left-wing party groups and the green party group as well as the liberal parties on the left side of the cultural left-right dimension and the two right-wing party groups of the Christian democrats and conservatives as well as the right-wing populists and right-wing extremists on the right side. However, a different picture emerges within the culturally left and right spectrum. There, the political distance between the voters within the cultural left (0.68) and within the cultural right (0.76) is only about half as great.



In summary, this means that the cultural preferences of the voters of the two populist-extreme party camps differ about twice as much from each other as those within the culturally left-wing and within the culturally right-wing party camp.

## Consequences for the new EU Parliament

What can be deduced from these results for the coming European Parliament?

In theory and purely in terms of voter preferences, new coalitions in the European Parliament are conceivable in economic and cultural matters – for example between Christian democrats/conservatives and right-wing populists, whose voters are sometimes closer to each other in cultural matters than the voters of some mainstream parties. But the past shows that most mainstream parties are reluctant to form coalitions with populists and Eurosceptics. It is not by chance that the data of this study show that left and right populist parties have particularly high levels of negative party identities. Especially in the European Parliament, the pro-European consensus of the mainstream parties has strong binding force and has repeatedly taken precedence over ideological differences between mainstream parties. Even during the financial crisis, when highly controversial economic questions had to be decided, the mainstream parties in the European Parliament preferred to compromise among themselves on the economic dimension rather than involve EU opponents and populists. Coalitions based on the “Austrian model”, as exemplified by the ÖVP and the FPÖ, are therefore unlikely in the European Parliament even after 2019.

## Conclusion:






































### Conflict or consensus in the new EU Parliament?

Poor representation creates populism. Conversely, this means that good representation is an excellent strategy against populism. But good representation is not an easy business in democracies. It requires those who are represented to give their consent and believe in the legitimacy of the system. If people do not feel adequately represented in the diversity of their interests and attitudes, this creates dissatisfaction with and criticism of democracy. Representation deficits activate and trigger populism.

Populists on the left and right then use such representation deficits for their own purposes. This will also shape the European elections in 2019, where they will benefit from the vulnerabilities of the mainstream parties. They defend the supposedly “true” interests of an allegedly “homogeneous” people against a supposedly “corrupt and evil elite”. They turn voters’ perceived representation deficits into populist criticism of the EU and its democratic system. However, dissatisfaction with democracy and EU scepticism remain the populists’ only and greatest common denominator. The populist-extreme “anti-EU camp” remains a fiction when it comes to concrete issues: left-wing and right-wing populist voters are even further apart in their preferences regarding such issues than the mainstream parties of the moderate left-right spectrum.

For the new European Parliament this means that consensus and positive majorities are only possible with broader coalitions of mainstream parties. Without the populist-extremist margins, positive majorities could in future require consensus between socialist, left-alternative, green and social-democratic parties, all the way to Christian democratic and conservative parties. The stronger the populist-extremist margins become, the more this forces mainstream parties to reach consensus in “grand” coalitions. If the mainstream parties do not succeed in building this bridge, negative majorities will lead to self-imposed gridlock and stagnation in Europe. The stronger the populist-extremist margins become, the more likely this scenario will be. But Europe still has a choice.

### The eight campaign issues

CAMPAIGN ISSUE	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Sweden	Spain	Hungary
European asylum policy												
European social spending												
Regulation of factory farming												
European financial assistance												
Sanctions for violating democracy												
European agricultural subsidies												
Brexit negotiations												
Military cooperation in Europe												

Note: Campaign issues are listed in order of salience. The flags indicate that an issue belongs to the top three most important issues in a given country.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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# 1. Pro or contra?

## Voting intentions and party identities in the 2019 European election

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The voting intentions of many Europeans present a promising picture for voter turnout in the elections: on average across the twelve European countries examined in this study, more than two thirds (68 percent) of those eligible to vote “definitely” want to participate in the European elections in 2019. In Germany, this is the response of almost three quarters (73 percent) of all voters. However, the relationship between the intention to vote and actual voting behaviour is too loose to form the basis of any forecast. It is therefore more meaningful to analyse the patterns as well as the underlying reasons for the intention to participate in the elections.

Our results show that older people and those with a higher level of formal education are more likely to have an intention to vote in the European elections than younger people and those with lower levels of education. Populist attitudes do not play a significant role in intended participation. Accordingly, there is no evidence of a causal connection between populism and the definite intention to participate in the European elections. However, the left-right self-placement of respondents is related to participation: the political margins on the left and right are more strongly mobilised than the political centre, which for now appears to suffer somewhat from “voter fatigue”.

Indeed, people with populist attitudes are much more likely to intend to cast their vote for the populist parties. This is particularly the case for those on the right: the further to the right voters locate themselves, the more likely they are to opt for one of the populist parties.

But do voters tend to make their voting decisions for or against a party? That is, do they vote for the party that best represents their interests, attitudes and preferences? Or are they more likely to vote against other parties whom they do not support at all and whose electoral success they want to prevent? We have examined these questions by empirically measuring and interpreting positive and negative party identities. We find that positive party identities are much less widespread than negative party identities. Populist radical right and extreme right parties achieve the highest proportion of positive party identities among voters (10.3 percent). However, the two party groups on the left and right margins not only have the strongest positive party identities, but at the same time also have a particularly high level of negative party identities (52.2 and 52.8 percent, respectively).

Our results therefore also show that negative party identities are highly relevant to the European elections and the European election campaign 2019. It is precisely in the confrontation between mainstream and populist parties that the mobilisation of negative identities in Europe seems to become more and more important: populist parties are mobilising against mainstream parties, while the mainstream parties are increasingly relying on the (counter)mobilisation of voters against populist parties.


## Pro or contra?

Since the first European elections in 1979, voter turnout in the European Union as a whole has only ever known one direction: it has been decreasing. While turnout in 1979 was 62 percent across Europe, it has declined to a varying degree in every subsequent European election, to only 42.6 percent. However, this decline does not necessarily reflect decreasing interest in the European elections on the part of voters. Since 1979, many new member states have joined, some of which also have a low turnout in national elections (e.g. due to a lack of compulsory voting). They lower the European average. In addition, compulsory voting has been abolished in some countries (Franklin 2001).

In fact, many Europeans give promising responses regarding the 2019 elections: on average, more than two thirds (68 percent) of the electorate in the twelve European countries surveyed in this study “definitely” want to participate in the 2019 European elections. In Germany, this proportion reaches almost three quarters (73 percent) of all voters. And also in comparison to earlier European elections, many Europeans seem to have a stronger intention to vote this time: according to a Eurobarometer survey conducted about six months before the European elections in 2009, only 56 percent of all EU citizens eligible to vote considered themselves highly likely to participate in the elections. One year before the 2019 European elections, this figure was 64 percent for a similar question:

FIGURE 1 +/-50? - Voter turnout and voting intentions in Europe

In percent



Note: The Eurobarometer survey results are based on the following questions:

"Can you tell me on a scale of 1 to 10 how likely it is that you would vote in the next European elections in June 2009?" and "The next European Parliament elections will be held in May 2019. How likely are you to vote in these elections? (scale of 1-10)". The voting intention was defined as the proportion of respondents that indicated a probability between 6 and 10 on the scale to vote in the European election. In the Eurobarometer 2014, there was no equivalent question.

Source: Own illustration based on data from the Special Eurobarometer 303 (2009) and the Eurobarometer 89.2 (2018) as well as on data from the European Parliament (2014).

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However, when we compare such figures with the actual turnout, it is clear that survey responses are not an unbiased prediction of actual participation. In the 2009 European elections, the actual turnout was only 43 percent, although 56 percent of all eligible voters were still relatively sure they wanted to cast their vote six months before the election. The difference between the intention to vote and the actual turnout was therefore 13 percentage points in 2009. For the 2014 European elections, no comparable data are available on intended participation.

Whether the high figures of intended participation measured in this study in the twelve countries examined for the 2019 European elections point to an actual increase in voter turnout must therefore be left open. The relationship between intended participation and actual voting behaviour is too loose to form the basis of any forecast of turnout (on the relationship between reported and actual turnout in general, cf. Holbrook and Krosnick 2010, as well as Karp and Brockington 2005).

It is therefore more meaningful to analyse the patterns as well as the underlying reasons for the intention to participate in the elections, than to focus on the absolute figures. Who is most certain that they will participate in the election? And who feels less certain, i.e. less mobilised than others in terms of voting intentions?

To this end, in this study we use logistic regression models that predict the probability that an individual “definitely” wants to participate in the European elections. In these models, we test various explanatory variables that could be associated with the intention to vote (cf. the methodological appendix on p. 93).

In addition to sociodemographic characteristics, such as age and gender, we have also examined various attitudes as explanatory variables of the intention to vote, such as attitudes regarding the political system of the individual countries and the EU, as well as attitudes towards European integration. We also consider left-right self-placement and populist attitudes. Finally, analyses similar to those carried out to explain intended participation were also carried out to explain the choice to vote for Eurosceptic and populist parties (cf. the methodological appendix on p. 93 ff.).

The results of these analyses for our samples from twelve countries can be summarised as follows:

### Voting intentions I: who is planning to go to the polls?

Among the sociodemographic explanatory factors, it is above all respondents' age and level of formal education that have a statistically significant effect on the intention to vote:

- Older people are more likely to report that they want to take part in the European elections than young people. The intention to vote rises with the age of the respondents, then flattens out again from the age of 60.
- In the run-up to the 2019 European elections, people with a formally higher level of education remain more likely to want to participate in the elections than people with a formally lower level of education.


There are also very clear differences when it comes to attitudes towards the EU:

- People who consider their own country's EU membership to be a "good thing" are more likely to vote than people who reject EU membership (Mattila 2003).
- A similar effect can be seen regarding satisfaction with democracy in the EU. Here, too, those who are satisfied are more likely to want to take part in the European elections than the dissatisfied.
- Similarly, those who are pro-integration – who want the European integration process to progress more quickly than it has so far – prove to be more mobilised than those voters who do not want this.

Populist attitudes do not play a significant role for participation intentions: once we have controlled for other factors, people with strong populist attitudes have neither a stronger nor a weaker intention to vote than people with weak populist attitudes. Hence, there is no evidence of a causal connection between populism and the definite intention to participate in the European elections (Anduiza et al. 2019). However, the left-right self-placement of respondents does have an effect: the political margins on the left and right are more strongly mobilised than the political centre, which for now appears to suffer somewhat from "voter fatigue":

FIGURE 2 "Voter fatigue" in the political centre?

In percent



Method: Predicted probability of definitely voting in European elections, based on logistic regression analysis with confidence intervals (95%).  
Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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The figure illustrates that while a voter from the political centre (= self-placement at 5 on the left-right scale from 0 to 10) has a 70 percent probability of definitely wanting to participate in the European elections, this probability rises to over 80 percent on the left and right margins of the ideological spectrum. However, there are of course significantly fewer voters on the political margins than in the political centre. Nevertheless, a higher turnout on the political margins would result in a disproportionate representation of the political preferences of radical voters in the election results and would distort the results at the expense of voters with centrist preferences. This evidence for greater mobilisation at the political margins is quite consistent with the results of other studies, which show that small, often extremist opposition parties perform particularly well in European elections (Hix and Marsh 2007).

## Voting intentions II: Who is planning to vote for Eurosceptic parties?

Next we consider what party people intend to vote for, specifically whether they want to vote for a Eurosceptic party (when asked the question “If the European Parliament elections were held tomorrow, which party would you vote for, or would you not vote?”; see also the methodological appendix on p. 93, including the classification of Eurosceptic parties). The following picture emerges with regard to sociodemographic characteristics:

- Women are less likely to intend to vote for a Eurosceptic party than men. This difference is not explained by other political attitudes towards the EU or other sociodemographic differences between women and men, for which we control in various ways.
- People with higher levels of formal education are also less likely to support a Eurosceptic party than people with lower levels of formal education. Those with the highest level of formal education have the lowest probability of voting for a Eurosceptic party.

There are also clear differences regarding attitudes towards the EU:

- Respondents who support their country’s membership of the EU, see themselves as Europeans and are satisfied with the functioning of democracy in the EU are less likely to opt for Eurosceptic parties than people who reject their country’s membership of the EU, see themselves exclusively as citizens of their own country and are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy in the EU.










Another interesting result concerns populist attitudes: the more pronounced these are, the greater the probability that a respondent will vote for a Eurosceptic party. However, this is explained by the fact that in our study most Eurosceptic parties are also populist. If we look exclusively at non-populist Eurosceptic parties, we find that people with populist views are not more likely to vote for them.

## IN FOCUS

### What is populism?

#### IN FOCUS What is populism?

Below are a few statements on politics and society. Please tick to indicate the extent to which you agree with each statement.

						
The politicians in the [NATIONAL] Parliament need to follow the will of the people.		Strongly agree <input type="radio"/>	Tend to agree <input type="radio"/>	Neither agree or disagree <input type="radio"/>	Tend to disagree <input type="radio"/>	Strongly disagree <input type="radio"/>
The people, and not politicians, should make our most important political decisions.		Strongly agree <input type="radio"/>	Tend to agree <input type="radio"/>	Neither agree or disagree <input type="radio"/>	Tend to disagree <input type="radio"/>	Strongly disagree <input type="radio"/>
The political differences between the elite and the people are greater than the differences among the people.		Strongly agree <input type="radio"/>	Tend to agree <input type="radio"/>	Neither agree or disagree <input type="radio"/>	Tend to disagree <input type="radio"/>	Strongly disagree <input type="radio"/>
I would rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than by a professional politician.		Strongly agree <input type="radio"/>	Tend to agree <input type="radio"/>	Neither agree or disagree <input type="radio"/>	Tend to disagree <input type="radio"/>	Strongly disagree <input type="radio"/>
Elected politicians talk too much and take too little action.		Strongly agree <input type="radio"/>	Tend to agree <input type="radio"/>	Neither agree or disagree <input type="radio"/>	Tend to disagree <input type="radio"/>	Strongly disagree <input type="radio"/>
What people call "compromise" in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.		Strongly agree <input type="radio"/>	Tend to agree <input type="radio"/>	Neither agree or disagree <input type="radio"/>	Tend to disagree <input type="radio"/>	Strongly disagree <input type="radio"/>
The particular interests of the political class negatively affect the welfare of the people.		Strongly agree <input type="radio"/>	Tend to agree <input type="radio"/>	Neither agree or disagree <input type="radio"/>	Tend to disagree <input type="radio"/>	Strongly disagree <input type="radio"/>
Politicians always end up agreeing when it comes to protecting their privileges.		Strongly agree <input type="radio"/>	Tend to agree <input type="radio"/>	Neither agree or disagree <input type="radio"/>	Tend to disagree <input type="radio"/>	Strongly disagree <input type="radio"/>

Source: Items taken from Akkermann et al. (2014) and Van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2018).


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Although populism is a contested concept, there is now a growing consensus in the political science literature around an ideational definition of populism. Following this ideational approach, populism should be thought of as a set of ideas that is characterised not only by maintaining that society is divided between two antagonistic and homogeneous groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, but also by claiming that politics is about respecting popular sovereignty at any cost (Mudde 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). One of the important advantages of such a definition of populism is that it allows empirical analysis and measurement of both the supply and demand side of populism (Hawkins et al. 2018b; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018). On the one hand, this approach allows us to identify the political actors who adopt populist ideas, and also to examine whether and to what extent populist ideas are linked with other political ideologies in order to mobilise voters (e.g. with authoritarianism and nativism among populist radical right parties in Europe). On the other hand, the populism conceptualisation on which this study is based also allows us to analyse voters’ demand for populism through surveys: how widespread are populist attitudes within different segments of the electorate and what conditions favour the activation of such views?

The survey conducted for this study examines the demand for populism on the voters’ side. We use a number of items/questions to measure the level of populism among the European citizens surveyed. In doing so, we rely on existing scientific research, in particular on the work of Van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2018), who have already measured populist attitudes in nine European countries. The items we use to measure populism have already featured in various comparative studies (e.g. Akkerman et al. 2014; Hawkins et al. 2018a; Meléndez and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; Rico et al. 2017) and belong to the most widely used and accepted scales for measuring populist attitudes among voters.

The figure shows the items used in this study to measure populist attitudes. The items aim to make the constitutive elements of the ideational definition of populism measurable. They test, for example, whether and to what extent citizens are of the opinion that (a) “the people” is a virtuous, homogeneous, unified entity, (b) advocate popular sovereignty juxtaposed against elitist rule, and (c) portray themselves at odds with the political establishment, which is alleged to act against the interest of “the people”. The more voters agree with the statements, the more populist they are. Confirmatory factor analyses were carried out to determine whether these eight items all measure the same underlying concept. The results show that the items indeed measure a common concept of populism across our twelve countries. Accordingly, the eight populism items were then used to form a populism index. For each respondent, this populism index is derived as the average agreement with the eight individual items (cf. the methodological appendix of this study, p. 102).

With regard to left-right self-placement, we again find a difference between the centre and the margins of the political spectrum. In contrast to the intention to participate, however, the probability of intending to vote for a Eurosceptic party shows a clear tilt to the right:



The figure illustrates that while the probability of voting for a Eurosceptic party is about 40 percent in the political centre, it rises to just over 45 percent on the left but almost 60 percent on the right. About six out of ten voters who place themselves to the far right intend to vote for a Eurosceptic party in the 2019 European elections. This speaks to existing findings showing that Eurosceptic attitudes are more pronounced at the ideological margins and provide extremist parties with an opportunity to gather support (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004; van Elsas and van der Brug 2015).

### Voting intentions III: who is planning to vote for populist parties?

When we consider who plans to vote for a populist party, we find similar effects to those shaping the intention to vote for a Eurosceptic party (cf. the methodological appendix, p. 96, including the classification of populist parties). On the one hand, this can be explained by the fact that all the populist parties examined in this study are also Eurosceptic. In this respect, it is hardly surprising that men and people with less formal education are also significantly more likely to vote for a populist party. Nor is it surprising at the level of attitudes that people who see

themselves exclusively as citizens of their country and not as Europeans, who do not think their country's membership of the EU is a good thing and are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy in the EU, tend to vote for populist parties.

Finally, it should be pointed out that people with strong populist attitudes are indeed much more likely to vote for one of the populist parties (Van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018) and that populist parties, which are mostly right-wing populist in our sample of countries, are performing particularly well in the run-up to the 2019 European elections, especially among individuals who are "right-wing": those who locate themselves further to the right are more likely to opt for one of the populist parties. Almost half of all people on the far right intend to elect a populist party, while only about half as many on the far left intend to do so.

But do voters tend to make their voting decisions for or against a party? That is, do they vote for the party that best represents their interests, attitudes and preferences? Or are they more likely to vote against other parties whom they do not support at all and whose electoral success they want to prevent? We examine these questions below by empirically measuring and interpreting positive and negative party identities.

## The (forgotten) relevance of negative party identities

There is no doubt that voters are showing declining levels of identification with political parties across Europe. Two complementary factors can explain this: on the one hand, voters have become increasingly sophisticated and therefore many of them behave as independents, who are willing to change their party preferences depending on what is at stake at the election rather than voting according to habitual party loyalties (Dalton, 2017). It is therefore not surprising that overall electoral behaviour is becoming more volatile and that the fragmentation of the political landscape is increasing in most European countries. On the other hand, political parties find it increasingly difficult to maintain their social roots (e.g. in mass organisations such as trade unions). They are therefore less and less able to maintain or develop strong party ties in large parts of the population (Mair 2013). Not by chance, the number of party members has fallen sharply in many European countries, while election campaigns are increasingly organised and shaped by external, professional teams rather than by activists or members of the parties themselves.

Although it is true that voters' identification with the mainstream political parties in Europe is diminishing, we often overlook the fact that party identities are important in their positive and negative manifestations. While positive identity refers to voters' psychological attachment to a political party, negative identity refers to voters' psychological rejection of a political party (Campbell et al. 1960). This is a central analytical difference to which more empirical attention has only recently been devoted in order to better understand the sometimes disruptive changes in the political landscape in various democracies around the world (e.g. Abramowitz 2018; Caruana et al. 2014; Medeiros and Noel 2013).

As a working hypothesis to be tested, we assume that positive partisanship is much less widespread than negative partisanship. If this assumption is correct,

it is conceivable that many citizens will not vote first and foremost for the party to which they feel most strongly attached, but will rather vote against parties to which they most strongly object. They then opt for a party that seems to promise them the most certain protection against the parties they most strongly oppose and whose electoral success they are determined to prevent.

This is also highly relevant to the European elections and the 2019 European election campaign:

Against the background of declining positive partisanship across Europe, the mobilisation of negative partisanship could play an important role. Especially in the confrontation between mainstream and populist parties, the mobilisation of negative identities in Europe seems to be increasingly significant: populist parties usually fight against mainstream parties, while mainstream parties are increasingly relying on the (counter)mobilisation of voters against the populist parties (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018; Vehrkamp and Wegschaider 2017).

However, there is little empirical research on negative party identities in Europe. For this reason, in this study we have developed empirical measures of negative and positive party identities and applied them to the twelve countries examined. As will be explained in more detail on the next page, there are various ways of empirically measuring positive and negative partisanship. Based on earlier studies (Meléndez and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017), we have chosen a very demanding operationalisation. This makes it possible to identify those voters who have a particularly strong attachment to or rejection of certain political parties. Nevertheless, the measurement method we propose is not the only one that can be used for the empirical analysis of positive and negative partisanship.

However, the results of this study offer an important perspective on party identities. They thus contribute to a better understanding of the relations between political parties and their voters in democracies with multi-party systems and elections at several political levels (regional/local, national, European).

## IN FOCUS

### The concept and measurement of party identities

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Although there are not many empirical studies on negative party identities, there are different approaches to measuring them in surveys. For example, scholars have developed the question of whether someone has negative thoughts and feelings towards a party. Others have asked whether individuals would never vote for a particular party and again other studies have been based on the so-called “party feeling thermometer”, which measures attitudes towards parties on a scale from 0 to 100 (e.g. Abramowitz 2018; Caruana et al. 2014; Medeiros and Noel 2013; Rose and Mishler 1998). Most of this research uses case studies of two-party systems with elections at the national level. However, this study analyses the attitudes and profiles of voters in the context of elections to the European Parliament, in which parties are elected at the national level and then form coalitions and alliances at the European level. Therefore, we consider it more effective to apply an operationalisation of positive and negative party identities, which is able to capture voting intentions in multilevel systems (with regional, national, and European elections). We have therefore decided to use the very demanding measurement of positive and negative partisanship developed by Meléndez and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017), which is defined as follows:




A positive party identity towards a party is ascribed only to those respondents who have indicated that at each of the three electoral levels mentioned, they will “definitely” vote for that particular party: in elections for the European Parliament, for the national parliament and for the regional parliament (in those countries where there are no regional parliaments, we asked instead about local elections). Conversely, we classify people as holding a negative party identity towards a party if they have indicated that they will “definitely not” vote for that party in each of the three types of elections asked in the survey. In order to be able to make statements about party identities at the European level, we have calculated the average positive or negative party identity for all parties assigned to a party group (weighting all parties equally).

The following figure illustrates this measurement of negative or positive party identity using the example of the SPD in Germany: respondents who stated that they “definitely” wanted to vote for the SPD in all three elections (European elections, Bundestag elections and state elections) were assigned a positive party identity for the SPD. Meanwhile, those who indicated that they would “definitely not” vote for the SPD in the European elections, the Bundestag elections and the state elections, have a negative party identity for the SPD.

### IN FOCUS Measuring positive and negative party identities: the example of the SPD

Thinking for the moment just about the SPD:

Would you vote for the SPD in one of the three elections below?

		NEGATIVE IDENTITY			POSITIVE IDENTITY
		Definitely not	Probably not	Probably yes	Yes, definitely
Regional election		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Bundestag election		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
European election		<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Source: Own illustration

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Future research on party identities in Europe could make use of this operationalisation and measurement of positive and negative party identities. In the long run, it would then be possible to determine how stable or volatile such party identities are over time. Theoretically, positive identities towards a party could be expected to be relatively stable over time, since the formation of party loyalty is a process that is arguably linked to deep-rooted socialisation phases and electoral experiences. In contrast, negative party identities towards a party can be assumed to be more volatile over time, as they may be more dependent on a party's actual behaviour (e.g. change of leadership, programmatic adjustment) and other specific events that can damage or add value to the party brand (e.g. corruption scandals or external crises that render the party's agenda more or less attractive).



## Positive party identities: are right-wing populists and right-wing extremists gaining ground?

In the following, positive and negative party identities are analysed at the level of the European party groups which we defined for this study. This reveals whether and to what extent the European party groups face different levels of approval and rejection by the electorate, and different proportions of loyal supporters and tough critics.




Figure 4 shows the average of positive party identities for the six main European party groups analysed in this study. The following three points stand out in particular:

First, on average, populist radical right and extreme right parties have the highest proportion of voters who identify positively with a party from this group: averaging across all populist radical right and extreme right parties, 10.3 percent of voters in a country have a positive party identity towards these parties. But why, in comparison to the other party groups analysed in this study, does this party group – consisting mainly of relatively new parties – have a particularly large number of loyal supporters? One possible reason could be that populist radical right and extreme right parties place special emphasis on advancing controversial ideas in their political work, which usually also triggers polarised debates. Against this background, it seems less surprising that these very parties are in a position to establish a loyal base and to maintain strong ties with their voters. Such voters

may have a particularly strong emotional attachment to the controversial programmatic agenda of these parties, or they may develop that attachment during the fierce debates which the parties provoke. In addition, populist radical right and extreme right parties often take up niche issues that have so far received little or no attention from mainstream parties. As a result, their voters can be very certain that they want to vote for exactly this party in each of the three types of election.

Nevertheless, it remains astonishing that populist radical right and extreme right parties have more positive partisanship than mainstream parties, most of which have been active in the struggle for voters for much longer. At least theoretically, mainstream parties should already have more stable connections with their respective societal support groups and be able to maintain and expand them. This could be assumed especially for a country like Germany, where the electoral success of populist radical right parties is still a relatively new phenomenon. But even in Germany, the proportion of voters who identify positively with the AfD is already much higher than the proportion of voters with a positive party identity for some of the mainstream parties (such as the SPD). Future research should therefore investigate in more depth why populist radical right and extreme right parties are able to build up very strong positive partisanship so quickly (the same applies to populist radical left and extreme left parties, see below).

Secondly, the level of positive partisanship faced by the two traditional mainstream party groups is almost identical, but significantly lower than that of right-wing populists and right-wing extremists: while Christian democratic and conservative parties can rely on 6.7 percent of voters with positive party identities, an average of 6.1 percent of voters identify positively with social democratic and socialist parties. Since most parties from these two groups have long been established in politics and have extensive government experience, they used to have a very stable base of voters. Nevertheless, the number of those voters has fallen sharply over time. This is certainly due in part to societal transformations, such as increasing levels of voter education, which have an emancipatory effect (Dalton 2017). But also developments in the party system, such as the increasing programmatic similarity and interchangeability of mainstream parties play a role (Mair 2013). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that a similarly high proportion of voters (6.2 percent) feel very closely connected to populist radical left and extreme left parties. Many such parties are also relatively new (e.g. "Podemos" in Spain and "La France insoumise" in France). Nevertheless, in a short time span, they – like many of the populist radical right parties – seem to have succeeded in winning a comparatively large and stable base of supporters, on whom they can also rely in elections.

Thirdly, the green and liberal party groups also have roughly the same number of supporters with a positive party identity (4.4 percent and 4.3 percent respectively). This rather low level is as expected, because these are parties that normally mobilise a fairly small proportion of the electorate and are therefore less likely to be able to form a large loyal core base of voters in all elections. Although in some European countries certain parties of these two groups won many votes in the last elections (e.g. the Greens in Germany or the VVD in the Netherlands), it does not seem at present that they have been able to gain a strong base of loyal supporters.


## Negative party identities: polarisation at the extreme margins

In order to get a full picture of the effect of party identities, both positive and negative partisanship must be considered. Figure 5 shows the other side of the coin, displaying – analogously to Figure 4 – the average level of negative party identities for the six European party groups defined for our study.

Here, too, an interesting finding emerges: the two party groups on the left and right margins not only have high levels of positive partisanship, but are also confronted with a particularly high level of negative partisanship. In other words, these party groups not only have a solid base of voters, but also a large number of sharp critics. In fact, with an average negative party identity of 52.8 percent of voters, parties from the populist radical right and extreme right party group are most frequently rejected.

However, the populist radical left and extreme left parties have an average negative party identity of 52.2 percent of voters and thus experience virtually as much societal rejection as their right-wing counterparts. This also demonstrates that the adaptation of the ideas and rhetoric of these two party groups may be a risky strategy for mainstream parties, since a large proportion of voters decisively reject them (Vehrkamp 2018).

FIGURE 5 Negative party identities by party groups



Note: Red line indicates the average of the six party groups.  
Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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The liberal parties are the third most unpopular party group in terms of negative partisanship. On average across all liberal parties, 50.7 percent of voters have a negative party identity towards them. When interpreting this result, however, we have to bear in mind that the liberal party group is very heterogeneous in itself (van Haute and Close 2019). In view of the fact that liberal parties often present themselves as defenders of the free market and liberal values, this finding can nevertheless be partially explained, since these are two issues that – as we will see in Chapter 3 of this study – are highly controversial within the European electorate and polarise voters. This could at least partially explain the relatively high level of negative party identities for the liberals.

On average, the Christian democrats/conservatives and the green parties have a similarly high level of negative party identities, averaging 47.8 percent for Christian democratic and conservative parties and 47 percent for the green parties. The social democratic and socialist parties have the lowest average level of negative party identities of all party groups considered in this study: only 42 percent of voters on average in the twelve countries surveyed said that they would never vote for any of these parties in any of the three elections mentioned. A low level of negative partisanship means that these parties theoretically have more room than other parties to increase their voter base. At the same time, however, it may also indicate that the programmatic agenda put forth by these parties generates less polarisation and that it may therefore be less clear to voters what the parties actually stand for.





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## 2. Why populism?

### Representation gaps as a cause of populism

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Are populist views intensified by a lack of representation?

Do people become more populist if they feel that parties do not adequately represent their positions and interests?

There are numerous and theoretically well-founded conjectures on these questions. However, empirical evidence of a causal relationship between representation and populist attitudes has so far been scarce. Closing this gap is one of the objectives of this study.

In order to empirically investigate the causal relationship between representation and populism, we have designed and conducted an innovative survey experiment for this study.

The primary aim of the experiment was to randomly change people's feelings of representation in order to measure the impact of poor feelings of representation on populist attitudes. To this end, respondents were first asked about their positions on various European policy issues that play a role in the public debate on the European elections. Subsequently, they were shown randomly selected party scenarios, which differed in whether and to what extent their own position on a topic was

represented by the parties of their country in the European election campaign. Respondents were then asked to indicate how well they felt represented in this scenario by the parties in their country. Finally, they were asked about their agreement with various, typical populist statements to measure the degree of their individual populist attitudes. Through this experimental setup, it was possible to statistically ascertain whether the subjectively felt representation of people has an influence on their populist attitudes:

Do people who are poorly represented become more populist?

The short answer to this question is: yes - at least those respondents who were not populist already. The results of the analysis show that representation gaps can activate and reinforce populism. Poorer representation by parties in representative democracies can lead to an increase in populist attitudes. For the fight against populism these results mean: good representation can help limit the spread of populist attitudes. Parties' efforts to better reflect the various positions and interests in society and to represent them in the political process are a promising means of countering the further spread of populist attitudes in representative democracies.

## Are populist views intensified by a lack of representation?

Do people become more populist if they feel that the parties do not adequately represent their positions and interests?

This is a question on which there has been plenty of speculation, much of it theoretically well-founded. For instance, mainstream parties may have become too similar to each other and therefore no longer adequately reflect and represent the positions and interests of the people in their diversity. That creates dissatisfaction with parties, with politicians and with the functioning of democracy, and may activate populist attitudes against the “corrupt elite” (Hawkins, Rovira Kaltwasser and Andreadis 2018; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). As prominent as these argumentations may be in academic and public debate, empirical evidence of a causal connection between representation and populist attitudes has so far been scarce (see e.g. Oliver and Rahn 2016). Closing this research gap is one of the aims of the present study.

In order to investigate the causal relationship between representation and populism empirically, we have designed and conducted an innovative survey experiment for this study.

The primary goal of the experiment was to randomly change people's feelings of representation, in order to measure the extent to which populist attitudes are affected by a perceived lack of representation. For this purpose, respondents were first asked about their positions on various questions which play a role in public debate on the European elections (see Table 6 on p. 101 for the exact questions and answer options). They were then shown randomly chosen party scenarios, which differed according to whether and how much their own position on a topic was represented by the parties of their country in the European election campaign. Respondents could then indicate the extent to which they felt represented by the parties of their country in this scenario. Finally, they were asked their opinion on various typical populist statements in order to ascertain the level of their individual populism (see “In Focus” p. 50 and the methodological appendix of this study on p. 99).

Using this experimental setup, we were then able to determine statistically whether perceived representation influences the level of populist attitudes:

Do people who feel poorly represented express themselves in more populist terms?  
Do people who feel well represented have less populist notions of politics and democracy than those who are badly represented?

Is there, then, a causal relationship between the degree of perceived representation and the degree of populist attitudes?


The short answer to this question is: yes – at least for those respondents who were not populist already.

The results of the analysis show that representation gaps can activate and reinforce populism.



The statistical analyses of the survey results show that the less people feel that they are represented, the more they tend to agree with populist statements. This connection is primarily true for people who are themselves rather non-populist. Where respondents were largely non-populist before participating in the representation experiment, their populism was intensified when they gained the impression of being poorly represented over the course of the experiment.

FIGURE 6 The representation effect – worse representation means more populism



Method: Structural equation models (SEM).

Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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In other words: the less the parties of a country cover the particular views of a respondent, the less that respondent feels represented, and the more populist he or she becomes. The feeling of not being adequately represented makes people more populist: representation gaps and deficits in responsiveness can increase populist attitudes.

Using the concrete example of two hypothetical respondents, this connection can be described as follows:

Before their participation in the survey experiment, both respondents appeared to be largely non-populist when surveyed on typical populist attitude statements. In the first survey of populist attitudes before the experiment, they were therefore not among the “populists”, i.e. the third of respondents with the strongest populist attitudes of all respondents, but among the two thirds who are “non-populists”, being either completely non-populist or only partly populist.

After participating in the first round of the experiment, both were asked again about their populist attitudes. One of the two respondents was among those who felt poorly represented by the parties in the experiment, due to the lack of coverage of their own position on the policy issue. Her responses were more populist in the aftermath than those of the other participant, who felt very well represented, due to the coverage of her position on the policy issue by the parties.

## IN FOCUS

### Do representation deficits increase populist attitudes?

The logic and design of the survey experiment on the relationship between representation and populist attitudes

---

Does the feeling of being insufficiently represented by political parties when it comes to one's own preferences and views lead to populist attitudes? Do people who do not feel represented by political parties become more populist in their stances towards politics and democracy? Are representation gaps and responsiveness deficits therefore a cause of populism?

In this study, we investigate these questions using an innovative survey experiment with the following structure:

First, respondents were asked about their opinion on one of eight different European political issues which could play a role for the 2019 European elections (see Table 6 on p. 101 for the exact questions and answer options). On all political issues, respondents had the opportunity to choose between three answer categories. Thus, for instance, on the question of EU social spending, they could choose between "increasing" spending, "keeping" current levels, and "reducing" spending.

In a second step, the same respondents were shown one of three scenarios in which the parties in their country positioned themselves on that issue during the European election campaign, that is, respondents saw whether and how many parties would advocate each of the three answers (see figure on the next page):

Each respondent was randomly assigned one of the three representation scenarios.

The participants were then asked how well they personally felt represented by the parties on this issue (from 1 = "not at all" to 7 "very well").

Finally, we measured the dependent variable of the experiment: the level of populist attitudes of the respondents. For this, we made use of the nine populist attitude questions from Castanho Silva et al. (2018), three for each of three dimensions of populism: anti-elitism, people-centrism, and regarding politics as a conflict between "good" and "evil" (see the methodological appendix for the exact items on p. 99). Each respondent was given one randomly chosen question for each dimension. Deviating from our general measurement of populist attitudes in this study (see "In Focus" on p. 34), we use this alternative battery of populism items in the experiment to prevent respondents from answering the

same items twice. This also enables us to measure populist attitudes before and during the experiment. The item batteries of Castanho Silva et al. (2018) and Van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2018) as well as Akkerman et al. (2014) are considered the best existing populism scales, especially for multinational studies like ours (Castanho Silva et al. 2019). After the end of the first round, each of the 22,945 respondents was asked about a further randomly chosen policy area, following the same structure.

IN FOCUS **Example of representation scenarios for  
“European social spending”**

	POSITION	TAKEN BY...
SCENARIO 1	Increasing social spending	all parties
	Keeping social spending at current levels	no party
	Reducing social spending	no party
SCENARIO 2	Increasing social spending	at least one party
	Keeping social spending at current levels	at least one party
	Reducing social spending	no party
SCENARIO 3	Increasing social spending	at least one party
	Keeping social spending at current levels	at least one party
	Reducing social spending	at least one party

Note: Respondents were randomly shown one of the three scenarios. Within each scenario, the order of positions (“Increasing social spending”, etc.) was also randomised, so that the preferred position of the respondent was randomly either represented or not represented by the parties.

Source: Own illustration.


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The relationship between representation and populist attitudes could then be analysed on the basis of these survey results using statistical analysis methods (i.e. structural equation models). More precisely: we analysed the relationship between the perceived representation of an individual’s position by the parties and the individual’s level of populist attitudes.

On this basis, for the first time we can make causal statements about the relationship between representation and populist attitudes. The central results are described in Chapter 2. The methodological details are explained in the methodological appendix (pp. 99) (see also: Castanho Silva and Wratil 2019).

This shows that the experiment gave the first respondent the feeling that her position was badly represented, which made her more populist than the second respondent, who felt well represented. It may have become clear to the first respondent that her political positions were not sufficiently represented by her country's political parties. That is why she agreed more with populist statements than the second respondent, who felt very well represented by the parties in the experiment. This leads to the conclusion that the differing levels of populism between the two respondents at the end of the experiment were caused by their differing experiences of representation. Because the first participant felt poorly represented, her responses were more populist than those of the second participant, and because the latter felt well represented, her statements were less populist.

FIGURE 7 Gaps in representation as a cause of populism



Pre-existing populist attitudes

populist

non-populist

Method: Structural equation models (SEM).

Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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Statistically, this relationship can be described as follows:

Figure 7 shows the relationship between the independent variable “perceived representation” and the dependent variable “populist attitudes”. The causal connection thus runs from representation to populism.

The representation scale on the horizontal axis shows the subjective feeling of representation given by the respondent after participating in one round of the representation experiment. A scale from 1 (= “I do not feel the parties represent me at all”) to 7 (= “I feel very well represented”) shows the perceived degree of representation. The populism index on the vertical axis shows the respondent’s populist attitudes, also on a scale from 1 (= “I do not agree with the populist statements at all”) to 7 (= “I fully agree”). The populism index represents the average value of responses to three populist statements from Castanho Silva et al. (2018).

The two representation–populism lines in the graph show the effect of subjectively felt representation on a person’s populist attitudes: the upper line for those who were populist before participating in the experiment (= blue shading)

and the lower line for those who were non-populist before participating in the experiment (= brown shading).

The upper line makes it clear that even a perception of good representation does not lead to less populism among populists. The line rises slightly, but this increase is not statistically significant. Those with a populist attitude cannot easily be converted by improved representation.

The lower line illustrates the fact that for non-populists, the feeling of good representation reduces populism, while the feeling of poor representation leads to

an increase in populism. Non-populists thus become even less populist through improvements in representation. At the same time, they become more populist with a deterioration in representation. The relationship shown by the lower line is statistically significant, i.e. it is so strong and empirically verified that it is very unlikely to have arisen accidentally. It can be interpreted in the sense of cause and effect: poor representation contributes to the activation of populist attitudes.

The standardised coefficients of the structural equation model are as follows:

TABLE 1 Results of the survey experiment for the relationship between representation and populist attitudes

GROUP	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DEPENDENT VARIABLE	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR
populist voters	feelings of representation	populist attitudes	-0.004	0.030
	represented by at least one party	feelings of representation	0.177***	0.013
non-populist voters	feelings of representation	populist attitudes	-0.071**	0.023
	represented by at least one party	feelings of representation	0.227***	0.017

Note: Standardised coefficients from structural equation model. The significance level is indicated as follows: \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ .

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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The values in Table 1 show that the effect of representation (per standard deviation) is negative for non-populists ( $-0.071$  standard deviations in populist attitudes) and statistically significant ( $p$ -value of  $0.002$ ). The effect for populists is indistinguishable from zero ( $p$ -value of  $0.899$ ). Different conditions of representation leave the populist attitudes of populists unaffected, but can make non-populist people either more populist through a deterioration of representation, or even less populist through improvements in representation. It should be noted, however, that the effect size measured here ( $-0.071$  standard deviations) is comparatively small, even if it only refers to representation on a single political issue.

### Interim conclusion:

The results of our survey experiment show that poor representation by parties in representative democracies can lead to stronger populist attitudes.

For the fight against populism, these results mean that good representation can help limit the spread of populist attitudes. If parties endeavour to reflect the various positions and interests in society and to represent them in the political process, they thereby contribute to countering the further spread of populist attitudes in representative democracies.

According to our results, however, this is not a recipe against convinced populists. Those who already have a clearly populist view of politics and democracy will not be persuaded otherwise by better representation by the parties. Thus, representation does not help against populists, but it can help to prevent the further spread of populist attitudes.

But what does this mean when it comes to dealing with populist attitudes in the run-up to the 2019 European elections?

And what conclusions can be drawn from this for the parties and their programmatic priorities in the final sprint of the election campaign?

Two things in particular seem important to us, given these results on the connection between representation and populist attitudes:

- On the one hand, our analysis shows that the parties' efforts to ensure that voters feel represented are worthwhile. Representation counts! Through good representation, parties strengthen the foundations of representative democracy and make an important contribution against the further spread of populist attitudes among their voters. This goal is worth every effort!
- On the other hand, election campaigns are always a special opportunity to improve representation: by taking up and defining important issues, and by discussing them in controversial terms, political parties can improve voters' sense of representation in election campaigns. This is achieved by responding to their topics and positions, by playing an active part in forming opinions, and by representing the emerging democratic spectrum of opinions as well as possible.

Particular attention should be paid by the parties to those issues which are especially relevant to voters, precisely because – as we saw in Chapter 1 – voters do not necessarily identify with existing parties. Such topics have a particularly strong effect on perceived representation. On the one hand, people are more sensitive to representation gaps and deficits in responsiveness regarding personally important topics. On the other hand, for many people, such symbolic themes have an above-average influence on their general feeling of being heard and represented by political parties. Thus, the following section defines and discusses a total of eight topics in order of their importance to voters. To this end, voters were asked how important each issue was to them personally. This is indicated by the number of countries in which a topic is one of the three most important topics for the 2019 European elections based on the average importance of the topics for voters:





































- Should the EU's influence on **asylum decisions** of the member states (for the purpose of redistributing refugees) be increased, maintained or reduced? (eleven countries)
- Should the EU increase, maintain or reduce direct **social spending**? (ten countries)
- Should the EU increase, maintain or reduce regulation in **factory farming** to strengthen animal rights (seven countries)?
- Should the EU increase, maintain or reduce **financial assistance** to countries in economic difficulty? (five countries)
- Should the EU reduce, maintain or increase payments from the EU budget to a member state if that state **breaches democratic standards**? (one country)
- Should EU **agricultural subsidies** be increased, maintained or reduced? (one country)
- Should the EU make no, some or any necessary concessions to the British regarding **Brexit**? (one country)

- Should military cooperation in the EU be strengthened, maintained or reduced?  
(no country)

But even topics that are not currently among the three most important in any country, or only in a few, can offer opportunities for improved representation. Many people are not yet clearly positioned on such issues, which gives the parties increased scope to set the agenda and shape programmatic priorities. At the same time, parties have the opportunity to raise awareness of those issues through clear, recognisable and controversial positions.

How do people see these eight political issues in each nation, and which issues present opportunities for the political parties? What conclusions and recommendations can be drawn for the election campaigns?

FIGURE 8 Overview of the eight campaign issues

CAMPAIGN ISSUE	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Sweden	Spain	Hungary
European asylum policy												
European social spending												
Regulation of factory farming												
European financial assistance												
Sanctions for violating democracy												
European agricultural subsidies												
Brexit negotiations												
Military cooperation in Europe												

Note: Campaign issues are listed in order of salience. The flags indicate that an issue belongs to the top three most important issues in a given country.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.


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FIGURE 9 European asylum policy: Europe's missed opportunity


In percent

Attitudes to European asylum policy  
by country

EU influence over asylum decisions should be...

Attitudes to European asylum policy  
by voters of the party groups

EU influence over asylum decisions should be...



Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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## European asylum policy: Europe's missed opportunity

EU asylum policy remains an enormously important election campaign issue for European citizens. In eleven of the twelve countries surveyed, it is one of the three most important topics for voters in the 2019 European elections. In ten countries, however, people would rather see less than more EU influence on asylum policy (Figure 9, above). The only countries where people would prefer more EU influence rather than less are Germany (39 percent) and Spain (33 percent). The majority of all other countries would like the EU to play a smaller role in asylum policy, most strongly in the UK (53 percent), Hungary (50 percent), France (46 percent) and Poland (45 percent).

A somewhat different picture emerges if we focus on party supporters: the majority of the supporters of three of the four mainstream party groups are in favour of greater EU influence on asylum issues. This is most evident among the supporters of the green parties (41 percent for more, only 17 percent for less EU influence; see Figure 9, below). Of the mainstream parties, only the voters of the Christian democratic and conservative parties are in favour of less rather than more EU influence on asylum issues (39 percent for less, 29 percent for more). As one would expect, the supporters of populist radical right and extreme right parties are most strongly in favour of less EU influence (71 percent), since only eleven percent advocate more EU influence in asylum policy. Among supporters of populist radical left and extreme left parties, on the other hand, opinions are balanced.

### European asylum policy is not yet convincing for Europe's voters


All in all, asylum policy thus represents a missed opportunity for Europe: the EU has not yet convinced its citizens that asylum policy needs to be more strongly Europeanised. Only a minority of the European electorate want the EU to have a greater say in asylum issues before the 2019 European elections. The desire for less EU influence in asylum policy is even more pronounced among the whole electorate than it is among the supporters and voters of the parties. On average, non-voters are therefore even more reluctant to see more EU influence than voters. National parties must represent citizens' various preferences if they want to limit the further development of populist attitudes. The EU institutions therefore face a major challenge in asylum policy. On the one hand, they must try to find convincing answers and solutions for a European asylum policy. On the other hand, they must also allow critical voices from both the populist and the conservative party spectrum, so that the views of the citizens are represented.

FIGURE 10 European social spending: Europe's heart beats on the left


In percent

Attitudes to European social spending  
by country

European social spending should be...

Attitudes to European social spending  
by voters of the party groups

European social spending should be...



Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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## European social spending: Europe's heart beats on the left

European social policy is almost as important to voters in Europe as asylum policy: in ten of the twelve countries surveyed it is one of the three most important issues. Opinions on social policy remain strongly ideological: the majority of supporters of left-wing parties are in favour of an increase and the majority of right-wing party supporters are in favour of a reduction in EU spending on social issues. The strongest support for more EU social spending is among supporters of populist radical left and extreme left parties (56 percent), the weakest among Christian democratic and conservative party supporters (20 percent) and voters of populist radical right and extreme right parties (24 percent).

Thus, on social policy questions, the divide is not between “mainstream” parties and “populist parties”, but between “right” and “left”. This is most evident among the supporters of populist radical left and extreme left parties: despite their general scepticism towards the EU, the majority (56 percent) wants more and not less EU spending on social affairs. At the opposite pole are the voters of the populist radical right and extreme right parties, 37 percent of whom are in favour of less and only 24 percent in favour of more social spending by the EU. But even among the supporters of all right-wing parties, almost two-thirds of respondents are against cutting the EU's current social spending. There is no European party group whose supporters fundamentally question current EU spending on social affairs.

This can also be seen at the level of individual countries: only in Sweden, the Netherlands and Austria are more people in favour of a reduction than an increase in EU spending on social affairs. Overall, there is also a high level of support for the status quo at the country level. Approval for more EU social spending is at its highest by far in Spain (52 percent) and Greece (52 percent), while the Swedes are most in favour of a reduction (41 percent).

### Is the status quo the only possible consensus for European social policy?


Overall, current EU social spending thus has a more than solid foundation of voter support. There is no fundamental ideological dispute among the electorate over the need to address social concerns at a European level. The situation is different, however, when it comes to the direction in which EU social spending should be developed. Here, we see the ideological divide described above, between supporters of different parties and voters in different member states. Even the supporters of the mainstream parties in the European Parliament – the social democrats, Christian democrats and conservatives as well as the greens and liberals – disagree about whether the EU should focus on more or less social spending in the future. For them, a continuation of the status quo with only marginal changes in social spending would probably be the only viable consensus.

FIGURE 11 Regulation of factory farming: an important issue with a chance of consensus


In percent

**Attitudes to factory farming  
by country**

EU regulations on factory farming should be...

**Attitudes to factory farming  
by voters of the party groups**

EU regulations on factory farming should be...



Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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## Regulation of factory farming: an important issue with a chance of consensus

In few other policy fields discussed here are voters in Europe as united as they are on the regulation of factory farming. In almost all countries and party groups, significantly more people want stronger regulation rather than weaker regulation of industrial agriculture and factory farming. Furthermore, in seven of the twelve countries surveyed, this is one of the three most important topics of the European election campaign. That shows that although the regulation of factory farming may have a reputation as a niche issue, in terms of significance for voters, it is far ahead of supposedly more important issues such as Brexit and financial aid in the 2019 European elections.

At the country level (Figure 11, above), only Greece (31 to 25 percent), Hungary (31 to 22 percent) and Poland (36 to 19 percent) prefer less rather than more regulation of factory farming. In all other countries, the majority of people are in favour of stronger regulation. The greatest voter demand for more regulation is in Austria (68 percent), Germany (62 percent), Sweden (55 percent) and France (50 percent). Conversely, only six percent of voters in Austria, eight percent in Germany and nine percent in Sweden want less regulation.

Among party supporters, only the voters of the right-wing populists show a generally balanced spread of opinions between more or less agricultural regulation (cf. Figure 11, below). The desire for more regulation of factory farming is most pronounced by far among the voters of Europe's green parties (71 percent). But the voters of the left-wing populists and left-wing extremists (47 percent) and the social democrats and socialists (46 percent) are also in favour of more regulation, by clear relative majorities. Even among Christian democratic and conservative voters, almost four out of ten (38 percent) are in favour of more regulation, while among right-wing populists and right-wing extremists it is about one in three (34 percent). In each case, only a small minority would like to see a reduction in the regulation of factory farming in Europe.

### A winning argument for the greens


By demanding stronger regulation of industrial agriculture and mass livestock farming, green parties in particular could find a winning argument in their European election campaign. The topic offers the greens the chance of broad support in society, across party lines and national borders – especially as many voters see the greens as being naturally competent and responsible on this topic. Even the majority of voters of Europe's Christian democratic and conservative parties support the status quo of regulation or want to extend it. This is probably not represented by all national parties. In addition, this topic offers all political parties in the election campaign the opportunity to take up an issue positively, without having to fear that a negative campaign from other parties could have any chance of success. This opportunity should be seized.

FIGURE 12 European financial assistance: solidarity has a majority


In percent

Attitudes to European financial assistance  
by country

European financial assistance should be...

Attitudes to European financial assistance  
by voters of the party groups

European financial assistance should be...



Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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## European financial assistance: solidarity has a majority

Another EU election campaign issue that remains important to voters is European financial assistance for countries in economic difficulties. In five of the twelve countries surveyed, this was one of the top three topics for the European elections. Given the sometimes fierce political and public debate about this, European opinion presents a perhaps surprisingly positive picture. Only among the voters of populist radical right and extreme right parties as well as the Christian democrats and conservatives does a narrow relative majority (34 and 26 percent respectively) wish for less European financial assistance rather than more (Figure 12, below). Among the supporters of all other European party groups from the far left to the right, there are only very small minorities calling for the curtailment of current financial aid to economically weak countries in the EU.



The range of opinions becomes more nuanced when one looks at the country level. Here the perspectives of member states as potential contributors and recipients is reflected more clearly. At any rate, the desire to reduce financial assistance is greater in economically strong countries than in potential beneficiary countries. But even in Germany, only one third (33 percent) of all voters would like to see aid reduced, whilst conversely, a two-thirds majority would either maintain it (54 percent) or even increase it (13 percent). A similar picture emerges in other economically strong Eurozone countries such as Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands.

### EU financial assistance finds support across party lines and national borders

Overall, voter preferences for financial solidarity in Europe tend to be determined regionally rather than ideologically. Beyond the political camps, voters are aware of the economic interests of their countries, and this is reflected in their attitudes. Nevertheless, the current EU policy of financial solidarity with countries in economic difficulties is based on broad majority support across most party lines and national borders. This speaks for a much more proactive approach from mainstream parties in dealing with Eurosceptic and populist criticism of financial assistance – especially since the supporters of populist parties are also deeply divided on this issue. While the voters of left-wing populist parties want more financial solidarity in the EU, right-wing populists are much more critical. But even among right-wing populists, there is no clear majority in favour of dismantling existing financial aid. Reason enough, then, to take up the issue in a much more positive way in the European election campaign and to use it more assertively in the fight for a Europe of financial solidarity.

FIGURE 13 Violators of democratic norms: should they be punished?

In percent

**Attitudes to sanctions for eroding democracy  
by country**EU payments to countries which violate  
democratic norms should be...  
cut    maintained    increased**Attitudes to sanctions for eroding democracy  
by voters of the party groups**EU payments to countries which violate  
democratic norms should be...  
cut    maintained    increased

Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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## Violators of democratic norms: should they be punished?

It may only be among the three top issues for voters in Poland, but none of the eight campaign issues discussed here has as much support across parties and nations as financial punishment for countries that violate democratic norms. In seven of the twelve countries surveyed, at least the absolute majority of people are in favour of cutting payments from the EU budget to transgressors against democracy (Figure 13, above). Even in Hungary and Poland, the countries which currently stand accused, at least one in three (38 and 31 per cent respectively) supports punishment, while a good half of the electorate advocate maintaining the payments. At the same time, the outright anti-democrats who want a financial reward for transgressors remain only a small minority even in Poland (15 percent) and Hungary (12 percent).

This picture becomes even clearer among party supporters. Almost all European party groups have absolute majorities for financial sanctions for countries that violate democratic norms: among the supporters of the green parties (62 percent), the social democratic and socialist parties (61 percent), the liberal parties (57 percent), the Christian democratic and conservative parties (57 percent) and also among the supporters of the populist radical left and extreme left parties (53 percent). And even among the supporters of populist radical right and extreme right parties, 46 percent favour sanctions (Figure 13, below). At the same time, the proportion of anti-democrats who want a financial reward for violations of democratic norms is even lower among voters than among all those eligible to vote.

The clearest outliers among the parties are the ruling parties in Poland and Hungary, PiS and FIDESZ: with eight percent and ten percent respectively, only every tenth supporter of these parties advocates financial sanctions for offending countries. Thus, only the supporters of the very parties which are suspected of violating fundamental democratic norms in their own countries are opposed to sanctions. Indeed, it may be that this issue is so important in Poland because it affects the country directly.

### **Taking a stand against the erosion of democracy!**


The EU can therefore be sure of broad support from the majority of all electorates and voters if it imposes financial sanctions for breaches of democratic standards in individual member states. Should anti-democratic wrong-doers be punished? At any rate, the people of Europe want a clear stance against the erosion of democracy in the run-up to the 2019 European elections. Decision-makers in the EU should listen to this message and take it seriously, even if voters do not regard the fear that democracy is deteriorating as one of the most important issues in the European elections.

FIGURE 14 European agricultural subsidies: being determines consciousness


In percent

Attitudes to European agricultural subsidies  
by country

European agricultural subsidies should be...

Attitudes to European agricultural subsidies  
by voters of the party groups

European agricultural subsidies should be...



Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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## European agricultural subsidies: being determines consciousness

European agricultural subsidies are a niche issue in the 2019 EU election campaign: only in Spain, one of the largest recipient countries of agricultural subsidies in Europe, do voters see this as one of the three most important topics of the election. This is also another area in which a comparatively large proportion (54 percent) opt for maintaining the status quo. On the one hand, this suggests a high level of public support for the EU's current policy of agricultural subsidies. However, it may also be an indication of the low importance of the issue for many voters not directly affected. In fact, overall, opinions on the EU's common agricultural policy give a picture which is generally balanced and unspectacular. The high level of support for the status quo is accompanied at party level by relatively equal support for both more and less European agricultural subsidies (Figure 14, below). Only supporters of populist radical left and extreme left groups (36 percent) are somewhat more subsidy-friendly. In all other party groups, roughly four to five out of ten supporters are in favour of more or less agricultural subsidies.



At the country level, however, there are major differences, partly explained by the size of each country's agricultural sector and the associated level of agricultural subsidies received. What is particularly striking is that in large recipient countries, approval for more agricultural subsidies is above average. These include Spain (40 percent approval), Italy (41 percent) and France (34 percent), but also Poland (35 percent). One exception is Germany, which is also one of the major recipient countries, where voter approval for larger agricultural subsidies is well below average (16 percent). Conversely, support for a reduction in subsidies is greater here, at 34 percent, than it is in any of the other countries surveyed.

### **Agricultural subsidies as a niche issue with a majority for the status quo?**

On the whole, the issue of European agricultural subsidies is neither particularly relevant for the forthcoming election nor unusually controversial. It seems to be almost completely removed from party competition, because at least at the voter level, the positions of the supporters of all party groups from the far left to the far right are relatively similar. And when it comes to the dispute between European countries, as with many redistribution issues, "being determines consciousness": being on the recipient or the contributor side determines voters' consciousness regarding the question of subsidies. Due to clear polarisation in the preferences of voters in different member states and relatively strong support for the status quo, it is unlikely that there will be a consensus on a significant adjustment in the level of agricultural subsidies, provided that parties and governments represent their voters.

FIGURE 15 **Brexit negotiations: no far-reaching concessions**

In percent

**Attitudes to Brexit by country****Attitudes to Brexit by voters of the party groups**

Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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## Brexit negotiations: no far-reaching concessions

The Brexit negotiations and the EU's willingness to make concessions to the United Kingdom, the candidate for withdrawal from the EU, are now only among the top issues in this European election campaign in the UK itself. In none of the other eleven countries surveyed is the topic still among the three most important issues of the European elections. This points to a certain weariness and indifference towards the Brexit negotiations, an attitude which could nevertheless change again depending on the further course of events if a disorderly Brexit also affects other European countries.

The range of opinions regarding further Brexit concessions on the part of the EU is also relatively clear: with the exception of the UK, only a minority (ten to 25 percent) of all voters in all other countries surveyed would like to see far-reaching concessions. At the same time, about two to four out of ten respondents are against concessions by the EU in the Brexit negotiations. The situation is somewhat different in the United Kingdom itself. But even there, not even every third person (29 percent) wants concessions from the EU at any price, while 51 percent of Britons entitled to vote in the European elections are in favour of at least some concessions and about one in five (21 percent) is in favour of the EU making no concession whatsoever.

Overall, the high figures for the middle category, "some concessions", are striking. In almost all countries they are just below or even above the 50 percent mark. This points to an altogether more moderate attitude on the part of the majority of people in Europe, who seem to be willing to compromise. The EU should make "some concessions" to the British in fair negotiations, but not too many. The hard position of "no concessions" is shared in most countries only by about 20 to 40 percent of all voters. However, voters in France and Germany, the two large countries that are important for EU negotiations, are much less willing to compromise. In Germany and France, more than four out of ten of all voters want the EU to make no concessions in the Brexit negotiations (43 percent and 42 percent respectively).

### The majority of European voters want a fair Brexit


Most voters in Europe want fair conditions for the continuing Brexit negotiations. There is clear willingness to make concessions to the British in the negotiations, albeit within certain limits. A fair Brexit, but not at any price – that's how the opinions of many Europeans could be summarised, in a year when the hottest phase of the European election campaign could see the first withdrawal of an EU country since the founding of the EU.

FIGURE 16 Military cooperation in Europe: yes, please!


In percent

Attitudes to military cooperation in the EU  
by country

Military cooperation in the EU should be...

Attitudes to military cooperation in the EU  
by voters of the party groups

Military cooperation in the EU should be...



Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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## Military cooperation in Europe: yes, please!

While military cooperation in Europe hardly seems to be an important topic for voters, it does receive high levels of approval. Military cooperation in the EU is the only one of the eight political issues examined which does not rank among the top three issues of the election campaign in a single country. Nevertheless, there are few other policy areas where cross-party and cross-border approval is as high and as uncontroversial as it is on this one.

At the country level, in all twelve countries surveyed, more people would like to see military cooperation strengthened than would like to see it reduced. In most countries, between 35 and 45 percent of voters agree to more military cooperation, while the demand for a reduction is supported only by small minorities. Only in Spain (27 percent), Sweden (29 percent) and the UK (22 percent) is approval for more military cooperation significantly lower. In these countries, however, approval for the status quo is also very high, at more than 50 percent, so that in all countries surveyed an overwhelming majority of people are in favour either of maintaining the current level or of more military cooperation in the EU.

A similar picture emerges among the supporters of the European party groups. Here too, in all party groups, more people are in favour of intensifying military cooperation than of reducing it. Only the supporters of populist radical left and extreme left parties, with just 36 percent in favour of more cooperation and 23 percent in favour of reducing cooperation in the military sphere, are somewhat less prepared to cooperate in military matters than the supporters of other party groups.

### A European army as a surprise hit in the EU election 2019?

The high level of cross-national and cross-party support both for existing military cooperation in the EU and for increased cooperation, coupled with comparatively low voter attention, indicates that this issue is being underestimated in the EU election campaign. In any case, anyone who is looking for an electoral campaign topic that is broadly acceptable from a social and party-political point of view could find that in the expansion of military cooperation in Europe, up to the point of an European army. By endeavouring to take a positive and proactive stance on this issue, parties could gain the approval of an overwhelming majority of voters. First, the parties would have to awaken more interest in the topic among voters. But they can achieve precisely this during the election campaign, especially since the risk of a negative campaign on this topic seems very low in comparison, and would be unlikely to be successful.




FIGURE 17 Country telegram Germany

In percent

Top three campaign issues:

Attitudes of the electorate



Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in Germany.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

On two of the three top election campaign topics, the opinions of respondents in Germany deviate strongly from the average opinions across the twelve countries surveyed. On the one hand, Germans place much more emphasis on “more EU” in asylum policy than the average (39 versus 26 percent). At the same time, only 28 percent of Germans want less EU influence in asylum policy, compared to 41 percent on average in the countries surveyed. Germans have not yet given up on the EU in asylum policy. On the other hand, more Germans (62 percent) are in favour of more regulation of factory farming at EU level than the average across the countries surveyed (41 percent). A strong campaign issue, especially for the Greens.

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


FIGURE 18 Country telegram France

In percent

Top three campaign issues:

Attitudes of the electorate



Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in France.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

When it comes to asylum policy, the French are even more sceptical about a stronger role for the EU than the average of all respondents. While in France almost half of all voters argue for less EU influence in asylum decisions, the average of the countries surveyed is only four out of ten (41 percent). After the UK (53 percent) and Hungary (50 percent), the French thus prove to be the most critical nation with regard to EU asylum policy in comparison with the twelve countries surveyed. On this, they differ particularly from Germany, where most voters (39 percent) are in favour of “more EU” in asylum policy.

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


FIGURE 19 Country telegram United Kingdom

In percent

Top three campaign issues:

Attitudes of the electorate



Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in the United Kingdom.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

For the “Leave” campaign in the UK, the EU's common asylum policy was an argument in favour of Brexit. In this, the campaign drew on the fact that a majority of the British electorate (53 percent) would prefer “less EU” in asylum policy. On average across our twelve countries, only four out of ten voters (41 percent) take this view. Meanwhile, only 13 percent of all Britons want “more EU” in asylum policy, compared to 26 percent on average. A divide between British and wider European opinion is also evident on the subject of Brexit itself. While three out of ten Britons would like the EU to make “any concessions necessary” in the Brexit negotiations, on average only 17 percent of respondents across all countries take this stance.

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FIGURE 20 Country telegram Italy

In percent

Top three campaign issues:

Attitudes of the electorate

Issue		Attitudes of the electorate		
		reduced	maintain	increase
Issue 1: EU financial assistance		8	39	53
Issue 2: EU regulations on factory farming		abolish	maintain	increase
	30		36	34
Issue 3: EU influence on asylum policy		decrease	maintain	increase
	39		25	36

Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in Italy.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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Even though many Italians vote for anti-Eurosceptic parties, most of them want more financial solidarity in the EU. More than half of all Italians (53 percent) even want “more financial support”, while only three out of ten (31 percent) of all Europeans take this view. Another 39 percent of Italian voters would at least like to keep financial assistance at the current level. Only eight percent are in favour of reducing current financial aid to countries in economic difficulties. At least in this area, Italy would like to see “more” rather than “less” Europe.



FIGURE 21 Country telegram Netherlands

In percent

Top three campaign issues:

Attitudes of the electorate

Issue		Attitudes of the electorate		
		reduce	maintain	increase
Issue 1: EU financial assistance	38		46	16
Issue 2: European social spending	29	reduce	maintain	increase
			51	20
Issue 3: EU influence on asylum policy	39	decrease	maintain	increase
			40	21

Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in Netherlands.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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In the EU, the Dutch stand for financial self-reliance on the part of the member states. This can also be seen in their main campaign issue for the European elections, EU financial assistance for countries in economic difficulty. Almost four out of ten Dutch people are in favour of less EU financial support, compared with only one in five on average across countries (21 percent). In turn, only a small minority of 16 percent in the Netherlands are in favour of more EU financial aid, while almost twice as many people on average across countries would like this (31 percent). Thus, in the 2019 European election campaign, the Dutch continue to live up to their reputation as guardians of stability in EU finances.



FIGURE 22 Country telegram Denmark

In percent

Top three campaign issues:

Attitudes of the electorate

Issue		Attitudes of the electorate		
		reduce	maintain	increase
Issue 1: European social spending	21		57	22
Issue 2: EU regulations on factory farming	11	abolish	maintain	increase
			48	42
Issue 3: EU influence on asylum policy	44	decrease	maintain	increase
			35	21

Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in Denmark.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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The Danish are comparatively typical of the average of the countries surveyed when it comes to their top three election campaign topics. Their opinion on these topics does not deviate strongly from the average. Regarding factory farming and industrial agriculture fewer Danes (eleven percent) are in favour of reducing EU regulation than the average of all countries surveyed (21 percent). The Danes are also somewhat more sceptical about a further increase in EU social spending than the average of 32 percent, with only 22 percent in favour. Otherwise, in this EU election campaign Denmark is in the best sense of the word the average of the countries surveyed.




FIGURE 23 Country telegram Greece

In percent

Top three campaign issues:

Attitudes of the electorate



Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in Greece.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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The Greeks are extremely pro-European on all three top election campaign issues in the run-up to the European elections. For each of the three topics, more Greeks want “more” Europe than the average of the twelve countries surveyed. This applies to asylum policy (38 percent vs. 26 percent on average), EU social spending (52 percent vs. 32 percent) and EU financial assistance for countries in economic difficulty (67 percent vs. 31 percent). Even after more than ten years of “crisis politics” – or perhaps precisely because of it – many Greeks are backing solidarity in the EU when it comes to European issues that are important to them.




FIGURE 24 Country telegram Spain

In percent

Top three campaign issues:

Attitudes of the electorate



Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in Spain.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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The Spanish, too, are focusing on “more” rather than “less” Europe when it comes to their top issues in the EU election campaign. This applies to agricultural subsidies, which 40 percent of the Spanish electorate think should be increased, while on average across Europe only one in four respondents (26 percent) supports this. This also applies to EU financial support (54 percent vs. 31 percent) and European social spending (52 percent vs. 32 percent). All of these are questions of spending from which Spain has benefited in the past (such as agricultural subsidies and financial support for the banking sector). But even after their experiences in the years of the financial crisis – or precisely because of them – many Spaniards still support solidarity in the EU.




FIGURE 25 Country telegram Sweden

In percent

Top three campaign issues:

Attitudes of the electorate



Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in Sweden.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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EU social spending is the top issue for Swedes in the 2019 European elections, and they evidently continue to prefer the national model of the Swedish welfare state to EU spending on social policy. Only just under half as many Swedes (17 percent) as the average of all countries (32 percent) are therefore in favour of more EU spending on social affairs. In turn, more than four out of ten Swedes (41 percent) would like to see a reduction in such expenditure, compared to only 25 percent on average. In no other country is the rejection of more EU social spending as pronounced as it is in Sweden.

 **FIGURE 26 Country telegram Austria**

In percent

Top three campaign issues:

Attitudes of the electorate

		reduce	maintain	increase
Issue 1: <b>European social spending</b>	29		49	23
Issue 2: <b>EU regulations on factory farming</b>	6	abolish	maintain	increase
			25	68
Issue 3: <b>EU influence on asylum policy</b>	44	decrease	maintain	increase
			27	29

Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in Austria.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

The Austrians are a little more sceptical than the average of the countries surveyed when it comes to two of their most important topics, EU social spending and EU asylum policy. On the whole, however, they deviate only slightly from the average on these issues. The story is different when it comes to their second most important campaign topic, factory farming and industrial agriculture. Here, the Austrians are more intensely in favour of more regulation by the EU (68 percent) than the average of the countries surveyed (41 percent). Only six percent of all Austrians are in favour of abolishing EU requirements in this area, the lowest of all the countries surveyed.

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 **FIGURE 27 Country telegram Poland**

In percent

Top three campaign issues:

Attitudes of the electorate


		reduce	maintain	increase
Issue 1: <b>European social spending</b>	23		46	31
Issue 2: <b>EU payments to transgressors against democracy</b>	31	cut	maintain	increase
			54	15
Issue 3: <b>EU influence on asylum policy</b>	45	decrease	maintain	increase
			40	15

Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in Poland.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

The Polish electorate differs from the European average on two points in their three most important election campaign issues. On asylum policy, only 15 percent of all respondents would like the EU to exert more influence, compared with 26 percent on average in the twelve countries surveyed. At the same time, slightly more people in Poland (45 percent) are against a stronger role for the EU on asylum issues than the average (41 percent). The second difference is the degree of approval for sanctions for transgressions against democratic norms. While on average more than half of the electorate across all countries (54 percent) would like to see such sanctions, only three out of ten Poles (31 percent) take this view.

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 **FIGURE 28 Country telegram Hungary**

In percent

Top three campaign issues:

Attitudes of the electorate

		reduce	maintain	increase
Issue 1: <b>EU financial assistance</b>	10		60	30
Issue 2: <b>European social spending</b>	16	reduce	maintain	increase
			46	38
Issue 3: <b>EU influence on asylum policy</b>	50	decrease	maintain	increase
			37	13

Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in Hungary.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

The Hungarian view of the EU differs across their top issues in the European election campaign. While they are the most Eurosceptic of all the countries surveyed in terms of asylum policy (alongside the French and the British), they are much more friendly towards EU social spending and financial assistance. On asylum policy, 50 percent of all Hungarians want less EU influence, noticeably more than the average across all countries (41 percent). In the case of EU social spending (16 percent) and financial assistance (10 percent), however, the proportion of Eurosceptic Hungarians is significantly lower than the average of the twelve countries surveyed (25 and 21 percent, respectively).

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## 3. Who can agree on what?

### Consensus and divisions among the electorate in the 2019 European election

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Is the European election above all a struggle between “mainstream” parties and “populists”, between “pro-Europeans” and “Eurosceptics”, or even between “supporters of democracy” and “opponents of democracy”?

The overall picture shows that when it comes to attitudes towards the political system – i.e. populist attitudes, satisfaction with democracy in the EU and support for membership in the EU – the political divisions between party supporters are very different from those regarding economic and cultural questions:

- In terms of populist attitudes and attitudes towards the EU system, there is a clear polarisation between the supporters of the mainstream parties (Christian democrats, conservatives, social democrats, liberals and greens) on the one hand and the supporters of populist and extremist parties – left and right – on the other. While supporters of the mainstream parties are predominantly satisfied with EU democracy, support EU membership and are not very populist, those who vote for populist and extremist parties are more strongly opposed to EU membership, more dissatisfied with EU democracy and tend to favour populist ideas.
- On economic and cultural questions, meanwhile, a more classic ideological left-right divide is apparent, with the

supporters of conservative, right-wing populist and right-wing extremist parties at one end and the supporters of green, social democratic and socialist parties as well as left-wing populist and left-wing extremist parties at the other.

What can be deduced from these results for the coming European Parliament?

In theory, and purely in terms of voter preferences on economic and cultural questions, new coalitions in the European Parliament are conceivable – for example between Christian democrats/conservatives and right-wing populists, whose voters are closer to each other regarding cultural matters than the voters of some mainstream parties. But the past shows that the mainstream parties are mostly reluctant to form coalitions with populist and Eurosceptic forces. Especially in the European Parliament, the pro-European consensus of the mainstream parties is a strong binding force and has repeatedly taken precedence over ideological divisions between the mainstream parties. Even during the financial crisis, when highly controversial economic questions had to be decided, the mainstream parties in the European Parliament preferred to compromise among themselves on the economic dimension rather than involve EU opponents and populists. Coalitions based on the “Austrian model”, as exemplified by the ÖVP and the FPÖ, are therefore very unlikely in the European Parliament, even after 2019.

## Who can agree on what?

Which political conflicts between voters will shape the European elections in 2019 and presumably in part also the new European Parliament?

Is the European election above all a struggle between “mainstream” parties and “populists”, between “pro-Europeans” and “Eurosceptics”, or even between “supporters of democracy” and “opponents of democracy”, or the “friends” of an open society and its “enemies”?

To what extent has the traditional conflict between “left” and “right” been superseded by new social and political divides, such as between the winners and losers of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2008), communitarians and cosmopolitans (Merkel 2017), or between a “green-alternative-libertarian” voter camp (GAL) on the one hand and a “traditional-authoritarian-nationalist” voter camp (TAN) on the other (Hooghe et al. 2002; Marks et al. 2006)?

This study approaches these questions from the perspective of the voters in the 2019 European election. We therefore do not look at party programmes, or the past voting or coalition behaviour of the 85 parties from the twelve European countries surveyed, but analyse the lines of division before the 2019 European elections at the voter level.

- How populist are the voters of the various party groups?
- How Eurosceptic or pro-European are they?
- How satisfied are they with democracy in Europe?
- And what are their attitudes and preferences with regard to economic and cultural issues?
- How economically or culturally left-wing or right-wing are the voters of the individual party groups?

These analyses provide an overall picture of the existing political divisions in the run-up to the 2019 European elections in the twelve countries surveyed. These political divisions may also be reflected in the work of the new European Parliament – at least insofar as the elected parties follow the mandate of their voters in their future work.

The overall picture shows that when it comes to attitudes towards the political system – i.e. populist attitudes, satisfaction with democracy in the EU and support for membership in the EU – the political divisions between party supporters are very different from those which define the debate on economic and cultural questions:

- In terms of populist attitudes and attitudes towards the EU system, there is a clear polarisation between the supporters of mainstream parties (Christian democrats, conservatives, social democrats, liberals and greens) on the one hand and the supporters of populist and extremist parties – left and right – on

the other. While supporters of the mainstream parties are predominantly satisfied with EU democracy, support EU membership and are not very populist, those who vote for populist and extremist parties are more strongly opposed to EU membership, more dissatisfied with EU democracy and tend to favour populist ideas.

- On economic and cultural questions, meanwhile, a more classic ideological left-right divide is apparent, with the supporters of conservative, right-wing populist and right-wing extremist parties at one end and the supporters of green, social democratic and socialist parties as well as left-wing populist and left-wing extremist parties at the other.

### Mainstream parties versus populists and extremists I – support for EU membership


The conflict between supporters of the mainstream parties and the populist and extremist parties is very clear when it comes to support for EU membership, which is often used in the academic literature as an indicator of Euroscepticism, or support for European integration (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). When asked whether membership of the European Union was a “good thing” for their country, respondents could choose between five answer categories: “strongly agree”, “tend to agree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, “tend to disagree” and “strongly disagree”. The responses were aggregated for the voters of the various party groups, using the mean of their responses from 1 (= strongly agree) to 5 (= strongly disagree).

At the same time, agreement with eight typical populist statements was used to measure how populist the respondents were (see “In Focus” on p. 34). For this purpose, the mean value of respondents’ answers to the eight populism items from 1 (= strongly disagree with populist statement) to 5 (= strongly agree with populist statement) was calculated for the supporters of each party group.

This allows us to locate the supporters of the European party groups across our twelve countries according to their level of populism and Euroscepticism (Figure 29): the horizontal axis depicts the populist tendencies of party voters and the vertical axis their support for EU membership. The further a party group deviates from the intersection of the black axis lines, the more it deviates from the average of the electorate as a whole. On the horizontal axis of populist attitudes, the least populist party voters are on the very right, while the most populist party voters are on the very left. On the vertical axis of support for EU membership, the most pro-European party voters are at the top, and the most Eurosceptic party voters are at the bottom.

In the four quadrants (see Figure 29 on the next page) of the populism/Euroscepticism space the populist/pro-European quadrant and the non-populist/Eurosceptical quadrant remain completely unoccupied. There is no party group with supporters who are more populist than the average and at the same time more pro-European than the average, or less populist than the average and at the same time more Eurosceptic than the average.

FIGURE 29 A divided EU Parliament? – Euroscepticism



Note: The dots show the weighted average for the voters of each party group, the axes show the weighted average for the whole electorate.

Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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The supporters of all party groups are thus located exclusively in the two remaining quadrants in the top right (= less populist and more pro-European than the average) or in the bottom left (= more populist and more Eurosceptic than the average).

Voters of all mainstream party groups can be found in the non-populist, Europe-friendly quadrant. Green and liberal voters are the least populist and most pro-European, while the supporters of the group of Christian democratic and conservative parties are a little less populist than pro-European, compared to the average across the electorate. Socialist and social-democratic voters, meanwhile, are a little more pro-European than populist.

In the populist-Eurosceptic quadrant, on the other hand, we find the voters of both left- and right-wing populist or radical parties. While their degree of populist attitudes is similarly high, they differ in the extent of their Euroscepticism: supporters of populist radical left and extreme left parties are much less Eurosceptic than populist radical right and extreme right voters. Nevertheless, the supporters of both party groups are much more Eurosceptic than the average of all voters and than the voters of all mainstream party groups.

For the voters of the mainstream party groups, the average values are: Christian democrats and conservatives (populism: 3.68; Euroscepticism: 2.35), social democrats and socialists (populism: 3.83; Euroscepticism: 1.97), liberals (populism: 3.65; Euroscepticism: 1.73) and greens (populism: 3.64; Euroscepticism: 1.88). For the voters of populist-extremist party groups, the averages are as follows: populist radical left and extreme left parties (populism: 4.04; Euroscepticism: 2.61) and



populist radical right and extreme right parties (populism: 4.06; Euroscepticism: 3.24). In contrast, the average across all voters on the populism index is 3.89 and 2.52 for the EU membership question.

Altogether, the divide between proponents and opponents of EU membership is almost identical to the divide between populists and non-populists: supporters of the mainstream parties, who are less populist than the average, contrast with populist and extremist voters on the left and right margins. In this respect, the data from this study show that the stronger the populist attitudes of voters, the lower their support for EU membership. This finding ties in with the argument that both left-wing and right-wing populist forces are very sceptical of supranational organisations, which are often portrayed as closed entities, allegedly controlled and dominated by an obscure elite (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; Müller 2016).

### Mainstream parties versus populists and extremists II – (dis)satisfaction with democracy in Europe

When we consider how satisfied people are with the functioning of democracy in the EU, rather than support for EU membership, almost exactly the same picture emerges (“How satisfied or dissatisfied are you overall with the way democracy works... in the European Union?”). Here, too, the voters of the six party groups are located in only two quadrants.


Unlike in the question above on support for EU membership, respondents were able to provide their answers on a scale from 0 (= very dissatisfied) to 10 (= very satisfied). On the basis of the aggregated responses of the supporters of each European party group, it was then possible to locate them in Figure 30 on the vertical axis of democracy satisfaction: the more satisfied voters are, the higher the party group is placed on the axis.

Combined with the degree of their populist attitudes, the overall picture is again very clear: in the quadrant at the top right of Figure 30 (on the next page), we once again find the supporters of the four mainstream party groups, who are non-populist and rather satisfied with democracy. The quadrant at the bottom left of the figure again contains the populist and extremist party groups from the left and right margins, whose voters are populist and rather dissatisfied with democracy.

Thus, the positioning of the party groups within the two quadrants shows a very similar pattern both for Euroscepticism and for satisfaction with democracy. Populist radical left and extreme left voters are not only less Eurosceptic, but also less dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy in the EU than the supporters of populist radical right and extreme right parties. Nevertheless, the supporters of both populist-extremist party groups are much more dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy in the EU than the supporters of all mainstream party groups.

For the supporters of the mainstream party groups, the average values are: Christian democrats and conservatives (populism: 3.68; democracy satisfaction: 4.49), social democrats and socialists (populism: 3.83; democracy satisfaction: 4.82),

FIGURE 30 A divided EU Parliament? – Satisfaction with democracy



Note: The dots show the weighted average for the voters of each party group, the axes show the weighted average for the whole electorate.  
Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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liberals (populism: 3.65; democracy satisfaction: 5.68) and greens (populism: 3.64; democracy satisfaction: 4.85). For populist-extremist voters, the values are: populist radical left and extreme left parties (populism: 4.04; democracy satisfaction: 3.63) and populist radical right and extreme right parties (populism: 4.06; democracy satisfaction: 2.99). The average across the whole electorate is 3.89 on the populism index and 4.05 on the democracy satisfaction scale.

In summary, then, the division between “mainstream” parties and “populists and extremists” is very striking both on the question of support for EU membership and on general satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the EU. These attitudes to the political system reveal two clearly separate party camps: supporters of the mainstream parties stand in contrast to the populist and extremist camp on the left and right margins, who are Eurosceptic and dissatisfied with democracy in the EU.

This is precisely the distinction between the “pro-Europeans” and “Eurosceptics” as well as between “mainstream” and “populist” parties that has increasingly been cited in the current European election campaign, shaping political rhetoric.

And the figures in this study show that this political rhetoric ahead of the 2019 European elections is indeed reflected in the differing preferences and attitudes of voters. It is therefore not simply imaginary (election campaign) rhetoric, but rather a divide which is reflected in the attitudes and preferences of voters. This divide is drawn between populist and extremist voters on the left and right margin, who tend to reject their countries’ EU membership and view the functioning of democracy in Europe very critically, and voters of mainstream party groups, who

are much more Europe-friendly and also more satisfied with democracy in the EU. This divide may play an important role in the European elections. As shown in Chapter 1 of this study, populist and extremist parties both on the left and on the right are very unpopular among large sections of the population, which means that the mainstream parties could try to mobilise negative feelings toward them.

At this level, then, the notorious conflict between “mainstream” and “populist” parties does exist. But how similar are populist voters on the left and right in terms of economic and cultural issues? In other words: how uniform are their visions, when it comes to the future direction of European policy?

### Economically and culturally left-wing or right-wing?

To answer these questions, it is helpful to look at the voters of the party groups according to their economic and cultural left-right orientations. For this purpose, two additive indices were formed in this study, which measure the preferences and attitudes of respondents on an economic and a cultural dimension.

To measure economic left-right preferences, voters’ attitudes were aggregated into four different economically relevant questions. On a scale from 0 to 10, respondents were able to position themselves between the following statements:

- “People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves” (= 10) or “The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” (= 0)
- “People who are unemployed should have to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits” (= 10) or “People who are unemployed should have the right to refuse a job they do not want” (= 0)
- “Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas” (= 10) or “Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people.” (= 0)
- “Government should decrease taxes a lot and spend much less on social benefits and services” (= 10) or “Government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on social benefits and services” (= 0)

The index value of economic left-right preferences is the average scale value of the answers to the four questions. In the following, we compare the aggregated average index value of supporters of the party groups in our twelve countries (see Table 7 in the methodological appendix on p. 102 of this study).

Similarly, for the measurement of cultural left-right preferences, the attitudes of party supporters were aggregated into three different culturally relevant questions. On a scale of 0 to 10, respondents were able to position themselves between the following statements:

- “A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled” (= 10) or “A woman can be fulfilled through her professional career” (= 0)


- “A woman who does not want to have a child should be allowed to have a free and safe abortion” (= 10) or “Abortion should not be allowed in any case” (= 0)
- “Homosexual couples should be allowed to adopt children” (= 10) or “Homosexual couples should not be allowed to adopt children under any circumstances” (= 0)

Here, too, we calculated the average scale value of each respondent's three answers, in order to determine the average index values for the party groups by aggregating the respondents of a party group (cf. also Table 8 in the methodological appendix on p. 103 of this study).

The index values of the two left-right dimensions then result in the four-quadrant scheme of economic and cultural left-right preferences in Figure 31.

The horizontal axis runs from the economic left to the economic right, with each party group positioned according to the views of its voters. Analogously, the vertical axis represents the cultural left-right dimension: the most culturally right-wing party voters are at the top, and the most culturally left-wing party voters are at the bottom. The black axis lines indicate the averages across the electorate. The party supporters in the upper right quadrant of Figure 31 are thus more right-wing than the average, both economically and culturally, and the party supporters in the lower left quadrant are more left-wing than the average, economically and culturally – in each case compared to the average of all eligible voters.

FIGURE 31 A divided EU Parliament? – Conflict and consensus



Note: The dots show the weighted average for the voters of each party group, the axes show the weighted average for the whole electorate.  
Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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It is interesting to note that the party-political camps emerging from voters' economic and cultural left-right preferences are different from those based on attitudes towards the political system. On the level of substantive economic and cultural questions, the well-known, traditional party-political left-right camps can be identified: one camp is more left-wing than average on economic and cultural questions, and the other is more right-wing than average on those questions. Social democratic and socialist voters are on the left, as are the supporters of the greens and the populist radical left and extreme left parties. In the economically and culturally right-wing camp, we find supporters of the Christian democratic and conservative parties as well as the populist radical right and extreme right parties.

Only the supporters of the liberal parties break this pattern and position themselves economically clearly to the right and culturally clearly to the left of the average of all eligible voters. In this respect, these parties find themselves in a peculiar situation. On the one hand, they could theoretically form an alliance with right-wing parties to implement economic reforms in favour of the free market, in view of their voters' preferences. On the other hand, they could theoretically form an alliance with left-wing parties to push through cultural reforms in favour of liberal values. This offers the liberal parties, which in the European Parliament are predominantly organised in the ALDE parliamentary group, great opportunities for coalitions in various ideological directions. But it also holds the danger of having to make painful concessions on issues on the other dimension when making economic (or cultural) "deals" with the right (or left).


All in all, it can be seen that the political divide between mainstream parties and populists becomes almost completely irrelevant when it comes to substantive economic and cultural questions. The camp of populist and extremist voters is divided between right-wing populists and extremists, who are economically and culturally on the right, and left-wing populists and extremists, who are economically and culturally on the left. At the same time, the mainstream party camp is divided into economically and culturally right-wing Christian democratic and conservative party supporters and economically and culturally left-wing social democratic, socialist and green party supporters. Only the liberals are both economically right-wing and culturally left-wing, and are therefore located economically in the right-wing and culturally in the left-wing camp. Voter preferences on substantive issues thus indicate a different political divide between the party groups in the new European Parliament than attitudes towards the system, such as support for EU membership or satisfaction with democracy in the EU.

## Left versus right I – the economic dimension

Figure 32 (on the next page) zooms in on economic left-right preferences. Here, the positions of each party's supporters are shown on the economic left-right dimension. This clearly reveals the political camps mentioned above.

On the far left are the left-wing populist and left-wing extremist voters, with an average index value of 4.79. Immediately next to them are the supporters of the green parties (4.87) and shortly thereafter the supporters of the social democratic and socialist parties (5.16). These three party groups are clearly to the left of the

FIGURE 32 Economic left or right?



Note: The dots show the weighted average for the voters of each party group.  
Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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average of the electorate (5.61). By contrast, supporters of populist radical right and extreme right parties (5.95), liberal parties (5.99), and Christian democratic and conservative parties (6.32) are clearly to the right of the average.

The aggregated depiction of economic left-right preferences thus shows how a camp is formed by the supporters of the two left-wing and green party groups on the left, and by the two right-wing party groups and the liberal parties on the right.

This is also illustrated by the length of the distance arrows between the different party groups, which indicate how strongly the preferences of the voters of different party groups differ from one another: in Figure 32, the preferences of the voters of the mainstream party groups are furthest apart because at their margins the index value of Christian democratic and conservative voters differs by 1.45 points from that of the greens. The second greatest distance when it comes to economic left-right preferences is between the supporters of the two populist and extremist party groups: the political distance between the supporters of populist radical left and extreme left parties and their right-wing counterparts is 1.16 index points, which is also very considerable.

A different picture emerges on each side of the political spectrum. The distance between voters' political preferences within the economically left-wing and economically right-wing party camps is only 0.37 index points on each side.

In summary, this means that the economic preferences of populist and extremist voters on the left and right differ more than three times as much from each other as those of voters within the party camps on the economic left and the economic right.

## Left versus right II – the cultural dimension


A similar but not completely identical picture emerges for cultural left-right preferences in Figure 33. Here, party voters are located on a cultural dimension from left to right. And here, too, a clear picture emerges:

On the far left are the green parties, whose voters have an average index value of 2.40 on the cultural dimension. Not far away are the social democratic and socialist voters (2.94), the populist radical left and extreme left voters (3.02) and the liberal voters (3.08). The supporters of these four party groups are thus clearly to the left of the average of all eligible voters (3.60). To the right, on the other hand, are the supporters of the Christian democratic and conservative parties (3.79) and, to the far right, the populist radical right and extreme right parties (4.55). In cultural questions, the supporters of the liberal parties thus position themselves clearly to the left of the average. Liberal voters are thus the only group to defy clear left-right classification, because they prove to be economically right-wing and culturally left-wing.

Thus, in cultural left-right preferences, there is once again a contrast between the supporters of the two left-wing party groups, the green party group and the liberal parties on the left side of the cultural left-right dimension, and the two right-wing party groups (Christian democrats and conservatives, and populist radical right and extreme right parties) on the right side.

It is important to note that the supporters of the greens and the supporters of the right-wing populists and extremists define the extreme endpoints on the cultural left-right dimension. This finding confirms the thesis that an important part of the political conflict in today's Europe is directly linked to the emergence of relatively new political groups. On the one hand, green parties advocate a clearly left-wing agenda on cultural issues, which is supported more by relatively wealthy citizens than by the working class. On the other hand, the right-wing populists and

FIGURE 33 Cultural left or right?



Note: The dots show the weighted average for the voters of each party group.  
Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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extremists advocate a radically conservative agenda on cultural issues which is supported more by the working class than by the wealthy electorate. It can therefore be said that the greens and the populist radical right are the “legitimate” and the “unwanted” offspring resulting from the spread of post-material values in Europe: while the greens have emerged from the so-called “silent revolution”, the populist radical right sees itself as a reaction to it – a “silent counter-revolution” (Ignazi 1992; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2013).


This is also shown by the length of the distance arrows between the different party groups, which once again indicate how strongly voter preferences differ between the respective party groups. As Figure 33 shows, the cultural preferences between supporters of the two populist and extreme party groups are furthest apart. Here, the political distance between left-wing populist and extremist voters and right-wing populist and extremist voters is a considerable 1.53 index points. The second greatest distance is between the mainstream party groups. The index value of the Christian democratic and conservative party group differs by 1.39 points from that of the greens.

However, a different picture emerges within the culturally left-wing and right-wing sides of the political spectrum. There, the political position gap between voters within the cultural left (0.68) and within the cultural right (0.76) is only about half as great.

In summary, this means that voters’ cultural preferences differ between the two populist-extreme party camps about twice as much as they do within the culturally left-wing and within the culturally right-wing party camp.

A similar picture also emerges regarding the question of migration (Figure 34). Here, too, the greatest difference is between the positions of the populist radical party groups, with 1.2 index points. Furthermore, the populist radical right and extreme right parties have a unique selling point on migration policy, inso-

FIGURE 34 For or against migration?



Note: The dots show the weighted average for the voters of each party group.  
Target population: EU citizens eligible to vote in twelve European countries.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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far as the Christian democratic and conservative party groups are further from the right-wing populists and right-wing extremists than they are from the other mainstream party groups.

Thus, the Christian democratic and conservative parties face a dilemma with regard to migration: if they join the other mainstream party groups, they will leave the right-wing populists and right-wing extremists to become the only critics of migration. If they align themselves with the right-wing populists, they will push the agenda on migration substantially to the right, and perhaps bring increased attention and acceptance to a topic which has key importance for populist radical right and extreme right parties.

What can be deduced from this for the coming European Parliament? In theory and purely in terms of voter preferences, new coalitions in the European Parliament are conceivable in economic and cultural matters – for example between Christian democrats/conservatives and right-wing populists, whose voters are sometimes closer to each other in cultural matters than the voters of some mainstream parties. But the past shows that mainstream parties are mostly reluctant to form coalitions with populist and Eurosceptic forces. Especially in the European Parliament, the pro-European consensus of the mainstream parties has strong binding force and has repeatedly taken precedence over ideological divisions between the mainstream parties. In fact, some results suggest that even during the financial crisis, when highly controversial economic questions had to be decided, the mainstream parties in the European Parliament preferred to compromise among themselves on the economic dimension rather than involve EU opponents and populists (e.g. Blumenau and Lauderdale 2018). Coalitions based on the “Austrian model”, as exemplified by the ÖVP and the FPÖ, are therefore very unlikely in the European Parliament, even after 2019.

## Methodological appendix
















































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### General information

In the study, we use survey weights for most descriptive statistics and in most analyses to adjust the results to the target population of EU citizens eligible to vote in the 2019 European elections in each of the twelve European countries surveyed (see also “About the study”, p. 4). Wherever we make cross-national statements, respondents from different countries were given the same weighting, regardless of the population size of the member state. For the analysis of the survey experiment in Chapter 2, we do not use survey weights, since their benefit in the analysis of survey experiments is questionable in the case of high-quality samples and when the precise identification of the “population average treatment effect” is not of great interest (Miratrix et al. 2018).

The allocation of the parties to the six party groups was based on existing comparative studies of political parties. Since some parties are not easy to classify, we worked with country experts who helped us assign parties to party groups. For example, on the basis of expert recommendations, we did not assign the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S) to any of the six party groups. The Polish PSL and the Hungarian MKKP were also excluded from the classification of party groups (cf. Table 2).

TABLE 2A Overview of the party groups

PARTY GROUP	PARTY
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC AND CONSERVATIVE PARTIES	
 Denmark	Det Konservative Folkeparti (KF)
 Denmark	Venstre (V)
 Germany	CDU / CSU
 France	Les Républicains (LR)
 Greece	Νέα Δημοκρατία (ΝΔ)
 United Kingdom	Conservative Party
 United Kingdom	Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)
 Italy	Forza Italia
 Italy	Fratelli d'Italia
 Netherlands	Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA)
 Netherlands	ChristenUnie (CU)
 Austria	Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP)
 Sweden	Kristdemokraterna (KD)
 Sweden	Moderaterna (M)
 Spain	Partido Popular (PP)
 Hungary	Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP)
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIALIST PARTIES	
 Denmark	Enhedslisten (EL)
 Denmark	Socialdemokraterne (S)
 Germany	SPD
 France	Parti Socialiste (PS)
 Greece	Κίνημα Αλλαγής (KINAA)
 United Kingdom	Labour Party
 United Kingdom	Scottish National Party (SNP)
 United Kingdom	Plaid Cymru
 Italy	Partito Democratico
 Netherlands	Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)
 Austria	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ)
 Poland	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD)
 Sweden	Socialdemokraterna (S)
 Spain	Bildu
 Spain	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)
 Spain	Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea - Partido Nacionalista Vasco (EAJ-PNV)
 Spain	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)
 Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció (DK)
 Hungary	Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP)
 Hungary	Momentum Mozgalom
GREEN PARTIES	
 Denmark	Alternativet
 Denmark	Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF)
 Germany	Die Grünen
 France	Europe Écologie Les Verts (EELV)
 United Kingdom	Green parties
 Netherlands	GroenLinks
 Austria	Die Grünen - Die Grüne Alternative (GRÜNE)
 Austria	JETZT - Liste Pilz
 Sweden	Miljöpartiet de Gröna (MP)
 Hungary	Lehet Más a Politika (LMP)
 Hungary	Párbeszéd Magyarorszáért (PM)

Source: Own illustration.

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TABLE 2B Overview of the party groups

PARTY GROUP	PARTY
<b>LIBERAL PARTIES</b>	
 Denmark	Liberal Alliance (LA)
 Denmark	Radikale Venstre (RV)
 Germany	FDP
 France	La République En Marche!/ Mouvement démocrate/Agir (LREM/MoDem/Agir)
 France	Union des démocrates et indépendants (UDI)
 United Kingdom	Liberal Democrats
 Netherlands	Democrate 66 (D66)
 Netherlands	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)
 Austria	NEOS - Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (NEOS)
 Poland	Nowoczesna (.N)
 Poland	Platforma Obywatelska (PO)
 Sweden	Centerpartiet (C)
 Sweden	Liberalerna (L)
 Spain	Ciudadanos (C's)
 Spain	Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català (PDeCAT)
<b>POPULIST RADICAL LEFT AND EXTREME LEFT PARTIES</b>	
 Germany	Die Linke
 France	La France Insoumise (FI)
 Greece	Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας (ΚΚΕ)
 Greece	Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς (ΣΥΡΙΖΑ)
 Netherlands	Socialistische Partij (SP)
 Sweden	Vänsterpartiet (V)
 Spain	Unidos Podemos
<b>POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT AND EXTREME RIGHT PARTIES</b>	
 Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti (DF)
 Germany	AfD
 France	Rassemblement national (RN)
 Greece	Χρυσή Αυγή
 United Kingdom	United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
 Italy	Lega
 Netherlands	Forum voor Democratie (FvD)
 Netherlands	Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)
 Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)
 Poland	Kukiz'15
 Poland	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)
 Poland	Wolność
 Sweden	Sverigedemokraterna (SD)
 Spain	VOX
 Hungary	Fidesz - Magyar Polgári Szövetség
 Hungary	Jobbik Magyarorszáért Mozgalom (Jobbik)
<b>OTHER PARTIES</b>	
 Italy	Movimento 5 Stelle
 Poland	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL)
 Hungary	Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt (MKKP)

Source: Own illustration.

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## Chapter 1

### Model for intended participation in the elections

The results of Figure 2 are based on logistic regression analyses. The dependent variable was operationalised via the question of whether respondents intended to participate in the 2019 European elections:

*And, if you think about the upcoming European Parliament elections this year: Which statement applies to you personally?*

*I will definitely vote*

*I do not know yet if I will vote*

*I will not vote whatever happens*

Respondents who answered the question with “I will definitely vote” were coded as “1”. Respondents were coded “0” if they answered “I do not know yet if I will vote” or “I will not vote whatever happens”. Respondents who gave a “don’t know” answer were excluded from the analysis. Left-right self-placement was measured on a scale from 0 (“left”) to 10 (“right”). To avoid losing many observations, we recoded respondents who could not classify themselves on the left-right scale into the middle category. However, Figure 2 shows the original distribution of respondents on the left-right scale. In the model, we also control for gender, age, education, employment status, income, support for EU membership, national versus European identity, satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the EU and in the respondent’s own country, political interest, EU integration preferences, economic and cultural left-right preferences and populist attitudes. In addition, we include fixed effects for countries. Where the academic literature suggests curvilinear effects of variables, quadratic terms of the variables were tested and maintained in the final model, provided that the coefficients on the quadratic term reached statistical significance at the 5 percent level.

To calculate the predicted probabilities, the covariates were fixed at their observed values (“observed-value approach”). This allows the interpretation of these probabilities as estimated percentages in the target population (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013).

### Model of vote choice for a Eurosceptic party

The results of Figure 3 are based on logistic regression analyses. The dependent variable was operationalised via a vote choice question for the European elections:

























*In the European Parliament elections, some people do not manage to cast their vote, or do not participate for other reasons. How about you? If the European Parliament elections were held tomorrow, which party would you vote for, or would you not vote?*

Respondents who said that they would spoil their ballot, who did not wish to participate in the election or who gave a “don’t know” answer were excluded from the analysis. In addition, only supporters of major parties were considered: those who would vote for very small parties were also excluded from the analysis. The parties were classified as “Eurosceptic” and “non-Eurosceptic”, based on their membership of the political groups in the European Parliament. Parties currently

belonging to ALDE, EFA/Greens, EPP or S&D were classified as non-Eurosceptic. Parties in the ECR, EFDD, ENF and GUE/NGL groups were classified as Eurosceptic. If parties did not belong to any of the parliamentary groups in the European Parliament, they were categorised based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017). The parties were defined as Eurosceptic if the overall orientation of the party leadership was assessed by experts as  $\leq 4$  (i.e. neutral to hostile to European integration). In total, there were five parties that could not be classified on the basis of this approach (JETZT - Liste Pilz from Austria, Alternativet from Denmark, MKKP from Hungary, Liberal Alliance from Denmark and VOX from Spain). The first three were classified as non-Eurosceptic, the last two as Eurosceptic. In addition, FIDESZ and KDNP from Hungary were coded as Eurosceptic despite their affiliations, since FIDESZ has been suspended from the EPP. It is important to note that our definition of Euroscepticism is therefore relatively “soft”, i.e. even parties that do not reject the EU in principle but only criticise it in its current form are considered “Eurosceptic” (Taggart and Szczesiak 2004).

In this model, the same covariates with the same operationalisations as in the intended participation models were used as independent variables. Figure 3 also shows the original distribution of respondents on the left-right scale. Also in this model, country fixed effects were included, quadratic effects were tested and the observed-value approach was used to calculate the predicted probabilities.

TABLE 3A Classification of the parties as Eurosceptic/non-Eurosceptic

COUNTRY	PARTY
<b>EUROSCEPTIC</b>	
 Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti (DF)
 Denmark	Enhedslisten (EL)
 Denmark	Liberal Alliance (LA)
 Germany	AfD
 Germany	Die Linke
 France	La France Insoumise (FI)
 France	Rassemblement national (RN)
 Greece	Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας (ΚΚΕ)
 Greece	Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς (ΣΥΡΙΖΑ)
 Greece	Χρυσή Αυγή
 United Kingdom	Conservative Party
 United Kingdom	Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)
 United Kingdom	United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
 Italy	Fratelli d'Italia
 Italy	Lega
 Italy	Movimento 5 Stelle
 Netherlands	ChristenUnie (CU)
 Netherlands	Forum voor Democratie (FvD)
 Netherlands	Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)
 Netherlands	Socialistische Partij (SP)
 Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)
 Poland	Kukiz'15
 Poland	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)
 Poland	Wolność

Source: Own illustration.

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TABLE 3B Classification of the parties as Eurosceptic/non-Eurosceptic

COUNTRY	PARTY
<b>EUROSCEPTIC</b>	
 Sweden	Sverigedemokraterna (SD)
 Sweden	Vänsterpartiet (V)
 Spain	Bildu
 Spain	Unidos Podemos
 Spain	VOX
 Hungary	Fidesz - Magyar Polgári Szövetség
 Hungary	Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Jobbik)
 Hungary	Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP)
<b>NON-EUROSCEPTIC</b>	
 Denmark	Alternativet
 Denmark	Det Konservative Folkeparti (KF)
 Denmark	Radikale Venstre (RV)
 Denmark	Socialdemokraterne (S)
 Denmark	Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF)
 Denmark	Venstre (V)
 Germany	CDU/CSU
 Germany	FDP
 Germany	Grüne
 Germany	SPD
 France	Europe Écologie Les Verts (EELV)
 France	La République En Marche!/ Mouvement démocrate/Agir (LREM/MoDem/Agir)
 France	Les Républicains (LR)
 France	Parti Socialiste (PS)
 France	Union des démocrates et indépendants (UDI)
 Greece	Κίνημα Αλλαγής (KINAA)
 Greece	Νέα Δημοκρατία (ΝΔ)
 United Kingdom	Green Party
 United Kingdom	Labour Party
 United Kingdom	Liberal Democrats
 United Kingdom	Plaid Cymru
 United Kingdom	Scottish National Party (SNP)
 Italy	Forza Italia
 Italy	Partito Democratico
 Netherlands	Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA)
 Netherlands	Democrate 66 (D66)
 Netherlands	GroenLinks
 Netherlands	Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)
 Netherlands	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)
 Austria	Die Grünen - Die Grüne Alternative (GRÜNE)
 Austria	JETZT - Liste Pilz
 Austria	NEOS - Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (NEOS)
 Austria	Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP)
 Austria	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ)
 Poland	Nowoczesna (.N)
 Poland	Platforma Obywatelska (PO)
 Poland	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL)
 Poland	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD)
 Sweden	Centerpartiet (C)
 Sweden	Kristdemokraterna (KD)
 Sweden	Liberalerna (L)

Source: Own illustration.

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TABLE 3C Classification of the parties as Eurosceptic/non-Eurosceptic

COUNTRY	PARTY
<b>NON-EUROSCEPTIC</b>	
 Sweden	Miljöpartiet de Gröna (MP)
 Sweden	Moderaterna (M)
 Sweden	Socialdemokraterna (S)
 Spain	Ciudadanos (C's)
 Spain	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)
 Spain	Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea - Partido Nacionalista Vasco (EAJ-PNV)
 Spain	Partido Popular (PP)
 Spain	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)
 Spain	Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català (PDeCAT)
 Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció (DK)
 Hungary	Lehet Más a Politika (LMP)
 Hungary	Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt (MKKP)
 Hungary	Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP)
 Hungary	Momentum Mozgalom
 Hungary	Párbeszéd Magyarországért (PM)

Source: Own illustration.

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### Model of vote choice for a populist party

Some of the findings in Chapter 1 relate to the choice of a populist versus a non-populist party. These results are based on logistic regression analyses. The dependent variable was also operationalised via the same vote choice question for the European elections (see question text on p. 93).

Respondents who said that they would spoil their ballot, who did not wish to participate in the election or who gave a “don’t know” answer were excluded from the analysis. In addition, only supporters of major parties were considered: those who would vote for very small parties were also excluded from the analysis. The classification of the parties as “populist” and “non-populist” was based on current comparative research on populism (e.g. Van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018; van Kessel 2015). In some cases, where there is no consensus in the literature on the classification of parties as “populist” or “non-populist”, we worked with country experts.

In this model, the same covariates as in the intended participation models were used as independent variables. Also in this model, country fixed effects were included, quadratic effects were tested and the observed-value approach was used to calculate predicted probabilities.




































TABLE 4A Classification of the parties as populist/non-populist

COUNTRY	PARTY
<b>POPULIST</b>	
 Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti (DF)
 Germany	AfD
 Germany	Die Linke
 France	La France Insoumise (FI)
 France	Rassemblement national (RN)
 Greece	Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς (ΣΥΡΙΖΑ)
 United Kingdom	United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
 Italy	Lega
 Italy	Movimento 5 Stelle
 Netherlands	Forum voor Democratie (FvD)
 Netherlands	Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)
 Netherlands	Socialistische Partij (SP)
 Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)
 Poland	Kukiz'15
 Poland	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)
 Sweden	Sverigedemokraterna (SD)
 Spain	Unidos Podemos
 Spain	VOX
 Hungary	Fidesz - Magyar Polgári Szövetség
 Hungary	Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Jobbik)
<b>NON-POPULIST</b>	
 Denmark	Alternativet
 Denmark	Det Konservative Folkeparti (KF)
 Denmark	Enhedslisten (EL)
 Denmark	Liberal Alliance (LA)
 Denmark	Radikale Venstre (RV)
 Denmark	Socialdemokraterne (S)
 Denmark	Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF)
 Denmark	Venstre (V)
 Germany	CDU/CSU
 Germany	FDP
 Germany	Grüne
 Germany	SPD
 France	Europe Écologie Les Verts (EELV)
 France	La République En Marche! / Mouvement démocrate/Agir (LREM/MoDem/Agir)
 France	Les Républicains (LR)
 France	Parti Socialiste (PS)
 France	Union des démocrates et indépendants (UDI)
 Greece	Κίνημα Αλλαγής (KINAA)
 Greece	Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας (ΚΚΕ)
 Greece	Νέα Δημοκρατία (ΝΔ)
 Greece	Χρυσή Αυγή
 United Kingdom	Conservative Party
 United Kingdom	Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)
 United Kingdom	Green parties
 United Kingdom	Labour Party
 United Kingdom	Liberal Democrats
 United Kingdom	Plaid Cymru
 United Kingdom	Scottish National Party (SNP)

Source: Own illustration.

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TABLE 4B Classification of the parties as populist/non-populist

COUNTRY	PARTY
<b>NON-POPULIST</b>	
 Italy	Forza Italia
 Italy	Fratelli d'Italia
 Italy	Partito Democratico
 Netherlands	Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA)
 Netherlands	ChristenUnie (CU)
 Netherlands	Democrate 66 (D66)
 Netherlands	GroenLinks
 Netherlands	Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)
 Netherlands	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)
 Austria	Die Grünen - Die Grüne Alternative (GRÜNE)
 Austria	JETZT - Liste Pilz
 Austria	NEOS - Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (NEOS)
 Austria	Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP)
 Austria	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ)
 Poland	Nowoczesna (.N)
 Poland	Platforma Obywatelska (PO)
 Poland	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL)
 Poland	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD)
 Poland	Wolność
 Sweden	Centerpartiet (C)
 Sweden	Kristdemokraterna (KD)
 Sweden	Liberalerna (L)
 Sweden	Miljöpartiet de Gröna (MP)
 Sweden	Moderaterna (M)
 Sweden	Socialdemokraterna (S)
 Sweden	Vänsterpartiet (V)
 Spain	Bildu
 Spain	Ciudadanos (C's)
 Spain	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)
 Spain	Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea - Partido Nacionalista Vasco (EAJ-PNV)
 Spain	Partido Popular (PP)
 Spain	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)
 Spain	Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català (PDeCAT)
 Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció (DK)
 Hungary	Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP)
 Hungary	Lehet Más a Politika (LMP)
 Hungary	Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt (MKKP)
 Hungary	Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP)
 Hungary	Momentum Mozgalom
 Hungary	Párbeszéd Magyarországért (PM)

Source: Own illustration.

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## Chapter 2

In this chapter, we use an instrumental variable approach to estimate the effect of perceived representation on populist attitudes. Our binary instrument results from the randomised party scenarios and the preferences of the interviewees: if according to the party scenario at least one party represents a respondent's preference on an issue, the instrumental variable takes the value "1". In all other cases, it is "0". In the first stage, the instrument predicts whether respondents feel that they are well represented by the parties. We measure this with the following item:

### Feeling of representation

*Based on this information, on a scale from 1 to 7, how well do you personally feel represented by the parties on this issue?*

not at all represented very well represented

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

In the second stage, the feeling of representation influences populist attitudes. The measurement of populism in the experiment is conducted with items from Castanho Silva et al. (2018):

### Populism items for the experiment

TABLE 5 Populism items from Castanho Silva et al. (2018)

PEOPLE-CENTRISM	AGREEMENT
1. Politicians should always listen closely to the problems of the people.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Politicians don't have to spend time among ordinary people to do a good job.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. The will of the people should be the highest principle in this country's politics.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ANTI-ELITISM	AGREEMENT
1. The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Government officials use their power to try to improve people's lives.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Quite a few of the people running the government are crooked.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
POLITICS AS A CONFLICT BETWEEN "GOOD" AND "EVIL"	AGREEMENT
1. You can tell if a person is good or bad if you know their politics.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. The people I disagree with politically are not evil.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. The people I disagree with politically are just misinformed.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Source: Items from Castanho Silva et al. (2018).

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Each respondent was presented with a randomly selected item for each of the three populism dimensions in the battery (in the second round, another three random items were taken from the items not yet shown). The average rating of the three items for each respondent was then calculated. We model this average as the dependent variable.

We estimate the effects of the first and second stage using structural equation models (SEM). The effects for the second stage are shown in Chapter 2 (see Table 1). In the first stage, the instrument increases feelings of representation by 0.177 standard deviations for populist respondents and by 0.277 standard deviations for non-populist respondents (p-value of 0.000 in both cases). The instrument is therefore highly relevant. Further details on the survey experiment can be found in the accompanying scientific discussion paper by Castanho Silva and Wratil (2019).

It should be noted that the results for respondents' preferences on the eight campaign issues are based on smaller samples, as each respondent only answered the questions on two of the eight issues. This means that our national samples comprise approximately 500 respondents and our multinational total sample approximately 6,000 respondents per question.

For this updated version, the representation experiment was repeated in Italy. This means that the coefficients in the structural equation models in Table 1 have changed slightly. However, the substantive results remain identical.

TABLE 6 Preferences towards campaign issues

CAMPAIGN ISSUES	QUESTION	ANSWER OPTIONS
European asylum policy	Some people say that the EU should have no say on how each member state deals with asylum applications. Others say the EU should intervene in asylum policies in the member states in order to redistribute refugees across Europe. What do you prefer?	<input type="checkbox"/> Decreasing EU influence <input type="checkbox"/> Maintaining current EU influence <input type="checkbox"/> Increasing EU influence
European social spending	Some people say that the EU should spend more money on social concerns, such as unemployment, even if taxpayers have to pay more into the EU budget. Others say that the EU should reduce spending on social concerns to alleviate the burden on EU taxpayers. What do you prefer?	<input type="checkbox"/> Increasing social spending <input type="checkbox"/> Keeping social spending at current levels <input type="checkbox"/> Reducing social spending
Regulation of factory farming	Some people think that the EU should impose more restrictions on factory farming to protect animal rights, even if that would increase the price of meat products. Others say that restrictions for factory farming are already too strong and should be abolished to lower the price of meat products. What do you prefer?	<input type="checkbox"/> Imposing more restrictions <input type="checkbox"/> Maintaining current restrictions <input type="checkbox"/> Abolishing some restrictions
European financial assistance	Some people believe that the EU should take more measures to financially support member states who are in economic trouble. Others think that the support given by the EU today in case of economic crises is already more than enough and should be reduced. What do you prefer?	<input type="checkbox"/> Increasing financial support <input type="checkbox"/> Maintaining financial support at current levels <input type="checkbox"/> Reducing financial support
Sanctions for violating democracy	Some people say that the EU should cut payments to member states accused of violating democratic norms, in order to protect European values. Others say that cutting payments to these countries would be an illegitimate interference with their internal affairs. What do you prefer?	<input type="checkbox"/> Cut payments <input type="checkbox"/> Maintaining payments <input type="checkbox"/> Increasing payments
European agriculture subsidies	Some people say that the EU should keep existing financial support (e.g. subsidies) to farmers in order to protect the existence and quality of European agriculture. Others say that this financial support causes high prices for consumers, and thus subsidies should be cut. What do you prefer?	<input type="checkbox"/> Increasing subsidies <input type="checkbox"/> Maintaining subsidies at current levels <input type="checkbox"/> Reducing subsidies
Brexit negotiations	Some people say that the EU should have a very strict attitude in the Brexit negotiations, even if it leads to the UK leaving without a deal. Others say that the EU and the UK should achieve a deal even if that means the EU makes large concessions. What do you prefer?	<input type="checkbox"/> Making no concessions <input type="checkbox"/> Making some concessions <input type="checkbox"/> Making any concessions necessary
Military cooperation in Europe	Some people say that the EU should increase military cooperation and build a common European army, which would be stronger and cheaper than national armies. Others say that only the existence of national armies independent from one another can keep countries self-reliant. What do you prefer?	<input type="checkbox"/> Increasing military cooperation <input type="checkbox"/> Keeping current military cooperation <input type="checkbox"/> Abolishing military cooperation

Source: Own Illustration.

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## Chapter 3

In Chapter 3, various indexes are used to measure populist attitudes and the economic and cultural left-right preferences of respondents. Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were first carried out to test whether the corresponding items load on a common factor, as is theoretically to be expected. In addition, we tested whether the corresponding items were understood in a similar way in the twelve countries (“measurement invariance”). These conditions are fulfilled for all indexes used.

### Populism index

The eight items for measuring populist attitudes come from Akkerman et al. (2014) as well as from Van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2018). To create the index, the average of all eight items was calculated for each respondent. Higher values indicate stronger populist attitudes and lower values mean weaker populist attitudes. A CFA confirms that the items all load on a common factor (CFI: 0.957; TLI: 0.937; RMSEA: 0.076; SRMR: 0.03).

### Economic and cultural left-right preferences

Five items each from Van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2018) were used to measure both economic and cultural left-right preferences (cf. Tables 7 and 8). The CFA revealed that item 1 of the economic left-right scale and items 3 and 4 of the cultural left-right scale had very low factor loadings. Therefore, these items were excluded from the index calculations. After exclusion of these items, the remaining items each loaded on a common factor (economically left-right: CFI: 0.994; TLI: 0.82; RMSE: 0.043; SRMR: 0.011; culturally left-right: CFI: 0.992; TLI: 0.972; RMSEA: 0.050; SRMR: 0.011). The average of the four or three items respectively was used to calculate the indexes.

TABLE 7 Items for measuring economic left-right preferences

Below are a few statements on politics and society. In each case, please indicate which statement you most tend to agree with.

ITEM	AGREEMENT	ITEM
1. Incomes should be made more equal.	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	1. We need larger income differences as incentives.
2. People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves.	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	2. The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.
3. People who are unemployed should have to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits.	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	3. People who are unemployed should have the right to refuse a job they do not want.
4. Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas.	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	4. Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people.
5. Government should decrease taxes a lot and spend much less on social benefits and services.	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	5. Government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on social benefits and services.

Source: Items from Van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2018).

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TABLE 8 Items for measuring cultural left-right preferences

And how about the statements below? In each case, please indicate which statement you most tend to agree with.

ITEM	AGREEMENT	ITEM
1. A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled.	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	1. A woman can be fulfilled through her professional career.
2. A woman who does not want to have a child should be allowed to have a free and safe abortion.	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	2. Abortion should not be allowed in any case.
3. Children should be taught to obey authority.	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	3. Children should be encouraged to have an independent judgement.
4. People who break the law should get tougher sentences.	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	4. Tougher sentences do not contribute to reduce criminality.
5. Homosexual couples should be allowed to adopt children.	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	5. Homosexual couples should not be allowed to adopt children under any circumstances.

Source: Items from Van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2018).

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## Euroskepticism

To measure pro-European or Eurosceptic attitudes, we asked respondents whether they supported their country's membership of the EU:

*Membership of the European Union is a good thing for [COUNTRY].*

*strongly agree (1)*

*tend to agree (2)*

*neither agree nor disagree (3)*

*tend to disagree (4)*

*strongly disagree (5)*

## Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the EU

The following statement was used to measure satisfaction with the functioning of EU democracy:

*How satisfied or dissatisfied are you overall with the way democracy works... in the European Union?*

*very dissatisfied*

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

*very satisfied*

## Statistical appendix

### QUESTION 1 Voting participation – Which statement applies to you personally?

In percent of the electorate, number of respondents in absolute terms

A	TOTAL (EU-12 COUNTRIES)*	GENDER		AGE			LEVEL OF EDUCATION		
		male	female	15 to 34	35 to 54	55 and over	low	medium	high
I vote in (almost) all elections	78.5	80.4	76.8	66.5	77.9	87.3	72.2	78.8	86.0
Sometimes I vote in elections and sometimes I don't	12.6	11.8	13.4	17.8	13.6	8.2	14.5	13.0	9.7
Actually, I rarely or never vote in elections	7.1	6.5	7.8	12.4	7.0	3.8	10.4	6.9	3.5
Don't know / no answer	1.7	1.3	2.1	3.4	1.6	0.7	2.9	1.4	0.8
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	23,725	11,145	12,580	6,223	9,253	8,239	5,978	10,214	7,533

B	MONTHLY NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME			PROFESSIONAL SITUATION			
	low (under € 1,500)	middle (€1,500 to under €3,000)	high (€3,000 and above)	employed	in education	retired	not working
I vote in (almost) all elections	72.4	81.2	86.8	79.1	70.5	88.1	69.4
Sometimes I vote in elections and sometimes I don't	15.7	12.2	9.1	13.4	13.1	7.8	16.6
Actually, I rarely or never vote in elections	10.2	5.7	3.5	6.4	10.8	3.5	11.9
Don't know / no answer	1.7	1.0	0.7	1.1	5.6	0.7	2.2
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	7,805	6,975	5,386	12,050	1,703	5,011	4,612

C	GROUP OF PARTIES					
	Christian democratic and conservative parties	Social democratic and socialist parties	Green parties	Liberal parties	Populist radical right and extreme right parties	Populist radical left and extreme left parties
I vote in (almost) all elections	90.0	88.2	84.6	86.0	83.4	87.7
Sometimes I vote in elections and sometimes I don't	7.8	9.6	11.5	11.2	12.8	8.4
Actually, I rarely or never vote in elections	1.8	1.9	3.1	2.4	3.5	2.6
Don't know / no answer	0.5	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.3	1.2
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	2,865	3,575	1,314	2,044	4,728	1,322



D	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy
I vote in (almost) all elections	88.9	81.0	66.3	82.7	79.0	80.0
Sometimes I vote in elections and sometimes I don't	6.6	10.7	16.0	9.0	10.8	12.1
Actually, I rarely or never vote in elections	3.3	6.7	13.1	7.3	8.3	5.7
Don't know / no answer	1.2	1.6	4.7	1.0	1.9	2.2
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,973	1,995	1,949	2,027	2,133	1,952

E	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Spain	Sweden	Hungary
I vote in (almost) all elections	73.2	80.7	69.8	75.2	92.4	72.3
Sometimes I vote in elections and sometimes I don't	18.2	12.8	19.1	13.9	4.4	18.6
Actually, I rarely or never vote in elections	7.6	5.7	9.5	8.0	2.5	8.2
Don't know / no answer	1.1	0.8	1.6	2.9	0.8	0.9
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,924	1,984	1,911	1,949	1,976	1,952

Note: \*Surveyed countries: Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Hungary.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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## QUESTION 2 Political Interest – In general: How interested are you in politics?

In percent of the electorate, number of respondents in absolute terms

A	TOTAL (EU-12 COUNTRIES)*	GENDER		AGE			LEVEL OF EDUCATION		
		male	female	15 to 34	35 to 54	55 and over	low	medium	high
0 (not interested at all)	6.8	5.1	8.5	10.0	7.3	4.3	10.9	6.2	3.0
1	2.3	1.7	2.8	2.7	2.6	1.6	2.7	2.4	1.4
2	3.4	2.5	4.3	4.2	3.7	2.6	4.0	3.6	2.4
3	5.5	4.2	6.8	7.1	5.9	4.0	5.9	6.1	4.1
4	5.6	4.5	6.5	7.3	5.7	4.3	5.8	6.1	4.3
5	13.5	11.6	15.2	14.1	12.5	14.0	15.3	14.2	9.9
6	10.9	9.6	12.1	12.0	11.1	10.0	11.3	10.6	10.9
7	16.2	17.3	15.2	16.1	16.3	16.1	14.3	16.5	18.2
8	14.7	17.2	12.3	11.6	14.8	16.6	11.9	14.3	18.8
9	6.8	8.3	5.4	4.2	6.7	8.7	4.9	6.9	9.0
10 (very interested)	13.7	17.4	10.2	9.9	12.6	17.3	11.7	12.7	17.7
Don't know / no answer	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.5	1.4	0.4	0.3
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	23,725	11,145	12,580	6,223	9,253	8,239	5,978	10,214	7,533

B	MONTHLY NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME			PROFESSIONAL SITUATION			
	low (under € 1,500)	middle (€1,500 to under €3,000)	high (€3,000 and above)	employed	in education	retired	not working
0 (not interested at all)	9.1	5.3	3.4	6.4	6.3	4.0	11.0
1	3.1	2.0	1.1	2.2	2.4	1.8	3.0
2	4.2	3.0	2.3	3.5	4.5	2.5	4.0
3	6.3	5.1	4.4	5.6	7.4	3.9	6.7
4	6.3	5.1	4.3	5.4	8.7	4.4	6.1
5	15.2	12.5	10.7	12.6	12.5	14.4	14.5
6	10.8	11.0	11.0	11.5	12.2	9.2	11.6
7	13.7	18.1	18.8	17.3	17.3	15.7	14.4
8	12.4	16.1	18.3	15.6	12.5	16.3	11.7
9	6.0	7.4	8.3	6.8	4.6	8.9	5.2
10 (very interested)	12.3	14.1	17.3	12.9	11.1	18.3	10.8
Don't know / no answer	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.5	1.0
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	7,805	6,975	5,386	12,050	1,703	5,011	4,612

C	GROUP OF PARTIES					
	Christian democratic and conservative parties	Social democratic and socialist parties	Green parties	Liberal parties	Populist radical right and extreme right parties	Populist radical left and extreme left parties
0 (not interested at all)	2.9	2.9	2.3	2.1	4.5	3.1
1	0.9	1.8	1.2	0.8	1.7	1.6
2	2.4	2.7	2.1	2.7	3.1	2.0
3	4.6	4.2	4.8	4.6	4.9	3.0
4	4.6	5.2	6.6	6.0	4.9	3.3
5	12.2	12.9	11.2	10.7	13.4	11.3
6	11.7	9.5	11.3	12.8	10.7	11.4
7	19.9	17.6	17.6	19.2	15.8	19.7
8	16.6	17.2	19.4	19.3	15.5	17.2
9	8.2	9.9	8.6	7.8	7.7	7.6
10 (very interested)	15.9	16.1	14.5	13.5	17.6	19.6
Don't know / no answer	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.2
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	2,865	3,575	1,314	2,044	4,728	1,322

D	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy
0 (not interested at all)	4.2	4.7	14.8	5.9	8.8	7.6
1	1.9	1.7	3.3	1.7	1.9	3.0
2	3.7	3.0	4.3	2.8	2.8	2.6
3	7.0	4.5	6.1	3.5	5.0	4.3
4	6.7	4.3	5.4	4.9	4.4	5.2
5	14.0	12.1	14.9	13.2	10.4	10.7
6	11.0	8.1	9.5	9.3	9.9	13.4
7	17.9	13.1	12.3	18.6	16.0	16.9
8	16.5	18.0	10.1	14.4	15.0	15.5
9	6.4	8.1	4.7	8.1	7.4	6.0
10 (very interested)	10.2	22.0	12.4	17.7	17.7	14.5
Don't know / no answer	0.7	0.3	2.3	0.1	0.7	0.4
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,973	1,995	1,949	2,027	2,133	1,952

E	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Spain	Sweden	Hungary
0 (not interested at all)	6.2	4.1	5.8	10.2	3.1	6.5
1	1.9	2.3	2.9	2.5	1.7	2.7
2	3.4	3.8	3.8	3.4	2.7	5.0
3	4.8	6.6	6.7	6.6	4.5	6.7
4	5.1	5.6	7.5	5.5	5.0	7.1
5	11.4	13.9	15.8	15.0	10.4	19.9
6	15.1	10.9	10.9	11.3	10.0	11.7
7	25.0	15.2	12.8	15.2	18.9	12.8
8	18.2	14.8	12.8	13.0	16.0	12.1
9	4.4	10.1	7.3	6.3	7.4	5.4
10 (very interested)	3.7	12.7	13.1	9.7	19.7	10.0
Don't know / no answer	0.8	0.1	0.7	1.5	0.7	0.2
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,924	1,984	1,911	1,949	1,976	1,952

Note: \*Surveyed countries: Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Hungary.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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**QUESTION 3 European elections – And, if you think about the upcoming European Parliament elections this year:  
Which statement applies to you personally?**

In percent of the electorate, number of respondents in absolute terms

A	TOTAL (EU-12 COUNTRIES)*	GENDER		AGE			LEVEL OF EDUCATION		
		male	female	15 to 34	35 to 54	55 and over	low	medium	high
I will definitely vote	67.9	71.1	64.9	58.9	66.4	75.4	61.1	67.5	76.9
I do not know yet if I will vote	23.0	21.0	24.9	28.8	23.6	18.4	26.0	24.0	17.6
I will not vote whatever happens	5.1	5.2	5.0	6.9	5.5	3.4	7.3	4.8	2.8
Don't know / no answer	4.1	2.8	5.2	5.4	4.5	2.8	5.6	3.8	2.7
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	23,725	11,145	12,580	6,223	9,253	8,239	5,978	10,214	7,533

B	MONTHLY NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME			PROFESSIONAL SITUATION			
	low (under € 1,500)	middle (€1,500 to under €3,000)	high (€3,000 and above)	employed	in education	retired	not working
I will definitely vote	64.2	70.6	75.6	68.6	64.0	75.9	59.1
I do not know yet if I will vote	26.0	22.2	18.1	23.4	25.5	18.0	27.5
I will not vote whatever happens	6.4	4.1	3.8	4.7	5.1	3.3	8.1
Don't know / no answer	3.5	3.1	2.6	3.4	5.4	2.8	5.4
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	7,805	6,975	5,386	12,050	1,703	5,011	4,612

C	GROUP OF PARTIES					
	Christian democratic and conservative parties	Social democratic and socialist parties	Green parties	Liberal parties	Populist radical right and extreme right parties	Populist radical left and extreme left parties
I will definitely vote	79.2	80.1	78.6	80.2	76.2	80.9
I do not know yet if I will vote	18.5	17.0	18.9	17.2	20.7	16.6
I will not vote whatever happens	0.7	1.0	0.5	1.2	1.5	1.1
Don't know / no answer	1.6	1.9	2.1	1.5	1.6	1.5
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	2,865	3,575	1,314	2,044	4,729	1,322

D	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy
I will definitely vote	76.0	73.0	61.0	70.8	56.7	77.0
I do not know yet if I will vote	15.6	19.1	23.1	23.2	24.1	16.0
I will not vote whatever happens	3.2	5.4	9.5	4.6	8.7	3.6
Don't know / no answer	5.1	2.5	6.5	1.4	10.5	3.4
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,973	1,995	1,949	2,027	2,133	1,952

E	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Spain	Sweden	Hungary
I will definitely vote	66.4	67.2	68.0	66.1	69.4	63.8
I do not know yet if I will vote	25.1	27.2	25.5	25.2	21.7	30.3
I will not vote whatever happens	5.9	3.5	4.1	4.7	3.1	4.1
Don't know / no answer	2.7	2.0	2.4	4.0	5.8	1.8
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,924	1,984	1,911	1,949	1,976	1,952

Note: \*Surveyed countries: Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Hungary.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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**QUESTION 4 Left-Right-Self-Assessment – When people talk about politics, they often talk about “left” and “right”.  
Where would you place yourself?**

Please locate yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “left” and 10 means “right”.

In percent of the electorate, number of respondents in absolute terms

A	TOTAL (EU-12 COUNTRIES)*	GENDER		AGE			LEVEL OF EDUCATION		
		male	female	15 to 34	35 to 54	55 and over	low	medium	high
0 (left)	5.4	5.1	5.7	5.9	4.7	5.9	5.9	5.4	5.1
1	2.8	2.5	3.0	2.9	2.6	2.9	2.2	2.6	3.7
2	5.9	5.9	5.9	6.3	5.5	5.9	4.4	5.5	8.3
3	8.5	8.3	8.6	9.5	8.0	8.3	6.5	8.2	11.5
4	7.6	7.7	7.6	7.7	7.7	7.5	5.9	7.3	10.3
5	22.6	21.7	23.5	21.1	22.6	23.6	24.0	23.3	19.7
6	8.6	9.7	7.5	8.5	8.4	8.7	8.0	8.5	9.5
7	9.5	11.7	7.3	9.7	9.9	8.9	8.4	9.5	10.8
8	7.5	9.1	6.0	6.3	7.4	8.4	6.9	7.9	7.6
9	2.7	2.9	2.5	1.8	2.6	3.4	2.6	2.9	2.5
10 (right)	6.1	7.0	5.2	4.8	6.5	6.5	7.2	6.3	4.3
Don't know / no answer	12.9	8.4	17.2	15.6	14.0	10.1	18.1	12.8	6.8
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	23,725	11,145	12,580	6,223	9,253	8,239	5,978	10,214	7,533

B	MONTHLY NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME			PROFESSIONAL SITUATION			
	low (under € 1,500)	middle (€1,500 to under €3,000)	high (€3,000 and above)	employed	in education	retired	not working
0 (left)	7.1	5.2	3.4	4.6	7.3	6.0	6.2
1	2.9	3.1	2.7	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.6
2	5.1	6.3	6.6	6.0	8.1	5.6	5.1
3	7.5	9.8	9.1	8.4	11.8	8.6	7.6
4	7.2	8.1	8.6	8.0	9.8	7.5	6.3
5	25.2	23.1	19.5	22.7	18.0	24.2	22.6
6	7.0	9.6	10.8	9.1	8.5	8.6	7.2
7	7.5	9.7	13.4	10.4	11.7	8.8	7.5
8	6.0	7.9	10.1	8.0	5.3	8.3	6.3
9	2.2	2.9	3.6	2.6	1.5	3.3	2.6
10 (right)	7.6	4.9	6.0	6.1	2.4	6.8	6.6
Don't know / no answer	14.8	9.5	6.2	11.5	12.2	9.6	19.5
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	7,805	6,975	5,386	12,050	1,703	5,011	4,612

C	GROUP OF PARTIES					
	Christian democratic and conservative parties	Social democratic and socialist parties	Green parties	Liberal parties	Populist radical right and extreme right parties	Populist radical left and extreme left parties
0 (left)	0.6	12.9	7.0	1.9	1.5	21.2
1	0.5	6.4	5.8	1.4	0.8	10.1
2	1.2	13.3	16.6	4.5	1.1	17.2
3	2.4	17.4	19.3	9.9	1.9	16.6
4	3.8	12.5	15.8	12.0	2.7	10.9
5	22.2	20.1	19.7	27.0	20.2	14.5
6	16.1	3.9	4.3	14.3	9.4	2.8
7	19.1	3.4	3.3	13.1	14.5	1.9
8	14.0	1.9	2.1	7.1	15.2	1.3
9	5.5	0.8	0.6	2.1	6.1	0.2
10 (right)	8.7	1.4	0.8	2.8	17.9	0.4
Don't know / no answer	6.0	6.2	4.6	3.8	8.7	2.8
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	2,865	3,575	1,314	2,044	4,728	1,322

D	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy
0 (left)	4.2	3.0	6.4	6.2	4.4	7.9
1	3.0	2.0	2.9	2.0	2.7	2.6
2	8.9	6.5	4.6	4.1	6.3	4.4
3	9.9	11.2	6.9	6.8	9.3	7.3
4	7.9	11.5	5.8	10.3	8.4	5.3
5	15.5	29.7	18.8	30.1	18.9	15.0
6	8.5	12.6	5.7	9.0	9.2	7.3
7	12.2	8.3	6.6	8.6	9.1	9.8
8	10.9	3.8	7.1	5.3	5.8	8.9
9	4.6	0.9	3.2	2.0	1.6	3.1
10 (right)	4.1	1.8	8.3	5.8	3.4	11.4
Don't know / no answer	10.5	8.9	23.8	9.8	21.0	17.1
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,973	1,995	1,949	2,027	2,133	1,952

E	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Spain	Sweden	Hungary
0 (left)	2.5	2.7	5.0	10.4	5.0	7.6
1	2.7	2.7	2.6	4.1	4.1	2.0
2	6.4	6.4	5.3	7.5	6.1	3.8
3	8.1	9.3	7.3	12.0	7.6	5.8
4	7.5	8.2	6.9	8.6	5.9	5.1
5	18.9	32.0	25.7	21.6	14.8	30.7
6	11.0	10.7	7.7	6.1	9.1	5.4
7	13.5	9.5	8.5	7.8	13.6	6.3
8	11.6	5.6	6.1	5.3	12.5	7.3
9	3.1	1.1	4.3	2.2	4.4	2.1
10 (right)	3.4	3.3	8.0	5.5	8.4	10.0
Don't know / no answer	11.4	8.4	12.6	9.0	8.5	13.8
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,924	1,984	1,911	1,949	1,976	1,952

Note: \*Surveyed countries: Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Hungary.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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## INDEX 1 Populism index

Number of respondents in absolute terms

A	TOTAL (EU-12 COUNTRIES)*	GENDER		AGE			LEVEL OF EDUCATION		
		male	female	15 to 34	35 to 54	55 and over	low	medium	high
Average populism index	3.89	3.89	3.90	3.73	3.90	4.00	4.00	3.90	3.75
Number of respondents	23,725	11,145	12,580	6,223	9,253	8,239	5,978	10,214	7,533

B	MONTHLY NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME			PROFESSIONAL SITUATION			
	low (under € 1,500)	middle (€1,500 to under €3,000)	high (€3,000 and above)	employed	in education	retired	not working
Average populism index	4.00	3.91	3.73	3.87	3.59	3.97	3.98
Number of respondents	7,805	6,975	5,386	12,050	1,703	5,011	4,612

C	GROUP OF PARTIES					
	Christian democratic and conservative parties	Social democratic and socialist parties	Green parties	Liberal parties	Populist radical right and extreme right parties	Populist radical left and extreme left parties
Average populism index	3.68	3.83	3.64	3.65	4.06	4.04
Number of respondents	2,865	3,575	1,314	2,044	4,728	1,322

D	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy
Average populism index	3.62	3.87	4.04	4.23	3.83	3.92
Number of respondents	1,973	1,995	1,949	2,027	2,133	1,952

E	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Spain	Sweden	Hungary
Average populism index	3.56	3.84	3.99	4.13	3.80	3.89
Number of respondents	1,924	1,984	1,911	1,949	1,976	1,952

Note: For the exact calculation of the index see the methodical appendix on p. 102.

\*Surveyed countries: Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Hungary.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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## INDEX 2 Economic left-right preferences

Number of respondents in absolute terms

A	TOTAL (EU-12 COUNTRIES)*	GENDER		AGE			EDUCATION		
		male	female	15 to 34	35 to 54	55 and over	low	medium	high
Average economic left-right positioning	5.61	5.70	5.53	5.35	5.57	5.83	5.55	5.65	5.62
Number of respondents	23,725	11,145	12,580	6,223	9,253	8,239	5,978	10,214	7,533

B	MONTHLY NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME			PROFESSIONAL SITUATION			
	low (under € 1,500)	middle (€1,500 to under €3,000)	high (€3,000 and above)	employed	in education	retired	not working
Average economic left-right positioning	5.37	5.68	5.93	5.73	5.39	5.86	5.09
Number of respondents	7,805	6,975	5,386	12,050	1,703	5,011	4,612

C	GROUP OF PARTIES					
	Christian democratic and conservative parties	Social democratic and socialist parties	Green parties	Liberal parties	Populist radical right and extreme right parties	Populist radical left and extreme left parties
Average economic left-right positioning	6.32	5.16	4.87	5.99	5.95	4.79
Number of respondents	2,865	3,575	1,314	2,044	4,728	1,322

D	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy
Average economic left-right positioning	5.58	5.63	5.32	5.68	5.43	5.76
Number of respondents	1,973	1,995	1,949	2,027	2,133	1,952

E	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Spain	Sweden	Hungary
Average economic left-right positioning	5.46	6.04	5.83	5.09	6.11	5.41
Number of respondents	1,924	1,984	1,911	1,949	1,976	1,952

Note: For the exact calculation of the index see the methodical appendix on p. 102.

\*Surveyed countries: Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Hungary.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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## INDEX 3 Cultural left-right preferences

Number of respondents in absolute terms

A	TOTAL (EU-12 COUNTRIES)*	GENDER		AGE			LEVEL OF EDUCATION		
		male	female	15 to 34	35 to 54	55 and over	low	medium	high
Average cultural left-right preferences	3.60	3.94	3.29	3.38	3.56	3.80	3.89	3.64	3.19
Number of respondents	23,725	11,145	12,580	6,223	9,253	8,239	5,978	10,214	7,533

B	MONTHLY NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME			PROFESSIONAL SITUATION			
	low (under € 1,500)	middle (€1,500 to under €3,000)	high (€3,000 and above)	employed	in education	retired	not working
Average cultural left-right preferences	4.10	3.51	3.09	3.52	2.85	3.87	3.74
Number of respondents	7,805	6,975	5,386	12,050	1,703	5,011	4,612

C	GROUP OF PARTIES					
	Christian democratic and conservative parties	Social democratic and socialist parties	Green parties	Liberal parties	Populist radical right and extreme right parties	Populist radical left and extreme left parties
Average cultural left-right preferences	3.79	2.94	2.40	3.08	4.55	3.02
Number of respondents	2,865	3,575	1,314	2,044	4,728	1,322

D	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy
Average cultural left-right preferences	2.73	3.34	3.63	4.85	2.80	4.10
Number of respondents	1,973	1,995	1,949	2,027	2,133	1,952

E	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Spain	Sweden	Hungary
Average cultural left-right preferences	3.36	3.25	4.88	3.09	2.60	4.72
Number of respondents	1,924	1,984	1,911	1,949	1,976	1,952

Note: For the exact calculation of the index see the methodical appendix on p. 102.

\*Surveyed countries: Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Hungary.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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**QUESTION 5 Performance of the government – Now thinking about the [NATIONAL] government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?\***

In percent of the electorate, number of respondents in absolute terms

A	TOTAL (EU-12 COUNTRIES)*	GENDER		AGE			LEVEL OF EDUCATION		
		male	female	15 to 34	35 to 54	55 and over	low	medium	high
0 (very dissatisfied)	23.6	24.8	22.5	20.2	24.8	24.8	24.8	23.1	23.1
1	6.6	6.6	6.6	5.7	7.1	6.6	6.4	6.2	7.4
2	9.2	9.5	9.0	9.6	8.8	9.5	8.2	9.4	10.3
3	10.9	10.9	10.9	12.3	10.7	10.0	10.4	10.9	11.3
4	7.8	7.0	8.6	9.5	7.2	7.3	7.0	8.4	7.8
5	12.2	10.9	13.5	13.1	11.6	12.2	12.8	12.4	11.2
6	8.8	9.0	8.6	9.6	9.2	8.0	9.0	8.3	9.6
7	8.4	9.2	7.7	8.0	8.8	8.4	7.7	8.5	9.2
8	4.8	5.7	3.9	3.6	4.8	5.5	4.6	4.9	4.7
9	1.7	1.8	1.5	1.2	1.3	2.3	1.5	1.9	1.3
10 (very satisfied)	2.2	2.4	2.0	1.4	2.1	2.7	2.8	2.1	1.4
Don't know / no answer	3.9	2.4	5.3	5.8	3.6	2.8	4.9	3.9	2.6
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	23,725	11,145	12,580	6,223	9,253	8,239	5,978	10,214	7,533

B	MONTHLY NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME			PROFESSIONAL SITUATION			
	low (under € 1,500)	middle (€1,500 to under €3,000)	high (€3,000 and above)	employed	in education	retired	not working
0 (very dissatisfied)	28.2	21.4	20.5	22.8	15.2	24.3	28.1
1	7.5	5.8	5.8	6.6	5.2	6.3	7.4
2	8.8	9.3	10.2	9.3	11.7	9.6	7.9
3	9.9	11.6	10.9	11.1	14.6	10.3	9.9
4	6.8	8.4	8.5	7.6	11.3	7.1	8.2
5	11.7	12.9	12.0	12.0	13.6	12.6	11.6
6	7.6	9.6	10.1	9.6	10.4	7.6	8.3
7	7.2	8.7	11.1	9.1	7.7	8.6	6.8
8	4.2	5.8	5.2	5.0	3.2	5.6	3.8
9	1.9	1.6	1.8	1.5	1.0	2.3	1.5
10 (very satisfied)	3.0	2.2	1.5	1.9	1.2	2.8	2.1
Don't know / no answer	3.2	2.8	2.6	3.4	4.9	2.9	4.5
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	7,805	6,975	5,386	12,050	1,703	5,011	4,612

C	GROUP OF PARTIES					
	Christian democratic and conservative parties	Social democratic and socialist parties	Green parties	Liberal parties	Populist radical right and extreme right parties	Populist radical left and extreme left parties
0 (very dissatisfied)	16.8	28.0	20.0	21.8	27.8	18.4
1	5.2	6.7	6.0	6.1	6.6	6.6
2	6.9	9.5	12.3	10.6	7.7	10.8
3	9.4	11.4	13.6	12.5	8.2	10.6
4	8.5	8.2	10.2	7.8	5.9	7.3
5	13.9	12.2	11.9	11.0	10.1	11.3
6	12.3	7.7	9.7	11.7	8.4	12.1
7	13.2	7.7	8.2	9.8	10.0	11.8
8	7.5	3.8	3.5	5.1	7.1	6.1
9	2.2	1.6	1.4	0.8	3.2	1.4
10 (very satisfied)	2.2	1.6	1.2	1.3	4.4	2.3
Don't know / no answer	2.0	1.7	2.2	1.4	0.8	1.5
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	2,865	3,575	1,314	2,044	4,728	1,322

D	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy
0 (very dissatisfied)	8.3	18.4	32.1	36.7	32.1	15.4
1	3.2	5.8	9.8	8.7	7.2	4.5
2	8.2	11.5	12.1	9.1	10.8	5.6
3	14.2	14.0	9.7	10.5	12.1	7.0
4	11.5	10.8	6.2	6.3	7.8	7.3
5	17.5	14.5	9.8	8.5	10.2	13.3
6	12.6	7.4	5.8	6.5	6.6	13.4
7	13.4	6.4	3.6	6.2	5.0	13.3
8	5.1	4.3	3.1	3.4	2.6	8.4
9	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.9	3.1
10 (very satisfied)	0.6	1.0	1.9	1.4	1.5	5.1
Don't know / no answer	4.6	5.2	4.9	1.9	3.3	3.8
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,973	1,995	1,949	2,027	2,133	1,952

D	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Spain	Sweden	Hungary
0 (very dissatisfied)	9.9	11.1	26.2	23.2	35.1	34.3
1	4.6	4.8	8.1	7.5	8.2	6.5
2	7.3	8.7	8.9	10.2	9.8	8.6
3	9.6	11.4	9.7	11.9	10.2	9.9
4	10.3	7.4	7.6	9.0	5.4	4.4
5	13.7	16.2	10.3	12.7	9.5	10.6
6	18.0	7.6	7.0	9.6	6.1	5.5
7	16.6	11.2	7.1	6.8	4.5	7.3
8	5.6	8.2	5.7	3.3	2.6	5.2
9	0.8	3.8	3.6	1.1	0.9	2.3
10 (very satisfied)	0.9	3.6	3.5	1.7	1.0	3.7
Don't know / no answer	2.8	6.0	2.3	3.0	6.7	1.7
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,924	1,984	1,911	1,949	1,976	1,952

Note: \*Surveyed countries: Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Hungary. \*\* This question has been adjusted for each country individually.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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QUESTION 6 **Democracy A** – How satisfied or dissatisfied are you overall with the way democracy works in ... [COUNTRY] ?\*\*

In percent of the electorate, number of respondents in absolute terms

A	TOTAL (EU-12 COUNTRIES)*	GENDER		AGE			LEVEL OF EDUCATION		
		male	female	15 to 34	35 to 54	55 and over	low	medium	high
0 (very dissatisfied)	16.1	16.5	15.7	14.3	16.9	16.4	17.7	16.1	14.0
1	5.1	5.3	4.9	4.0	5.3	5.6	5.0	5.2	5.1
2	7.1	7.4	6.9	7.3	7.0	7.1	6.4	7.2	7.9
3	9.9	10.3	9.6	10.9	9.5	9.7	10.0	9.8	10.1
4	8.4	7.9	8.8	9.6	8.2	7.8	8.1	8.8	8.0
5	13.6	12.4	14.7	13.7	13.1	14.1	15.2	13.4	11.9
6	10.1	10.3	9.9	10.6	10.8	9.0	9.2	9.7	11.8
7	11.9	12.1	11.7	11.3	12.0	12.1	9.9	12.2	13.8
8	7.9	9.1	6.8	7.4	7.8	8.5	6.6	8.0	9.4
9	3.0	3.6	2.4	2.4	2.7	3.7	2.9	3.0	3.1
10 (very satisfied)	2.9	3.1	2.7	2.3	2.8	3.4	3.2	2.8	2.6
Don't know / no answer	4.1	2.2	6.0	6.4	4.0	2.7	5.9	4.0	2.2
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	23,725	11,145	12,580	6,223	9,253	8,239	5,978	10,214	7,533

B	MONTHLY NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME			PROFESSIONAL SITUATION			
	low (under € 1,500)	middle (€1,500 to under €3,000)	high (€3,000 and above)	employed	in education	retired	not working
0 (very dissatisfied)	21.7	13.9	11.6	15.1	11.1	15.5	20.9
1	6.4	4.7	4.0	4.7	3.8	5.6	5.9
2	8.0	7.5	6.4	7.3	7.3	6.5	7.4
3	10.4	10.4	9.2	9.9	12.1	9.8	9.6
4	8.2	8.8	7.9	8.5	9.0	7.8	8.7
5	13.5	14.0	11.9	13.1	13.3	14.4	14.1
6	8.3	11.1	12.0	11.3	10.7	8.4	9.1
7	8.4	13.3	15.5	12.7	14.6	11.8	9.0
8	5.5	8.2	11.9	8.4	7.9	9.4	5.2
9	2.3	3.2	4.4	2.9	3.1	4.0	1.8
10 (very satisfied)	3.1	2.5	3.5	2.7	2.0	3.8	2.5
Don't know / no answer	4.3	2.5	1.8	3.4	5.1	3.0	5.8
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	7,805	6,975	5,386	12,050	1,703	5,011	4,612

C	GROUP OF PARTIES					
	Christian democratic and conservative parties	Social democratic and socialist parties	Green parties	Liberal parties	Populist radical right and extreme right parties	Populist radical left and extreme left parties
0 (very dissatisfied)	8.2	16.9	10.0	12.4	20.8	15.5
1	3.0	4.8	4.9	5.2	6.1	4.7
2	5.7	6.9	6.8	6.0	7.5	8.9
3	8.8	9.3	11.0	9.5	8.8	12.8
4	7.2	8.4	8.2	8.1	7.2	8.8
5	12.6	13.5	12.6	12.3	12.6	13.9
6	11.5	10.0	13.3	12.1	9.9	10.0
7	18.2	12.7	14.9	15.9	10.3	12.9
8	13.5	9.4	10.7	10.4	7.3	6.9
9	5.3	3.2	4.2	4.1	3.5	2.8
10 (very satisfied)	4.4	3.2	2.5	3.3	4.6	1.9
Don't know / no answer	1.7	1.8	0.9	1.0	1.5	0.9
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	2,865	3,575	1,314	2,044	4,728	1,322

D	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy
0 (very dissatisfied)	3.9	11.8	24.7	28.6	15.1	11.0
1	1.7	4.0	7.6	8.7	4.2	4.7
2	3.0	7.2	7.9	10.2	6.7	6.7
3	6.0	9.3	11.1	12.8	12.0	10.1
4	6.3	7.6	8.1	8.7	9.1	10.8
5	12.5	12.3	13.0	11.7	15.3	17.6
6	10.8	10.0	7.3	6.8	10.4	14.7
7	20.4	15.5	6.9	6.5	10.9	10.4
8	17.8	11.0	4.9	2.4	5.4	5.9
9	7.6	4.6	1.6	1.1	1.5	2.1
10 (very satisfied)	4.5	2.7	1.5	0.9	1.6	2.4
Don't know / no answer	5.5	4.1	5.6	1.7	7.8	3.7
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,973	1,995	1,949	2,027	2,133	1,952

E	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Spain	Sweden	Hungary
0 (very dissatisfied)	7.6	4.9	17.6	15.9	22.1	29.7
1	2.5	2.7	7.2	5.0	5.2	8.1
2	4.6	4.8	8.0	8.9	7.9	9.4
3	7.3	10.3	10.2	11.7	9.2	9.0
4	8.0	10.5	9.0	8.8	6.7	7.0
5	12.6	16.5	13.6	17.6	9.5	10.9
6	16.0	13.4	7.9	10.8	7.7	5.0
7	22.5	15.7	8.1	8.8	10.5	6.1
8	11.5	10.2	5.9	5.2	10.2	5.1
9	1.9	5.0	3.2	1.6	3.1	2.6
10 (very satisfied)	1.4	4.1	5.3	2.6	3.9	3.8
Don't know / no answer	4.2	2.0	4.0	3.2	4.1	3.3
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,924	1,984	1,911	1,949	1,976	1,952

Note: \*Surveyed countries: Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Hungary. \*\* This question has been adjusted for each country individually.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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### QUESTION 7 Democracy B – How satisfied or dissatisfied are you overall with the way democracy works ... in the European Union?

In percent of the electorate, number of respondents in absolute terms

A	TOTAL (EU-12 COUNTRIES)*	GENDER		AGE			LEVEL OF EDUCATION		
		male	female	15 to 34	35 to 54	55 and over	low	medium	high
0 (very dissatisfied)	15.7	18.6	12.9	11.8	16.0	17.9	18.8	15.0	12.8
1	4.6	5.3	4.0	2.9	5.1	5.3	4.7	4.7	4.4
2	7.4	8.1	6.7	5.9	7.4	8.4	6.3	7.8	8.0
3	10.0	10.4	9.7	9.5	9.9	10.6	10.1	9.8	10.3
4	9.4	9.0	9.8	9.1	9.3	9.6	9.0	9.5	9.7
5	15.6	14.1	17.0	15.9	15.3	15.7	16.2	16.0	14.2
6	10.6	10.5	10.7	12.4	10.2	9.7	9.5	10.4	12.2
7	9.2	9.8	8.6	11.0	8.9	8.2	7.2	9.4	11.2
8	5.1	5.6	4.6	5.8	5.5	4.2	4.1	4.7	6.9
9	1.8	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.7	2.2	1.6	1.9	1.9
10 (very satisfied)	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.1
Don't know / no answer	8.7	4.7	12.4	12.3	8.6	6.2	10.6	8.7	6.1
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	23,725	11,145	12,580	6,223	9,253	8,239	5,978	10,214	7,533

B	MONTHLY NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME			PROFESSIONAL SITUATION			
	low (under € 1,500)	middle (€1,500 to under €3,000)	high (€3,000 and above)	employed	in education	retired	not working
0 (very dissatisfied)	16.3	15.6	15.3	14.8	7.6	17.0	19.0
1	4.7	5.1	4.3	4.7	2.3	5.4	4.1
2	7.5	7.7	7.6	7.4	5.0	8.0	7.6
3	9.7	10.6	10.1	10.1	9.4	10.7	9.4
4	9.1	9.5	10.3	9.6	9.3	9.8	8.5
5	15.8	15.6	14.5	15.4	15.9	16.3	15.5
6	9.8	11.6	11.9	11.1	14.4	9.6	9.5
7	8.7	9.4	10.5	9.7	13.6	7.9	7.8
8	5.3	4.8	5.7	5.6	6.4	4.3	4.5
9	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	2.3	1.3
10 (very satisfied)	2.7	1.7	1.8	2.1	2.1	2.1	1.8
Don't know / no answer	8.1	6.6	6.2	7.6	12.3	6.6	11.0
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	7,805	6,975	5,386	12,050	1,703	5,011	4,612



C	GROUP OF PARTIES					
	Christian democratic and conservative parties	Social democratic and socialist parties	Green parties	Liberal parties	Populist radical right and extreme right parties	Populist radical left and extreme left parties
0 (very dissatisfied)	10.5	9.0	6.6	2.7	30.0	16.8
1	3.9	2.8	2.9	2.5	7.6	5.7
2	6.7	6.4	7.6	4.0	8.9	9.5
3	11.8	9.6	8.7	8.2	9.9	13.0
4	10.7	9.9	12.3	8.5	8.2	11.4
5	16.5	16.8	16.2	16.3	13.2	15.4
6	13.1	12.6	15.3	17.0	6.9	10.0
7	11.3	12.2	15.1	18.2	5.3	7.5
8	6.4	8.1	6.9	9.6	3.5	3.7
9	2.0	3.0	1.7	4.0	1.4	0.7
10 (very satisfied)	2.2	2.8	2.0	5.6	1.6	0.9
Don't know / no answer	4.9	6.9	5.0	3.5	3.8	5.5
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	2,865	3,575	1,314	2,044	4,728	1,322

D	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy
0 (very dissatisfied)	11.8	13.6	23.2	21.3	24.2	16.3
1	3.8	4.5	7.0	6.2	4.2	5.2
2	5.9	8.6	7.4	10.6	6.6	6.0
3	7.8	11.0	9.4	12.6	8.8	9.5
4	9.0	10.2	8.8	10.4	7.7	10.2
5	16.8	15.2	13.5	14.7	10.8	16.3
6	11.0	11.3	8.2	8.0	7.2	14.4
7	10.7	9.7	5.4	6.9	7.9	8.3
8	5.3	5.5	3.4	3.0	4.0	4.3
9	1.9	2.6	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.9
10 (very satisfied)	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.2	2.2	1.5
Don't know / no answer	15.0	6.7	12.0	4.3	15.1	6.0
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,973	1,995	1,949	2,027	2,133	1,952

E	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Spain	Sweden	Hungary
0 (very dissatisfied)	9.9	14.2	8.1	8.8	22.2	13.1
1	3.6	5.1	4.1	3.1	4.3	4.3
2	6.6	7.7	6.5	6.1	8.0	8.5
3	9.3	14.2	6.9	10.3	9.9	10.7
4	9.9	10.9	8.5	10.3	8.5	8.3
5	15.9	17.9	15.9	22.0	11.8	17.0
6	17.7	10.2	13.3	10.8	6.8	8.7
7	12.5	8.7	11.5	11.5	7.7	9.5
8	4.6	4.2	9.0	5.9	4.5	7.5
9	1.4	1.0	4.9	1.7	0.7	2.9
10 (very satisfied)	1.1	1.7	5.9	2.8	0.7	4.2
Don't know / no answer	7.5	4.2	5.5	6.8	14.9	5.4
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,924	1,984	1,911	1,949	1,976	1,952

Note: \*Surveyed countries: Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Hungary.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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**QUESTION 8 Democracy C – Please tick to indicate the extent to which you agree with each statement.**  
**Democracy can have problems, but it is still better than any other form of government.**

In percent of the electorate, number of respondents in absolute terms

A	TOTAL (EU-12 COUNTRIES)*	GENDER		AGE			LEVEL OF EDUCATION		
		male	female	15 to 34	35 to 54	55 and over	low	medium	high
Strongly agree	37.4	39.0	35.9	30.4	35.4	44.1	32.7	35.7	46.2
Tend to agree	32.3	32.8	31.8	30.5	32.6	33.2	29.6	33.3	33.8
Neither agree or disagree	17.7	17.0	18.3	21.0	18.8	14.3	21.2	18.7	11.5
Tend to disagree	4.3	4.9	3.8	6.0	4.5	3.1	4.7	4.3	4.0
Strongly disagree	2.4	3.0	1.9	3.1	2.6	1.8	2.9	2.5	1.7
Don't know / no answer	5.9	3.4	8.4	9.1	6.1	3.6	9.0	5.6	2.8
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	23,725	11,145	12,580	6,223	9,253	8,239	5,978	10,214	7,533

B	MONTHLY NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME			PROFESSIONAL SITUATION			
	low (under € 1,500)	middle (€1,500 to under €3,000)	high (€3,000 and above)	employed	in education	retired	not working
Strongly agree	31.7	38.7	47.1	36.5	39.5	45.8	28.9
Tend to agree	31.8	34.3	31.7	33.2	29.4	34.0	29.7
Neither agree or disagree	21.8	16.5	12.8	18.2	16.7	12.9	22.7
Tend to disagree	5.3	4.3	3.6	4.6	5.5	2.3	5.9
Strongly disagree	3.2	2.4	1.7	2.4	3.1	1.4	3.4
Don't know / no answer	6.2	3.8	3.0	5.1	5.7	3.6	9.4
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	7,805	6,975	5,386	12,050	1,703	5,011	4,612

C	GROUP OF PARTIES					
	Christian democratic and conservative parties	Social democratic and socialist parties	Green parties	Liberal parties	Populist radical right and extreme right parties	Populist radical left and extreme left parties
Strongly agree	48.8	50.6	48.6	50.7	26.1	45.8
Tend to agree	31.8	29.0	33.4	31.6	35.5	29.6
Neither agree or disagree	12.9	13.2	10.9	12.6	24.1	15.5
Tend to disagree	2.7	2.8	3.4	2.9	7.0	4.8
Strongly disagree	1.4	1.7	1.5	0.9	3.7	2.0
Don't know / no answer	2.4	2.8	2.3	1.3	3.6	2.3
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	2,865	3,575	1,314	2,044	4,728	1,322

D	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy
Strongly agree	50.3	44.1	24.5	49.1	35.4	26.2
Tend to agree	26.8	29.1	30.9	28.4	36.1	37.2
Neither agree or disagree	11.8	14.9	20.7	14.7	16.2	22.7
Tend to disagree	2.2	4.3	5.8	3.7	2.8	5.2
Strongly disagree	1.7	1.8	6.1	2.1	1.2	3.0
Don't know / no answer	7.2	5.8	12.0	2.0	8.3	5.9
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,973	1,995	1,949	2,027	2,133	1,952

E	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Spain	Sweden	Hungary
<b>Strongly agree</b>	19.4	49.5	30.4	38.1	50.8	29.7
<b>Tend to agree</b>	41.0	31.8	37.2	31.8	25.5	31.5
<b>Neither agree or disagree</b>	26.0	12.3	21.2	16.0	11.6	24.5
<b>Tend to disagree</b>	5.6	2.7	4.9	5.1	4.6	5.5
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	2.4	1.0	2.3	3.2	2.5	2.1
<b>Don't know / no answer</b>	5.5	2.8	4.1	5.8	5.0	6.7
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,924	1,984	1,911	1,949	1,976	1,952

Note: \*Surveyed countries: Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Hungary.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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**QUESTION 9 Democracy D – Please tick to indicate the extent to which you agree with each statement.**  
**Membership of the European Union is a good thing for [COUNTRY]\*\***

In percent of the electorate, number of respondents in absolute terms

A	TOTAL (EU-12 COUNTRIES)*	GENDER		AGE			LEVEL OF EDUCATION		
		male	female	15 to 34	35 to 54	55 and over	low	medium	high
Strongly agree	25.9	28.9	23.0	27.5	23.3	27.3	20.1	25.0	34.5
Tend to agree	26.6	25.4	27.8	27.4	25.8	26.9	23.7	26.6	30.4
Neither agree or disagree	19.7	17.8	21.5	20.2	20.6	18.5	22.3	20.7	14.8
Tend to disagree	11.7	12.2	11.2	9.6	12.8	12.0	12.8	12.3	9.3
Strongly disagree	10.8	12.7	8.9	7.3	11.9	12.0	13.5	10.4	8.1
Don't know / no answer	5.4	2.9	7.6	8.1	5.6	3.2	7.6	5.1	2.9
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	23,725	11,145	12,580	6,223	9,253	8,239	5,978	10,214	7,533

B	MONTHLY NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME			PROFESSIONAL SITUATION			
	low (under € 1,500)	middle (€1,500 to under €3,000)	high (€3,000 and above)	employed	in education	retired	not working
Strongly agree	26.6	24.6	28.3	25.0	38.1	29.3	19.5
Tend to agree	24.3	28.3	29.2	27.5	28.8	26.8	23.8
Neither agree or disagree	22.7	19.4	16.0	19.9	16.6	17.7	23.5
Tend to disagree	10.7	12.9	12.6	12.4	7.0	11.4	12.3
Strongly disagree	10.3	11.3	11.0	10.4	3.7	11.5	13.3
Don't know / no answer	5.5	3.5	3.0	4.8	5.8	3.3	7.7
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	7,805	6,975	5,386	12,050	1,703	5,011	4,612

C	GROUP OF PARTIES					
	Christian democratic and conservative parties	Social democratic and socialist parties	Green parties	Liberal parties	Populist radical right and extreme right parties	Populist radical left and extreme left parties
Strongly agree	29.8	42.8	45.4	52.0	11.0	20.2
Tend to agree	32.5	29.8	31.1	29.3	19.5	31.2
Neither agree or disagree	16.7	13.2	11.6	11.4	24.7	22.3
Tend to disagree	10.4	7.1	5.5	4.0	19.0	14.3
Strongly disagree	8.8	4.3	3.7	2.0	23.0	9.6
Don't know / no answer	1.7	2.8	2.6	1.2	2.8	2.5
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	2,865	3,575	1,314	2,044	4,728	1,322

D	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy
Strongly agree	20.7	31.6	17.0	19.8	30.9	16.7
Tend to agree	31.9	28.9	25.0	30.5	14.5	23.3
Neither agree or disagree	17.0	15.9	20.0	23.2	11.0	28.4
Tend to disagree	11.5	9.4	13.2	15.0	12.9	14.5
Strongly disagree	10.8	8.3	15.4	9.8	24.1	11.3
Don't know / no answer	8.2	6.0	9.5	1.7	6.6	5.8
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,973	1,995	1,949	2,027	2,133	1,952

E	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Spain	Sweden	Hungary
Strongly agree	13.1	29.6	39.9	32.8	21.7	36.1
Tend to agree	33.0	27.2	28.0	33.5	22.4	22.3
Neither agree or disagree	25.7	18.1	18.5	18.5	14.8	26.6
Tend to disagree	14.2	13.1	6.2	7.1	16.5	6.5
Strongly disagree	9.1	9.7	4.4	2.8	18.6	3.7
Don't know / no answer	4.9	2.3	3.1	5.2	6.0	4.8
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,924	1,984	1,911	1,949	1,976	1,952

Note: \*Surveyed countries: Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Hungary. \*\* This question has been adjusted for each country individually.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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## QUESTION 10 Identity – Do you see yourself as ...?\*

In percent of the electorate, number of respondents in absolute terms

A	TOTAL (EU-12 COUNTRIES)*	GENDER		AGE			LEVEL OF EDUCATION		
		male	female	15 to 34	35 to 54	55 and over	low	medium	high
[NATIONALITY] only	37.1	34.7	39.4	33.9	40.9	35.6	46.1	38.0	24.4
[NATIONALITY] and European	48.5	50.0	47.1	46.5	44.2	54.1	42.6	48.1	56.5
European and [NATIONALITY]	6.6	7.4	5.9	8.3	6.7	5.5	3.8	6.8	9.8
European only	1.7	1.8	1.6	2.7	1.8	0.9	1.2	1.6	2.5
None of the above	4.3	4.7	4.0	6.1	4.6	2.9	4.1	3.9	5.3
Don't know / no answer	1.7	1.3	2.1	2.7	1.8	1.0	2.2	1.5	1.4
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	23,725	11,145	12,580	6,223	9,253	8,239	5,978	10,214	7,533

B	MONTHLY NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME			PROFESSIONAL SITUATION			
	low (under € 1,500)	middle (€1,500 to under €3,000)	high (€3,000 and above)	employed	in education	retired	not working
[NATIONALITY] only	38.5	35.7	35.9	37.5	24.0	35.8	42.9
[NATIONALITY] and European	47.9	50.4	49.9	47.8	53.4	54.8	41.4
European and [NATIONALITY]	6.1	6.8	7.9	7.0	10.5	5.2	6.2
European only	1.5	1.8	2.0	1.7	3.5	0.9	1.9
None of the above	4.4	4.1	3.5	4.4	6.4	2.5	5.2
Don't know / no answer	1.6	1.3	0.9	1.5	2.1	0.7	2.5
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	7,805	6,975	5,386	12,050	1,703	5,011	4,612

C	GROUP OF PARTIES					
	Christian democratic and conservative parties	Social democratic and socialist parties	Green parties	Liberal parties	Populist radical right and extreme right parties	Populist radical left and extreme left parties
[NATIONALITY] only	37.8	26.2	17.8	17.5	56.3	29.1
[NATIONALITY] and European	53.1	56.5	57.2	65.1	37.5	50.6
European and [NATIONALITY]	5.7	9.3	14.3	11.8	2.8	7.8
European only	0.9	2.4	4.3	2.1	0.6	2.2
None of the above	1.9	4.6	5.8	2.7	2.3	8.6
Don't know / no answer	0.6	1.0	0.7	0.8	0.6	1.8
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	2,865	3,575	1,314	2,044	4,728	1,322

D	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy
[NATIONALITY] only	49.5	26.2	38.7	36.2	53.7	45.9
[NATIONALITY] and European	43.3	51.3	44.0	52.2	27.7	43.0
European and [NATIONALITY]	3.3	11.7	6.3	6.4	7.1	6.0
European only	0.7	3.1	1.8	1.0	2.8	1.0
None of the above	1.8	5.8	5.8	3.5	7.4	2.9
Don't know / no answer	1.4	2.0	3.3	0.8	1.4	1.3
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,973	1,995	1,949	2,027	2,133	1,952

E	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Spain	Sweden	Hungary
[NATIONALITY] only	42.6	31.0	26.5	14.0	46.1	33.5
[NATIONALITY] and European	43.2	51.6	60.0	67.5	43.4	56.9
European and [NATIONALITY]	5.9	8.9	8.5	4.7	4.3	6.6
European only	1.6	2.6	1.2	2.4	1.2	1.1
None of the above	4.6	4.7	2.0	8.7	3.7	0.9
Don't know / no answer	2.2	1.2	1.8	2.7	1.4	1.0
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,924	1,984	1,911	1,949	1,976	1,952

Note: \*Surveyed countries: Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Hungary. \*\* This question has been adjusted for each country individually.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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**QUESTION 11A European integration – In your opinion, what is the current speed of building Europe?**

Please indicate on a scale where 1 is standing still, and 7 is running as fast as possible. Choose the one which best corresponds with your opinion of the current speed of building Europe.

In percent of the electorate, number of respondents in absolute terms

A	TOTAL (EU-12 COUNTRIES)*	GENDER		AGE			LEVEL OF EDUCATION		
		male	female	15 to 34	35 to 54	55 and over	low	medium	high
1 (standstill)	9.6	11.6	7.7	7.7	10.1	10.5	10.5	9.4	8.8
2	11.3	13.7	9.1	8.6	11.4	13.1	10.0	11.4	12.8
3	16.8	18.5	15.3	15.9	16.2	18.1	16.0	16.7	18.2
4	22.8	22.0	23.5	24.8	22.1	22.1	21.3	23.6	23.1
5	15.9	15.9	15.8	18.5	15.1	14.9	15.4	15.8	16.7
6	4.1	4.2	4.0	4.2	4.1	3.9	4.1	4.0	4.2
7 (running as fast as possible)	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.8	3.2	2.4	3.0	2.9	2.4
Don't know / no answer	16.8	11.3	21.9	17.4	17.9	15.2	19.9	16.2	13.9
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	23,725	11,145	12,580	6,223	9,253	8,239	5,978	10,214	7,533

B	MONTHLY NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME			PROFESSIONAL SITUATION			
	low (under € 1,500)	middle (€1,500 to under €3,000)	high (€3,000 and above)	employed	in education	retired	not working
1 (standstill)	11.2	9.1	8.9	9.3	6.8	9.4	11.6
2	11.2	11.9	12.4	11.5	9.4	13.1	9.5
3	16.5	18.6	17.3	16.6	18.6	18.2	15.3
4	22.6	23.5	24.4	23.3	25.8	22.5	21.0
5	16.7	16.8	14.8	16.6	18.5	14.3	15.5
6	4.1	4.1	4.5	4.5	3.1	4.1	3.4
7 (running as fast as possible)	3.4	2.3	3.0	2.9	1.6	2.5	3.5
Don't know / no answer	14.2	13.8	14.7	15.4	16.4	16.0	20.2
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	7,805	6,975	5,386	12,050	1,703	5,011	4,612

C	GROUP OF PARTIES					
	Christian democratic and conservative parties	Social democratic and socialist parties	Green parties	Liberal parties	Populist radical right and extreme right parties	Populist radical left and extreme left parties
1 (standstill)	7.5	5.2	5.3	4.8	16.3	10.5
2	12.1	10.0	12.6	9.6	12.2	14.2
3	17.7	17.4	20.5	18.4	15.5	19.9
4	25.8	25.1	25.1	27.8	21.0	23.4
5	18.1	17.9	15.4	23.4	14.5	16.1
6	4.5	4.8	3.7	5.8	4.5	3.3
7 (running as fast as possible)	2.1	3.4	2.8	2.1	4.5	1.7
Don't know / no answer	12.2	16.2	14.6	8.3	11.5	10.9
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	2,865	3,575	1,314	2,044	4,728	1,322



D	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy
1 (standstill)	4.2	10.9	13.5	12.1	8.2	17.7
2	5.8	18.9	13.5	17.8	7.6	14.7
3	11.6	23.9	17.0	22.9	9.3	16.4
4	25.0	22.0	15.7	24.5	16.5	20.3
5	17.4	9.8	11.2	12.3	9.2	13.9
6	5.1	1.7	3.5	1.7	2.1	3.0
7 (running as fast as possible)	4.1	1.5	3.6	0.9	2.9	2.2
Don't know / no answer	27.0	11.4	22.1	7.9	44.3	11.9
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,973	1,995	1,949	2,027	2,133	1,952

E	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Spain	Sweden	Hungary
1 (standstill)	3.6	10.9	9.8	7.5	10.1	6.9
2	6.6	16.0	8.0	9.5	9.1	8.5
3	13.6	25.6	16.3	18.2	13.7	14.2
4	26.6	26.8	26.3	27.5	18.3	24.5
5	26.4	10.0	22.9	23.2	12.1	23.1
6	8.7	1.7	6.8	4.3	3.5	7.1
7 (running as fast as possible)	3.9	1.2	2.3	1.2	2.2	7.6
Don't know / no answer	10.7	7.9	7.6	8.7	31.0	8.2
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,924	1,984	1,911	1,949	1,976	1,952

Note: \*Surveyed countries: Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Hungary.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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## QUESTION 11B European integration – And which corresponds best to the speed you would like?

Please indicate on a scale where 1 is standing still, and 7 is running as fast as possible. Choose the one which best corresponds with your opinion of the current speed of building Europe.

In percent of the electorate, number of respondents in absolute terms

A	TOTAL (EU-12 COUNTRIES)*	GENDER		AGE			LEVEL OF EDUCATION		
		male	female	15 to 34	35 to 54	55 and over	low	medium	high
1 (standstill)	3.8	5.3	2.5	2.4	4.5	4.1	4.0	3.4	4.4
2	2.8	3.5	2.1	1.7	2.9	3.4	3.0	2.8	2.5
3	5.5	6.4	4.7	5.4	5.7	5.4	4.8	6.2	5.1
4	17.5	17.2	17.7	17.5	19.0	15.9	14.9	18.6	18.6
5	24.1	24.8	23.6	24.9	24.4	23.4	20.7	25.5	26.1
6	14.5	15.6	13.5	14.2	12.5	16.7	15.0	13.7	15.3
7 (running as fast as possible)	12.8	14.1	11.6	14.3	10.9	13.7	16.2	11.0	11.6
Don't know / no answer	19.0	13.3	24.4	19.5	20.2	17.5	21.4	18.8	16.4
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	23,725	11,145	12,580	6,223	9,253	8,239	5,978	10,214	7,533

B	MONTHLY NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME			PROFESSIONAL SITUATION			
	low (under € 1,500)	middle (€1,500 to under €3,000)	high (€3,000 and above)	employed	in education	retired	not working
1 (standstill)	3.9	3.6	4.7	3.9	1.8	3.4	5.1
2	2.7	3.1	3.0	2.6	1.8	3.3	3.0
3	5.2	5.7	6.3	5.9	4.1	5.3	5.6
4	15.9	18.1	20.9	18.9	16.5	15.7	16.6
5	23.4	25.2	27.1	25.7	26.3	23.8	20.1
6	15.9	16.2	12.3	13.8	17.1	17.0	12.5
7 (running as fast as possible)	16.9	12.0	9.2	11.3	15.4	13.6	14.6
Don't know / no answer	16.2	16.3	16.6	17.8	17.1	18.1	22.5
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	7,805	6,975	5,386	12,050	1,703	5,011	4,612

C	GROUP OF PARTIES					
	Christian democratic and conservative parties	Social democratic and socialist parties	Green parties	Liberal parties	Populist radical right and extreme right parties	Populist radical left and extreme left parties
1 (standstill)	3.0	1.7	0.7	1.0	8.2	3.4
2	2.1	1.7	1.2	2.7	5.0	1.7
3	5.6	5.5	5.1	5.5	7.3	4.2
4	20.5	17.4	20.9	17.0	17.4	16.6
5	27.0	25.4	30.6	30.9	22.1	24.7
6	17.4	16.7	14.8	18.3	12.9	19.2
7 (running as fast as possible)	11.1	14.9	11.8	15.3	13.1	16.1
Don't know / no answer	13.3	16.8	15.0	9.3	14.0	14.2
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	2,865	3,575	1,314	2,044	4,728	1,322

D	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Denmark	Germany	France	Greece	United Kingdom	Italy
1 (standstill)	5.1	3.7	5.3	3.3	6.5	4.6
2	3.3	2.4	3.2	2.6	2.6	3.0
3	6.7	5.8	3.4	5.5	4.1	4.8
4	22.7	22.3	14.1	15.5	14.3	15.0
5	22.0	29.5	21.8	23.0	15.8	21.5
6	7.5	14.9	10.3	22.5	5.8	15.9
7 (running as fast as possible)	4.0	6.8	14.4	17.7	5.6	21.6
Don't know / no answer	28.7	14.7	27.5	10.0	45.3	13.6
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,973	1,995	1,949	2,027	2,133	1,952

E	SURVEYED COUNTRIES					
	Netherlands	Austria	Poland	Spain	Sweden	Hungary
1 (standstill)	3.6	2.6	2.5	1.0	4.9	2.8
2	3.7	3.1	3.1	0.7	3.5	2.4
3	6.7	6.5	7.9	2.0	7.2	5.6
4	21.9	22.6	18.2	8.1	21.6	13.3
5	30.8	33.5	28.8	20.9	18.8	23.8
6	14.2	14.6	17.7	25.9	7.0	18.8
7 (running as fast as possible)	5.8	7.9	11.7	32.4	4.7	21.7
Don't know / no answer	13.3	9.3	10.2	9.1	32.3	11.6
Weighted basis	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of respondents	1,924	1,984	1,911	1,949	1,976	1,952

Note: \*Surveyed countries: Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Hungary.

Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

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