From Fragmentation to Integration:

Towards a "Whole-of-Society" Approach to Receiving and Settling Newcomers in Europe

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Executive Summary

Europe's migration crisis erupted against a backdrop of persistent integration challenges. Over the last few decades, most European countries have grappled with disappointing socioeconomic and civic engagement outcomes for some immigrants and their children, despite huge investments and a fair amount of experimentation. Meanwhile, social cohesion – in many ways the essence of successful integration – has been eroded by anxiety about rapidly changing communities and the perceived effects this change has on national and cultural identities. The most recent flows have fuelled these anxieties further, and have made integration issues even more pertinent.

As a result, the prognosis for efforts that seek to successfully integrate newcomers is uncertain. The diversity and scale of inflows, large numbers of unaccompanied minors, and significant (mental) health needs of newcomers is putting further pressure on already stretched public services. In addition, many of the newest arrivals face additional difficulties entering and succeeding in local labour markets due to limited education, poor host-country language proficiency (and, in many cases, illiteracy in their own language), and skills and experience that do not meet the needs of local employers.

The stakes for economic, social and cultural integration could not be higher. Countries need to both support people on the pathway to work, especially work that holds opportunities for skills development and upward mobility; they also need to create the conditions for intercultural and intergenerational relationships to flourish. And they need to ensure that newcomers feel a part of the collective 'we', while encouraging existing communities to feel part of the collective project of receiving and settling new arrivals.

Although the paths to pursuing these goals will differ, the following principles should stand most countries – and communities – in good stead not just for this crisis, but also for the next one:

1. Adopt a work-focused approach to integration that also supports social integration. Work is the most direct route to broader integration. Newcomers should be encouraged to enter employment as soon as possible, filling skill gaps as they gain valuable host-country experience (through part-time, flexible, and distance learning options where appropriate). However, traditional jobs will not be the right vehicle for everyone. Voluntary work may be more fitting for people caring for family members, while self-employment (including through digital platforms) and entrepreneurship can shortcut the path to employment for both the high- and low-skilled. Government agencies and service providers will need to collaborate to ensure that labour market integration policies further social integration and vice versa.

2. Systematically engage the "whole of society" in integration efforts. Civil society and the private sector are indispensable partners to government. The last year has seen a flurry of activity from these sectors, including from new actors such as the tech industry (an important driving force behind the private-sector summit that followed the UN Refugee Summits in September 2016). To translate this energy into real outcomes, governments need to work closely with key partners to ramp

up their efforts. For businesses, this means moving beyond 'corporate social responsibility' to build lasting partnerships that align with their long-term economic interests. For social entrepreneurs, it means working with individuals and companies to see the best of their bright ideas develop into mainstream integration services, not just small projects. Harnessing the ideas and enthusiasm of social partners writ large, both old and new, could help solve complex social challenges, create and cultivate new forms of social capital, and encourage communities to feel a sense of ownership in receiving and supporting newcomers.

3. Manage social change and regain public trust. With large numbers of the most recent newcomers thought to share cultural and religious norms out of the mainstream, it is important that the concerns of receiving communities are not belittled or sidelined. Governments of all levels should provide space for members of the public to discuss their concerns. Countries that frame immigration as a core part of the national narrative – part of who 'we' are, not just something happening 'to' us – are more successful in defusing natural anxiety about the pace of change. But communication is not everything: governments will also need to ensure that policies and programming are attuned to broader societal needs, so they are not perceived to favour newcomers over other members of the community.

The lull in flows has allowed countries to catch their breath, but now is the time for strategic planning and experimentation, not complacency. Policymakers need to develop and articulate goals, setting out their plans and how they will implement them, and agreeing on how they will measure progress. It is also vital that governments start producing and sharing high-quality evidence, particularly if they wish to encourage new players to shoulder some of the burden. Finally, they will need to experiment and innovate in a more rapid, dynamic way – both to generate new ideas and to bring the most effective programmes to scale.

While the recent migration crisis deepened and broadened existing integration challenges in Europe, it has also attracted the political, social, and economic capital to finally address these issues and set countries on new paths. The decisions being made now will shape not only the integration outcomes for the most recent newcomers, but the ways we think about and experience integration for decades to come. As superdiversity and hypermobility become the water in which we all swim, countries will have to develop responses that have flexibility and adaptation – 'learning-by-doing' – at their core. These characteristics are also at the heart of resilience which, in turn, contributes to community robustness and a more inclusive future.

1 Introduction

Europe is mired in a period of deep uncertainty and fragmentation. The UK referendum vote to leave the European Union cast light on widening polarisation across Europe – between cosmopolitan urbanites and residents of suburban and rural communities, between young and old, and between the winners and losers of globalisation (writ large). In recent years, the rise of populist, anti-elite, and far right movements and parties has revealed deep frustration, and even anger, with the European project. Meanwhile, flashpoints over cultural tensions and the cost of – and, in some countries, competition for – scarce resources have been tied (not always accurately) to the social and economic impacts of immigration. With some countries still plagued by sluggish economies and the continued effects of austerity policies, the causes of people's discontent are complex and far-reaching. But immigration has become the mast to which an array of concerns is pinned.[1]

This is the stage on which the biggest migration crisis[2] since the Second World War is playing out. With the lull in numbers of asylum seekers crossing the Eastern Mediterranean following the closure of the Balkan route and the EU-Turkey deal, there is a sense that the fever has broken. But symptoms of the crisis continue to unfold and deepen across the region. Countries of arrival and transit on Europe's periphery, already struggling economically, are facing processing backlogs. The countries that have received most newcomers are contending with bottlenecks in their social services as they strive to house, care for, and educate needy populations. And communities across the region are grappling with the fast pace with which their neighbourhoods are changing.

In some quarters, there is hope that newcomers will bring dynamism and vital skills, especially to regions with rapidly ageing populations and a shrinking new worker pipeline. But history teaches us that supporting new arrivals (especially those from rural backgrounds or with limited education) into good jobs is hard – and costly. These newest cohorts are entering labour markets at a time of intense flux: most advanced industrial societies are likely to require better skilled and fewer workers in the future, due in part to innovations in labour-saving technologies.

This policy brief examines the challenges and opportunities both for the most recent cohorts of migrants and refugees and the countries and communities in which they settle.[3] It begins by analysing what is known about integration, and then considers the implications for the most recent migration crisis. It then analyses three promising policy approaches and makes concrete recommendations for where there is a clear case for government action. It concludes by setting out some additional interventions that policymakers should consider, regardless of whether they subscribe to the three overarching approaches.

[1] For a discussion of the drivers of anxiety about immigration, see Papademetriou & Banulescu-Bogdan (2016).

[2] Since the crisis is both a 'migrant crisis' and a 'refugee crisis', this brief uses the phrase 'migration crisis' to best capture the fact that these are mixed flows.

[3] Although this brief focuses on newly arrived refugees, the latest arrivals in Europe are mixed flows. Moreover, many of the challenges faced by humanitarian arrivals are shared by migrants arriving for family unification.

2 Integration: Challenges New and Old

Integration is a highly contested policy terrain. This is reflected in the extensive debates about the appropriate focus, scope, and even goals of integration policy. Yet despite widely divergent immigration histories, most countries have had to contend with a core set of cultural, social, and economic integration challenges.

Most of these challenges were exacerbated, but not caused, by the migration crisis. Many countries were facing rising social tensions, erupting in flashpoints over cultural and religious symbols and practices, before arrivals across the Mediterranean began to increase. With many communities still recovering from the global recession, the sovereign debt crisis, and prolonged austerity programmes, the scale and pace of the migration crisis put pressure on already-strained public services and increased competition for scarce resources. And the highly concentrated nature of migration flows – with asylum seekers visible in stations, streets, and city centres – deepened the perception that the impacts of globalization and immigration are asymmetrical and that social change is proceeding at a relentless and uncontrollable pace.

2.1 What We Have Learned – Europe's Integration History

Perhaps above all else, Europe's experience with post-World War II migration shows that integration takes time. Some of the most significant challenges have included:

- **Slow progress into work.** Foreign-born migrants in the European Union are disadvantaged across numerous indicators, including employment rates, labour market participation, and job quality. Although newcomers make progress in entering work the longer they are in the host country, they remain overrepresented in low-skilled work even after a decade of residence – and employment gaps do not disappear for certain groups (namely women and people who come through humanitarian and family routes). Visible minorities are also particularly disadvantaged in the labour market; people with a combination of these characteristics (e.g. Muslim women) are thus highly vulnerable.[4]
- **Underemployment and brain waste.** Skilled migrants often face systemic barriers to accessing work for which they were trained. Migrants with a university degree are over 10 percentage points less likely to be in work relative to similarly educated natives in Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden (OECD, 2015a). Despite progress recognising qualifications,[5] newcomers face limited opportunities to plug gaps where home- and host-country education

[4] For an overview of the evidence, see Papademetriou & Benton (2016).

[5] For instance, Germany's Recognition Act of April 2012 provides all applicants with qualifications attained abroad with a legal right to receive an evaluation and decision on whether their qualifications are equivalent. The IQ Network ('Integration through Qualification' or 'Integration durch Qualifizierung') aims to increase recognition rates, including through counselling for jobseekers. See Rietig (2016). However, not all EU Member States have transposed the relevant legislation into national laws, and the European Commission has launched infringement proceedings against a number of countries.

systems do not easily map onto one another. These challenges are not limited to Europe; in the United States, almost a quarter of college-educated immigrants are un- or underemployed (Zong & Batalova, 2016).

- **Intergenerational disadvantage and social exclusion.** Almost a quarter of young people in Western Europe now have a migration background (a similar proportion to the one in the United States).[6] Ultimately, the real test of integration is whether these children of immigrants have the tools to thrive. Young people of migration background are more susceptible to being NEET (not in education, employment or training), to leaving school early, and to being underrepresented in higher education.[7] A significant concern in recent years has been the role of social exclusion in 'home grown' extremism among the second generation. Although the links between socio-economic deprivation and vulnerability to radicalisation are complex, the marginalisation of young people of migrant background is cause for deep concern – and a factor exacerbating anxiety about immigration.
- **Anxiety about changing national identity and culture.** Large-scale immigration has rendered questions of national identity more salient – and perceived threats to it more destabilising. This is particularly true in the case of influxes of visibly or religiously different minorities, who bring cultural norms that are seen as incompatible with European values and the societal 'ethos'. Governments have wavered on how best to approach cultural and civic integration, experimenting with outright restrictions on certain practices (including the most recent burkini bans in France) to more lenient forms of accommodation – but no country has yet succeeded in diffusing the anxieties that these changes bring. Segregation of ethnic and religious communities in neighbourhoods, schools, and prisons is both a driver of anxiety and a factor hindering the success of those cut off from the benefits that social interactions can bring.

2.2 The 'Migration Crisis' and Integration

Against this backdrop, the migration crisis that began in earnest in 2015 intensified many of these social, economic, and cultural cleavages. Initially, there was considerable optimism that newcomers would bring in-demand skills, in response to largely anecdotal reports that their educational levels were higher than previous cohorts of refugees. Angela Merkel's high profile message that Germany was open to refugees, for instance, was seen by many as a win-win, signalling the country's role as a humanitarian leader while helping meet its rising demographic and skills needs. But emerging evidence suggests that many newcomers lack the education, skills, and experience that are in demand in European knowledge economies. The political backlash in Germany has undermined the

[6] In the EU-15, 14% of the 15-34 age group arrived in childhood or has at least one foreign-born parent, and a further 10% arrived as adults. In the United States, 24.5% of the population are first- or second-generation immigrants (children and adults).

[7] Children of two foreign-born migrants are more likely to leave school early than native and mixed children – especially in Belgium and Germany where they are almost twice as likely to do so (Eurostat, 2011). But there is considerable variation across Europe, with the second generation in the United Kingdom performing much better on educational indicators (both higher education and early school leaving).

remarkable sense of unity in offering a welcome to refugees, illuminating a simmering resentment among many, especially in certain areas of the country.

The migration crisis has deepened integration challenges in a number of ways:

- **Scale.** The scale, pace, and persistence of the crisis pose large challenges to traditional countries of immigration and new destinations alike. Major receiving countries such as Germany and Sweden saw their populations increase by over 1.5%.[8] And even in countries that saw relatively small absolute numbers, the rate of change was unprecedented.[9] The seemingly unexpected nature of these flows and the fact that, until recently, there seemed to be no end in sight, has exacerbated public anxiety about immigration further.
- **Capacity and processing challenges.** In many countries, the scale and pace of the flows has overwhelmed the capacity of asylum processing and integration institutions. Insufficient housing for new arrivals means that asylum seekers are often initially housed away from economic centres (and job opportunities). Or, if they choose to house themselves, they crowd into substandard accommodation designed for far fewer people, contributing to neighbourhood tensions. Disagreements over capacity issues have also strained relationships between national and local governments, and overturned fragile burden-sharing agreements.[10]
- **Additional health and protection needs.** Having undertaken protracted and arduous journeys, many asylum seekers arrive with significant health needs. The large number of unaccompanied minors, in particular, brings considerable challenges. With specific protection, supervision, and housing needs, young people travelling alone can't be supported through traditional integration services. Migrants who arrive as teens, often with limited or interrupted schooling, struggle to catch up with their peers.[11] And many children go missing in the system and are vulnerable to exploitation.[12]
- **Mixed economic prospects.** Since non-labour migrants to Europe, for the most part, come from countries with underdeveloped education systems, the relatively high education levels of many

[8] In 2015, nearly 1.1 million people registered their intention to claim asylum in Germany, equivalent to more than 1.25% of its population. However, registration numbers can double count some people if they register in more than one place, or if they have since moved on. In fact, the German Interior Ministry has indicated that the total number for 2015 stood at slightly under 900,000. Sweden received 162,550 asylum applications (equivalent to 1.7% of its population). Hungary, whose government has been openly anti-immigration, received 177,135 applications in 2015, equivalent to 1.8% of its population (Migration Policy Institute, 2016).

[9] For instance, Finland saw an increase in first-time asylum applications from 3,620 in 2014 to 32,345 in 2015, an increase of nearly 800%. See Saukkonen (2016).

[10] These tensions came to a head in Sweden, where a controversial new law makes distribution among municipalities mandatory. The system in Sweden was traditionally voluntary, but as of 2016 all municipalities are required to pull their weight and a distribution formula will be introduced from 2017.

[11] For instance, unaccompanied minors increased by 400% in Sweden between 2014 and 2015 (Migrationsverket, 2016).

[12] In January, Europol reported than 10,000 unaccompanied minors had gone missing, and potentially been exploited by trafficking networks (Townsend, 2016).

Syrians was initially a cause for optimism. However, the stereotype of the highly qualified Syrian engineer may be simplistic. Recent studies from Austria and Germany have reported that between one-third and slightly more than half of Syrians have at least an upper secondary degree.[13] However, many newcomers – and almost half of Afghans – have almost no education at all.[14] This diversity of education levels makes it all the more important for countries to have early systems for identifying skills and needs. And since some newcomers lack basic numeracy and literacy skills even in their own language, they face limited chances in host-country labour markets without huge investments in skills training.

This analysis of the most recent arrivals, coupled with Europe's existing integration challenges, points to a number of priorities for policymakers: narrowing the gap between arrival and work (while ensuring that job opportunities have potential for upward mobility and don't contribute to brain waste), ensuring that those unable to work have other opportunities to contribute, and regaining public trust and restoring community cohesion.

3 Policy Approaches

For all of the reasons described in the previous section, Europe is facing greater integration challenges than ever before. Addressing these will require intensive, up-front investments that balance evidence and evaluation-led approaches with experiments to find new solutions – and partnerships with new actors.

This section outlines a number of the big questions policymakers are facing and highlights promising approaches to overcome these challenges. While not every country will be able to do everything, adherence to these broad principles will put them on the right path to weather this and future crises in their own way.

3.1 Developing Work-Focused Policies that Support Social Integration

The greatest challenge facing European countries is narrowing the gaps between arrival and economic self-sufficiency. Work is a direct route to broader integration, and public confidence on immigration and integration systems – not to mention the long-term sustainability of welfare systems – depends on a greater number of newcomers entering work quickly.

[13] According to the Displaced Persons in Austria Survey, 53% of Syrians had a post-secondary or upper-secondary qualification, compared to 29% of Afghans and 46% of Iraqis (Vienna Institute of Demography, 2016). The most recent cohorts of Syrians to Germany appear to have lower levels of education and limited work experience. In Germany, 31% of asylum seekers who arrived in 2014 and supplied 'voluntary information' about their education had a post-secondary or upper secondary education (OECD, 2015b). Of course, self-reporting is always highly problematic.

[14] In Austria, around 30% of Afghans have only a primary level education (Bernstein, 2016).

In many countries, the structure of initial integration programmes encourages newly arrived refugees (and often family arrivals) to attain a minimum level of linguistic and cultural fluency before actively seeking work. This approach to investing in newcomers is well-meaning and takes seriously the risk of underemployment and brain waste – which can, in turn, undermine social integration when high-skilled migrants feel frustrated by their inability to practice in their field or to build a meaningful professional network. But the balance will need to be struck much closer to 'work first', even if this means that newcomers have to learn the local language (and close skills gaps) on the job.

This approach will not be right for everyone. Policies that aim to create incentives to work can have perverse consequences for *social integration*. Restricting high quality training programmes to job-seekers, for instance, can exclude women caring for children from learning the language. 'Activation' policies (that make receiving benefits conditional on certain behaviour, such as active job-seeking or participation in training) can make people destitute or push them into the informal economy. Governments may thus need to manage their expectations vis-à-vis recent arrivals. They will also need to ensure that labour market integration policies support social integration goals, and vice versa by improving governance mechanisms for coordination.[15]

To make a 'work first' approach most effective, policymakers should consider the following:

- **Develop early systems for identifying needs.** Most countries reserve the most intensive services for legal migrants and those granted protection to avoid investing in people who are then required to leave. Still, it is important to develop systems that at the very least map skills and experience for all newcomers and provide access to creative methods for assessing competence for people who lack (or can't prove) formal qualifications.[16]
- **Make it possible to develop skills on the job.** Many migrants and refugees are keen to enter work as soon as possible, even if this means taking a job at a lower skill level than their education and training. Improving the availability of part-time, flexible, and distance learning – as well as creating incentives for employers to invest in their newcomer workforce – is essential to avoiding low-skilled work becoming 'sticky'. Bridging programmes, which provide opportunities to gain experience at the bottom of the ladder in a sector consistent with one's training while plugging gaps in skills and experience, are the gold standard in this regard.[17]

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[15] Promising governance structures include Austria's strategic plan for the integration of asylum seekers, which suggests ways to align services – such as by providing parents with language classes while their children are at kindergarten (Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, 2015). Portugal has also prepared for the arrival of newcomers by setting up an interministerial and multilevel working group to coordinate the reception of resettled refugees.

[16] The most effective practices include assessment techniques and on-the-job assessment, but these are costly in both time and resources.

[17] For instance, Canada has pioneered bridging courses for newly arrived migrants (enabling them to get experience at the bottom of the ladder in the vocation for which they have been trained, while plugging gaps in their qualifications). In Sweden, bridging courses for professionals, including health professionals, teachers, and lawyers, have had a positive impact on employment outcomes and wages (Niknami & Schroder, 2014). See Desiderio (2016) for an overview of bridging and fast track courses in different countries.

- **Prepare service providers to advise about alternative forms of work.** Voluntary, freelance, remote, and part-time work are all valid (if shorter-term) alternatives to a traditional job, and may provide greater opportunities for social integration (including language learning) than low-skilled work. These routes may be less immediately obvious to service providers, and may conflict with other goals (such as protecting existing workers).[18] Supporting newcomers into voluntary work – especially where it mitigates pressures on public services, such as elder care – can be a win-win for communities under strain from ageing populations, nurture intergenerational and intercultural relationships, and improve the skills and language proficiency of new arrivals.
- **Remove the barriers to self-employment.** Entrepreneurship can act as a fast track to self-sufficiency for both newcomers *and* those with limited prospects in local labour markets. But starting a business is often beset with challenges, not the least of which is accessing credit and navigating complex bureaucracy. Governments can provide mentoring, incubator and accelerator support, and financing.[19]

3.2 Building a "Whole-of-Society" Integration System

Top-down integration policies have limited potential to genuinely shift the needle when it comes to the integration of newcomers. Governments can't solve complex social challenges alone, and initiatives driven by non-governmental actors (including refugees and migrants themselves) are more likely to be seen as a collective project rather than something imposed from above. Harnessing the energy and enthusiasm of civil society, communities, and employers is therefore critical both to the long-term resilience and wellbeing of societies, and to ensuring that significant government investments in newcomers bear fruit.

The 2015-2016 period saw an explosion of energy and enthusiasm from civil society, ranging from large numbers of people volunteering or offering newcomers their spare rooms, to private companies offering donations, both financial and in-kind. A number of large U.S. firms have pledged to donate considerable sums of money, or to match donations, through the White House partnership programme. And the recent private sector pledges around the United Nations General Assembly Summit for Refugees and Migrants were impressive, with 51 companies pledging more than $650 million (though $500 million of that was the commitment of a single individual).[20] But integration

[18] Uber, for instance, has attracted controversy for encouraging precarious work while undercutting local taxi firms. Still, such jobs can combine a fast-track to work with the opportunity to speak to locals, and are often flexible enough to allow migrants to pursue education or training programmes.

[19] Promising policy interventions in this area include mentoring and training (such as the start-up classes run in German and Arabic by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Berlin) and incubators and accelerators (that provide support identifying funding and office space). For instance, This Foreigner Can is a 16-week migrant business accelerator that selects talented entrepreneurs for a training programme to develop and scale their businesses in return for equity. See Desiderio (2014) for an overview of the barriers, and Desiderio (2016) for an overview of the latest efforts to overcome these.

[20] This pledge was made by financier and philanthropist George Soros, whose focus is on supporting businesses and social enterprises founded by refugees and migrants.

programmes to directly hire migrants are still largely small-scale and connected to employers who see hiring refugees as their corporate social responsibility, rather than a genuinely business-savvy/ cost-effective proposition.[21] Policymakers thus face the challenge of institutionalizing much bigger partnerships and enlisting the big players as a way to offer thousands instead of dozens of high value apprenticeships.

The huge amount of social and technological innovation in recent months also shows promise for overcoming barriers to accessing services for vulnerable groups or engaging communities.[22] Unlike traditional government (or even civil society) actors, tech and social entrepreneurs respond quickly, collaborate easily across borders and seek to involve refugees and migrants in the design and delivery of new innovations.[23] However, the speed of the innovation community response has been a double-edged sword, with numerous tools developed that don't meet user needs, connect with mainstream services, or adhere to minimal security and privacy requirements (Benton & Glennie, 2016). As a result, policymakers face the challenge of fostering experimentation and engaging these groups while encouraging greater evaluation and sharing of what works.

To ensure that whole-of-society efforts are high value and at a scale that matters, policymakers will need to:

- **Broker new partnerships with investors and employers.** The most effective initiatives encourage employers to engage beyond their corporate social responsibility arms and recalibrate the calculus for hiring newcomers. A promising model in this area is Social Impact Bonds (SIBs), which combine private investment (often in areas where it is difficult to find the political will for public investment), delivery by non-governmental actors (who are given the freedom to experiment), and public payments only if certain results are achieved (which reduces the risk for governments).[24]
- **Engage social entrepreneurs in designing and delivering integration services.** Governments can engage a wider constituency in generating ideas through social challenge prizes or open

[21] For instance, Siemens in partnership with the city of Erlangen, Germany, has a programme offering paid internships to degree-holding asylum seekers with good English or German proficiency, which includes workplace orientation, skills assessment, and training.

[22] Digital tools have been created for translation, language training, navigating public services, connecting refugees with people with spare rooms, earning money without identity documents or a bank account, and learning to code. See Benton & Glennie (2016) for an overview of these across the migration continuum.

[23] For instance, many of the new intensive coding schools have built their business model around recruiting refugee programme graduates to return as mentors or teachers.

[24] For instance, the Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy is partnering with the foundation Sitra to improve immigrants' training opportunities. The programme will involve on-the-job, language, professional skills, and cultural training. It aims to get participants into work within four months after training has begun, and the government will only pay if this goal is met – with investors carrying the risk (Sitra, 2016).

competitions, and support and scale what works through follow-on funding and incubation.[25] Giving the best solutions the chance to win public contracts to deliver services will be the most robust pathway to realizing these alternative models on any significant scale; supporting young companies to grow can also help fuel economic growth.

- **Encourage promising initiatives to measure their own impact.** Since many non-governmental programmes are extremely small-scale, they often lack the resources (and often inclination) to undertake proper impact investment, and any assessments of impact are often skewed by selection biases (because participants tend to be more motivated or better qualified to begin with). Governments could support promising initiatives to measure their own impact, understand what good evidence looks like, and disseminate lessons more widely and systematically.

3.3 Managing Social Change and Regaining Public Trust

Successful integration is critical to improving public trust in the management of immigration and its consequences. Across Europe, the persistent belief that government is unequal to the task of managing immigration well – exacerbated by the perception that the asylum process is being misused, local infrastructure is being overwhelmed, and long-cherished cultural and societal norms are being questioned – has poisoned the well of policy innovation (Papademetriou, 2016). Even countries with a long and proud tradition of welcoming refugees, such as Sweden, have had to confront the question of whether there are limits to their generosity.

Part of the challenge is that the most recent migration flows have not affected all parts of Europe – or even all parts of a single country – evenly.[26] Countries like Hungary that have received large volumes of non-labour migrants suddenly have had to contend with little preparation and the fact that such migration was in direct contradiction to stated policy goals of immigration control. As a result, Hungary has felt imposed upon and seen strong reactions to migration. The fact that

[25] Examples of where challenge prizes have been used in the field of immigrant integration include the European Commission Social Innovation Competition, which in 2016 focused on refugee and migrant integration, and the IKEA Foundation Design Challenge, a partnership between IKEA and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to encourage designers and creatives to develop innovative solutions for receiving and integrating refugees in urban areas.

[26] The challenges and responses discussed in this paper focus on the national dimension. The 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, the global protection system, and the extensive global efforts needed to address this challenge are beyond the scope of this discussion. But it is worth noting that clearly these trends are happening against the backdrop of more muscular efforts to build a multilateral response, with the UN General Assembly Summit on Migrants and Refugees taking place in September 2016. President Obama's Leaders' Summit on Refugees on the margins of this meeting was also an important step to increasing the attention and resources in the global protection system, raising a further $4.5 billion over 2015 levels and doubling the number of resettlement places offered worldwide. However, it remains to be seen how much difference it will make. The precedent set by previous donor conferences is that some of the money pledged had often already been committed, and promises are not always fulfilled. See Papademetriou & Fratzke (2016) for an analysis of the reasons for both optimism and pessimism following the Summits, and see Papademetriou & Benton (2016) for an overview of the money on the table thus far for the Valetta EU/Africa Summit on Migration in 2015, and the London Syrian Donors Conference in 2016.

Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán has seen political opportunity in talking up the issue has contributed further to many Hungarians' sense of loss of control. On the other side of the spectrum, extraordinary shows of generosity have been seen in countries like Portugal (or subnational regions like Catalonia), which feel they have untapped capacity to welcome more refugees, and are actively trying to find more pathways to receive them.

On difficult and divisive issues, such as immigration, it is always important to listen to the public and give them an opportunity to air their views. The following guidance is important in that regard:

- **Create an inclusive national narrative around immigration.** Countries that frame immigration as a core part of the national narrative – part of who 'we' are, not just something happening 'to' us – are more successful in defusing natural anxiety about the pace of change.
- **Avoid targeted programmes that can be perceived as unfair.** Policymakers must be careful to avoid the appearance that immigrants are receiving more support than native-born individuals by ensuring that *everyone* is positioned for success. Many of the smartest investments for newly arrived migrants and refugees will also hold value for other disadvantaged groups. For instance, public employment services that are equipped to give advice about retraining to meet the needs of the local jobs market (instead of largely serving low-skilled jobseekers and performing the function of gatekeeper for benefits) are likely to benefit older workers who have lost their jobs, young people who are unable to gain a foothold in the labour market, and migrants and refugees alike.
- **Make the public feel its concerns have been heard.** Acknowledging concerns and creating political space for members of the public to express doubts about immigration and migration policies – in mainstream rather than just extremist circles – can go a long way towards tempering frustration. Moreover, politicians need to cease treating integration and protection as two separate priorities, and to be much clearer in their public statements about the core tradeoffs that are being made. Managing public expectations and tapping into the public's moral consciousness and sense of solidarity instead of feeding the flames of polarisation and division – and confronting issues head on and explaining why certain choices are being made – is particularly important.

4 Conclusions and Recommendations

The migration crisis brought into sharp focus significant difficulties European countries face in receiving and processing newcomers. These challenges have often seemed to exhaust the capacity of national and local governments to craft thoughtful, forward-thinking integration programmes. The number of daily arrivals has abated – at least for the moment – but in many ways the real work has only begun. Instead of breathing a sigh of relief, policymakers should be using this time to make choices: about where to make investments in the next two to three years, how muscular they wish to be in their approach, and, most crucially, what kind of societies they wish to operate in 15 to 20 years' time.

This is also the time for realism. Policymakers need to decide what their priorities are, and what 'good enough' strategies for integration look like. For some of the most disadvantaged groups in recent cohorts, convergence with natives on socioeconomic outcomes may not be an attainable goal. But perfection should not be the enemy of good: these groups should still have the opportunity to learn the language of their new homes, have flourishing lives and families, and benefit from the opportunity to participate in and contribute to society. Opportunities for realising social integration even in the absence of traditional labour market integration should be top of the agenda for such discussions and initiatives.

Three concepts should inspire these efforts:

- **Strategy.** This period of calm following the ebb in arrivals should be one of reflection, not complacency. Policymakers should clearly develop and articulate goals, and identify collective milestones to evaluate progress across different policy areas and on different timescales. The choices governments make now will shape how strong societies will be in the coming decades.
- **Evaluation.** Many countries have become better at measuring and understanding what works, but more extensive evaluation – including with high quality evidence that uses a control group – and data sharing is needed to ensure that investments today succeed and are cost-effective over the long run. Governments must thus strike a balance between responding quickly and responding thoughtfully. Collecting and evaluating evidence – and, critically, adapting systems based on this – must become an integral part of the policymaking ethos.
- **Innovation.** New technologies offer promising ways to speed the integration process – from tools that offer newcomers a chance to plug skills gaps quickly to digital platforms that mobilise the energy and resources of the public. The main challenge is how to extend what works to a much, much larger scale. Greater collaboration between employers, civil society, tech entrepreneurs, the wider public, and governments (at all levels) is essential to deepen and strengthen Europe's ability to address – and even solve – integration challenges today and in the future.

Integration policy as we know and speak about it is constantly evolving. This evolution is hinted at by mainstreaming, but goes way beyond: superdiversity and hypermobility will likely define all of our futures. With this adjustment will come a number of linguistic and policy shifts. We are set to move away from narrow concepts of integration and community cohesion, and towards a richer and more inclusive, yet perhaps more realistic, objective in which a constantly changing 'we' creates ever more robust and resilient communities.

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