In a Nutshell

Just How Resilient are OECD and EU Countries?

Sustainable Governance in the Context of the COVID-19 Crisis

Christof Schiller, Thorsten Hellmann, Helene Schüle,
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BertelsmannStiftung

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along with additional graphics, are available at
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In a Nutshell

Resilience of Democracy

In states where freedom of the press, civil and political rights, the independence of the judiciary and core democratic values were subject to erosion even before the crisis, these worrying developments became further entrenched as a result of actions taken in the name of battling the coronavirus crisis. However, those countries classified as democratically resilient proved able, for the most part, to demonstrate their resilience, even during the crisis. In Turkey, Hungary, 94, Mexico and Croatia, efforts to hollow out key democratic institutions have only continued during the crisis. In addition, the pressure placed on media professionals increased significantly in these countries. The ability of the courts to monitor the legality of measures taken by these state's governments has also been curbed even further. All of the other states in our sample also placed significant restrictions on political freedoms and civil liberties in order to contain the spread of the coronavirus. In this respect, the first year of the pandemic serves as a litmus test for whether elected governments are se-

FIGURE 1 **Democracy 2020 and Resilience of Democracy 2021**



Score: standardized, 1-10
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators

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rious about commitments to restoring these rights at the first possible opportunity during an acute crisis. Whether attempts to effectively compensate for these restrictions have been made is, however, also relevant. It is thus a matter of the proportionality of restrictions introduced (see Fig. 1).

Only eight states in our sample have succeeded in demonstrating a high degree of credibility with regard to the proportionality of the restrictions placed on political freedoms and civil liberties. In Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, Estonia, Greece, Portugal and the United Kingdom, our experts found the leadership in these countries to have made particularly credible commitments to lifting the restrictions placed on political freedoms and civil liberties at the first available opportunity. In many of these states, the decisions made were based on clear legal principles that in many cases featured mandatory exit clauses and were subject to regular judicial and legislative review. Restrictions placed on political and civil liberties are particularly problematic if they are influenced by political self-interest and are applied only to certain groups. This was the case in Poland, where restrictions on the freedom to demonstrate were interpreted differently for different groups and different kinds of public protest. The state of civil and political rights has also worsened in Hungary and Turkey, where governments exploited the coronavirus crisis to introduce tighter restrictions.

An important measure of the quality of a country's democratic culture is the ability of its political leadership to engage in compromise. In 10 of the countries we surveyed, political polarization posed a significant obstacle either within the policymaking process or later in the coordination and implementation of key crisis-response measures. Particularly at the beginning of the pandemic, we observed a high degree of cooperation between various political actors in many countries – including those featuring a highly polarized party landscape – that was manifest in short-term support for the government's course of action in a "rally around the flag" effect. However, this changed as the pandemic continued. In Belgium, Estonia, France, Spain, Turkey, Israel, Poland, Hungary, Mexico and the United States, failures to bridge partisan divides slowed progress in controlling the pandemic.

FIGURE 2 **Resilience of Democracy**



Score: standardized, 1-10
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators

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Resilience of Governance

Having resilient democratic institutions and processes as well as a resilient rule of law are thus important when it comes to responding capably to a crisis. However, highly resilient democratic institutions are a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective policy performance. States with high quality of democracy scores in the SGI 2020 have therefore generally proved more successful in terms of their crisis preparedness and response (see Fig. 3).

Nonetheless, there are clearly several states which, despite their robust democratic institutions, fall short in terms of delivering crisis-resilient economic and social policies. Thus, in addition to the quality of democracy, the sustainability and effectiveness of governance capabilities is equally important to a state's continued viability. This relates first to the quality of the existing crisis-management system itself. Second, a government's ability to successfully manage a crisis depends on criteria such as the ability to effectively formulate a crisis response, establish a functioning crisis-monitoring system, wage a clear crisis communication campaign and implement political measures. Third, both citizens and civil society must be empowered to monitor and influence the development of policies on an ongoing basis.

In retrospect, however, with the exception of South Korea, none of the countries we examined were adequately prepared in terms of their administrative crisis management and preparedness systems to deal with a public health crisis on the scale of the COVID-19 pandemic. Almost all countries, for example, did not have enough medical equipment for the pandemic at the beginning of the crisis. Of particular concern is the fact that in many cases, there was no clear allocation of competencies among the authorities involved in the event of a crisis. Instead, in nearly every country surveyed, we saw a lack of clarity in terms of who was responsible for what as well as a lack of experience with the channels of communication, which resulted in serious problems with coordination between authorities at different levels of government. This proved to pose a particular challenge to nearly all federally organized states which, however, were by no means the only ones to struggle with such problems. Countries with more centralized political systems such as the United Kingdom, Estonia, Italy and Japan also found it difficult to coordinate the central government's response to the crisis with that of regional governments. Looking forward, in order to strengthen their response to future crises, all states will need to subject their individual crisis architecture to regular evaluation and stress tests. Ensuring that such efforts have an impact, however, will require that the actors involved be provided a clear mandate and timetable, for example, so that they can provide the leadership binding

FIGURE 3 **Policy Performance 2021 and Democracy 2020**



Score: standardized, 1-10
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators

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recommendations for improvements to the crisis architecture. Maintaining a transparent evaluation process is also important.

Our study also shows that countries featuring robust executive capacities before a crisis are at an advantage when it comes to rapidly formulating effective countermeasures, evaluating the measures implemented and successfully communicating their crisis-response policies. Most of the countries that topped our "executive capacity" ranking for the 2020 SGI survey – which covers the end of November 2018 to the end of November 2019 – also number among the strongest performers in our special survey's "executive response" ranking. This is true for the Nordic countries of Finland, Sweden and Denmark as well as Oceania's New Zealand, all of which are top performers in terms of their executive crisis response. In terms of their overall executive capacity, other countries in our sample also achieved a level more or less on par with that observed by our experts in the SGI 2020. However, there are important exceptions to this. Greece, for example, shows impressive improvement compared to the pre-crisis period in both evidence-based policy formulation and national coordination efforts. As a result, it is in the group of top performers in terms of executive response along with the Nordic countries and New Zealand. By contrast, Estonia shows substantial deterioration compared to the previous reporting period in almost all areas of governance, ranging from the quality of evidence-based policy formulation to policy evaluation, public consultation and the national coordination of policy measures. A closer look at the individual criteria for good governance examined by our survey provides important lessons to draw upon when facing future crises.

Countries that can quickly and effectively incorporate the advice of experts into policy formulation or in adjustments made to appropriate policies tend to deliver a more effective crisis response. This has been particularly true for New Zealand, South Korea and Greece, which top our ranking on effective policy formulation. However, twelve out of the 29 countries surveyed demonstrated only marginal success in being able to rapidly and systematically translate the available expert advice into a coherent pandemic-control policy. In the United States and Mexico, sitting presidents deliberately chose to ignore or express disdain for the advice voiced by established scientific advisory bodies. The horrible consequences of their inaction are well known: In terms of excess mortality, Mexico ranks last and the United States 27th among the 29 countries examined.

As the coronavirus pandemic progressed, policymakers were increasingly confronted with the challenge of creating a coherent crisis response able to incorporate divergent expert opinions, rapidly accumulating scientific evidence, and broader economic and societal perspectives on the consequences of the pandemic. Nearly all of the countries we studied varied considerably over time in terms of the extent to which the political leadership followed the advice of virologists on how to contain the pandemic. It is therefore crucial, on the one hand, that as a crisis develops, the circle of advisory experts and social groups remains sufficiently open and permeable to new members. Doing so ensures that new insights and overlooked issues are taken into consideration. In some of the countries examined, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, it turned out that the pool of experts involved was too limited at the beginning of the crisis. On the other hand, we see in all of the countries surveyed a lack of formally established mechanisms able to identify, effectively balance and coordinate divergent perspectives and conflicting goals as a crisis continues.

Another important area where further work is needed is ensuring that governments have the data collection and analysis capacities to evaluate the impact of measures taken. As the pandemic showed, many countries still struggle with gathering and assessing good data on health-related and other socioeconomic early-warning indicators that inform crisis-management decisions. In many states, there was an initial lack of valid and reliable data, such as that regarding intensive-care unit (ICU) capacity or excess mortality rates. This was also the case in countries such as the Netherlands, which are otherwise known for their excellent information infrastructure. A potentially promising approach to remedying this issue is to link up various and more detailed administrative data, and to tie this data to a frequently conducted survey of households. Overall, however, countries such as the Netherlands, New Zealand, Denmark

and South Korea, each of which feature highly developed information and data infrastructures able to monitor on an ongoing basis the consequences of the pandemic, had greater success in mitigating the economic, health and social consequences of the pandemic.

It is important here to ensure that the data and information collected is also rapidly made available for public review and in ways that are user-friendly. However, the coronavirus crisis has shown just how far behind most states are in terms of providing open government data. Eight of the 29 states we studied delivered only weak and incomplete data on the pandemic to their citizens. And once published, this data often turned out to be unreliable. In addition, it was often unclear what data and which interpretation of the data ultimately informed government decisions on pandemic measures. In several other states, the essential (raw) data or information informing the leadership's decision-making metrics was not consistently made available to the public. Bucking this trend, Canada once again proved able to significantly increase transparency, accountability and the participation of its citizens – even during the crisis – through its already well-developed Open Government platform.

Overall, in all the countries examined, the degree to which legislative or civil society groups such as employers' associations, trade unions, environmental groups and welfare organizations were involved in policy formulation suffered as a result of the rapid-fire pressure under which measures had to be adopted. However, during the crisis, none of the countries in our sample proved able to adapt their societal consultation processes so as to enable the government and civil society to engage – under the strain of time pressure – in an adequate and effective exchange of ideas while formulating policies. In many of the countries surveyed, parliamentary oversight opportunities proved to be severely limited both de facto and de jure. In six countries, parliaments had almost no oversight capabilities. Only Portugal and Greece involved civil society groups more so than they had before. In both cases, however, the governments interacted with unions and employers' associations primarily to provide them information rather than engage in an exchange of ideas. Looking ahead, a strong recovery from the crisis will therefore require involving civil society groups more heavily in the formulation of measures designed to lead the way forward.

Because key civil society actors are generally not heavily involved in decision-making processes during a crisis, a government's crisis communication becomes increasingly relevant. In fact, countries that are able to formulate relatively successful policies in response to a crisis often also feature a coherent and unified crisis communication strategy. There is therefore a correlation between proactive and coherent crisis communication efforts and a successful crisis response. Countries such as New Zealand, for example, succeeded in creating a shared understanding of the cause and effects of the coronavirus crisis through only a few clearly stated objectives and measures. From the outset, federally organized states faced greater challenges than more centralized ones in coordinating their respective crisis communication. All too often, countries such as Canada, the United States, Germany, Switzerland and Belgium, for example, failed to ensure that the public was provided with consistent information through the various levels of local administrative bodies.

However, when it comes to the question of successful national coordination efforts, one should not necessarily shy away from comparing federally organized systems with more centralized political systems. This should not come as a surprise. After all, the pandemic has powerfully demonstrated that this involves mobilizing and orchestrating a collective effort on a national scale, establishing solidarity across subnational entities, and empowering subnational actors to find solutions that work at the local level. In principle, federally organized states are particularly well-poised to draw on tried and tested structures and processes. In Germany, for example, the pandemic response required several rounds of federal-state coordination in which the two levels often ran into conflict with each other. However, with the help of a strong scientific advisory staff, the chancellor's office was comparatively successful in containing these tensions, and the effort as a whole was able to respond effectively to regional particularities and concerns. During the second and third waves of the pandemic, however, the

foundation of this consensus increasingly began to erode in large part due to a series of state-level elections, resulting in the pursuit of uncoordinated and uneven approach across the country. Overall, however, the ranking is topped by the more centralized countries of New Zealand, South Korea, Denmark, Greece and Sweden. In these countries, national coordination efforts proved sensitive to local concerns and were thus carried out with the least friction, at least during the first year of the pandemic.

Overall, nearly half of the countries in our sample – 14 states in total – must therefore in retrospect be regarded as insufficiently resilient with regard to their political-administrative capacity to act during the coronavirus crisis. The current gap found between these states regarding their capacity to govern could actually grow rather than narrow in the years to come. For example, countries such as Canada, New Zealand and South Korea, each of which features a strong evaluation culture, decided already during the first year of the pandemic to draw upon the experience of past pandemics by initiating evaluations and taking steps to adapt their response along the way. Showing considerable readiness and willingness to learn from other countries' experiences with pandemics, New Zealand introduced its NZ Covid Tracer app, which was closely modeled on Singapore's contact-tracing app.

Our analysis shows that, during the first year of the coronavirus, the quality of a state's crisis response depended significantly on how well prepared the government was to deal with a crisis. Those countries already equipped before the pandemic with an effective crisis preparedness and management system as well as robust economic and social policies generally demonstrated a stronger executive response during the crisis and proved able to respond more competently to the economic and social policy challenges faced (see Fig. 4). Greece is a positive outlier in this regard, featuring an above-average crisis response, despite its rather adverse baseline conditions. By contrast, the United States stands out for its far-below-the-expected-bar performance, given its potential.

FIGURE 4 **Overall Response and Overall Preparedness**

SGI 2021 COVID-19 STUDY



Score: standardized, 1-10
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators

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New Zealand, South Korea and Sweden are the top performers in our **overall ranking of the resilience of governance** (see Fig. 5). The states demonstrating the most difficulty in steering their country's response to a crisis on the scale of the coronavirus pandemic were Israel, Croatia, Italy, Poland, Hungary and Mexico.

FIGURE 5 **Resilience of Governance**



Score: standardized, 1-10
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators

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Economic Resilience

More than half of the states in our sample were showing weak economic growth even long before the coronavirus crisis. Between 2010 and 2019, real average economic growth was just 2% or lower in 15 of the 29 states. Some leading economies also appear to be losing increasing ground to other countries with regard to gross fixed capital formation. On this measure, Japan is the only G-7 state to fall among the top 10 countries in our survey. Progress in product development, which results from an effective research and innovation sector, also varies widely.

Before the crisis, none of the countries in our sample had yet developed convincing programs for transitioning to a climate-friendly and resource-conserving economic model. Some of the countries showing the highest recent economic growth rates fall into the bottom group in terms of key indicators measuring outcomes along the path to a climate-neutral economy. Top economic performers such as Ireland, Estonia, Poland and South Korea are among the states with the highest per capita greenhouse gas emissions. On the other hand, countries such as Sweden and Finland, despite being top performers in terms of climate protection and renewable energy development, have considerable catching up to do with regard to energy efficiency and using raw materials sustainably.

The already-high levels of public debt in many countries, paired with further increases due to coronavirus-era stimulus packages, require policymakers to focus clearly on the major socio-economic challenges ahead. Countries that were already highly indebted before the crisis typically increased their public debt more significantly during the first year of the pandemic than did less heavily indebted countries. Moreover, fiscally well-positioned countries did not make excessive use of the low-interest credit options available to them. It is therefore already foreseeable that the coronavirus crisis will widen the gap between fiscally well-positioned countries and those that were already worse off.

When crafting their stimulus programs during the first year of the pandemic, the vast majority of the countries in our sample made virtually no attempt to set the sustainable transformation of the economy as one goal. In a minority of the countries examined, stimulus programs have already been designed to help economies transition toward a point of climate neutrality and resource-conserving growth. However, only 10 of the 29 states in our sample have released policy measures in this area. Just two countries – Germany and Sweden – are already seeking to align their economic stimulus programs with environmental and sustainability goals.

While some countries were relatively well prepared for the crisis in terms of labor market policies, many others were unable to draw on existing instruments and institutions appropriate to the crisis' specific challenges. Countries with comprehensive short-time work schemes and well-developed labor market policies fared better through the pandemic's first year than did those lacking such instruments. The short-time work policy model again become a popular export during the coronavirus crisis. Countries with considerable experience implementing such programs, such as Germany, France and Switzerland, extended their regulations still further. Best positioned in terms of the resilience of their labor market policies are Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden. What these countries have in common is that their systems enable employers' and employees' organizations to work together constructively. In addition, these countries have successfully managed to significantly increase the employment rate among older workers in particular.

Nevertheless, few of the countries examined used the first phase of short-time work to reform the regulatory framework so as to provide greater incentives for worker training and further education. After the crisis, when people return to their jobs, the labor market will look different, requiring a different set of skills and qualifications than before the crisis. Denmark has taken an interesting approach in this regard. Here, policymakers have set compensation levels within retraining programs to provide the highest level of benefits to people retraining in areas experiencing skill shortages.

Our **overall ranking on economic resilience** (see Fig. 6) is led by Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Denmark. The bottom group is made up of Poland, Croatia, Hungary, Chile, Turkey, Italy and Mexico. Both with regard to their vulnerability to crises and their economic-policy crisis response, these countries show the greatest shortcomings in terms of economic sustainability.

FIGURE 6 **Economic Resilience**

SGI 2021 COVID-19 STUDY



Score: standardized, 1-10
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators

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Welfare State Resilience

Overall, the analysis (see Fig. 7) shows a strong correlation between the degree of preparedness for the crisis and the quality of a country's actual crisis response. Countries whose social security systems were already well positioned before the pandemic tended to respond better to the challenges arising during the crisis in the areas of education, health and family policy.

Countries that were well prepared for the crisis in terms of education policy typically had strongly digitalized education systems, and also supported a certain degree of autonomy with regard to teaching methods. The pandemic led to school closures on a greater or lesser scale in all 29 countries examined. Countries whose education systems were already highly digitalized before the pandemic – that is, those in which digital infrastructure was already in place, and where teaching staff had previous experience with distance-learning tools – were most successful in making a rapid and smooth transition from face-to-face to online instruction. Denmark and Sweden stand out in this respect, with each placing among the top four countries in the study's four digitalization-related indicators. Another common feature of well-organized education systems is a certain degree of autonomy granted to decentralized local authorities or teaching institutions, thus allowing them to experiment with or use different instruction methodologies.

The unequal distribution of educational opportunities that existed before the outbreak of COVID-19 has worsened in most countries. Children from socially disadvantaged families were more seriously affected by school closures due to a lack of laptops, fast internet connections and digital skills. This was true of well-performing states as well. For example, in Denmark, despite the well-developed digital infrastructure, many primary-level students – especially children from economically or ethnically disadvantaged backgrounds – did not receive instruction during the first year of the pandemic. In Canada too, students from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds were disproportionately affected by school closures and the shift to online learning, in large part due to a lack of support programs for children with special needs.

FIGURE 7 **Welfare State Response and Welfare State Preparedness**

SGI 2021 COVID-19 STUDY



Score: standardized, 1-10
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators

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In many countries, the increase in intensive-care capacities for COVID-19 patients was accompanied by a neglect of people with other conditions. A shortage of well-trained staff proved to be a key bottleneck in this regard. As a consequence, hospitals were often unable to use their newly expanded intensive-care facilities to full capacity and could not guarantee that all patients would receive the proper care. While some states were forced to postpone elective surgeries, the focus on COVID-19 patients had more serious consequences in others. In Poland, for example, hospitals were unable to admit many sick people even in cases of emergency.

Closures of schools and kindergartens during the crisis everywhere made it more difficult for parents to reconcile work and family responsibilities. In response, the EU and OECD countries examined here introduced or adapted a series of family-policy measures aimed at making this combination easier, while providing financial support to families coping with income losses. In many countries, despite the coronavirus' dangers, early childhood education and care institutions were kept open for parents deemed "essential workers." In instances where this was not possible, financial support was often introduced for parents who had to stay at home due to school or kindergarten closures. Other (financial) benefits were also introduced or adapted to fit the new circumstances in many places. For example, such policies included top-ups to child benefits, one-time bonus payments for families, the introduction of additional benefits for poor families and the provision of subsidies to employers in order to enable flexible working. Overall, it appears that countries with sustainable family policies before the crisis were also more successful in their response to the crisis (see Fig. 8).

No country succeeded in promoting a more equitable division of household labor between the sexes. Government support measures mitigated the negative impact of the crisis on families but were not able to lead to a more equitable sharing of responsibilities between the sexes. On the contrary, the coronavirus crisis seems to have reinforced adherence to traditional family roles, as women ultimately took over the bulk of the additional burden associated with caring for children and elderly family members. This underscores the

FIGURE 8 **Family Support Policies und Family Policy Preparedness**



Score: standardized, 1-10
Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators

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FIGURE 9 **Welfare State Resilience**



fact that previous family-policy measures have done too little to make the household division of labor between women and men more equitable.

Overall, the welfare states in the countries of northern Europe showed the greatest resilience in the face of the crisis. **Our overall ranking on welfare state resilience** (Fig. 9) is led by Denmark, Sweden, Estonia and Finland. With the exception of the health sector, where Sweden (crisis response) and Estonia (preparedness and crisis response) both show slight weaknesses, these countries are among the top 10 in all three areas (education, health and family policy). In the area of education policy, all are even among the top five. In contrast, social security systems in the United States, Chile, Hungary and Mexico proved to be less resilient. The United States is ranked in the middle of the pack in terms of educational preparedness, while Chile achieves a mid-range ranking for its health-sector crisis response. However, these countries show major weaknesses in the other areas examined.

Measuring Sustainable Crisis Management

How well do democratic checks and balances function in a crisis? How forward-looking and effective is the political process of crisis management organized? How vulnerable are economic, health and social security systems in OECD and EU countries? How effective and sustainable is their crisis response? These are the guiding questions behind the special Covid-19 survey of the Sustainable Governance Indicators 2021. To answer them, 29 OECD and EU countries are assessed and compared on the basis of 94 indicators (see Fig. 11). The assessment is carried out by more than 70 international experts from the scientific community. These experts prepare detailed country reports (see Fig. 10). In this way, successful examples of effective and sustainable Covid-19 crisis management can be identified. The instrument is based on three pillars: the Resilience of Policies Index, which measures crisis preparedness and response in economic and social policy, the Resilience of Democracy Index, which measures the robustness of key democratic institutions, and the Resilience of Governance Index, which assesses crisis preparedness, response and accountability of the executive.

FIGURE 10 **Survey Process**

Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators

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FIGURE 11 **Survey Structure**

Resilience of Democracy

- Media Freedom
- Civil Rights and Political Liberties
- Judicial Review
- Informal Democratic Rules

Resilience of Governance

Executive Capacity Resilience | Crisis Governance

Executive Preparedness

- Crisis Management System

Executive Response

- Effective Policy Formulation
- Policy Feedback and Adaptation
- Public Consultation
- Crisis Communication
- Implementation of Response Measures
- National Coordination

Resilience of Executive Accountability

- Open Government
- Legislative Oversight

Resilience of Democracy

How well do democratic checks and balances function in a crisis?

Resilience of Governance

How forward-looking and effective is the political process of crisis management organized?

Resilience of Policies

How vulnerable are economic, health and social security systems in OECD and EU countries?

How effective and sustainable is their crisis response?

Source: Sustainable Governance Indicators

Resilience of Policies

Economic Resilience

Economic Preparedness

Economic Preparedness
- Economic Policy Preparedness
- GDP per Capita
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation
- Real GDP Growth Rate
- Energy Productivity
- Greenhouse Gas Emissions
- Material Footprint
- Renewable Energy

Labor Market Preparedness
- Labor Market Policy Preparedness
- Unemployment Rate
- Long-Term Unemployment Rate
- Youth Unemployment Rate
- Employment Rate
- Low Pay Incidence
- Employment Rates by Gender
- Involuntary Part-Time Employment
- Net Unemployment Replacement Rate
- Older Employment Rate

Fiscal Preparedness
- Fiscal Policy Preparedness
- Debt to GDP
- Primary Balance
- Gross General Government Interest Payments
- Budget Consolidation

Research and Innovation
- Research and Innovation Policy Preparedness
- Public R&D Spending
- Private R&D Spending
- Total Researchers
- Intellectual Property Licenses
- PCT Patent Applications
- Quality of Overall Infrastructure
- International Internet Bandwidth

Economic Crisis Response

Economic Response
- Economic Recovery Package
- Workplace Closing
- Change in GDP Growth Rate
- Change in Gross Fixed Capital Formation
- Fiscal Measures in Response to COVID-19 Pandemic

Sustainability of Economic Policy Response
- Recovery Package Sustainability

Labor Market Response
- Labor Market Policy Response
- Change in Unemployment Rate
- Change in Employment Rate
- Change in Youth Unemployment Rate
- Change in Older Employment Rate

Fiscal Response
- Fiscal Policy Response
- Change in Public Debt
- Change in Primary Balance

Research and Innovation Response
- Research and Innovation Policy Response

Welfare State Resilience

Welfare State Preparedness

Education System Preparedness
- Education Policy Preparedness
- Upper Secondary Attainment
- PISA Results, Socioeconomic Background
- Pre-primary Expenditure
- Low Achievers in all PISA Subjects
- PISA Availability of Effective Online Learning Platforms
- PISA Availability of Digital Learning Resources for Teachers
- PISA Quality of Schools' Internet Connection
- PISA Availability of Portable School Computers

Healthcare System Preparedness
- Health Policy Preparedness
- Spending on Preventive Health Programs
- Healthy Life Expectancy
- Perceived Health Status
- Out of Pocket Expenses
- Physicians
- Influenza Vaccination
- Daily Smokers
- Prevalence of Diabetes
- Nurses
- Intensive Care Beds

Families
- Family Policy Preparedness
- Childcare Enrollment, 0-2 Year Olds
- Childcare Enrollment, 3-5 Year Olds
- Fertility
- Child Poverty
- Female Labor Force Participation

Welfare State Response

Education System Response
- Education Response
- School Closures

Healthcare System Response
- Health Policy Response
- Excess Mortality
- Testing Policy
- COVID-19 Mortalities
- SARS-CoV-2 Infections

Family Policy Response
- Family Support Policies
- Change in Ratio of Female to Male Employment

- Qualitative Indicator
- Quantitative Indicator

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OECD and EU country sample

SGI Sustainable Governance Indicators



Denmark
57,929 $
5,814,422
136,5/km²
6.7 %
unitary
Single-party minority cabinet, prime minister: Mette Frederiksen

Sweden
53,080 $
10,278,887
24.6/km²
10.2 %
unitary
Multi-party minority cabinet, prime minister: Stefan Löfven

Finland
48,731 $
5,521,606
18.2/km²
5.4 %
unitary
Oversized cabinet, prime minister: Antti Rinne/ Sanna Marin

Estonia
36,919 $
1,326,898
31.3/km²
13.9 %
unitary
Minimum winning coalition, prime minister: Jüri Ratas/ Kaja Kallas

Ireland
88,086 $
4,934,040
71.7/km²
6.0 %
unitary
Multi-party minority cabinet, prime minister (Taoiseach): Leo Varadkar
Minimum winning coalition, prime minister (Taoiseach): Micheál Martin

United Kingdom
46,631 $
66,836,327
280.6/km²
11.3 % (2018)
de facto federal
Minimum winning coalition, prime minister: Boris Johnson

Germany
53,945 $
83,092,962
240.4/km²
9.0 %
federal
Minimum winning coalition, chancellor: Angela Merkel

France
47,680 $
67,055,854
119.2/km²
6.7 %
unitary
Oversized cabinet, president: Emmanuel Macron

Belgium
52,064 $
11,502,704
382.7/km²
7.3 %
federal
Multi-party minority cabinet, prime minister: Sophie Wilmès
Oversized cabinet, prime minister: Alexander de Croos

Netherlands
57,102 $
17,344,874
508.2/km²
6.7 %
unitary
Multi-party minority cabinet, prime minister: Mark Rutte

Switzerland
71,712 $
8,575,280
219.0/km²
9.6 %
federal
Governing executive: Bundesrat

Austria
56,303 $
8,879,920
109.3/km²
8.6 %
federal
Minimum winning coalition, chancellor: Sebastian Kurz

Poland
33,219 $
37,965,475
123.6/km²
9.4 %
unitary
Single-party majority cabinet, prime minister: Mateusz Morawiecki

Czechia
40,937 $
10,671,870
138.6/km²
4.3 %
unitary
Multi-party minority cabinet, prime minister: Andrej Babiš

Hungary
32,935 $
9,771,141
106.7/km²
8.6 %
unitary
Minimum winning coalition, prime minister: Viktor Orbán

Croatia
28,712 $
4,065,253
73.4/km²
12.2 %
unitary
Multiparty minority cabinet, prime minister: Andrej Plenkovic

Spain
40,880 $
47,133,521
93.7/km²
13.6 %
de facto federal
Single-party minority cabinet, prime minister: Pedro Sánchez
Multi-party minority cabinet, prime minister: Pedro Sánchez

Portugal
34,923 $
10,286,263
111.3/km²
10.5 %
unitary
Single-party minority cabinet, prime minister: António Costa

Italy
42,424 $
60,302,093
205.6/km²
13.8 %
unitary
Minimum winning coalition, prime minister: Guiseppe Conte

Greece
29,662 $
10,717,169
80.9/km²
12.3 %
unitary
Single-party majority cabinet, prime minister: Kyriakos Mitsotakis

South Korea
42,765 $
51,709,098
527.3/km²
16.7 % (2018)
unitary
Single-party majority cabinet, president: Moon Jae-in

Japan
41,937 $
126,264,931
346.9/km²
15.7 % (2015)
unitary
Oversized cabinet, prime minister: Yoshihide Suga

New Zealand
41,916 $
4,979,300
18.3/km²
10.9 % (2014)
unitary
Multi-party minority cabinet, prime minister: Jacinda Ardern
Single-party majority cabinet, prime minister: Jacinda Ardern

Legend
GDP per capita ($)
Population
Population/km²
Poverty rate (%)
State structure
Government from November 1, 2019 to January 15, 2021

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