

Tom Fries, Peter Walkenhorst  
With a foreword by Jan Eliasson

# Sharing Global Governance: The Role of Civil Society Organizations



Shaping a Globalized World  
| Bertelsmann Stiftung



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The forces of globalization have changed the world fundamentally, and this change has accelerated in recent decades. As a result of these transformations, the world has become much more interconnected and interdependent. We work and feel increasingly like “a global village”.

At the same time, the globalized world faces new challenges such as climate change, environmental degradation, poverty, pandemics and economic crises. These challenges respect no borders and cannot be solved by any country working alone. They require urgent and coordinated responses across the globe by a multiplicity of stakeholders.

Yet, it is increasingly obvious that our current instruments of international problem-solving are insufficient to cope with these problems. We must ask how we can organize our political processes and institutions so that they can effectively and fairly deal with both local and global challenges.

Clearly, the problems we face today are of such magnitude and complexity that they can be solved only by coordinated action. Therefore, we need more effective forms of collaboration between international organizations, governments, the private sector, the academic world and civil society. As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon pointed out in his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2009: “Our times demand a new definition of leadership – global leadership. They demand a new constellation of international cooperation – governments, civil society and the private sector, working together for a collective global good.”<sup>1</sup>

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UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon

While this call for new forms of cooperation applies to all global actors alike, civil society organizations (CSOs) – including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), philanthropic foundations and the various networks they create – can play a particularly important role in this evolution of global leadership. CSOs have become an integral part of the global governance landscape in recent decades and have repeatedly proven their capability to make a difference in world politics. They have emerged as a potentially global force – not as powerful as international

organizations, national governments and transnational corporations, but nonetheless as independent global actors capable of affecting political agendas and fostering social change. As a result, global governance is increasingly characterized by cooperative arrangements among CSOs, governmental actors and other organizations.

Against this background, it is important and timely to explore the potential of CSOs in developing more effective and legitimate forms of global governance. We must explore the roles and contributions of CSOs in shaping global governance and identify the promises and pitfalls of their involvement. We must also identify measures to be taken that could foster and improve the contributions of CSOs and their collaboration with other actors, especially multilateral organizations.

<sup>1</sup> UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Speech at World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on 29 January 2009, [http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search\\_full.asp?statID=419](http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=419).



These questions are addressed in this report initiated by the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Its findings and recommendations evolved from consultations with international experts who met for a workshop at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, DC in April 2010.

The report emphasizes the need for more integrated and effective forms of “shared governance” and shared responsibility – i.e., collaborative efforts by CSOs and governmental actors on levels from the local to the global. It examines the strengths and weaknesses of CSOs and governmental organizations. The report argues that it is imperative to strengthen the formal and informal infrastructure for building the capacity of CSOs working in global governance contexts. Such an infrastructure is a prerequisite for more effective forms of collaboration and shared governance.

I support these arguments and recommendations. I am convinced that all actors must join forces to solve our global problems. To facilitate more effective collaboration we need to break down barriers between different actors and begin structuring our cooperative efforts more horizontally than vertically. In any successful collaboration, CSOs and governmental actors bring unique skills and resources to the table, though each actor also possesses weaknesses and limitations.

What is needed is an effective “division of labor” that builds on the respective strengths of CSOs and governmental organizations and, at the same time, minimizes their weaknesses. Such a division of labor may ultimately evolve as the result of trial and error. For this reason, it is important to review carefully the record of collaboration between CSOs and other actors of global governance.

In the absence of an overarching and comprehensive approach to global governance, collaborative efforts among state and non-state actors will increasingly provide the framework for addressing many of the challenges of the globalized world. The CSO community is not the *deus ex machina* that will solve all problems associated with global governance, yet it demonstrates time and again that things can be done differently. It thus has the potential to become a catalyst for change and to contribute to the evolution of more inclusive and effective forms of shared global governance.

**Jan Eliasson**

Chair, WaterAid/Sweden and the Anna Lindh Memorial Fund

Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden

Former President of the United Nations General Assembly

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Although this report represents the confluence of many ideas and contributors, the responsibility for any mistakes that slipped through in its production is, of course, ultimately ours alone. We hope that the report contributes to an international dialogue on the role of CSOs in global governance and the essentials of their work. Given the continuous growth of transnationally engaged CSOs, such a dialogue is more important than ever.

**Tom Fries**

**Peter Walkenhorst**

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One distinctive political development of recent decades is the rise of **shared governance** – the augmented participation of non-state actors (particularly civil society organizations) in global policymaking. Our increasingly interconnected and interdependent world is characterized by breathtakingly rapid economic globalization, greater density of modern communication networks and growing mobility. As we collectively tackle the challenges of climate change, poverty and social inequality, food and energy insecurity and economic crises, new forms of cooperation transcending national and sectoral borders are necessary.

The impact of civil society organizations (CSOs) in the global governance dialogue is increasing, and deserves greater attention. The growing number and breadth of civil society organizations is the direct outcome of a steady increase in resources available from governments, international institutions, corporations and foundations, accompanied by greater reliance by state-based actors on the outsourcing of public services. Newly empowered, CSOs fill roles in global governance that can be broadly separated into the categories of advocacy and operations but that more specifically include work in agenda-setting, negotiation of norms and agreements, implementation and monitoring, and reaction to non-compliance. As they eagerly assume a growing share of each of these burdens, the civil society community is increasingly expected to prove its legitimacy through empirical accountability measures and through demonstrable contributions to reducing the “democratic deficit”. The latter is the perceived hallmark of the largely northern (OECD) institutions of global governance.

In our analysis of the path towards more integrated and effective collaboration, we examine the strengths and weaknesses of CSOs and state-based organizations in global governance. We look particularly at the resources, access, skills and experience that each group of actors brings to the dialogue, and how the “labor” of advocacy and operations might be divided accordingly. We find that CSOs demonstrate a number of useful strengths. They are better positioned than governments to take the lead in identifying and marketing issues. They face lower barriers to innovation in practice, and they possess unmatched direct, focused experience on the ground. State-based actors have more fundamental strengths such as reliable resources, unchallenged access to the global governance dialogue, and the prerogative of sovereignty.

Each class of actors also suffers from critical weaknesses, however. Civil society actors’ need to present different faces to different audiences creates tension, as does the competition within their community for funding and prestige. Additionally, individual CSOs have only fragile authority and are subject to a number of unintended incentives that make them vulnerable to coercion by other actors. Governments, in our analysis, have two primary weaknesses. First, they have breadth without depth: they must deal with a vast array of issues faced by their citizens rather than – as CSOs do – a single issue and a discrete population. Second, they face unintended incentives in mitigating issues of concern, particularly in peace and security.

Multilateral intergovernmental organizations, which remain the gatekeepers of the global governance dialogue, constitute a unique class of contributors to that dialogue. They are traditionally viewed as forums in which states defend and support their own interests in an international context. But



more recent analysis looks at the ways in which multilateral organizations, treated not as forums but as a separate class of actors, face a separate set of incentives that dramatically impact the speed and effectiveness with which they construct, implement and monitor global governance. This report focuses primarily on the United Nations, though its recommendations are relevant to other international organizations as well.

Trans-national and trans-sectoral networks constitute a rising class of actors in dealing with highly charged issues in global governance. From ecological issues to public health to peace and security challenges, such networks play an increasing role in directing and implementing global governance. We examine several examples of such networks in search of recommendations for further such collaboration.

Our analysis and collaboration with experts lead to the conclusion that the infrastructure used to incorporate CSOs into the United Nations and other multilaterals must be strengthened and expanded. No new institution is needed to serve the purpose, but the avenues of exchange and interaction must become easier to tread for both parties. Multilateral institutions of global governance can accomplish this by:

- creating dedicated spaces and technologies for the interaction of civil society organizations and multilaterals;
- creating a publicly accessible clearinghouse of information on the issues under consideration by, and the activities of, the UN and other multilateral agencies charged with laying out global governance;
- creating a publicly accessible “experience bank” that would store codified knowledge (e.g., case studies, how-to guides, other concrete resources) to assist with capacity building among civil society organizations, particularly among Southern and underdeveloped civil society communities;
- creating reliable, robust multi-funder pools to support the aforementioned efforts towards Southern capacity building and expertise;
- providing financial support for the administrative and advocacy work of global governance networks (see Section 2F), including funding for training workshops and information services, and modest subsidies for low-cost lodging, travel and office facilities.

Such infrastructure is a basic prerequisite for shared global governance that can meet the challenges of this century.

# 1. Introduction

One distinct political development of recent decades is the increased participation of non-state actors, particularly civil society organizations (CSOs), in global policymaking. Against this background, this report explores the potential of organized civil society to shape global governance through agenda-setting, the negotiation of norms and agreements, and the implementing and monitoring of international policies. The ultimate goal of this analysis is to develop forward-thinking and practical policy recommendations for CSOs to contribute to effective and legitimate global governance in these policy areas.

## 1.A. Globalization, global governance and civil society

Economic globalization, modern communication technology and growing mobility are creating an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world characterized by new forms of cooperation that transcend national and cultural borders. At the same time, this globalized world faces an unprecedented set of challenges including climate change, environmental degradation, poverty and social inequality, health threats, food and energy insecurity, and economic crises. In the emerging international chorus of voices from the global North (for our purposes, the OECD) and the global South (for our purposes, the G77), characterized by deepening interdependence among the many categories of actors, more effective instruments for international problem-solving are needed. Managing this interdependence through multilateral cooperation has become a question of enlightened self-interest.

The term “global governance” lacks conceptual clarity. It may refer to the structures of transnational cooperation between state and non-state actors, or to the collective efforts, instruments, regulatory regimes and institutions that exist to address challenges that are beyond the capacity of individual states and societies to solve. While states are still the prime actors in international affairs, various new forms of governance beyond the nation-state have emerged that permit civil society organizations to enter the global governance arena. We devote most of our attention in this paper to governance with government, that is, collaborative forms of governance involving state and non-state actors.

The term “civil society” also lacks conceptual clarity. In fact, as the volume of literature on the subject grows, the discussion becomes more complex. Even the distinction between “NGO” and “CSO” is rarely well-delineated. In this report, we use “CSO” throughout, except when referring specifically to UN language where “NGO” is the standard.

Michael Edwards identifies three main ideations of the concept of civil society:<sup>2</sup>

- civil society as the “Good Society” (as opposed to “uncivil society”): the contemporary discussion focuses in particular on a presumed close correlation between civil society and democracy;
- civil society as the non-profit sector: the organizations that constitute a significant part of the infrastructure of a modern democratic society;

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<sup>2</sup> Edwards, M. (2004). *Civil Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.



- civil society as the public sphere: the forum in which societal issues are debated and negotiated.

In an analysis of civil society and global governance, assuming that all voluntary associations wish to promote democracy or that they agree on a common idea of the “Good Society” is unwise. Thus, these three concepts of civil society complement one another, each capturing an important quality of civil society that is pertinent to our analysis of the role of CSOs in global governance. For the purposes of this report we use the following broad definition, which, notably, excludes the private sector:

“Civil society refers to the set of institutions, organizations, and behaviors situated between the state, the business world, and the family. Specifically, this would include voluntary and non-profit organizations of many different kinds, philanthropic institutions, social and political movements, forms of social participation and engagement, the public sphere and the values and cultural patterns associated with them.”<sup>3</sup>

By playing an increasingly important role in identifying and handling transnational and global issues, CSOs have become a mediating element between societal interests and political regulation. Thus positioned, they fill several different roles:

- agenda-setting, in which they research, lobby and organize to draw attention to particular issues of concern;
- contributing to the development of norms and agreements, in which they participate in formal consultation and debate within the institutions of global governance;
- implementation and monitoring, in which they foster implementation and compliance with inter-governmental agreements by state-based actors and/or make their own contributions to policy implementation;
- reacting to non-compliance, in which, despite having no formal enforcement powers, CSOs can significantly raise the costs of non-compliance.<sup>4</sup>

Within the range of CSOs engaged in global governance, one can distinguish between those organizations primarily engaged in advocacy and those engaged primarily in operations.<sup>5</sup> Those CSOs focused on advocacy seek to influence public policy, and are most commonly referred to in discussions of influence because of their visibility in campaigning on particular issues. Operational or service-providing CSOs are focused on program or policy implementation. They often work closely with governments and international institutions in fields such as development, health and humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, we acknowledge large numbers of “hybrid” CSOs, networks and alliances, all of

3 Anheier, H.K. (2000). Can culture, market and state relate? LSE Magazine, Summer 2000, 16-18 [Quote p 17].

4 de Jonge Oudraat, C., & Haufler, V. (2008). Global Governance and the Role of NGOs in International Peace and Security. American Institute for Contemporary German Studies Policy Report 33.

5 Ibid., 14-16.

which make a black-and-white taxonomy of organizations less useful. For clarity we discuss most activities as though they fall largely within one of these two categories.

## 1.B. The rise and roles of civil society organizations

The recent expansion of organized civil society was stimulated by considerable economic growth, the expansion of an educated urban middle class – whose leadership was critical to the emergence of CSOs in many parts of the world – and the availability of cheap global communications systems. The growth has been slow but steady. Between 1992 and 2002, the number of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) registered with the Union of International Associations grew from 12,173 to 17,428 (annual growth of 3.32 percent). From 2002 to 2009, this number grew to 21,224 (annual growth of 2.86 percent).<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, attention to the increasing prominence of these “networked” organizations is called for.

During the past two decades INGOs have become better connected with one another and with key international organizations (e.g., the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF)). Much global public policymaking now occurs within policy networks, which can be transgovernmental (e.g., the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), transnational (e.g., the Climate Action Network) and/or trans-sectoral (e.g., the World Commission on Dams). These networks are, to many observers, promising structures that bring together different categories of actors in the search for equitable, realistic and sustainable policies. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which we will examine further, is most often cited as a successful model of such a network.

The growth of CSOs has been stimulated by a steady increase in the resources available from governments, international institutions, corporations and foundations for operational activities, as well as a growing reliance by state-based actors on the outsourcing of public services. The growth in resources for advocacy activities, in contrast, has largely relied upon mobilization of support and funds from the general public. This growth has led to the emergence of a global space of social and political participation in which these actors engage with one another, with state-based actors and with the business sector – truly a “vast, interconnected and multi-layered non-governmental space that comprises many hundreds of thousands of self-directing institutions and ways of life that generate global effects”.<sup>7</sup>

Given the diversity of their roles, CSOs are certainly contributing to a pluralization of global governance. They enable multiple values, perspectives and interests to be represented in the global governance dialogue, and they engender greater breadth and competence in capacity and functionality within the cast of actors who participate in that dialogue. But what are the implications of such pluralization for the legitimacy and effectiveness of global governance? How does the participation of CSOs help to address what is commonly called the **democratic deficit**?

6 Union of International Associations. (1992, 2002, 2009). Retrieved April 2010 from [www.uia.be/stats](http://www.uia.be/stats).

7 Keane, J. (2003). *Global Civil Society?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Quote p 20].



Traditionally, the principal source of legitimacy of international institutions and other instruments of global governance has been their capacity to address conflicts, poverty, and injustices in a manner that produces lasting benefits for states and societies. But this capacity alone is no longer sufficient; it must be complemented by **input legitimacy**, conferred by the participation of all categories of actors impacted by the regulation. When critical decisions are made by technocrats and bureaucrats in international institutions who are unaccountable to any discrete electoral base, individual citizens often have little sway over decisions that directly affect them. This condition, now commonly called the democratic deficit, is also characterized by the predominance of representatives from OECD countries within the management ranks of international organizations. Actors of global civil society, particularly those from the global South, are thus seen by some observers as a democratizing force in global governance.

Proponents of this view emphasize that civil society actors represent “positions rather than populations” in the global governance dialogue, and that their contribution can best be characterized as legitimacy by voice, rather than by vote.<sup>8</sup> Many observers are, however, skeptical of the value of CSOs as a mitigating force for such a democratic deficit. These latter observers say that many CSOs have no legitimate democratic system of representation themselves, and do not add a democratic quality to global governance merely by claiming to represent the underrepresented. Skeptics also suggest that individual constituents of CSOs are better viewed as customers or supporters than as simple voters.<sup>9</sup> Without a democratic system of internal decision-making that yields “one voice, one vote” choices, they say, CSOs cannot truly contribute to a more democratic global dialogue. Accordingly, CSOs must become more transparent and accountable if they wish to retain and expand their participation in global governance.<sup>10</sup>

Measured against traditional standards of representative democracy, greater participation of CSOs in international institutions is a drop in the bucket at best. It is no “silver bullet” for the democratization of global governance. The club of intergovernmental organizations is still exclusive, and CSOs’ easiest route to participation in global governance debates involves the permission and support of those institutions that, by and large, control the debates. This being said, CSOs are increasing the breadth of perspectives and interests that are represented in these debates, and this contribution must be supported.

Against this background, this report examines the roles and potential of CSOs in global governance. It focuses on the collaboration between CSOs and multilateral organizations with a special emphasis on the United Nations. We conclude that there is a strong need for international institutions to support capacity building within CSOs, especially southern CSOs, working in global governance contexts. We also find a strong case for more thorough incorporation of, in particular, southern civil society contributions into the deliberations of multilaterals. Such efforts are prerequisites for more effective forms of shared global governance that include all actors – state, non-state, local, and global.

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8 Keck, M. E. (2004). Governance Regimes and the Politics of Discursive Representation. In N. Piper/A. Uhlin (Eds.), *Transnational Activism in Asia: Problems of Power and Democracy*, London: Routledge 2004, 43-60 [Quote p 45].

9 Clark, J. (ed.) (2003). *Globalizing Civic Engagement. Civil Society and Transnational Action*. London: Earthscan. (pp 1-28).

10 Anheier, H. K. & Hawkes, A. (2008). Accountability in a Globalising World: International Non-Governmental Organisations and Foundations. In M. Albrow, H. Anheier, M. Glasius, M. E. Price, M. Kaldor (Eds.), *Global Civil Society 2007/8. Communicative Power and Democracy*. London: Sage Publications, 124-143.

## 2. Civil society organizations in international issues

### 2.A. The promise of collaboration

Since many pressing global challenges can be addressed at various levels, even small organizations can initiate significant change through strategically targeted action. But given the complex nature of the issues that the actors of global governance address, systemic change is more likely to result from collaborative efforts by many actors working on several levels. Accordingly, CSOs collaborate increasingly with governments and international institutions, but also with other public-sector and corporate actors.

“What is the value added by bringing civil society ... more fully into global policy processes? ... the enhancement of global policy processes in terms of increasing the capacity and competence of international organizations for fulfilling critically important information, normative, rule-creating, rule-supervising, and operational functions. NGOs, other civil society organizations, subnational governance institutions and the private sector indeed provide much needed value added but also represent good value for the money in coping with the myriad problems confronting humankind in the early twenty-first century” (Coate, 2009, p. 164).

Global governance of international issues has, historically, happened *ad hoc* as states, multilateral organizations and non-state actors – in particular, CSOs – addressed pressing issues singly or in coalitions. How can the difficult labor of crafting and implementing global governance be apportioned among actors in the future? Work is currently apportioned among CSOs, states and the formal structures of global governance in one of three ways:

- formal, event- or issue-specific negotiated collaboration in which general practices for distribution of labor are jointly debated and agreed;
- a market mechanism in which labor is taken up organically by those actors best suited to doing it;
- a planned economy mechanism in which labor is distributed in a hierarchical downward flow at the direction of the multilaterals, with little input from other actors.

Collaboration with international institutions is best demonstrated by the relationship between CSOs and the multinational and multilateral actors that develop and monitor global governance. This broad spectrum of organizations includes the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on peace and security issues, and the G-20, International Monetary Fund, World Bank Group and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on issues of global economic governance. This report focuses primarily on the UN.

Although Article 71 of the UN Charter mandated that only the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) should consult formally with NGOs, all main bodies of the UN involve CSOs (those that are accredited through ECOSOC) in some capacity today. Additionally, the establishment in 1996 of ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 allowed national, regional and local CSOs to obtain formal consultative status. This is significant because such formal recognition had been accorded previously only to international NGOs. Within the UN structure, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) maintains a database of more than 13,000 CSOs. This database includes traditional CSOs, think tanks, associations, and almost 1,000 indigenous peoples’ organizations. Registration with



DESA is the first step towards obtaining consultative status with the ECOSOC, which is the formal method of securing input to global governance debates through regular UN processes, special conferences and preparatory meetings for those conferences.<sup>11</sup>

CSOs' access to direct participation in governance discussions (e.g., "face time" or formal consultative status with those bodies that develop global governance) and to indirect influence (e.g., media pressure) is critical for determining the ease with which CSOs and multilaterals can work together to craft policy. To obtain formal access to the institutions of global governance, CSOs may need a physical presence in particular locations (e.g., New York and Geneva for the UN). CSOs with established bases and dedicated staff in critical cities are better known and respected by UN policymakers.

**Recommendation:**

Create dedicated spaces and technology for the interaction of CSOs and multilaterals. This would support systematic integration of CSO voices and would make *ad hoc* integration substantially easier.

The Quaker UN Office provides a noteworthy example of how a physical presence can dovetail with increased informal collaboration between CSOs and the United Nations. Housed in modest offices near to the UN in both New York and Geneva, the Quaker house provides a private, informal, non-partisan and apolitical location for policymakers and CSO representatives to work on intractable issues. This set-up could serve as a template for others.

While such a concrete footprint might be an unsustainable or impossible investment for many individual CSOs, a lack of resources can be overcome through collaborative membership in an issue-based or regionally based formal network of transnational CSOs. Such networks carry the collective legitimacy of their full memberships and are difficult to exclude from debates on relevant governance issues. Such networks also serve as aggregators and amplifiers for the voices of small and local CSOs with access to unique or especially rich information (e.g., intelligence on conflict zones or sudden humanitarian crises). The International Council of Voluntary Agencies, an observer of the UN's Inter-Agency Standing Committee, for example, acts as the collective voice of its member CSOs on humanitarian and refugee policy issues.

For a CSO, formal consultative status with ECOSOC also increases the CSO's access to the debate on global governance issues. Increasingly, though, CSOs with formal consultative status are indirectly supported in negotiations on global governance by CSOs that do not have formal access, but that contribute their knowledge and opinions informally. In addition, the recognition by the UN and some of the most significant INGOs of the necessity of collaboration has led to joint efforts to establish open and flexible structures of collaboration. The "Principles of Partnership", endorsed in 2007, were one such effort.<sup>12</sup>

11 United Nations Economic and Social Council (2010). Retrieved September 2010 from UN ECOSOC database, <http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/login.do>.

12 Global Humanitarian Platform. (2008). Retrieved August 2010 from <http://www.globalhumanitarianplatform.org/doc00002199.html>.

CSOs also indirectly influence sovereign states and global governing bodies through media channels and public campaigns. CSOs that manage to shape the dialogue and vocabulary that are used to discuss any issue can become highly influential. They can thereby pressure other actors to engage on an issue. But acting through this channel of influence leads to contentious, rather than cooperative, dialogue.

## 2.B. Strengths and weaknesses of CSOs and states in constructing and implementing global governance

Global governance emerges often from complex discussions among CSOs, the private sector, states and multilaterals. Without establishment, acceptance, ratification and implementation by international state-based governing bodies, global governance does not exist. CSOs' strengths can be deployed to contribute to a more legitimate and comprehensive dialogue on global governance, and states and state-based international organizations are beginning to cooperate with – and to co-opt – CSOs. This is particularly true of the global dialogue on controversial peace, security and humanitarian issues, but the trend extends to all areas of global governance. Accordingly, in this section we examine the strengths and incentives that drive the behavior of CSOs and the strengths and incentives of the multilaterals and international organizations with which CSOs must interact to create change on a global scale.

The strengths and weaknesses of all actors in these dialogues may be seen broadly in three areas:

- **Resources:** funding and other concrete assets that enable an organization to engage with and influence policymaking forums;
- **Access:** the organization's formal and informal relationship to the institutions of power in global governance;
- **Skills and experience:** the practical strengths and knowledge of an organization in its chosen field including direct, operational experience (e.g., development work or conflict resolution) and access to information, research capabilities and communication skills.

### 2.B.1. Strengths and weaknesses of CSOs

Broadly, CSOs can be categorized by a primary focus on advocacy (generally, agenda-setting and policy formulation) or on operations (generally, service delivery, implementation and monitoring).<sup>13</sup> Larger CSOs that combine the two roles are best positioned to establish themselves in the global governance dialogue; the “virtuous cycle” of their combined operational experience (which confers access to specialized information and connections) and advocacy experience (with which they can channel resources to their issues of interest, gaining further experience, information and credibility) is powerful.

<sup>13</sup> de Jonge Oudraat, C., & Haufler, V. (2008). Global Governance and the Role of NGOs in International Peace and Security. American Institute for Contemporary German Studies Policy Report 33, 14-16.



The strategic strengths of CSOs as contributors to a dialogue on global governance are many:

- **First-mover advantage:** In publicizing issues that have failed to gain traction with the public or with multilaterals, CSOs find it easier than governments to take the lead – to act as first-movers. This is in large part because CSOs lack genuine external voting constituencies and because rigorous third-party evaluation of CSOs is, for the most part, still rare (though this is changing). For the same reason, CSOs can undertake bold, potentially controversial actions and adopt innovative practices without fearing rapid reprisal from displeased voters or shareholders. Focused often on a single issue, and serving as they do a limited and ideologically unified set of (real or imagined) stakeholders, CSOs can build constituencies for their pet issues among their most critical supporters (donors and others) without any dispassionate assessment of those issues' global relevance. It is also easier for CSOs to construct alliances and partnerships, because of homogeneity among their stakeholders. Such alliances imply the endorsement of the partner's policy stances, and they are thus much more difficult for governments (who have diverse interests to serve) to undertake. Accordingly, issue-centered coalition building is far easier among CSOs than among state-based actors.
- **Innovation in method:** The skills and experience of CSOs are among their strongest contributions to international dialogue. Staffing in CSOs is often less dependent on simple seniority than that in state bureaucracies, and CSOs are likely to pay lower salaries than comparable government organizations. In the most recent figures available, the average salary for a government employee is US\$74,403 while, according to one industry survey, the executive director of a not-for-profit can expect to make approximately US\$55,000 a year.<sup>14, 15</sup> For these reasons and others, CSO staffers are likely to be younger, less entrenched, and quicker to adopt new technologies and techniques than their governmental counterparts.
- **Moral authority with limited accountability:** CSOs' aura of moral authority is strong, yet their accountability is often opaque. This odd combination is a great strength of CSOs when acting as advocates or negotiators in global governance. Few CSOs formally report to clearly defined, external parties (e.g., voting constituents or shareholders) whose sole concern with a given CSO is its performance in support of their own needs. For many CSOs, constituents have no meaningful or direct mechanism of redress. Thus, while CSOs' air of moral authority enables them to advocate a particular viewpoint, they need not consult their nominal constituents in selecting that viewpoint.

#### Case Study: Innovation in method

Frontline SMS and Ushahidi are two free and open-source software products that facilitate monitoring of elections, crises, and other events by individuals (Frontline SMS) and by the overlay of aggregated reporting on maps and through time (Ushahidi). The teams developing Frontline SMS and Ushahidi worked with foundations and CSO partners to create, test and deploy such systems for the purpose of crisis management and election monitoring in countries as diverse as Kenya, Haiti and Afghanistan. Built entirely by volunteers and available for free, the promising technology is a clear example of early adoption of innovative political action. The technology was developed at extremely low cost and took place within civil society rather than at the state level.

14 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2010). Retrieved Aug 2010 from <http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs041.htm>.

15 Salary Snapshot for Non-Profit Organization Industry. Retrieved August 2010 from [http://www.payscale.com/research/US/Industry=Non-Profit\\_Organization/Salary](http://www.payscale.com/research/US/Industry=Non-Profit_Organization/Salary).

- **In-depth experience:** Granular, direct, focused experience with issues and populations of concern is also a key asset for CSOs that wish to impact global governance. In contrast to governments, which must scatter their resources thinly across a great diversity of policy areas, operational CSOs have the single-issue focus, the flexible staff, and the direct experience of a conflict region that give their voices legitimacy. This same single-issue focus often means that CSOs have the speed and flexibility to be the first to respond to crises and to acquire information. CSOs are also better positioned than governments to vigorously pursue detailed (if, importantly, biased) first-hand input directly from their populations of concern. Such input, which comes from primary sources directly engaged with an issue, may be more valuable for this purpose than input from journalists or other middle men.

The strategic weaknesses of CSOs also critically affect their performance in the global governance dialogue.

- **Dual personae:** CSOs must be able to speak to their intended audiences – donors, policymakers, the public and others – equally well in two contexts: (1) publicly, through the media; and (2) privately, through direct advocacy with states and multilaterals. It is extremely difficult for an individual CSO to be heard in either context above the cacophony of civil society voices speaking on any particular issue.
- **Internecline competition:** The marketplace of issues within which each CSO must compete for attention is crowded. Within each issue, too, there is intense competition for a dominant civil society voice. For CSOs, this is truly competition for survival, as the voices and dollars that they recruit are their lifeblood. In particular, CSOs that rely to a great extent on private dollars for their funding play a zero-sum game to gain funds. But competition for members and supporters is also intense as CSOs that have large memberships can make a strong argument for inclusion based on the sheer weight of public opinion that they represent.
- **Fragile authority:** CSOs' power is more fragile than that of governments, and – because the institutions of global governance are state-based – individual CSOs are more easily ignored or ostracized than are national governments. CSOs' influence on global governance is the product of their assets such as funding and alliances and of their perceived validity, impartiality and expertise. Additionally, while CSOs can build relationships with donors – governmental and otherwise – with relative ease, they also risk appearing to serve at the pleasure and direction of those funders. This becomes particularly relevant in conflict areas, where armed groups should be given no reason to conflate their concept of “the enemy” (e.g., the US military in Afghanistan) with associated CSOs from the same part of the world. In Afghanistan, CARE International and Oxfam International rejected substantial aid packages from USAID because of “strings attached” that required the humanitarian CSOs to work with counterinsurgency activities and Provincial Reconstruction Teams.<sup>16</sup> Both organizations felt that the damage to their perceived legitimacy and reputation with their Afghan constituents would overwhelm

<sup>16</sup> USAID rejects NGO concerns over aid militarization. (2009, December 2). IRIN Asia. Retrieved April 2010 from <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=87288>.



the value of the funding they might receive. They worried that the funding would sour the relationship with the populations they endeavored to serve and render their on-ground staff legitimate military targets. This, of course, created tension with the counterinsurgency efforts and peacekeeping missions that, many claimed, were clearing the way for the efforts of CSOs.

- **Susceptibility to coercion:** Many CSOs seek formal participation in the dialogue on global governance through several avenues, of which consultative status with ECOSOC is one. This understandable desire can create a coercive environment – intentional or not – in which advocacy-focused CSOs in particular may feel that they must choose between “going along to get along” or formal ostracism from multilaterals. In addition, the value of alliance-building for CSOs may leave them open to coercion. Alliances built for the mere value of having a partner, rather than on an alignment of mission and perspective, may – when missions and strategies diverge – leave weaker CSOs open to coercion by stronger partners.
- **Unintended consequences:** Many CSOs are focused on a single issue, and the persistence of that issue sustains the organization and the people in it. Accordingly, an issue-focused CSO will aggressively recruit funding and attention to its own issue, thereby drawing dollars away from other issues. This means that one organization’s success may come at the expense of a more critical need.

### 2.B.2. Strengths and weaknesses of states

States bring different strengths to the global governance dialogue.

- **Reliable resources:** States boast unmatched financial resources, standing militaries, and plentiful civilian staff. Though these resources are limited, the advantage in these areas is quite markedly on the side of nations and multilaterals, rather than CSOs. In the context of security issues specifically, state-based actors also have the operational and logistical skill that much of civil society lacks.
- **Respect for sovereignty:** For good or ill, the global acknowledgement of national sovereignty gives governments the power to exercise their will to the brink of internationally agreed norms. Governments retain this power even when their legitimacy is questioned by peer states. States can also wield formal, procedural influence in multilateral negotiations through veto power and other such mechanisms, which they can use to coerce both state level and sub-state level actors.
- **Access and information:** National governments possess unparalleled access to the structures of global governance, of which they are the primary creators. Governments, therefore, are extremely difficult to ostracize. The community of states – a coalition of the powerful – is unwilling to act in concert to exclude all but the most egregious offenders within their community, fearing that such action would set an unappealing precedent, and that other members of the community might find their own sovereignty comparably constrained later. Governments also have unique access to information about global governance activity, especially *in re* ongoing discussions

within the multilaterals that establish global governance. Simple information asymmetry puts governments at a great advantage, relative to CSOs.

**Recommendation:**

Create a publicly accessible clearinghouse of information on the issues under consideration by, and the activities of, the UN and other multilateral agencies. Such an institution might also serve as a “watchdog” to monitor important changes in the dialogue and activity on a particular issue.

The strategic weaknesses of governments as contributors to global governance are also manifold, but three are of particular interest.

- **Breadth without depth:** Whereas CSOs can and do acquire granular, direct, focused skills and knowledge in a specific issue area, governments are weakened by the breadth of their responsibilities. Although they have unmatched power and durability, they find themselves ill-equipped to respond specifically, quickly, and in a focused way to each difficulty that their citizens face. This is due to the many competing interests they must balance and the ungainly nature of their large bureaucracies.
- **Conflicts of interest:** Governments are also prone to conflicts of interest, as are their CSO counterparts. A government may privately wish for the persistence of a conflict situation or humanitarian crisis to sustain donor flows from multilateral agencies. Alternatively, a regime may privately wish to suppress one ethnic, religious or political faction to solidify and sustain its own power. In any such case, a government’s contribution to the dialogue on global governance may have a motivation different from crisis resolution or other such “selfless” goals.
- **Lack of experience:** Few governments remain in office for more than several years. Even when they do, their politicians and their diplomatic personnel are typically moved every three or four years from one post, department or issue to another. As a result, government officials are often ill-informed about institutional procedures and ill-equipped to grasp the nuances of issues.



## 2.C. CSOs and states as actors in advocacy

The practice of advocacy is natural for CSOs and for governments. CSOs have the time, the interest, and the mission to undertake such work, while governments have the institutional mandate to serve the interests of their constituents in this capacity.

For a CSO, the purpose of successful advocacy goes well beyond the support of a moral or humanitarian cause; indeed, success in the conduct of agenda-setting also impacts a CSO's institutional survival. Without successfully pressing its primary issue onto the global agenda, sustaining the issue through the process of negotiations and monitoring the issue on an ongoing basis, an advocacy-focused CSO loses its purpose. To renew its relevance, such a CSO must reinvent itself or expand its focus.

For governments, agenda-setting and negotiation are as natural as they are for CSOs. Indeed, governments are designed to represent the interests of their citizens comprehensively, which CSOs are not. Though governments run no risk of losing their seats at the table of global governance, merely passive participation by any single state sets a dangerous precedent, creating a vacuum that other states will be only too ready to fill.

## 2.D. CSOs and states as actors in operations

CSOs are sometimes better positioned and more motivated than their government counterparts to undertake the work of implementation and long-term monitoring of governance. Before and after localized crises arise, CSOs are often better established on the ground than governments. CSOs have a legitimate interest and, often, the human assets and experience that a national government does not possess, simply because governments' human and material resources are usually thinly spread.

Skill in implementation is also the lifeblood that sustains many CSOs. As discussed in section 2.B., governments that keep implementation in-house must, in addition to disbursing funds, assume all accountability for the results, quickly acquire, develop and retain staff, and pursue innovative methods by which to resolve crises. Moving quickly to do these things is unnatural for governments, which reasonably prefer to move cautiously and avoid taking irrevocable positions on hot-button issues. In contrast, CSOs are often more ready to take on all of these tasks, relying on governments for funding where available. CSOs can also nudge other types of actors – in particular, states, multilaterals and their contractors – towards better performance by drawing attention to their missteps and outdated practices. However, much of the research on CSOs in peace-building operations is critical, pointing to the prevalence of crowding out of local actors and to the failure of CSOs to create a sustained impact.<sup>17</sup>

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17 Ohanyan, A. & Lewis, J.E. (2005). Politics of Peace-Building: Critical Evaluation of Interethnic Contact and Peace Education in Georgian-Abkhaz Peace Camp, 1998-2002. *Peace & Change* 30(1), 57-84.

One of the few studies to categorize the roles filled by civil society in implementation describes two roles of particular interest to this paper: (1) protection of citizens (including monitoring within conflict zones); and (2) delivery of basic services in order to facilitate higher-level efforts to mitigate conflict.<sup>18</sup> In the role of protection, CSOs often follow on the heels of state-based actors to undertake post-conflict monitoring. Such monitoring by CSOs can help to create long-term security for crisis-affected populations. In monitoring, the primary interests of CSOs and governments should align, and cooperative labor between them should be feasible, if difficult. The work of monitoring may also be less experience-dependent, and may thus invite the participation of a diverse range of actors to impart legitimacy to the process and the results. CSOs are, of course, well positioned to participate in the process since they can offer existing on-the-ground personnel. This is particularly the case when CSOs act in partnership with those local organizations already positioned and integrated into the communities that require monitoring.

Monitoring work can also help CSOs contribute to long-term compliance with established governance, though in these cases the powers wielded by CSOs and governments are very different. Effective compliance is rarely secured without a strong coalition of governments acting through a multilateral or jointly as an *ad hoc* coalition. To achieve compliance, states use formal venues and channels, but such influence can be weakened by competing demands on states' energies and attention. In contrast, CSOs wield little formal power but can instead raise costs for states or actors that fail to comply with established norms and agreements by undertaking public campaigns to shame non-compliant actors or by encouraging grass-roots techniques such as boycotts. In certain venues (e.g., the European Court of Justice) it is also possible for CSOs to bring suit against states for breach of international treaties, and in intergovernmental venues CSOs of particular nations can encourage their governments to act on their behalf. CSOs cannot, however, do a great deal to affect regimes or groups that are indifferent to such tools.

In any fragile, flammable situation in which military forces are involved, the ability of CSOs to support the implementation and monitoring of governance can be significantly hindered by any connection, real or perceived, with entities that maintain peace with weapons. The line between monitoring work as undertaken by CSOs and enforcement work undertaken by armed representatives of states or multilaterals must be completely clear, because the ability of CSOs to conduct humanitarian work is highly dependent upon their perceived impartiality and independence.

## 2.E. Institutional incentives of multilaterals

Understanding the institutional incentives of the participants in the global governance game is critical to understanding its development. State-based multilateral organizations have ultimate sway over much formally established global governance, and so a brief examination of their own institutional incentives (as opposed to the incentives of their member states) is warranted.

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<sup>18</sup> Paffenholz, T. (2009). Summary of results for a comparative research project: Civil Society and Peacebuilding. CCDP Working Paper 4. Geneva: The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding.



Traditionally, multilateral organizations are viewed as international forums in which states defend and support their own interests. More recently, analysis has begun to explore the conduct of multilateral institutions as entities unto themselves (in addition to, not instead of, their role as forums) with distinct organizational imperatives and goals.<sup>19</sup> Multilateral organizations, like sub-national coalitions, “may be created and supported for reasons of legitimacy and normative fit rather than efficient output; they may be created not for what they do but for what they are – for what they represent symbolically and the values they embody.”<sup>20</sup> Viewed through this lens, some civil society observers’ belief that multilateral institutions actually hinder the progress of global governance initiatives on a diverse range of topics is less difficult to understand.

Intergovernmental organizations do not compete with one another for organizational survival, although they do compete for power and influence. They often have no concrete criteria for success or failure. They serve as aggregators of knowledge, experience and authority (moral and, to some extent, legal) over and above that of their component states. However, because the power of the UN and other multilateral organizations is derived in some measure from their aura of impartiality, the motivation to settle for “middle of the road” outcomes that tread on the fewest toes is clear. In addition, the intra-organizational war for ideological and professional turf may result in the exclusion of input from weaker divisions within an organization and in stalemated negotiations between powerful divisions. This can result in hard-fought but tardy solutions that are variously uncreative, uninspired or incoherent.

Likewise, because of their role as a repository of the aggregated knowledge and experience of their component states, multilaterals are also more likely to make significant decisions without consulting the “voiceless” tens of thousands whom their decisions affect – “expertise [...] has allowed the UNHCR to make life and death decisions about [e.g.] refugees without consulting the refugees themselves, and to compromise the authority of states in various ways in setting up refugee camps.”<sup>21</sup>

Other institutional characteristics may impede creative, bold decision-making in multilaterals as well.<sup>22</sup> Necessarily reliant on protocols and rules, multilaterals are likely to make decisions that fit the rulebook, rather than the situation. On the other hand, when an institutional protocol is regularly broken, the deviation itself can become an “unspoken rule.” Likewise, because of the inconceivably broad scope of issues they must face, multilaterals are likely to approach each challenge as though it occurs in a context similar to every other, and each individual as though s/he has a value system identical to that of the institutional technocrats themselves.

State-based multilaterals must be treated as a distinct class of actors in global governance, rather than as mere venues in which other classes of actors interact. The institutional incentives that guide these multilaterals in their approach to the critical issues of the day can impede the development of

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19 Barnett, M. & Finnemore, M. (1999). The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization* 53(4), 699-732.

20 Ibid., [Quote p 703]

21 Ibid., [Quote p 710]

22 Ibid.

fruitful collaboration with other, faster-moving actors. Nevertheless, the unique suite of capabilities and resources that multilaterals possess makes them the most important partners for CSOs who are truly interested in influencing global governance.

## 2.F. Networked collaboration

Increasingly, transnational networks of CSOs, governments and other actors are making their weight felt in the dialogue on global governance. These networks cannot reasonably be called a “new” species of global actor (the global anti-apartheid movement dates to the 1960s, and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines took formal shape in 1996), but their rise as a common global response to issues of international concern is a noteworthy trend.

“In this world, the measure of power is connectedness”  
(Slaughter, 2009, p. 94)

The constellation of non-state actors with consultative status to the UN is increasingly described as a “third UN” beyond the secretariat (the second UN) and the member states (the first UN).<sup>23</sup> The presence of these actors in formal consultation, in global issue-focused campaigns (e.g., the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines) and in parallel forums has been a feature of UN deliberations since 1972.<sup>24</sup> These actors, in their interactions with the UN, often appear as umbrella organizations that bring together many civil society actors around a particular issue. Such organizations can form in direct response to changes in the UN, as did the Environment Liaison Center International, a group of more than 6,000 NGOs that coalesced around the creation of the United Nations Environmental Program.<sup>25</sup>

As these networks become more common, it is useful to examine their different purposes. Peter Willetts has suggested a taxonomy of networks that categorizes them as follows:<sup>26</sup>

- umbrella international non-governmental organizations, which have formal institutional structures and which can incorporate both national and international NGOs;
- information networks, which are loose arrangements with or without a formal structure, and which are primarily focused on helping members to communicate and share reliable research and up-to-date information;
- transnational advocacy networks, which are issue-centered loose coalitions of CSOs, states, and other actors;

23 Weiss, T. G., Carayannis, T. & Jolly, R. (2009). The “Third” United Nations. *Global Governance*, 15, 123-142.

24 Ibid.

25 Coate, R. A. (2009). The John W. Holmes Lecture: Growing the “Third UN” for People-centered Development – the United Nations, Civil Society, and Beyond. *Global Governance*, 15, 153-168.

26 Willetts, P. (2010). A Note on the Concept of Networks. Working paper for the conference “Towards a More Effective Division of Labor: The Role of Civil society organizations in Global Governance” held at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington on April 28, 2010.



- issue caucuses, which are similar in composition and purpose to transnational advocacy networks but are focused on a particular institutional forum for a limited period of time rather than continually on one issue across all relevant forums;
- governance networks, which exist to support civil society’s participation in policy making forums through assistance with accreditation processes, training in participation skills, and providing information on the activities of the governance forum of interest. They do not have common values, nor do they engage in advocacy.

These five types of networks are analytical ideal types. In practice, they often overlap. Information and governance networks, for example, may engage in a limited amount of advocacy, while advocacy networks may also promote research or address governance questions. Despite the blurring boundaries, these distinctions are helpful because they point out different roles and objectives that need to be understood to establish an effective collaboration within civil society and between civil society and state-based actors.

The security sector offers useful examples of successful and unsuccessful collaboration within multi-stakeholder networks. Multilateral agreements, supported by civil society communities and ratified by signatory governments, have been established in regard to classes of weapons such as nuclear, biological and chemical, as well as to specific armaments such as missiles and landmines.<sup>27</sup> In addition, management of security and humanitarian issues often demands the activation of trans-sectoral networks. But for the purposes of establishing governance, successful examples of networked collaboration are fewer and farther between. Rare is the issue in which a trans-sectoral network has successfully negotiated new norms, regulations or treaties that:

- “have teeth” (that is, for which compliance can be monitored and/or enforced);
- balance participation reasonably between CSOs and state-based actors;
- produce concrete, observable outcomes.

In terms of actual policy setting, networks of a higher order – i.e., leaders and persons of influence and prestige worldwide, connected often across different sectors – are better placed to decide outcomes on all but the most public issues. Anne-Marie Slaughter has suggested that “in a networked world, the issue is no longer relative power but centrality.”<sup>28</sup> The “rise of centrality” may be oversold as a true revolution; the royal houses of Europe for centuries focused on building their networks of allegiances through marriage and other connections of family or indebtedness. Powerful entities have always found their closest friends in other powerful entities.

27 Finnemore, M. (2005). Fights about rules: the role of efficacy and power in changing multilateralism. *Review of International Studies*, 31, 187-206.

28 Slaughter, A. (2009). America’s Edge: Power in the networked century. *Foreign Affairs*, 88(1), 94-113. [Quote p 7]

“Julia Taft ran the emergency program of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), after having been the CEO of InterAction, [...] while being a member of a UN committee coordinating emergency operations, and after having headed the US State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration” (Weiss, Carayannis, Jolly, 2009, p 134).

“Many key contributors to ideas as members of the first and second UN had significant prior associations with a university, a policy think tank, or a CSO – or joined one after leaving government or UN service. Many individuals have served as members or chairs of independent panels and commissions that examined emerging problems not yet on the international radar screen” (Weiss et al, 2009, p 127).

As discussed earlier, snapshots of the division of labor among civil society, states and multilaterals may belie more fluid connections between individual participants, who move easily from one sphere to the next. These personal ties between CSOs and their partners in global governance constitute a hidden network that depends on the sort of human networks and social capital that drive the success of a group or initiative in any community, and not on formal collaborative agreements across regions, issues, constituencies or sectors.

Though governments themselves retain the formal power to set the international policy agenda, this power is shifting as state-based actors begin to participate in the establishment of, and cede power to, trans-national and trans-sectoral networks. One successful example of such a network is the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) and the Global Business Coalition on AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GBCATM). Together, these organizations coordinate efforts by the UN, the private sector, foundations, CSOs and governments to address these diseases. The prestige and sheer number of the signatories to the GFATM and GBCATM keep these diseases prominent on the international agenda.

The UN Global Compact is another example of multi-stakeholder, transnational collaboration. While it is certainly easy to point to new and valuable ideas of good corporate citizenship that have arisen from the collaboration of its more than 8,000 participants, the Compact itself is sometimes seen as being toothless, with no meaningful mechanism of punishment for deviation from norms and standards of conduct. Indeed, the Compact has as its only mechanism of enforcement the “delisting” of companies, and more than 1,800 have been delisted for non-compliance with Compact standards.<sup>29</sup> But this rate of delisting was viewed as too high, and the Compact recently placed a year-long moratorium on the ejection of other companies, clearly demonstrating the Compact’s reluctance to enforce its own standards.

Trans-national networks that include actors from the private sector can be uniquely successful at agenda setting and agenda maintenance. This is partially because international commerce runs through the private sector and also partially because multinational companies (particularly in extractive industries) often have uniquely detailed, intimate knowledge of developing countries and conflict zones. Major business actors (retailers in particular) may also have more regular and broad-based contact through ad campaigns and physical presence with the public in the developed world than any CSO, and they may be better at capturing the public’s attention than governmental actors for whom marketing is not a core strength. Accordingly, the deployment of the private sector

29 Williamson, H. (2010, June 23). CSR in emerging economies: Style still trumps substance. Message posted to <http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2010/06/23/csr-in-emerging-economies-style-still-trumps-substance/>.



in support of a particular issue or policy, in the context of a coalition with civil society and state-based actors, can be a successful tactic.

In terms of actual impact, though, private-sector partnership has yet to demonstrate much concrete success. The Product(RE)D campaign, an innovative campaign designed to deploy the power of simple consumerism to support the GFATM, has been lambasted for its ineffectiveness,<sup>30</sup> having raised a mere US\$18 million to support the GFATM after corporate partners spent approximately US\$100 million in marketing dollars on (RED) campaigns. In comparison, the US government in 2006 donated US\$724 million to the GFATM (40 times the sum raised by the private-sector initiative) and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation contributed US\$650 million. Additionally, the success of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) shows that networks of established actors in global governance – CSOs and governments – can move issues forward that private-sector players cannot. This is because these networks are more familiar with the process of agenda-setting and negotiation at the global level.

„The Red campaign can be a good start or it can be a colossal waste of money, and it all depends on whether this edgy, innovative campaign inspires young people to be better citizens or just gives them an excuse to feel good about themselves while they buy an overpriced item they don't really need.“ - Trent Stamp, President, Charity Navigator (“Costly Red Campaign,” 2007)

Private citizens are also finding a place as stakeholders in, and contributors to, networks in global governance. In combination with new and inexpensive technologies such as Ushahidi and Frontline SMS (see section 2.B.), private citizens' contributions of time and knowledge can help to create a resilient, low-cost, easy and broad-based monitoring network. Such “crowdsourcing” technologies also dovetail with CSOs' increasing recognition that detailed, corporate-style market research can benefit their own work. CSOs are increasingly taking such lessons from the private sector and are employing citizen experts to obtain first-hand ideas and information from the developing world or from areas of conflict. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, for instance, “unofficially monitors and verifies the 1997 Ottawa Treaty through ‘citizen verification’ with 115 researchers in 85 countries.”<sup>31</sup>

### 2.F.1. Case Study: The International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines – initially a coalition of six north Atlantic CSOs: Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Handicap International, Physicians for Human Rights, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and the Mines Advisory Group – is often held up as a successful model of trans-sectoral collaboration. “Since its founding, the campaign has grown and spread to become a network of more than 1,400 groups, including groups working on women, children, veterans, religious groups, the environment, human rights, arms control, peace and development.”<sup>32</sup> In this and other networked campaigns, coalitions of CSOs gained

30 Frazier, M. (2007, March 5). Costly Red Campaign Reaps Meager \$18 Million. Advertising Age. Retrieved in May 2010 from [http://adage.com/article?article\\_id=115287](http://adage.com/article?article_id=115287).

31 de Jonge Oudraat, C., & Haufler, V. (2008). Global Governance and the Role of NGOs in International Peace and Security. American Institute for Contemporary German Studies Policy Report 33. [Quote p 24].

32 Williams, J. (1997). Nobel Lecture. Retrieved 16 September 2010 from [http://nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/peace/laureates/1997/williams-lecture.html](http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1997/williams-lecture.html).

influence over state actors in agenda-setting and negotiations by aggregating and coordinating the voices of countless individuals.

In one sense, the true genius of the ICBL network is in its organizational structure, which forms a tidy counterpoint to the hierarchical construction of multilateral organizations. There is no “home office” for the ICBL, nor is there hierarchical direction of national initiatives. The conduct and planning of each participating organization’s work can, within a broad set of general goals, be tailored to its distinct national or ideological context. This characteristic of the organization defuses intra-alliance tensions and makes it easy for member organizations to support the overarching goal of the Campaign without fearing that membership will limit their independence.

While the ICBL is justly lauded for its successful husbandry of the Ottawa Treaty through an extremely challenging process, the Treaty cannot be said to be an absolute success. Of the world’s 6.7 billion people (2008), at least 3.1 billion live in countries that are NOT signatory to the landmine ban. These include such critical nations as India, China, Russia, Pakistan and the United States.

### 2.F.2. Case Study: The World Commission on Dams

The World Commission on Dams (WCD) is an excellent example of a trans-sectoral network at work on several of the most pressing global challenges including water usage, energy sustainability and infrastructure. Most importantly, the WCD is a rare example of successful start-to-finish trans-sectoral collaboration focused on balanced representation. It provides a model for other issue coalitions seeking legitimacy in their dealings with issues of global governance.<sup>33</sup>

The WCD, founded in 1997, was the outgrowth of a years-old dialogue on the performance and desirability of large dams. After reaching a stalemate on guidelines for dam construction under the auspices of the World Bank, dam-building companies, CSOs, governmental organizations and multilaterals agreed to create an independent commission expressly for this purpose. A true trans-sectoral network, the Commission was an early example of balanced input across sectors. It moved away from the de facto reliance on traditional expertise that characterizes institutions of global governance and towards a more broad, diverse and inclusive model of global deliberation.

The WCD was structured with a group of twelve commissioners, a consultative group of sixty-eight stakeholders and professional staff to support the commissioners. The twelve commissioners were intended to represent “every significant perspective in the dams debate”.<sup>34</sup> The Commission was perceived as legitimate by each sector of its stakeholder constituency because, rather than relying on the “eminence and detachment” of its commissioners to serve as a proxy for legitimacy, it pursued legitimacy through an appropriate balance of representation.<sup>35</sup> The process of identifying

33 Dubash, N. (2009). Global Norms Through Global Deliberation? Reflections on the World Commission on Dams. *Global Governance*, 15, 219-238.

34 Asmal, K. (2001). World Commission on Dams Report, Dams and Development. *American University International Law Review*, 16, 1411-1413 [Quote p 1412].

35 Dubash, N. (2009). Global Norms Through Global Deliberation? Reflections on the World Commission on Dams. *Global Governance*, 15, 219-238 [Quote p 224].



the commissioners and stakeholders became a case study in which balance across many axes – geography, political disposition, local/national/multinational and sector – could be identified. The value of achieving balance of this kind is clear, but the public and transparent quality of the debate surrounding the Commission’s development was new and surprising to observers.

Once the heavy debate surrounding the composition of the Commission and consultative group was completed, the process of the WCD’s debates was itself a case study in legitimizing processes. The WCD’s innovative steps towards transparency and legitimacy included the rapid publication of deliberative and administrative documents, even those of a kind not usually released to the public in previous comparable deliberations. The Commission also organized public hearings around the globe, though they were hampered by the Commission’s limited budget for translation.

Interestingly, after the WCD had concluded its work, industries and governments claimed that “NGOs had influenced the process through insider connections and unfair access rather than through force of argument.”<sup>36</sup> While the NGOs mentioned might have added to the democratic appearance of the Commission’s composition, the legitimacy of the Commission at the process level was questioned because of the behavior of CSOs rather than the more frequently accused demons of the private or governmental sectors.

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36 Dubash, N. (2009). Global Norms Through Global Deliberation? Reflections on the World Commission on Dams. *Global Governance*, 15, 219-238 [Quote p 226].

## 3. Legitimacy, accountability, and the “democratic deficit”

### 3.A. Legitimacy and accountability in global governance

Legitimacy – a CSO’s image as an honest and accurately representative voice – is perhaps the most important asset that a CSO can have in negotiations on governance. Such legitimacy is increasingly conferred by “accountability” and by a long record of expertise. “Accountability” in civil society is often used as a synonym for financial transparency. VENRO (the German association of development CSOs) recently adopted binding rules for its membership, specifying accounting practices and reporting standards and helping the German public to assess and compare CSOs’ use of donor dollars. Beyond such accounting standards, concern over the largely unregulated CSO community has been the driver of new performance-monitoring and reporting initiatives including self-monitoring, complaint-based monitoring, and third-party auditing.<sup>37</sup>

Self-monitoring in the CSO community cannot be considered a sustainable framework for accountability. It is represented by such initiatives as the CSO Accountability Charter, founded by Amnesty International and several other prominent NGOs. The Charter has only a narrow reach (the original 2006 roster of fifteen has never increased significantly) and supports self-monitoring principles that inspire little confidence, for example:

“We will adhere to generally-accepted standards of technical accuracy and honesty in presenting and interpreting data and research, using and referencing independent research.”<sup>38</sup>

The One World Trust has also established an extensive clearinghouse of information on self-regulation initiatives by CSOs worldwide, contributing to the organizations’ ability to collect, analyze and publicize data on their own performance.

Complaints-based compliance and peer review are steps towards greater accountability. In a complaints-based model, as yet largely untested, external parties (from private citizens to peer organizations) are trusted to identify occasions for complaint and to submit those complaints to the public, an internal monitoring body (e.g., a board of directors) or an external monitoring body. The One World Trust has also identified several such systems, but a diligent review of the systems cited did not, as of early 2010, yield a Web-based submission form, a dedicated e-mail address, or a telephone number to call. From this, it might reasonably be construed that complaints-based compliance is not yet a workable reality. Peer-review systems, such as that implemented by the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, collect reportage on CSO performance but often keep their data away from public eyes, using it instead within the civil society community as a “lessons-learned” process. Thus it might be better described as a teaching tool than a step towards actual public accountability.

37 Lingán, J., Cavender, A., Lloyd, R., & Gwynne, B. (2009). Responding to NGO Development Effectiveness Initiatives. One World Trust / World Vision Briefing Paper No. 122.

38 International Non-Governmental Organisations Commitment to Accountability. INGO Accountability Charter. Retrieved August 2010 from <http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/read-the-charter/principles/>.



Finally, third-party audits include the work of such parties as the French SGS Group, Social Accountability International, and People in Aid. Though not specifically intended to audit the work and ethics of civil society actors in global governance, these organizations nevertheless perform a unique service. They audit “one level up”, examining management practices within CSOs. Social Accountability International, for example, provides accreditation to CSOs based on its proprietary SA8000 standards, which are themselves built on the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the international ISO 9000 auditing for code-based standards of practice.<sup>39</sup>

Third-party auditing – doubtless a positive step towards creating a culture of accountability – covers only a tiny percentage of the more than 3,000 CSOs with consultative status at the UN through ECOSOC, not to mention the more than 20,000 international CSOs listed in the Yearbook of International Organizations for 2005/2006. Until the stakeholders of CSOs themselves begin to demand accountability and to “vote with their feet”, shifting their “business” in the form of access, endorsements and dollars preferentially to those CSOs with internationally recognized certifications, even third-party auditing will remain a fundamentally voluntary system of self-monitoring.

### 3.B. The “democratic deficit”: imbalances in North-South representation

Many observers have commented on a perceived North-South divide (for our purposes, we will define this broadly as OECD-G77) in CSO representation at the UN and other bodies of global governance.<sup>40, 41</sup> These observers suggest that, as a result of this divide, norms and standards flow from northern cultures to southern, and that those organizations developing global governance are in many ways disconnected from the populations that will be directly affected by that governance. Though this is not uniformly the case, the high visibility of developed or northern states in the creation of global governance, particularly in such venues such as the G-8, G20 or P5+1, relative to developing or southern states understandably inspires this concern.

This divide between North and South is apparent at the UN. More than 25 percent of the 3,345 ECOSOC-registered NGOs with a specific headquarters address are based in North America. Another 20 percent are based in Western Europe;<sup>42</sup> eight percent are in northern Europe.<sup>43, 44</sup> More dramatically, two-thirds of such NGOs are headquartered in OECD countries, translating to a per-

39 Retrieved August 2010 from <http://www.sa-intl.org/>.

40 Bendaña, A. (2006). NGOs and Social Movements: A North/South Divide? United Nations Research Institute for Social Development: Civil Society and Social Movements Programme Paper Number 22.

41 Weiss, T. G. (2009). Moving Beyond North-South Theatre. *Third World Quarterly*, 30 (2), 271 – 284.

42 According to the UN Geoscheme, this includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands and Switzerland.

43 According to the UN Geoscheme, this includes Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

44 For further detail, constituent countries of each region, and explanation of calculations, see tables, pp: 39-52

capita representation<sup>45</sup> of 1.86 NGOs per 1,000,000 residents of the OECD. This contrasts with only 0.18 NGOs per 1,000,000 residents in the G77 community. If regional representation by GDP<sup>46</sup> is calculated, the OECD remains the best represented, with 0.058 NGOs at the UN per US\$ billion of GDP compared to 0.037 NGOs for the same amount of GDP in the G77. The tables at the end of this report offer further analysis.

It is possible, however, that the perceived North-South divide is a proxy for other slow-changing characteristics that are typical to southern or to northern countries. Countries with large, dense, wealthy populations might reasonably be expected to nurture CSOs. In contrast, those countries with small populations, low population density, a high preponderance of subsistence living, low access to discretionary funding for the typical activities of civil society and low access to the tools that enable collective and international action in the modern world are less likely to nurture CSOs of the sort recognized by the UN.

How can this condition be remedied? The procedural formalities of global governance institutions – a quality critical to their legitimacy and ability to act on the world stage – creates a predisposition towards typically Northern actors with extensive formal education and familiarity with the bureaucracy of the UN and other multilaterals. Also, cultural factors such as a history of organization and collective action around social issues – perhaps in the form of labor unions – might reasonably be considered to help determine the relative rate of formation of CSOs. The preponderance of such collective action is with the global North.

This also calls to mind the disparity in resourcing between northern and southern CSOs. CSOs based in comparatively poor nations often face scarcity of the funding that is necessary to build or acquire basic office infrastructure, to travel, to engage media, or to recruit a workforce. This is perhaps the most serious barrier to the creation of organizations capable of interacting fruitfully on the global stage.

#### **Recommendation:**

Create robust multi-funder pools to support the development of southern CSOs' capacity and infrastructure.

A truly trans-sectoral and geographically comprehensive model of global governance must incorporate civil society of the global South to a greater extent, as so many humanitarian, environmental, peace and security issues directly impact the global South. Though apparent concentration of CSOs in the global South is low, relative to the global North, one observer has noted that “registration [of CSOs] in many southern countries is weak or non-existent...They proliferate, even if they are not formed in the [model] we might talk about in the North.”<sup>47</sup> How might the participation of southern civil society be encouraged and facilitated?

45 (Number of registered NGOs headquartered in Region X) / (millions of people in Region X)

46 (Number of registered NGOs headquartered in Region X) / (US\$ billion of GDP (PPP) for Region X)

47 Steve Darvill, in an e-mail to the authors dated 29 June, 2010.



To obtain the participation of southern CSOs, such CSOs must first exist in sufficient numbers and have the appropriate skills to encourage multilaterals to include them in discussions on global governance. These goals require the concrete support of experienced northern colleagues and multilaterals themselves. Beyond funding that lowers the physical barriers to access, southern CSOs also need support in the form of education and training that helps them to learn the nuances of working with complex multilaterals.

**Recommendation:**

Create a publicly accessible “experience bank” of case studies, “how-to” guides, and other concrete resources to help under-resourced southern CSOs build capacity and access knowledge without direct training and experience.

Multilaterals and northern CSOs must actively seek the knowledge, ability and experience of the less-formalized community of southern CSOs. The following recommendations for doing this will help to create the foundation for richer, more comprehensive debate on global issues of the future.

## 4. Conclusions and recommendations

### 4.A. Conclusions: the way forward

Our world is changing rapidly, and the challenges that we face are increasingly global, rather than local. Yet existing institutions of global governance still have no truly global dialogue on the most pressing issues of the day. CSOs, particularly those from the less-developed world, can help address this problem. To bring the voices of these organizations into the discussion, however, requires action on the part of multilaterals and civil society from developed nations.

In this paper we have discussed the rise of civil society as a contributor to discussions on global governance, and examined the strengths and weaknesses that CSOs, governments, businesses and multilateral organizations evince as actors in creating and implementing global governance. We have also sought to examine the perceived “democratic deficit”, i.e., the disparity between the influence of civil society from northern (OECD) and southern (G77) countries in the creation of global governance.

The process of developing global governance will continue to be characterized by conflicts of interest, disparities among contributors’ expertise, education and vocabulary, and frequent exchange of personnel among actors. This can blur boundaries between organizations, but it can also create “social capital” within the community of contributors, and ease discussions of polarizing issues.<sup>48</sup>

Many examples of effective or ineffective collaboration exist, and they provide “how-to” templates for a future division of labor among actors. It may seem that more clearly defined roles for different classes of actors are warranted to respond more quickly and effectively to crises. But such specialization would come at the expense of flexibility and might reduce the capacity of multilaterals and CSOs to respond to global issues and crises in an *ad hoc*, “best-fit” manner.

More frequent informal consultation, as in the relationship between CSOs and the UN Security Council, is an alternative. CSOs’ informal involvement with the UN Security Council has increased substantially in the past two decades, although CSOs are not officially authorized to consult with the Council.<sup>49</sup> Initial reaction from the P-5 to formal CSO consultation with the Security Council was negative, but the prospect of an informal process of interaction through the NGO Working Group was received more warmly. CSOs now regularly report and advocate through informal channels of communication, including private meetings between CSO representatives and mission delegates.<sup>50</sup>

If future challenges are to be met by diverse, powerful coalitions of actors from multiple sectors and many regions of the globe, models of effective collaboration must be catalogued, described, and expanded. Those actors with the greatest power to alter the nature of the global governance dialogue must undertake new and innovative steps such as those discussed below. With such efforts, a truly shared model of global governance is possible.

48 Weiss, T. G., Carayannis, T. & Jolly, R. (2009). The “Third” United Nations. *Global Governance*, 15, 123-142.

49 Paul, J. (2004). NGOs and the UN Security Council. *Global Policy Forum*. Retrieved August 2010 from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/publications-mm/all-policy-papers-articles-and-statements-mm.html#2004>.

50 Ibid.



## 4.B. Recommendations to multilateral organizations

The participation of organized civil society in the development and implementation of global governance already occurs at a high level. This has come about as the demand for the knowledge and first-hand experience possessed by CSOs has increased, and as CSOs have learned better how to assert themselves on the governance stage. How, then, can this increasing participation be tailored to maximize its benefit for all concerned parties?

The infrastructure used to incorporate CSOs into the UN and other multilaterals must be strengthened and expanded. This is not to say that a new institution is needed to serve the purpose, but that the avenues of exchange and interaction must become easier to tread for both parties. This can be accomplished through a number of concrete steps, some of which are proposed below. These measures must also be used to support southern CSOs and to promote civil society in less-developed countries.

1. **Create dedicated spaces and technology** for the interaction of CSOs and multilaterals. Such efforts would primarily contribute to better access for smaller southern and northern CSOs that cannot sustain the human and physical infrastructure to maintain regular contact with multilaterals in New York, Geneva, Washington, DC or elsewhere. The existence of dedicated, accessible, reliable and widely affordable spaces and video/audio links would support systematic integration of civil society voices into the global governance dialogue and would also make *ad hoc* integration easier, permitting multilaterals, states and CSOs to respond in a rapid and coordinated way to urgent issues.
2. **Create a central, well-designed and broadly accessible clearinghouse of information** on current, past and future deliberations and activities of the UN and other multilateral agencies. Such a clearinghouse would enable CSOs of all kinds to have equal and more timely access to knowledge of the UN's activities. This would create a level playing field and empower CSOs to participate in discussions that are relevant to them and to their constituents. Such a clearinghouse might also serve as a watchdog to monitor important changes in the dialogue (e.g., substantial shifts in direction or tone) and activity on a particular issue.
3. **Create a publicly accessible experience bank** that would store codified knowledge (e.g., case studies, "how-to" guides, other concrete resources) to assist with capacity building among all CSOs, but with a particular focus on southern and underdeveloped civil society communities. Multilaterals value technological expertise and traditional education and prefer to receive input in a customary format and style; such an experience bank would contribute substantially to the ability of southern CSOs to create space for themselves in the global governance dialogue through: (1) the development of the requisite expertise and education; and (2) practice in the format and style preferred by multilaterals.
4. **Create reliable, robust multi-funder pools** to support the aforementioned efforts towards southern capacity building and expertise. These multi-funder pools might take the form of issue-focused

networks, and would work to support capacity building among southern organizations and the increased demand for southern knowledge and expertise among multilateral organizations. This in itself would serve as an incentive for growth in southern civil society.

5. **Recognize and fund the work of global governance networks** (see Section 2.F.), which can and do serve a critical role in facilitating the participation of southern CSOs in the development of global governance. Such support might include funding (to be channeled through the governance networks) for training workshops and information services, as well as modest subsidies for low-cost lodging, travel and office facilities. This would lower the barriers to participation for southern CSOs. It would also require multilaterals to give increased importance to funding the administrative work conducted by CSOs, as well as their better resourced operational work.



The following tables are intended to illustrate the North / South divide in civil society representation at the UN. Of the complete list of 3,413 NGOs that were registered with ECOSOC at the UN at the time of research, 3,345 (98 percent) are analyzed below. These are the organizations that, as of September 2010, had registered headquarters in a specific country.<sup>51</sup> No distinction is drawn between NGOs that operate locally or globally; the only metric used is the nation in which each NGO's headquarters is registered. This metric is crude, but the authors hope that the data will help to make the perceived disparity in North / South representation more concrete.

For regional analysis, the countries are categorized according to:

- their regions as defined by the UN Geoscheme;
- their status as OECD or G77 members (or neither); and
- their continents as defined by the UN Geoscheme.

The three metrics by which the various groups are sorted are:

- the percentage of the 3,413 NGOs that is housed in that group;
- the number of ECOSOC-registered NGOs per 1,000,000 citizens of that group; and
- the number of ECOSOC-registered NGOs per US\$1 billion by purchasing-power parity (PPP) in GDP.

GDP figures (PPP) were obtained mostly from the IMF, as were GDP-per-capita (PPP) figures. Population figures are primarily UN estimates for 2010. Where these sources were incomplete, other sources (e.g., the Central Intelligence Agency's figures or national statistical services) were consulted. A comprehensive list of sources for each data point is available from the authors upon request.

There are many figures that illustrate the North / South divide. More than 25 percent of the 3,345 ECOSOC-registered NGOs with a specific headquarters address are based in North America, though North America is home to only about five percent of the world's population. Another 20 percent are based in Western Europe; where less than three percent of the world's people live, and eight percent of the NGOs analyzed are headquartered in northern Europe, with less than two percent of the world's people (see Table 1).

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<sup>51</sup> NGOs were excluded from analysis if no headquarters location could be identified. Three NGOs headquartered in the Holy See were also excluded because the author found no satisfactory measures of population, GDP or GDP per-capita figures for that state.

More dramatically, two-thirds of the NGOs analyzed are headquartered in OECD countries, translating to a per-capita representation<sup>52</sup> of 1.86 NGOs per 1,000,000 residents of the OECD. This contrasts with only 0.18 NGOs per 1,000,000 residents in the G77 community. Put another way, each NGO headquartered in the G77 represents ten times as many people as an NGO headquartered in the OECD. If regional representation by GDP<sup>53</sup> is calculated, the OECD remains the best represented, with 0.058 NGOs at the UN per US\$billion of GDP compared to 0.037 NGOs for the same amount of GDP in the G77 (see Table 3).

The most direly underrepresented regions by population are in Asia. If Melanesia and Micronesia are considered to be outliers because of their comparatively tiny populations, the four most poorly represented regions by population are South Asia (with 0.14 NGOs at the UN for every million inhabitants), South-East Asia, Central Asia and, finally, East Asia (including China), for which every million citizens are represented by 0.08 NGOs at the UN. For comparison, Western Europe has 3.65 NGOs at the UN for every million citizens, North America has 2.57, and South America has 0.29 (See Table 2).

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52 (Number of registered NGOs headquartered in Region X) / (millions of people in Region X)

53 (Number of registered NGOs headquartered in Region X) / (US\$ billion of GDP (PPP) for Region X)



**Table 1.**  
Percentages of UN NGO representation, world population, and world GDP

REGION (UN Geoscheme)	NGOs	NGOs (UN %)	Population (global %)	GDP (global %)
Australia / New Zealand	42	1,23%	0,39%	1,40%
Caribbean	36	1,05%	0,54%	0,39%
Central America	38	1,11%	2,21%	2,48%
Central Asia	7	0,21%	0,91%	0,44%
East Asia	129	3,78%	22,75%	21,16%
Eastern Africa	52	1,52%	4,70%	0,48%
Eastern Europe	85	2,49%	4,31%	6,08%
Melanesia	1	0,03%	0,13%	0,03%
Micronesia	-	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
Middle Africa	55	1,61%	1,89%	0,36%
North Africa	133	3,90%	2,97%	1,55%
North America	884	25,90%	5,05%	22,45%
Northern Europe	303	8,88%	1,45%	5,00%
Polynesia	1	0,03%	0,00%	0,00%
South America	112	3,28%	5,73%	5,87%
South Asia	228	6,68%	24,61%	7,47%
South-East Asia	67	1,96%	8,55%	4,08%
Southern Africa	15	0,44%	0,84%	0,78%
Southern Europe	198	5,80%	2,27%	5,77%
West Africa	155	4,54%	4,50%	0,71%
Western Asia	106	3,11%	3,37%	3,88%
Western Europe	698	20,45%	2,81%	9,61%

CONTINENT (UN Geoscheme)	NGOs	NGOs (UN %)	Population (global %)	GDP (global %)
Africa	410	12,01%	14,90%	3,89%
Americas	1.070	31,35%	13,53%	31,19%
Asia	537	15,73%	60,19%	37,04%
Europe	1.284	37,62%	10,85%	26,46%
Oceania	44	1,29%	0,53%	1,43%

G77 / OECD / -	NGOs	NGOs (UN %)	Population (global %)	GDP (global %)
OECD	2.295	67,24%	18,08%	57,52%
G77	947	27,75%	76,95%	36,67%
Neither OECD nor G77	103	3,02%	4,97%	5,81%

**Table 2. (I)**  
**Analysis by Region (UN Geoscheme)**

Rank	REGION (UN Geoscheme)	NGOs	NGOs (UN %)	NGOs per 1,000,000 people	NGOs per billion dollars of GDP	Population (global %)	GDP (global %)	Population	GDP (millions \$US)	GDP per capita (calculated)
1	North America	884	25,90%	2,57	0,057	5,05%	22,45%	344.363.000	\$15.537.339	\$45.119,07
2	Western Europe	698	20,45%	3,65	0,105	2,81%	9,61%	191.415.091	\$6.653.835	\$34.761,29
3	Northern Europe	303	8,88%	3,06	0,087	1,45%	5,00%	98.876.895	\$3.463.086	\$35.024,22
4	South Asia	228	6,68%	0,14	0,044	24,61%	7,47%	1.677.377.000	\$5.168.519	\$3.081,31
5	Southern Europe	198	5,80%	1,28	0,050	2,27%	5,77%	154.881.618	\$3.991.015	\$25.768,16
6	West Africa	155	4,54%	0,51	0,314	4,50%	0,71%	306.624.784	\$493.947	\$1.610,92
7	North Africa	133	3,90%	0,66	0,124	2,97%	1,55%	202.396.990	\$1.072.828	\$5.300,61
8	East Asia	129	3,78%	0,08	0,009	22,75%	21,16%	1.550.171.845	\$14.645.284	\$9.447,52
9	South America	112	3,28%	0,29	0,028	5,73%	5,87%	390.255.488	\$4.060.056	\$10.403,58
10	Western Asia	106	3,11%	0,46	0,039	3,37%	3,88%	229.939.775	\$2.688.548	\$11.692,40
11	Eastern Europe	85	2,49%	0,29	0,020	4,31%	6,08%	293.997.659	\$4.206.194	\$14.306,90
12	South-East Asia	67	1,96%	0,11	0,024	8,55%	4,08%	582.798.317	\$2.824.623	\$4.846,66
13	Middle Africa	55	1,61%	0,43	0,224	1,89%	0,36%	128.676.106	\$246.072	\$1.912,34
14	Eastern Africa	52	1,52%	0,16	0,155	4,70%	0,48%	320.396.000	\$334.965	\$1.045,47
15	Australia / New Zealand	42	1,23%	1,57	0,043	0,39%	1,40%	26.830.605	\$966.879	\$36.036,42
16	Central America	38	1,11%	0,25	0,022	2,21%	2,48%	150.689.887	\$1.715.653	\$11.385,32
17	Caribbean	36	1,05%	0,98	0,134	0,54%	0,39%	36.889.000	\$268.328	\$7.273,93
18	Southern Africa	15	0,44%	0,26	0,028	0,84%	0,78%	57.467.300	\$541.607	\$9.424,61
19	Central Asia	7	0,21%	0,11	0,023	0,91%	0,44%	61.793.000	\$303.758	\$4.915,73
20	Melanesia	1	0,03%	0,12	0,053	0,13%	0,03%	8.524.000	\$18.776	\$2.202,72
21	Polynesia	1	0,03%	3,41	0,600	0,00%	0,00%	293.000	\$1.667	\$5.689,42
22	Micronesia	-	0,00%	-	-	0,00%	0,00%	231.000	\$1.010	\$4.372,29



**Table 2. (II)**  
**Analysis by Region (UN Geoscheme)**

Rank	REGION (UN Geoscheme)	NGOs	NGOs (UN %)	NGOs per 1,000,000 people	NGOs per billion dollars of GDP	Population (global %)	GDP (global %)	Population	GDP (millions \$US)	GDP per capita (calculated)
1	Western Europe	698	20,45%	3,65	0,105	2,81%	9,61%	191.415.091	\$6.653.835	\$34.761,29
2	Polynesia	1	0,03%	3,41	0,600	0,00%	0,00%	293.000	\$1.667	\$5.689,42
3	Northern Europe	303	8,88%	3,06	0,087	1,45%	5,00%	98.876.895	\$3.463.086	\$35.024,22
4	North America	884	25,90%	2,57	0,057	5,05%	22,45%	344.363.000	\$15.537.339	\$45.119,07
5	Australia / New Zealand	42	1,23%	1,57	0,043	0,39%	1,40%	26.830.605	\$966.879	\$36.036,42
6	Southern Europe	198	5,80%	1,28	0,050	2,27%	5,77%	154.881.618	\$3.991.015	\$25.768,16
7	Caribbean	36	1,05%	0,98	0,134	0,54%	0,39%	36.889.000	\$268.328	\$7.273,93
8	North Africa	133	3,90%	0,66	0,124	2,97%	1,55%	202.396.990	\$1.072.828	\$5.300,61
9	West Africa	155	4,54%	0,51	0,314	4,50%	0,71%	306.624.784	\$493.947	\$1.610,92
10	Western Asia	106	3,11%	0,46	0,039	3,37%	3,88%	229.939.775	\$2.688.548	\$11.692,40
11	Middle Africa	55	1,61%	0,43	0,224	1,89%	0,36%	128.676.106	\$246.072	\$1.912,34
12	Eastern Europe	85	2,49%	0,29	0,020	4,31%	6,08%	293.997.659	\$4.206.194	\$14.306,90
13	South America	112	3,28%	0,29	0,028	5,73%	5,87%	390.255.488	\$4.060.056	\$10.403,58
14	Southern Africa	15	0,44%	0,26	0,028	0,84%	0,78%	57.467.300	\$541.607	\$9.424,61
15	Central America	38	1,11%	0,25	0,022	2,21%	2,48%	150.689.887	\$1.715.653	\$11.385,32
16	Eastern Africa	52	1,52%	0,16	0,155	4,70%	0,48%	320.396.000	\$334.965	\$1.045,47
17	South Asia	228	6,68%	0,14	0,044	24,61%	7,47%	1.677.377.000	\$5.168.519	\$3.081,31
18	Melanesia	1	0,03%	0,12	0,053	0,13%	0,03%	8.524.000	\$18.776	\$2.202,72
19	South-East Asia	67	1,96%	0,11	0,024	8,55%	4,08%	582.798.317	\$2.824.623	\$4.846,66
20	Central Asia	7	0,21%	0,11	0,023	0,91%	0,44%	61.793.000	\$303.758	\$4.915,73
21	East Asia	129	3,78%	0,08	0,009	22,75%	21,16%	1.550.171.845	\$14.645.284	\$9.447,52
22	Micronesia	-	0,00%	-	-	0,00%	0,00%	231.000	\$1.010	\$4.372,29

**Table 2. (III)**  
**Analysis by Region (UN Geoscheme)**

Rank	REGION (UN Geoscheme)	NGOs	NGOs (UN %)	NGOs per 1,000,000 people	NGOs per billion dollars of GDP	Population (global %)	GDP (global %)	Population	GDP (millions \$US)	GDP per capita (calculated)
1	Polynesia	1	0,03%	3,41	0,600	0,00%	0,00%	293.000	\$ 1.667	\$5.689,42
2	West Africa	155	4,54%	0,51	0,314	4,50%	0,71%	306.624.784	\$493.947	\$1.610,92
3	Middle Africa	55	1,61%	0,43	0,224	1,89%	0,36%	128.676.106	\$246.072	\$1.912,34
4	Eastern Africa	52	1,52%	0,16	0,155	4,70%	0,48%	320.396.000	\$334.965	\$1.045,47
5	Caribbean	36	1,05%	0,98	0,134	0,54%	0,39%	36.889.000	\$268.328	\$7.273,93
6	North Africa	133	3,90%	0,66	0,124	2,97%	1,55%	202.396.990	\$1.072.828	\$5.300,61
7	Western Europe	698	20,45%	3,65	0,105	2,81%	9,61%	191.415.091	\$6.653.835	\$34.761,29
8	Northern Europe	303	8,88%	3,06	0,087	1,45%	5,00%	98.876.895	\$3.463.086	\$35.024,22
9	North America	884	25,90%	2,57	0,057	5,05%	22,45%	344.363.000	\$15.537.339	\$45.119,07
10	Melanesia	1	0,03%	0,12	0,053	0,13%	0,03%	8.524.000	\$18.776	\$2.202,72
11	Southern Europe	198	5,80%	1,28	0,050	2,27%	5,77%	154.881.618	\$3.991.015	\$25.768,16
12	South Asia	228	6,68%	0,14	0,044	24,61%	7,47%	1.677.377.000	\$5.168.519	\$3.081,31
13	Australia / New Zealand	42	1,23%	1,57	0,043	0,39%	1,40%	26.830.605	\$966.879	\$36.036,42
14	Western Asia	106	3,11%	0,46	0,039	3,37%	3,88%	229.939.775	\$2.688.548	\$11.692,40
15	Southern Africa	15	0,44%	0,26	0,028	0,84%	0,78%	57.467.300	\$541.607	\$9.424,61
16	South America	112	3,28%	0,29	0,028	5,73%	5,87%	390.255.488	\$4.060.056	\$10.403,58
17	South-East Asia	67	1,96%	0,11	0,024	8,55%	4,08%	582.798.317	\$2.824.623	\$4.846,66
18	Central Asia	7	0,21%	0,11	0,023	0,91%	0,44%	61.793.000	\$303.758	\$4.915,73
19	Central America	38	1,11%	0,25	0,022	2,21%	2,48%	150.689.887	\$1.715.653	\$11.385,32
20	Eastern Europe	85	2,49%	0,29	0,020	4,31%	6,08%	293.997.659	\$4.206.194	\$14.306,90
21	East Asia	129	3,78%	0,08	0,009	22,75%	21,16%	1.550.171.845	\$14.645.284	\$9.447,52
22	Micronesia	-	0,00%	-	-	0,00%	0,00%	231.000	\$1.010	\$4.372,29



**Table 3.**  
Analysis by OECD / G77 class

Rank	G77 / OECD / -	NGOs	NGOs (UN %)	NGOs per 1,000,000 people	NGOs per billion dollars of GDP	Population (global %)	GDP (global %)	Population	GDP (millions \$US)	GDP per capita (calculated)
1	OECD	2.295	67,24%	1,86	0,058	18,08%	57,52%	1.231.926.233	\$39.804.046	\$32.310,41
2	G77	947	27,75%	0,18	0,037	76,95%	36,67%	5.244.221.773	\$25.378.286	\$4.839,29
3	Neither OECD nor G77	103	3,02%	0,30	0,026	4,97%	5,81%	338.740.354	\$4.021.657	\$11.872,39

  

1	OECD	2.295	67,24%	1,86	0,058	18,08%	57,52%	1.231.926.233	\$39.804.046	\$32.310,41
2	Neither OECD nor G77	103	3,02%	0,30	0,026	4,97%	5,81%	338.740.354	\$4.021.657	\$11.872,39
3	G77	947	27,75%	0,18	0,037	76,95%	36,67%	5.244.221.773	\$25.378.286	\$4.839,29

  

1	OECD	2.295	67,24%	1,86	0,058	18,08%	57,52%	1.231.926.233	\$39.804.046	\$32.310,41
2	G77	947	27,75%	0,18	0,037	76,95%	36,67%	5.244.221.773	\$25.378.286	\$4.839,29
3	Neither OECD nor G77	103	3,02%	0,30	0,026	4,97%	5,81%	338.740.354	\$4.021.657	\$11.872,39

**Table 4.**  
Analysis by Continent (UN Geoscheme)

Rank	CONTINENT (UN Geoscheme)	NGOs	NGOs (UN %)	NGOs per 1,000,000 people	NGOs per billion dollars of GDP	Population (global %)	GDP (global %)	Population	GDP (millions \$US)	GDP per capita (calculated)
1	Europe	1.284	37,62%	1,74	0,070	10,85%	26,46%	739.171.263	\$18.314.130	\$24.776,57
2	Americas	1.070	31,35%	1,16	0,050	13,53%	31,19%	922.197.375	\$21.581.376	\$23.402,12
3	Asia	537	15,73%	0,13	0,021	60,19%	37,04%	4.102.079.937	\$25.630.732	\$6.248,23
4	Africa	410	12,01%	0,40	0,152	14,90%	3,89%	1.015.561.180	\$2.689.419	\$2.648,21
5	Oceania	44	1,29%	1,23	0,045	0,53%	1,43%	35.878.605	\$988.332	\$27.546,56

  

1	Europe	1.284	37,62%	1,74	0,070	10,85%	26,46%	739.171.263	\$18.314.130	\$24.776,57
2	Oceania	44	1,29%	1,23	0,045	0,53%	1,43%	35.878.605	\$988.332	\$27.546,56
3	Americas	1.070	31,35%	1,16	0,050	13,53%	31,19%	922.197.375	\$21.581.376	\$23.402,12
4	Africa	410	12,01%	0,40	0,152	14,90%	3,89%	1.015.561.180	\$2.689.419	\$2.648,21
5	Asia	537	15,73%	0,13	0,021	60,19%	37,04%	4.102.079.937	\$25.630.732	\$6.248,23

  

1	Africa	410	12,01%	0,40	0,152	14,90%	3,89%	1.015.561.180	\$2.689.419	\$2.648,21
2	Europe	1.284	37,62%	1,74	0,070	10,85%	26,46%	739.171.263	\$18.314.130	\$24.776,57
3	Americas	1.070	31,35%	1,16	0,050	13,53%	31,19%	922.197.375	\$21.581.376	\$23.402,12
4	Oceania	44	1,29%	1,23	0,045	0,53%	1,43%	35.878.605	\$988.332	\$27.546,56
5	Asia	537	15,73%	0,13	0,021	60,19%	37,04%	4.102.079.937	\$25.630.732	\$6.248,23

Table 5. (I)

## Countries / Territories with UN Geoscheme-assigned region, continent and OECD / G77 class

From: United Nations Geoscheme, <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm>, Retrieved 20 September 2010

Country / Territory	UN-defined region	UN-defined continent	OECD / G77 / -
Afghanistan	South Asia	Asia	G77
Åland Islands	Northern Europe	Europe	
Albania	Southern Europe	Europe	
Algeria	Northern Africa	Africa	G77
American Samoa	Polynesia	Oceania	
Andorra	Southern Europe	Europe	
Angola	Middle Africa	Africa	G77
Anguilla	Caribbean	Americas	
Antigua and Barbuda	Caribbean	Americas	G77
Argentina	South America	Americas	G77
Armenia	Western Asia	Asia	
Aruba	Caribbean	Americas	
Australia	Australia / New Zealand	Oceania	OECD
Austria	Western Europe	Europe	OECD
Azerbaijan	Western Asia	Asia	
Bahamas	Caribbean	Americas	G77
Bahrain	Western Asia	Asia	G77
Bangladesh	South Asia	Asia	G77
Barbados	Caribbean	Americas	G77
Belarus	Eastern Europe	Europe	
Belgium	Western Europe	Europe	OECD
Belize	Central America	Americas	G77
Benin	Western Africa	Africa	G77
Bermuda	North America	Americas	
Bhutan	South Asia	Asia	G77
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	South America	Americas	G77
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Southern Europe	Europe	G77
Botswana	Southern Africa	Africa	G77
Brazil	South America	Americas	G77
British Virgin Islands	Caribbean	Americas	
Brunei Darussalam	South-East Asia	Asia	G77
Bulgaria	Eastern Europe	Europe	
Burkina Faso	Western Africa	Africa	G77
Burundi	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77
Cambodia	South-East Asia	Asia	G77
Cameroon	Middle Africa	Africa	G77
Canada	North America	Americas	OECD
Cape Verde	Western Africa	Africa	G77
Cayman Islands	Caribbean	Americas	



**Table 5. (II)**  
Countries / Territories with UN Geoscheme-assigned region, continent and OECD / G77 class

Country / Territory	UN-defined region	UN-defined continent	OECD / G77 / -
Central African Republic	Middle Africa	Africa	G77
Chad	Middle Africa	Africa	G77
Channel Islands	Northern Europe	Europe	
Chile	South America	Americas	G77
China	East Asia	Asia	G77
China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region	East Asia	Asia	
China, Macao Special Administrative Region	East Asia	Asia	
Colombia	South America	Americas	G77
Comoros	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77
Congo	Middle Africa	Africa	G77
Cook Islands	Polynesia	Oceania	
Costa Rica	Central America	Americas	G77
Cote d'Ivoire	Western Africa	Africa	G77
Croatia	Southern Europe	Europe	
Cuba	Caribbean	Americas	G77
Cyprus	Western Asia	Asia	
Czech Republic	Eastern Europe	Europe	OECD
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	East Asia	Asia	G77
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Middle Africa	Africa	G77
Denmark	Northern Europe	Europe	OECD
Djibouti	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77
Dominica	Caribbean	Americas	G77
Dominican Republic	Caribbean	Americas	G77
Ecuador	South America	Americas	G77
Egypt	Northern Africa	Africa	G77
El Salvador	Central America	Americas	G77
Equatorial Guinea	Middle Africa	Africa	G77
Eritrea	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77
Estonia	Northern Europe	Europe	
Ethiopia	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77
Faeroe Islands	Northern Europe	Europe	
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)	South America	Americas	
Fiji	Melanesia	Oceania	G77
Finland	Northern Europe	Europe	OECD
France	Western Europe	Europe	OECD
French Guiana	South America	Americas	
French Polynesia	Polynesia	Oceania	
Gabon	Middle Africa	Africa	G77
Gambia	Western Africa	Africa	G77

Table 5. (III)

Countries / Territories with UN Geoscheme-assigned region, continent and OECD / G77 class

Country / Territory	UN-defined region	UN-defined continent	OECD / G77 / -
Georgia	Western Asia	Asia	
Germany	Western Europe	Europe	OECD
Ghana	Western Africa	Africa	G77
Gibraltar	Southern Europe	Europe	
Greece	Southern Europe	Europe	OECD
Greenland	North America	Americas	
Grenada	Caribbean	Americas	G77
Guadeloupe	Caribbean	Americas	
Guam	Micronesia	Oceania	
Guatemala	Central America	Americas	G77
Guernsey	Northern Europe	Europe	
Guinea	Western Africa	Africa	G77
Guinea-Bissau	Western Africa	Africa	G77
Guyana	South America	Americas	G77
Haiti	Caribbean	Americas	G77
Holy See	Southern Europe	Europe	
Honduras	Central America	Americas	G77
Hungary	Eastern Europe	Europe	OECD
Iceland	Northern Europe	Europe	OECD
India	South Asia	Asia	G77
Indonesia	South-East Asia	Asia	G77
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	South Asia	Asia	G77
Iraq	Western Asia	Asia	G77
Ireland	Northern Europe	Europe	OECD
Isle of Man	Northern Europe	Europe	
Israel	Western Asia	Asia	
Italy	Southern Europe	Europe	OECD
Jamaica	Caribbean	Americas	G77
Japan	East Asia	Asia	OECD
Jersey	Northern Europe	Europe	
Jordan	Western Asia	Asia	G77
Kazakhstan	Central Asia	Asia	
Kenya	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77
Kiribati	Micronesia	Oceania	
Kuwait	Western Asia	Asia	G77
Kyrgyzstan	Central Asia	Asia	
Lao People's Democratic Republic	South-East Asia	Asia	G77
Latvia	Northern Europe	Europe	
Lebanon	Western Asia	Asia	G77



Table 5. (IV)

Countries / Territories with UN Geoscheme-assigned region, continent and OECD / G77 class

Country / Territory	UN-defined region	UN-defined continent	OECD / G77 / -
Lesotho	Southern Africa	Africa	G77
Liberia	Western Africa	Africa	G77
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Northern Africa	Africa	G77
Liechtenstein	Western Europe	Europe	
Lithuania	Northern Europe	Europe	
Luxembourg	Western Europe	Europe	OECD
Madagascar	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77
Malawi	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77
Malaysia	South-East Asia	Asia	G77
Maldives	South Asia	Asia	G77
Mali	Western Africa	Africa	G77
Malta	Southern Europe	Europe	
Marshall Islands	Micronesia	Oceania	G77
Martinique	Caribbean	Americas	
Mauritania	Western Africa	Africa	G77
Mauritius	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77
Mayotte	Eastern Africa	Africa	
Mexico	Central America	Americas	OECD
Micronesia (Federated States of)	Micronesia	Oceania	G77
Monaco	Western Europe	Europe	
Mongolia	East Asia	Asia	G77
Montenegro	Southern Europe	Europe	
Montserrat	Caribbean	Americas	
Morocco	Northern Africa	Africa	G77
Mozambique	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77
Myanmar	South-East Asia	Asia	G77
Namibia	Southern Africa	Africa	G77
Nauru	Micronesia	Oceania	
Nepal	South Asia	Asia	G77
Netherlands	Western Europe	Europe	OECD
Netherlands Antilles	Caribbean	Americas	
New Caledonia	Melanesia	Oceania	
New Zealand	Australia / New Zealand	Oceania	OECD
Nicaragua	Central America	Americas	G77
Niger	Western Africa	Africa	G77
Nigeria	Western Africa	Africa	G77
Niue	Polynesia	Oceania	
Norfolk Island	Australia / New Zealand	Oceania	
Northern Mariana Islands	Micronesia	Oceania	

Table 5. (V)

Countries / Territories with UN Geoscheme-assigned region, continent and OECD / G77 class

Country / Territory	UN-defined region	UN-defined continent	OECD / G77 / -
Norway	Northern Europe	Europe	OECD
Occupied Palestinian Territory	Western Asia	Asia	G77
Oman	Western Asia	Asia	G77
Pakistan	South Asia	Asia	G77
Palau	Micronesia	Oceania	G77
Panama	Central America	Americas	G77
Papua New Guinea	Melanesia	Oceania	G77
Paraguay	South America	Americas	G77
Peru	South America	Americas	G77
Philippines	South-East Asia	Asia	G77
Pitcairn	Polynesia	Oceania	
Poland	Eastern Europe	Europe	OECD
Portugal	Southern Europe	Europe	OECD
Puerto Rico	Caribbean	Americas	
Qatar	Western Asia	Asia	G77
Republic of Korea	East Asia	Asia	OECD
Republic of Moldova	Eastern Europe	Europe	
Réunion	Eastern Africa	Africa	
Romania	Eastern Europe	Europe	
Russian Federation	Eastern Europe	Europe	
Rwanda	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77
Saint Helena	Western Africa	Africa	
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Caribbean	Americas	G77
Saint Lucia	Caribbean	Americas	G77
Saint Martin (French part)	Caribbean	Americas	
Saint Pierre and Miquelon	North America	Americas	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Caribbean	Americas	G77
Saint-Barthélemy	Caribbean	Americas	
Samoa	Polynesia	Oceania	G77
San Marino	Southern Europe	Europe	
Sao Tome and Principe	Middle Africa	Africa	G77
Saudi Arabia	Western Asia	Asia	G77
Senegal	Western Africa	Africa	G77
Serbia	Southern Europe	Europe	
Seychelles	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77
Sierra Leone	Western Africa	Africa	G77
Singapore	South-East Asia	Asia	G77
Slovakia	Eastern Europe	Europe	OECD
Slovenia	Southern Europe	Europe	OECD



Table 5. (VI)

Countries / Territories with UN Geoscheme-assigned region, continent and OECD / G77 class

Country / Territory	UN-defined region	UN-defined continent	OECD / G77 / -
Solomon Islands	Melanesia	Oceania	G77
Somalia	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77
South Africa	Southern Africa	Africa	G77
Spain	Southern Europe	Europe	OECD
Sri Lanka	South Asia	Asia	G77
Sudan	Northern Africa	Africa	G77
Suriname	South America	Americas	G77
Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands	Northern Europe	Europe	
Swaziland	Southern Africa	Africa	G77
Sweden	Northern Europe	Europe	OECD
Switzerland	Western Europe	Europe	OECD
Syrian Arab Republic	Western Asia	Asia	G77
Tajikistan	Central Asia	Asia	
Thailand	South-East Asia	Asia	G77
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Southern Europe	Europe	
Timor-Leste	South-East Asia	Asia	G77
Togo	Western Africa	Africa	G77
Tokelau	Polynesia	Oceania	
Tonga	Polynesia	Oceania	G77
Trinidad and Tobago	Caribbean	Americas	G77
Tunisia	Northern Africa	Africa	G77
Turkey	Western Asia	Asia	OECD
Turkmenistan	Central Asia	Asia	G77
Turks and Caicos Islands	Caribbean	Americas	
Tuvalu	Polynesia	Oceania	
Uganda	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77
Ukraine	Eastern Europe	Europe	
United Arab Emirates	Western Asia	Asia	G77
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Northern Europe	Europe	OECD
United Republic of Tanzania	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77
United States of America	North America	Americas	OECD
United States Virgin Islands	Caribbean	Americas	
Uruguay	South America	Americas	G77
Uzbekistan	Central Asia	Asia	
Vanuatu	Melanesia	Oceania	G77
Venezuela	South America	Americas	G77
Viet Nam	South-East Asia	Asia	G77
Wallis and Futuna Island	Polynesia	Oceania	
Western Sahara	Northern Africa	Africa	

Table 5. (VII)

Countries / Territories with UN Geoscheme-assigned region, continent and OECD / G77 class

Country / Territory	UN-defined region	UN-defined continent	OECD / G77 / -
Yemen	Western Asia	Asia	G77
Zambia	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77
Zimbabwe	Eastern Africa	Africa	G77



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