

SGI 2011 Codebook

Sustainable Governance Indicators



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Introduction

Welcome to the Sustainable Governance Indicators 2011 (SGI), a survey of sustainable policy performance and governance capacities in the OECD world (www.sgi-network.org).

Our goal is to assess sustainable policy performance by analyzing outcomes in key policy areas and strategic capacities of governments.

This codebook is intended to ensure a common understanding of SGI methodology and the assessment procedures. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us or your regional coordinator at the contact info provided here or on the next page.

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The Project

How successful are the OECD countries in the realization of sustainable policy results and how pronounced is the strategic management capability in each state in regards to the interaction of government and civil society actors? In answering these two guiding questions, the Sustainable Governance Indicators aim to promote the development of good governance and sustainable policy results and activate corresponding learning processes in the OECD countries. To this end, the SGI provide data points in the spirit of an evidence-based approach, which (1) enable policy-makers to derive best practices and strategy options, (2) offer science a basis for further research and (3) are useful for effective public communication in accordance with the goals of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Developed industrial countries face several major reform challenges at the outset of the twenty-first century. These future challenges include processes of globalization, demographic change (aging societies), resource scarcity – not only of natural resources, but human capital as well – and security risks such as the violence of international terrorism.

Under the guiding concept of sustainability, the SGI investigate on the one hand political performance of the OECD countries in policy fields especially affected by the above-mentioned future challenges. On the other hand, under the guiding concept of governance, they consider the actors and processes that are of central importance for effective political management. In this context, the question arises, to what extent the OECD countries are able to tackle key challenges of globalization through effective coordination and strategic governance management.

Given the above guiding questions, the Sustainable Governance Indicators are divided into two pillars: one that encompasses sustainable policy performance (Status Index) and one comprising governance (Management Index).

Status Index

This index examines the quality of democracy and policy performance in each country.

The quality of democracy in each country is measured against a definitional norm that considers issues relating to participation rights, electoral competition, and the rule of law. As all OECD member countries constitute democracies, SGI questions in this dimension focus on the quality rather than the presence of democracy. Individual questions monitor discriminatory practices related to the electoral process, citizens' access to public information (including the independence of the media), the protection of civil rights, and the legality of government and administration. A high quality of democratic standards is considered crucial for long-term system stability.

In the dimension "Policy Performance", outcomes in four major policy sectors – further broken down into 15 single policy areas – are measured by means of a wide range of economic and policy performance indicators (including both qualitative and quantitative indicators). The four policy sectors include:

- (1) Economy and employment: economy, labor market, enterprises, taxes, budgets
- (2) Social affairs: health care, social inclusion, families, pensions, integration
- (3) Security: external security, internal security
- (4) Resources: environment, research and innovation, education




Figure 1: Status Index

Management Index

This index examines how effective governments are in directing and implementing appropriate policies. Referring to more than the act of governing, executive governance encompasses the organizations and actors surrounding executives. Governments can fully develop their capacity only if they are embedded in a supportive environment. Therefore the Management Index examines not only the capacity of executives to act strategically, but also assesses whether parliaments, intermediary organizations and citizens hold governments accountable, enhance the knowledge base of decisions, and deliberate their normative appropriateness. According to this understanding of governance, the Management Index consists of two dimensions: executive capacity and executive accountability. These two concepts examine how strategically governments act and how they are held accountable by the public as well as the wider political system.

Executive capacity draws on the categories of steering capability, policy implementation and institutional learning. Steering capability questions refer to the role of strategic planning and expert advice, the effectiveness of inter-ministerial coordination and regulatory impact assessments, and the quality of consultation and communication policies. Questions on implementation assess the government's ability to ensure an effective and efficient task delegation to ministers, agencies or subnational governments. Questions on institutional learning refer to a government's ability to reform its own institutional arrangements and improve its strategic orientation.

Executive accountability is disaggregated into three categories corresponding to important actors or groups of actors that are considered to be key accountability providers in theories of democracy and governance. We investigate to what extent citizens are informed of government policies, whether the parliament is capable of evaluating and controlling the executive, and whether intermediary organizations (media, parties, interest associations) are characterized by policy know-how and relevance.




Figure 2: Management Index

Aggregation and Measurement

To operationalize and measure the concepts used in constructing the SGI, we decided to rely on a combination of statistical data drawn from official sources as well as the qualitative assessments of country experts. In sum, both indices – Status and Management Index – are based on 147 qualitative and quantitative indicators. 65 qualitative assessments are provided by country experts based upon the questionnaire (see below), and 82 quantitative indicators are collected by the SGI Team from official data sources.

While the expert ratings are based on a unified scale ranging from 1 to 10, the quantitative indicators are based on different scales and units of measurement. In order to aggregate the latter into composite indices and to ensure the comparability of all data on a scale from 1 to 10, the quantitative indicators will be standardized through a linear transformation.

The aggregation of all items and components into the two composite indices (Status and Management Index) follows a simple weighting model by assigning equal weights to each component and by using an additive method of aggregation.

Assessment Process




Figure 3: Assessment Process

Step 1: March 1 to April 30

The first country expert answers the questionnaire in the database, www.sgi-data.de. The expert produces a 30-page (approx. 10,000 words) country report. All further steps in the process are based on this initial country report. In addition to the report, the expert provides scores.

Step 2: May 1 to June 30

The second expert (reviewer) begins his/her work. The task is to check and edit the first expert's report by revising formulations, giving comments, adding new information. The reviewer will also give his/her scores independently from the first expert's scores, thus providing an independent second opinion. He/She will not be able to see the numerical scores of the first expert.

Step 3: July 1 to August 30

The coordinator will cross-check both the text and scores of the first and second expert in order to make further adjustments. At a certain stage, the coordinator's work will be open for joint examination by the first expert and reviewer. This enables all experts to get into a discursive process in order to finalize the text. While consulting the first experts and reviewers, the coordinator calibrates scores to reflect differences among countries and ensure intra-regional comparability.

Step 4: September

The coordinators and the SGI team review the ratings across regions. In this calibration conference, scores are calibrated to ensure inter-regional comparability.

Immediately after the calibration conference, the SGI Board reviews these ratings. Scores are recalibrated if necessary, resulting in final scores.

Step 5: October – November

The coordinator checks country reports for the last time. All country experts remain available for questions until the report is ready-to-edit. The coordinator sends the finalized country report to the editor. Questions by the editors are resolved by the coordinator, resulting in a ready-to-publish report.

Step 6: March 2011

The country report is published with both country experts and the regional coordinator listed equally as authors on our website www.sgi-network.org.

Major results of the SGI 2011 project will also be published as a book. To this end, the SGI Team, in close cooperation with the SGI Board, will commission special studies by experts in specific fields. These studies are to enrich current political debates on sustainability and governance by substantiating them with aggregated and disaggregated data of the SGI 2011 project (e.g. cross-country comparisons, reviews of regional trends, policy-specific studies, etc.).

Deadlines

Because of the consecutive manner in which three experts will produce the report, adhering to the deadlines will prove decisive for the success of the project. Therefore, country experts should begin early and keep in mind the volume of the work required.

Important Notes for your Assessment

Period under Review

The period under review for the SGI 2011 encompasses 2 years and stretches from May 1, 2008 to April 30, 2010 (end of the assessment from the first country expert). Developments after April 30, 2010 can therefore no longer be considered. All country experts should have the entire period of investigation in mind when writing the text and giving scores. Only in this manner can developments and processes be adequately accounted for and appraised.

Dealing with Changes in Government

In the case of a change in government during the period of evaluation, the country expert must decide how each of the governed periods should be assessed and where necessary weighted. If the change in government occurs at the very end of the assessment timeframe, the country expert should afford the new government minimal attention. If the change in government occurs at the very beginning of the period under review, the country expert should concentrate his/her attention predominantly on the new government. In each case, experts should make clear in the qualitative text of the assessment to which government period he/she is referring for each context-sensitive appraisal.

Utilizing the Entire Scoring Scale

In answering the SGI Questionnaire, it is essential to carefully read the complementary explanations to the questions. Only in this way can it be guaranteed that each expert has the same understanding of the question – a prerequisite for the comparability of the answers and scores of all experts for each question.

Simultaneously, it is important to study all answer options carefully before a selection is made. In selecting an answer, experts should always keep in mind that their assessment will later be considered in the context of the entire sample of OECD countries. For this reason, experts should, to the extent possible, utilize the entire scale of answer options in order to avoid a skewed data distribution. In this context, each score should always be verified for the greatest possible consistency with the qualitative assessment (text).

Assessment Overview

Status Index

Quality of Democracy

S 1	Electoral Process	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4		
S 2	Access to Information	2.1	2.2	2.3			
S 3	Civil Rights	3.1	3.2	3.3			
S 4	Rule of Law	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.6

Policy Performance

Economy and Employment

S 5	Economy	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.5		
S 6	Labor Market	6.1	6.2	6.3	6.4	6.5	6.6	6.7
S 7	Enterprises	7.1	7.2	7.3	7.4	7.5	7.6	
S 8	Taxes	8.1	8.2	8.3	8.4	8.5	8.6	
S 9	Budgets	9.1	9.2	9.3	9.4	9.5	9.6	

Social Affairs

S 10	Health Care	10.1	10.2	10.3	10.4	10.5	10.6	
S 11	Social Inclusion	11.1	11.2	11.3	11.4	11.5	11.6	10.7
S 12	Families	12.1	12.2	12.3	12.4	12.5		
S 13	Pensions	13.1	13.2	13.3	13.4	13.5		
S 14	Integration	14.1	14.2	14.3	14.4	14.5		

Security

S 15	External Security	15.1	15.2	15.3			
S 16	Internal Security	16.1	16.2	16.3	16.4	16.5	

Resources

S 17	Environment	17.1	17.2	17.3	17.4	17.5	17.6
S 18	Research and Innovation	18.1	18.2	18.3	18.4	18.5	18.6
S 19	Education	19.1	19.2	19.3	19.4	19.5	19.6

Management Index

Executive Capacity

Steering Capability

M 1	Strategic Capacity	1.1	1.2	1.3				
M 2	Inter-ministerial Coordination	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7
M 3	Evidence-based Instruments	3.1	3.2	3.3				
M 4	Societal Consultation	4.1						
M 5	Policy Communication	5.1						

Policy Implementation

M 6	Effective Implementation	6.1	6.2a	6.2b	6.2c	6.2d	6.3a	6.3b	6.3c
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Institutional Learning

M 7	Adaptability	7.1	7.2					
M 8	Organizational Reform Capacity	8.1	8.2					

Executive Accountability

Citizens

M 9	Citizens' Participatory Competence	9.1	9.2					
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Legislature

M 10	Structures and Resources of Legislative Actors	10.1	10.2	10.3	10.4	10.6		
M 11	Legislative Accountability	11.1	11.2	11.3	11.4	11.5	11.6	11.7

Intermediary Organizations

M 12	Media	12.1	12.2	12.3				
M 13	Parties and Interest Associations	13.1	13.2	13.3				

Quality of Democracy

- S 1 Electoral Process
- S 2 Access to Information
- S 3 Civil Rights
- S 4 Rule of Law

S1.1

Candidacy Procedures

How fair are procedures for registering candidates and parties?

Everyone has equal opportunity to become a candidate for election. The registration of candidates and parties may be subject to restrictions only when in accordance with law and if deemed reasonably necessary in a democratic society. This includes protecting the interests of national security or public order, public health or morals, or protecting the rights and freedoms of others.

Legal regulations provide for a fair registration procedure for all elections; candidates and parties are not discriminated against.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
A few restrictions on election procedures discriminate against a small number of candidates and parties.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Some unreasonable restrictions on election procedures exist that discriminate against many candidates and parties.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Discriminating registration procedures for elections are widespread and prevent a large number of potential candidates or parties from participating.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S1.2

Media Access

To what extent do candidates and parties have fair access to the media and other means of communication?

Every candidate for election and every political party has equal opportunity of access to the media and other means of communication, which allows them to present their political views and to communicate with the voters. Access to the media may not be restricted or refused on grounds of race, color, gender, language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

All candidates and parties have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. All major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Candidates and parties have largely equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of different political positions.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Candidates and parties often do not have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. While the major media outlets represent a partisan political bias, the media system as a whole provides fair coverage of different political positions.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Candidates and parties lack equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets are biased in favor of certain political groups or views and discriminate against others.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

To what extent do all citizens have the opportunity to exercise their right of participation in national elections?

To participate in national elections, every adult citizen must have the right to access an effective, impartial and non-discriminatory procedure for voting and voter registration. Voting rights also apply to convicts and citizens without a permanent residence in the country. No eligible citizen shall be denied the right to vote or disqualified from registration as a voter, otherwise than in accordance with objectively verifiable criteria prescribed by law, and provided that such measures are consistent with the State's obligations under international law. Every individual who is denied the right to vote or to be registered as a voter shall be entitled to appeal to a jurisdiction competent to review such decisions and to correct errors promptly and effectively. Every voter has the right of equal and effective access to a polling station or alternative voting method, including a feasible absentee voting option.

All adult citizens can participate in national elections. All eligible voters are registered if they wish to be.	10	<input type="checkbox"/>
There are no discriminations observable in the exercise of the right to vote.	9	<input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>		
The procedures for the registration of voters and voting are for the most part effective, impartial and non-discriminatory, although occasional. Citizens can appeal to courts if they feel being discriminated.	8	<input type="checkbox"/>
	7	<input type="checkbox"/>
	6	<input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>		
While the procedures for the registration of voters and voting are de jure non-discriminatory, cases of discrimination occur regularly in practice.	5	<input type="checkbox"/>
	4	<input type="checkbox"/>
	3	<input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>		
The procedures for the registration of voters or voting have systemic discriminatory effects. Groups of adult citizens are de facto excluded from national elections.	2	<input type="checkbox"/>
	1	<input type="checkbox"/>

To what extent is private and public party financing and electoral campaign financing transparent, effectively monitored and in case of infringement of rules subject to proportionate and dissuasive sanction?

This question refers to the obligations of the receiving entity (parties and entities connected with political parties) to keep proper books and accounts, to specify the nature and value of donations received and to publish accounts regularly. Please note that this question also includes an assessment of how effectively funding of political parties and electoral campaigns is supervised (monitored by an independent body such as electoral or parliamentary commission, anti-corruption body, audit institution etc. with checking, investigative, sanction and regulatory powers) and infringements are sanctioned (taking into account administrative, civil and criminal liability).

The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring to that respect. Effective measures to prevent evasion are effectively in place and infringements subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring. Although infringements are subject to proportionate sanctions, some, although few, loopholes and options for circumvention still exist.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The state provides that donations to political parties shall be published. Party financing is subject to some degree of independent monitoring but monitoring either proves regularly ineffective or proportionate sanctions in case of infringement do not follow.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The rules for party and campaign financing do not effectively enforce the obligation to make the donations public. Party and campaign financing is neither monitored independently nor, in case of infringements, subject to proportionate sanctions.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S2.1

Media Freedom

To what extent are the media independent from government?

This question asks to what extent are the media subject to government influence and the influence of actors associated with the government. The question focuses both on media regulation and government intervention. The rules and practice of supervision should guarantee sufficient independence for publicly owned media. Privately owned media should be subject to licensing and regulatory regimes that ensure independence from government.

Public and private media are independent from government influence; their independence is institutionally protected and respected by the incumbent government.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The incumbent government largely respects the independence of media, but the regulation of public and/or private media does not provide sufficient protection against potential government influence.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The incumbent government seeks to ensure its political objectives indirectly by influencing the personnel policies, organizational framework or financial resources of public media, and/or the licensing regime/market access for private media.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Major media outlets are frequently influenced by the incumbent government promoting its partisan political objectives. To ensure pro-government media reporting, governmental actors exert direct political pressure and violate existing rules of media regulation.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S2.2

Media Pluralism

To what extent are the media characterized by an ownership structure that ensures a pluralism of opinions?

This question does not assume that the predominance of either private or public ownership guarantees a pluralism of opinions. Rather, the underlying assumption is that a diversified ownership structure is likely to best represent the views and positions existing in society.

Diversified ownership structures characterize both the electronic and print media market, providing a well-balanced pluralism of opinions. Effective anti-monopoly policies and impartial, open public media guarantee a pluralism of opinions.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Diversified ownership structures prevail in the electronic and print media market. Public media compensate for deficiencies or biases in private media reporting by representing a wider range of opinions.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize either the electronic or the print media market. Important opinions are represented but there are no or only weak institutional guarantees against the predominance of certain opinions.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize both the electronic and the print media market. Few companies dominate the media, most programs are biased, and there is evidence that certain opinions are not published or are marginalized.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

To what extent can citizens obtain official information?

To assess the accessibility of government information, you should examine

- (1) whether a freedom of information act exists or equivalent legal regulations exist,
- (2) to what extent do the rules restrict access to information (e.g., exemptions, deadlines for responding to requests etc.) and justify these restrictions, and
- (3) whether mechanisms for appeal and oversight exist to enforce citizens' right to access information (e.g., administrative review, court review, ombudsman, commission etc.) You may consult www.freedominfo.org for information specific to your country.

Legal regulations guarantee free and easy access to official information, contain few, reasonable restrictions, and there are effective mechanisms of appeal and oversight enabling citizens to access information.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Access to official information is regulated by law. Most restrictions are justified, but access is sometimes complicated by bureaucratic procedures. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms permit citizens to enforce their right of access.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated by bureaucratic procedures and some restrictions. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms are largely ineffective.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Access to official information is not regulated by law; there are many restrictions of access, bureaucratic procedures and no or ineffective mechanisms of enforcement.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S3.1

Civil Rights

To what extent does the state respect and protect civil rights and how effectively are citizens protected by courts against infringements of their rights?

Civil rights contain and limit the exercise of state power by the rule of law. Independent courts guarantee legal protection of life, freedom and property as well as protection against illegitimate arrest, exile, terror, torture or unjustifiable intervention into personal life, both on behalf of the state and on behalf of private and individual actors. Equal access to the law and equal treatment by the law are both basic civil rights and also necessities to enforce civil rights.

All state institutions respect and effectively protect civil rights. Citizens are effectively protected by courts against infringements of their rights. Infringements present an extreme exception.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The state respects and protects rights, with few infringements. Courts provide protection.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Despite formal protection, frequent infringements of civil rights occur and court protection often proves ineffective.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
State institutions respect civil rights only formally, and civil rights are frequently violated. Court protection is not effective.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S3.2

Political Liberties

To what extent does the state concede and protect political liberties?

Political liberties constitute an independent sphere of democracy and are a prerequisite of political and civil society. They aim at the possibility of the formulation, the presentation and the equal consideration of citizens' preferences and are embodied in the codification and unlimited validity of every individual's right to speak, think, assemble, organize, worship, or petition without government (or even private) interference or restraints.

All state institutions concede and effectively protect political liberties.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
All state institutions for the most part concede and protect political liberties. There are only few infringements.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
State institutions concede political liberties but infringements occur regularly in practice.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Political liberties are unsatisfactory codified and frequently violated.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

How effectively does the state protect against discrimination based on gender, physical ability, ethnic origin, social status, political views or religion?

This question evaluates policies of state institutions aimed at preventing discrimination. Such an evaluation should refer to the measures taken by these institutions and their impact. The extent of observable discrimination may be used as an indicator for the efficacy of anti-discrimination policies.

Please note that this question also includes an assessment of how effectively the state protects the rights of disadvantaged persons or persons belonging to minorities by positive discrimination measures, special representation rights or autonomy rights.

State institutions effectively protect against and actively prevent discrimination. Cases of discrimination are extremely rare.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
State anti-discrimination protections are moderately successful. Few cases of discrimination are observed.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
State anti-discrimination efforts show limited success Many cases of discrimination can be observed.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The state does not offer effective protection against discrimination. Discrimination is widespread in the public sector and in society.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S4.1

Legal Certainty

To what extent do government and administration act on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions to provide legal certainty?

This question assesses the extent to which executive actions are predictable (i.e., can be expected to be guided by law).

Government and administration act predictably, on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions. Legal regulations are consistent and transparent, ensuring legal certainty.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Government and administration rarely make unpredictable decisions. Legal regulations are consistent, but leave a large scope of discretion to the government or administration.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Government and administration sometimes make unpredictable decisions that go beyond given legal bases or do not conform to existing legal regulations. Some legal regulations are inconsistent and contradictory.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Government and administration often make unpredictable decisions that lack a legal basis or ignore existing legal regulations. Legal regulations are inconsistent, full of loopholes and contradict each other.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S4.2

Judicial Review

To what extent do independent courts control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law?

This question examines how well the courts can review actions taken and norms adopted by the executive. To provide effective control, courts need to pursue their own reasoning free from the influence of incumbent governments, powerful groups or individuals. This requires a differentiated organization of the legal system, including legal education, jurisprudence, regulated appointment of the judiciary, rational proceedings, professionalism, channels of appeal and court administration.

Independent courts effectively review executive action and ensure that the government and administration act in conformity with the law.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Independent courts usually manage to control whether the government and administration act in conformity with the law.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Courts are independent, but often fail to ensure legal compliance.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Courts are biased for or against the incumbent government and lack effective control.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

To what extent does the process of appointing (supreme or constitutional court) justices guarantee the independence of the judiciary?

This question regards supreme or constitutional courts' sufficient independence from political influence as a prerequisite of a functioning democratic system. The appointment process is a crucial factor which determines judiciary independence.

The prospect of politically "neutral" justices increases accordingly with greater majority requirements and with the necessity of cooperation between involved bodies. A cooperative appointment process requires at least two involved democratically legitimized institutions. Their representative character gives them the legitimacy for autonomous nomination or elective powers. In an exclusive appointment process, a single body has the right to appoint justices irrespective of veto points; whereas in cooperative procedures with qualified majorities independence of the court is best secured.

When answering the question take also into account whether the process is formally transparent and adequately covered by public media. If your country does not have a supreme or constitutional court, evaluate the appointment process of the appellate court that is responsible for citizens' appeals against decisions of the government.

Justices are appointed in a cooperative appointment process with special majority requirements.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies with special majority requirements or in a cooperative selection process without special majority requirements.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies without special majority requirements.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
All judges are appointed exclusively by a single body irrespective of other institutions.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S4.4

Corruption Prevention

To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?

This question addresses how the state and society prevent public servants and politicians from accepting bribes by applying mechanisms to guarantee the integrity of officeholders: auditing of state spending; regulation of party financing; citizen and media access to information; accountability of officeholders (asset declarations, conflict of interest rules, codes of conduct); transparent public procurement systems; effective prosecution of corruption.

Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Most integrity mechanisms function effectively and provide disincentives for public officeholders willing to abuse their positions.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Some integrity mechanisms function, but do not effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S4.5

Rule of Law

S4.6

Control of Corruption

Policy Performance

Economy and Employment

- S 5 Economy
- S 6 Labor Market
- S 7 Enterprises
- S 8 Taxes
- S 9 Budgets

Social Affairs

- S 10 Health Care
- S 11 Social Inclusion
- S 12 Families
- S 13 Pensions
- S 14 Integration

Security

- S 15 External Security
- S 16 Internal Security

Resources

- S 17 Environment
- S 18 Research and Innovation
- S 19 Education

S5.1

Economic Policy

How successful has economic policy been in providing a reliable economic framework and in fostering international competitiveness?

This question addresses the existence of a government's general strategy to support the future-oriented development of its economy through regulatory policy. Sound economic policy is expected to adhere to the following principles: clear-cut assignment of tasks to institutions, refraining from unnecessary discretionary actions, frictionless interlinkage of different institutional spheres (labor market, enterprise policy, tax policy, budgetary policy) and the coherent set-up of different regimes (e.g. dismissal protection, co-determination rights, efficiency of anti-monopoly policies, income taxation). Countries following these principles are able to increase overall productivity, become more attractive for internationally mobile factors of production and thus raise their international competitiveness.

When answering the question, focus on the use and interplay of different regimes with regard to the aims of economic policy.

Economic policy fully succeeds in providing a coherent set-up of different institutional spheres and regimes, thus stabilizing the economic environment. It largely contributes to the objectives of fostering a country's competitive capabilities and attractiveness as an economic location.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Economic policy largely provides a reliable economic environment and supports the objectives of fostering a country's competitive capabilities and attractiveness as an economic location.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Economic policy somewhat contributes to providing a reliable economic environment and helps to a certain degree in fostering a country's competitive capabilities and attractiveness as an economic location.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Economic policy mainly acts in discretionary ways essentially destabilizing the economic environment. There is little coordination in the set-up of economic policy institutions. Economic policy generally fails in fostering a country's competitive capabilities and attractiveness as an economic location.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S5.2

GDP per capita

S5.3

Inflation

S5.4

Product Market Regulation

S5.5

Competitiveness

S6.1

Labor Market Policy

How effectively does labor market policy in your country address unemployment?

This question addresses a government's strategies to reconcile the following objectives: unemployment reduction and job security, and balancing supply and demand on the labor market by providing sufficient mobility of the labor force according to the needs of potential employers. To assess labor market policy comprehensively, special emphasis should be placed on the positive or detrimental effects resulting from labor market regulation (e.g., dismissal protection, minimum wages, collective agreements) and from the modus operandi of unemployment insurance.

- | | |
|--|-----------------------------|
| Successful strategies ensure unemployment is not a serious threat. | 10 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 9 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| Labor market policies have been more or less successful. | 8 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 7 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| Strategies against unemployment have shown little or no significant success. | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| Labor market policies have been unsuccessful and unemployment has risen. | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> |

S6.2

Unemployment

S6.3

Long-term Unemployment

S6.4

Youth Unemployment

S6.5

Low-skilled Unemployment

S6.6

Employment Rate

S6.7

Intensity of Active LMP

S7.1

Enterprise Policy

How successful has enterprise policy been in fostering innovation, entrepreneurship and economic competitiveness, and in stimulating private investment?

Private investment includes not only the acquisition of capital stock, but also entrepreneurial transactions aimed at investment, such as developing human capital, the restructuring of companies, establishing new companies, etc.

Enterprise policy has been successful in achieving the objectives of fostering innovation, entrepreneurship and economic competitiveness, and stimulating private investment.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Enterprise policy has largely achieved these four objectives.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Enterprise policy has partly achieved these four objectives.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Enterprise policy has not achieved the objectives of fostering innovation, entrepreneurship and economic competitiveness, and stimulating private investment.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S7.2

Enterprise Regulation

S7.3

Unit Labor Costs

S7.4

Corporate Investment

S7.5

Energy Costs for Enterprises

S7.6

Real Interest Rates

S8.1

Tax Policy

To what extent does taxation policy realize goals of equity, competitiveness and the generation of sufficient public revenues?

The objectives of justice and allocative efficiency suggest that taxation policies do not discriminate between different groups of economic actors with similar tax-paying abilities, such as corporate and personal income taxpayers (horizontal equity). Tax systems should also impose higher taxes on persons or companies with a greater ability to pay taxes (vertical equity). Tax rates and modalities should improve or at least not weaken a country's competitive position. However, tax revenues should be sufficient to ensure the long-term financing of public services and infrastructure. "Sufficiency" does not assume any specific ideal level of public expenditure, but refers only to the relationship between public revenues and expenditures.

Taxation policies are equitable, competitive and generate sufficient public revenues.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Taxation policies fail to achieve one of the three principles.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Taxation policies fail to achieve two of the three principles.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Taxation policies fail to realize the following three principles: equity, competitiveness and the generation of sufficient public revenues.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S8.2

Tax Evasion

S8.3

Marginal Tax Burden (individuals)

S8.4

Marginal Tax Burden (businesses)

S8.5

Tax System Complexity

S8.6

Total Tax Rate

S9.1

Budgetary Policy

To what extent does budgetary policy realize the goal of fiscal sustainability?

This question focuses on the aggregate of public budgets and does not assess whether budgets reflect government priorities or induce departments to manage efficiently. Sustainable budgeting should enable a government to pay its financial obligations (solvency), sustain economic growth, meet future obligations with existing tax burdens (stable taxes) and pay current obligations without shifting the cost to future generations (inter-generational fairness).

Budgetary policy is fiscally sustainable.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Budgetary policy achieves most standards of fiscal sustainability.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Budgetary policy achieves some standards of fiscal sustainability.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Budgetary policy is fiscally unsustainable.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S9.2

Debt-to-GDP

S9.3

Net Debt Ratio

S9.4

Debt Interest Ratio

S9.5

Budget Consolidation

S9.6

Soundness of Banks

S10.1

Health Policy

How effective and efficient are health care policies in your country?

Public health care policies should aim at providing high-quality health care for the largest possible share of the population and at the lowest possible costs.

Of the three criteria – quality, inclusiveness and cost efficiency – efficiency should be given less weight if the first two criteria can be considered fulfilled.

Health care policies provide high-quality health care for a majority of the population and services are efficiently organized.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Health care policies provide high-quality health care for a majority of the population, but services are inefficiently organized.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Health care policies provide poor-quality health care for a majority of the population and services are inefficiently organized.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Health care policies provide poor-quality health care for a majority of the population. Health care services are underfinanced, overloaded, unreliable and inefficiently organized.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S10.2

Private-to-Public HC Spending

S10.3

Spending on Pharmaceuticals

S10.4

Spending on Preventive and Health Programs

S10.5

Life Expectancy-to-HC Spending

S10.6

Infant Mortality

S11.1

Social Inclusion Policy

To what extent does social policy in your country prevent exclusion and decoupling from society?

Reducing the various risks of social exclusion is a core task of social policy. The prevention of poverty and the provision of enabling conditions for equal opportunity in society are essential elements of such a policy. In addition to poverty, please take also into account additional dimensions of exclusion like the experience of marginalization and the desire to be appreciated when evaluating socioeconomic disparities.

Policies very effectively enable societal inclusion and ensure equal opportunities.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
For the most part, policies enable societal inclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
For the most part, policies fail to prevent societal exclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Policies exacerbate unequal opportunities and exclusion from society.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S11.2

Poverty

S11.3

Life Satisfaction

S11.4

Youth not in Education and Unemployed

S11.5

Gini Coefficient

S11.6

Gender Equality

S11.7

Social and Political Participation

S12.1

Family Policy

To what extent do family support policies in your country enable women to combine parenting with participation in the labor market?

Traditional family patterns confine mothers to opt out of gainful employment and focus on household and child care work, a division of roles that has lost acceptance among an increasing number of women. This question is based on the assumption that an optimal system of family support should enable women to decide freely whether and when they want to remain full-time mothers or take up full- or part time employment.

Family support policies effectively enable women to combine parenting with employment.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Family support policies provide some support for women who want to combine parenting and employment.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Family support policies provide only few opportunities for women who want to combine parenting and employment.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Family support policies force most women to opt for either parenting or employment.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S12.2

Child Care Density

S12.3

Child Poverty

S12.4

Fertility Rate

S12.5

Spending on Family Policy

S13.1

Pension Policy

To what extent does pension policy in your country realize goals of poverty prevention, inter-generational equity and fiscal sustainability?

An optimal pension system should prevent poverty among the elderly due to retirement and should be based on distributional principles that do not erode the system's fiscal stability. It should ensure equity among pensioners, the active labor force and the adolescent generation. These objectives may be achieved by different pension systems: exclusively public pension systems, a mixture of public and private pension schemes, or publicly subsidized private pension plans. Accumulating public and private implicit pension debt is undesirable.

The pension policy is fiscally sustainable, guarantees inter-generational equity and effectively prevents poverty caused by old age.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The pension policy fails to realize one of these three principles.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The pension policy fails to realize two of these three principles.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The pension policy is fiscally unsustainable, does not effectively prevent old-age poverty and fails to achieve inter-generational equity.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S13.2

Older Employment

S13.3

Senior Citizen Poverty

S13.4

Dependency Ratio

S13.5

Public Pension Coverage

S14.1

Integration Policy

How effectively do policies in your country support the integration of migrants into society?

This question covers integration-related policies comprising a wide array of cultural, education and social policies insofar as they affect the status of migrants or migrant communities in society. The objective of integration precludes forced assimilation but favors integration by acquisition of nationality.

Cultural, education and social policies effectively support the integration of migrants into society.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Cultural, education and social policies seek to integrate migrants into society, but have failed to do so effectively.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Cultural, education and social policies do not focus on integrating migrants into society.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Cultural, education and social policies segregate migrant communities from the majority society.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S14.2

Foreign-born Secondary Attainment

S14.3

Foreign-born Tertiary Attainment

S14.4

Foreign-born Unemployment

S14.5

Foreign-born-to-Native Employment

S15.1

External Security Policy

How effectively does external security and defense policy in your country protect citizens against security risks and safeguard the national interest?

This question rests on the assumption that the aims of protecting citizens against security risks and safeguarding the national interest can be achieved by many different ways and combinations of security and defense policies. In addition a combination of various domestic and external policies can achieve an effective protection against new security risks arising from threats like terrorism. On the one hand the effectiveness of these policies depend on the relation between the aims and strategies of the defence policy and the way the military forces are financed, fitted with high-tech and state-of-the-art equipment and supported by a national consensus on the desired defense policy. On the other hand the membership in collective security alliances/organizations/treaties, the internal integration of domestic intelligence communities and their cooperation with regional/international counterparts, the promotion of neighbourhood stability, conflict prevention and assistance/risk containment for failed states are necessary pre-conditions to a successful security policy. Whereas military expenditures alone say little about the effectiveness of external security policy, they have to be taken into account in order to assess the cost/benefit-ratio of these policies.

External security policy protects citizens against security risks and safeguards the national interest very effectively.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
External security policy protects citizens against security risks and safeguard the national interest more or less effectively.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
External security policy does not effectively protect citizens against security risks and safeguard the national interest.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
External security policy exacerbates the security risks and does not safeguard the national interest.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S15.2

Conflicts Fought

S15.3

Relations with Neighbors

S16.1

Internal Security Policy

How effectively does internal security policy in your country protect citizens against security risks?

This question rests on the assumption that the aims of protecting citizens against security risks like crime, terrorism and similar threats that are more and more internationally organized can be achieved by many different ways and combinations of internal security policies. For example, an effective policy includes objectives such as the internal integration of domestic intelligence and police communities and their regional cross-border cooperation with regional/international intelligence and police communities, the domestic strategy of intelligence and police communities and so on. Whereas expenditures on public order and safety alone say little about the effectiveness of internal security policy, they have to be taken into account in order to assess the cost/benefit-ratio of this policy.

Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks very effectively.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks more or less effectively.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Internal security policy does not effectively protect citizens against security risks.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Internal security policy exacerbates the security risks.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S16.2

Homicides

S16.3

Burglaries and Robberies

S16.4

Reliability of Police Services

S16.5

Costs of Crime

S17.1

Environmental Policy

How effectively does environmental policy in your country protect and preserve the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment?

This question covers a government's activities aimed at safeguarding the environment and thereby securing the prerequisites for sustainable economic development.

Environmental policy effectively protects, preserves and enhances the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Environmental policy largely protects and preserves the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Environmental policy insufficiently protects and preserves the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Environmental policy has largely failed to protect and preserve the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S17.2

Energy Intensity

S17.3

CO₂ Emissions

S17.4

Energy Mix

S17.5

Water Usage

S17.6

Waste Management

S18.1

Research and Innovation Policy

To what extent does research and innovation policy in your country support technological innovations that foster the creation and introduction of new products?

This question comprises subsidies and incentives for research institutions conducting basic and applied research, as well as subsidies and incentives for establishing start-up companies that transfer scientific output into products and enhanced productivity. Bureaucratic impediments to research and innovation should also be taken into account.

Research and innovation policy effectively supports innovations that foster the creation of new products and enhance productivity.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Research and innovation policy largely supports innovations that foster the creation of new products and enhance productivity.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Research and innovation policy partly supports innovations that foster the creation of new products and enhance productivity.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Research and innovation policy has largely failed to support innovations that foster the creation of new products and enhance productivity.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S18.2

Public R&D Spending

S18.3

Industry R&D Personnel

S18.4

Science and Technology Degrees

S18.5

Triad Patents

S18.6

Computer and Internet Access

S19.1

Education Policy

To what extent does education policy in your country deliver high-quality, efficient and equitable education and training?

This question assesses the extent to which a government's education policy facilitates high-quality learning that contributes to personal development, sustainable economic growth and social cohesion. Your response should focus on the following, irrespective of the education system's organization: the contribution of education policy towards providing a skilled labor force, the graduate output of upper secondary and tertiary education, and (equitable) access to education. While the latter pertains to issues of fairness and distributive justice, it also has implications for a country's international competitiveness as unequal education implies a waste of human potential.

Education policy effectively delivers efficient and equitable education and training.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Education policy largely delivers high-quality, efficient and equitable education and training	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Education policy partly delivers high-quality, efficient and equitable education and training.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Education policy largely fails to deliver high-quality, efficient and equitable education and training.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S19.2

Upper Secondary Attainment

S19.3

Tertiary Attainment

S19.4

Continuing Education

S19.5

PISA Results

S19.6

Pre-primary Education

Executive Capacity

Steering Capability

- M 1 Strategic Capacity
- M 2 Inter-ministerial Coordination
- M 3 Evidence-based Instruments
- M 4 Societal Consultation
- M 5 Policy Communication

Policy Implementation

- M 6 Effective Implementation

Institutional Learning

- M 7 Adaptability
- M 8 Organizational Reform Capacity

M1.1

Strategic Planning

How much influence does strategic planning have on government decision-making?

Organizational forms of strategic planning include planning units at the center of government and personal advisory cabinets for ministers or the president/prime minister or extra-governmental bodies.

An indicator of influence may be the frequency of meetings between strategic planning staff and the head of government. Please substantiate your assessment with empirical evidence.

Dominant influence.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Considerable influence.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Modest influence.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
No influence.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M1.2

Medium-term Fiscal Framework

M1.3

Scholarly Advice

How influential are non-governmental academic experts for government decision-making?

An indicator of influence may be the frequency of meetings between government and external academic experts. Please substantiate your assessment with empirical evidence.

Dominant influence.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Considerable influence.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Modest influence.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
No influence.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M2.1

GO Expertise

Does the government office / prime minister's office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills substantively?

This question examines whether the government office (referred to in some countries as the prime minister's office, chancellery, etc.) has capacities to evaluate the policy content of line ministry proposals. In case this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents.

The GO / PMO has comprehensive sectoral policy expertise and provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government's strategic and budgetary priorities.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The GO / PMO has sectoral policy expertise and evaluates important draft bills.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise, but does not evaluate draft bills.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M2.2

GO Gatekeeping

Can the government office / prime minister's office return items envisaged for the cabinet meeting on the basis of policy considerations?

Please assess whether the GO/PMO is de facto, not only legally, able to return materials on the basis of policy considerations. In case this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents.

The GO/PMO can return all/most items on policy grounds.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The GO/PMO can return some items on policy grounds.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The GO/PMO can return items on technical, formal grounds only.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The GO/PMO has no authority to return items.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M2.3

Line Ministries

To what extent do line ministries have to involve the government office/prime minister's office in the preparation of policy proposals?

Please assess whether line ministries involve the GO/PMO de facto, not only legally, in the preparation of policy proposals. In case this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents.

There are interrelated capacities for coordination in the GO/PMO and line ministries.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M2.4

Cabinet Committees

How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees prepare cabinet meetings?

This question studies whether cabinet committees (composed exclusively of cabinet members) or ministerial committees (composed of several ministers and individual non-cabinet members) effectively filter out or settle issues so that the cabinet can focus on strategic policy debates.

Please assess whether ministerial or cabinet committees are de facto, not only legally, able to prepare cabinet meetings. In case this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents.

The large majority of issues are reviewed and scheduled first by/for the committees.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Most of the issues are prepared by committees. Or: Issues of political or strategic importance are reviewed and scheduled by/for the committees.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
There is hardly any preparation of cabinet meetings by committees.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
There is no preparation of cabinet meetings by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M2.5

Senior Ministry Officials

How effectively do senior ministry officials prepare cabinet meetings?

This question examines whether senior ministry officials (leading civil servants or political appointees including junior ministers below the cabinet level) effectively filter out or settle issues so that the cabinet can focus on strategic policy debates.

Please assess whether senior ministry officials are de facto, not only legally, able to prepare cabinet meetings. In case this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents.

Most issues arrive in time to be reviewed and scheduled first by/for the senior ministry officials (i.e., more than 70 percent of cabinet agenda items are prepared).	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Many of the issues are prepared by senior ministry officials (i.e., 50-70 percent of cabinet agenda items are prepared).	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
There is some preparation of cabinet meetings by senior ministry officials (i.e., less than 50 percent of cabinet agenda items are prepared).	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
There is no or hardly any preparation of cabinet meetings by senior ministry officials.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M2.6

Line Ministry Civil Servants

How effectively do line ministry civil servants coordinate policy proposals?

This question refers to administrative coordination and examines to what extent civil servants of individual ministries effectively coordinate the drafting of policy proposals with other ministries so that political coordination bodies and the cabinet can focus on strategic policy debates.

In case this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents.

Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by civil servants.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Many policy proposals are coordinated by civil servants.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
There is some coordination of policy proposals by civil servants.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by civil servants.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms work?

This question examines whether there are informal coordination mechanisms (examples: coalition committees, informal meetings within government or with party groups, informal meetings across levels of government) which effectively filter out or settle issues so that the cabinet can focus on strategic policy debates?

- | | |
|--|-----------------------------|
| Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by informal mechanisms. | 10 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 9 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| Many policy proposals are coordinated by informal mechanisms. | 8 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 7 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| There is some coordination of policy proposals by informal mechanisms. | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by informal mechanisms. | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> |

M3.1

RIA Application

Does the government regularly assess the potential socioeconomic impact of the draft laws it prepares (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?

If RIA activities are not centrally registered, please try to obtain exemplary information that is representative of the situation in your country. **Please Note: If RIA are not applied or do not exist, please give your country a score of "1" for this question AND for M3.2 and M3.3.

In case this question does not fully apply to your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents and substantiate your answer.

RIA are applied systematically to new or existing regulations, but are limited to those matching defined criteria.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA are not applied systematically to study the impact of regulations.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA are applied randomly.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA are not applied or do not exist.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M3.2

Needs Analysis

To what extent do RIA analyze the purpose of and need for a regulation?

This question seeks to assess the analytical depth of RIA. Please try to obtain exemplary information that is representative of the situation in your country. In case this question does not fully apply to your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents and substantiate your answer.

RIA define the purpose of and need for a regulation in a clear, concise and specific manner.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA mention the purpose of and need for a regulation, but the specification is not sufficiently clear, concise and/or well-defined.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA mention the purpose of and the need for a regulation, but do not specify.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA do not analyze the purpose of and the need for a regulation.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M3.3

Alternative Options

To what extent do RIA analyze alternative options?

This question seeks to assess the scope of RIA.

Please try to obtain exemplary information that is representative of the situation in your country. In case this question does not fully apply to your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents and substantiate your answer.

RIA analyze alternative options (including “do nothing”) and quantify the costs and benefits of the different alternatives.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA highlight alternative options and consider the pros and cons of each option.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA consider some alternative options	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA do not analyze alternative options.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M4.1

Negotiating Public Support

To what extent does the government consult with trade unions, employers' associations, leading business associations, religious communities, and social and environmental interest groups to support its policy?

This question assesses how successfully the government consults with economic and social actors in preparing its policy. Successful consultation is conceived here as an exchange of views and information that increases the quality of government policies and induces economic and social actors to support them.

The government successfully motivates economic and social actors to support its policy.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government facilitates the acceptance of its policy among economic and social actors.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government consults with economic and social actors.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government hardly consults with any economic and social actors.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M5.1

Coherent Communication

To what extent does the government implement a coherent communication policy?

The government effectively coordinates the communication of ministries; ministries closely align their communication with government strategy.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government seeks to coordinate the communication of ministries through consultation procedures. Contradictory statements are rare, but do occur.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The ministries are responsible for informing the public within their own particular areas of competence; their statements occasionally contradict each other.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M6.1

Government Efficiency

To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?

This question seeks to evaluate a government's implementation performance against the performance benchmarks set by the government for its own work. The assessment should therefore focus on the major policy priorities identified by a government and examine whether declared objectives could be realized.

The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M6.2a

Ministerial Compliance

To what extent does the organization of government ensure that ministers do not seek to realize their self-interest but face incentives to implement the government's program?

Organizational devices providing incentives for ministers include prime ministerial powers over personnel, policies or structures, coalition committees, party summits, comprehensive government programs/coalition agreements and cabinet meetings. In case this question does not fully apply to your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents and substantiate your answer.

The organization of government successfully provides strong incentives for ministers to implement the government's program.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The organization of government provides weak incentives for ministers to implement the government's program.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The organization of government partly prevents ministers from realizing departmental self-interests.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The organization of government fails to prevent ministers from realizing departmental self-interests.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M6.2b

Monitoring Line Ministries

How effectively does the government office / prime minister's office monitor line ministry activities?

This question assumes that effective delegation from the core executive to ministries is reflected in the monitoring of line ministry activities by the administration of the core executive. While such monitoring is not sufficient to prevent line ministries from prioritizing sectoral over government interests, the presence or absence of monitoring is taken here as a proxy of effective delegation policies. In case this question does not fully apply to your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents and substantiate your answer.

- | | |
|--|-----------------------------|
| The GO / PMO effectively monitors the activities of line ministries. | 10 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 9 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The GO / PMO monitors the activities of most line ministries. | 8 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 7 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The GO / PMO shadows the activities of some line ministries. | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The GO / PMO does not monitor the activities of line ministries. | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> |

M6.2c

Monitoring Agencies

How effectively do ministries monitor the activities of executive agencies?

An effective implementation may be constrained by bureaucratic drift. To ensure that agencies act in accordance with government policies, this question assumes that ministries and their leading officials should monitor the activities of semi-autonomous executive agencies in their task area.

In federal states with few executive agencies at the central level of government, the assessment should also consider regional-level decentralized agencies acting on behalf of the federal government.

- | | |
|--|-----------------------------|
| The ministries effectively monitor the activities of all executive agencies. | 10 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 9 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The ministries monitor the activities of most of the executive agencies. | 8 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 7 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The ministries monitor the activities of some executive agencies. | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The ministries do not monitor the activities of executive agencies. | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> |

M6.2d

Internal Auditing

M6.3a

Task Funding

To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?

A high or low degree of decentralization as such does not constitute a meaningful indicator of executive capacity. Rather, this question focuses on the delegation problem associated with decentralization.

If the central government delegates a public task to lower levels of government (as a rule: regional self-government and in unitary states without regional self-government, local self-government), the central government needs to ensure that such tasks are adequately funded. The absence of corresponding funding sources ("unfunded mandates") indicates a lack of responsibility and strategic design. Funding may be provided through grants (shares of centrally collected taxes) from the central budget or by endowing subnational self-governments with their own revenues.

Please note that subnational self-government refers to directly elected subnational administrative authorities with considerable discretion. The broad concept of "delegation" applied here is taken from principal-agent theory and includes independent powers of subnational self-government enshrined in the constitution. Thus, no difference is made between independent powers and those central government powers that have been delegated by laws or executive regulations to subnational self-government.

The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M6.3b

Constitutional Discretion

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion?

As a high or low degree of decentralization as such does not constitute a meaningful indicator of executive capacity, this question takes the constitutional scope of regional self-government or, in unitary states without regional self-government, local self-government autonomy, as a point of reference.

Central government institutions are assumed to enable subnational self-governments to use this autonomy fully. Subnational autonomy may be curtailed by legal, administrative, fiscal or political measures of the central level. Such de facto centralizing policies may be deliberate or unintentional, unconstitutional or in accordance with the constitution.

The central government enables subnational self-governments to use their constitutional scope of discretion fully.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments' scope of discretion.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided autonomy.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M6.3c

National Standards

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national standards of public services?

This question seeks to assess how central government ensures that the decentralized provision of public services complies with standards (rules, performance figures, etc.) agreed upon and set on the national level.

Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments meet national standards of public services.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Central government ensures largely that subnational self-governments meet national standard of public services.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments meet national minimum standards of public services.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments meet national standards of public services.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M7.1

Domestic Adaptability

To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?

Government structures include the organization of ministries, the cooperation among ministries and in cabinet, the center of government and relations with subnational levels of government. This question asks whether these structures have been adapted to address inter / supranational developments and their effects for policy formulation and policy implementation.

Please note that structural reforms are also studied in view of their role in institutional learning (question M8.2).

The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government has largely adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government has partly adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government has not adapted domestic government structures.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M7.2

International Coordination

To what extent does the government participate in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives?

This question evaluates whether the government actively collaborates in reform initiatives promoted by international fora or organizations. The underlying assumption is that – given the transnational integration of modern states – executive capacity increasingly depends on whether a government is able to actively participate in international institutions and in shaping international policies.

Joint reform initiatives concern challenges or problems that cannot be mastered unilaterally by an individual country and that aim to facilitate international cooperation in fields such as international security, economic development, social progress, human rights issues or environmental protection.

The government actively participates in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives as often as possible.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government often participates in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government selectively and sporadically participates in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government does not participate in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M8.1

Self monitoring

To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?

Institutional arrangements include the rules of procedure and the work formats defined there, in particular the cabinet, the office of the head of government, the center of government, the portfolios of ministries, the advisory staffs of ministers and the head of government as well as the management of relations with parliament, governing parties, ministerial administration and public communication.

The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
There is no monitoring.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M8.2

Institutional Reform

To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?

For a list of institutional arrangements, see question M8.1. Strategic capacity is the capacity to take and implement political decisions which take into account the externalities and interdependencies of policies, are based on scientific knowledge, promote common goods and represent a long-term orientation.

The government improves considerably its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

Executive Accountability

Citizens

M9 Citizens' Participatory Competence

Legislature

M 10 Structures and Resources of Parliamentary Actors

M 11 Parliamentary Accountability and Oversight

Intermediary Organizations

M 12 Media

M 13 Parties and Interest Associations

M9.1

Policy Knowledge

To what extent are citizens informed of government policy-making?

This question assesses the extent to which citizens have information and knowledge enabling them to evaluate government policy-making adequately. The question focuses on policies, not the personnel or political composition of government or the power struggles that often dominate government. A high level of information about policies presupposes that citizens understand the motives, objectives, effects and implications of policies.

Please rely on local opinion survey data to substantiate your evaluation.

Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of government policies.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Many citizens are well-informed of individual government policies.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Few citizens are well-informed of government policies; most citizens have only a rudimentary knowledge of policies.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Most citizens are not aware of government policies.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M9.2

Voter Turnout

M10.1	Number of Committees
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M10.2	Committee Size
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M10.3	Pro-Government Committee Chairs
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M10.4	Deputy Expert Staff
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M10.6	Legislature's Expert Staff
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M11.1

Non-Majority Leverage

M11.2

Obtaining Documents

Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?

Please assess whether parliamentary committees are de facto, not only legally, able to obtain the documents they desire from government. Specify if you consider the rights of committees limited. This question considers regular parliamentary committees only, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Parliamentary committees may not ask for government documents.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M11.3

Summoning Ministers

Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?

Please assess whether parliamentary committees are de facto, not only legally, able to summon ministers to committee meetings and to confront them with their questions. Please specify if you consider the rights of committees limited. This question considers regular parliamentary committees only, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M11.4

Summoning Experts

Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?

Please assess whether parliamentary committees are de facto, not only legally, able to invite experts to committee meetings. Please specify if you consider the rights of committees limited. This question considers regular parliamentary committees only, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

Parliamentary committees may summon experts.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M11.5

Task Area Coincidence

To what extent do the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries coincide?

If the task areas of parliamentary committees match the task areas of ministries, each parliamentary committee may focus on monitoring the activities of its corresponding ministry, thereby increasing the control capacity of the legislature. There are two possible ill-fitting constellations between committee and ministerial portfolios. If there are fewer committees than ministries, the committees may be overburdened with monitoring ministerial activities. If there are more committees than ministries, control responsibilities are split and the parliament may act non-cohesively.

This question considers regular parliamentary committees only, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

The task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries fully coincide. Parliamentary committees monitor ministries effectively.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The task areas of parliamentary committees do not fully correspond to the task areas of ministries. Parliamentary committees are largely capable of monitoring ministries.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The task areas of parliamentary committees do not correspond to the task areas of ministries. Parliamentary committees fail to monitor ministries effectively.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The task areas of parliamentary committees differ widely from the task areas of ministries. Parliamentary committees frequently fail to monitor ministries effectively.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M11.6

Audit Office

To what extent is the audit office accountable to the parliament?

This question assesses the extent to which the parliament can rely on its own auditing capacities

- | | |
|---|-----------------------------|
| The audit office is accountable to the parliament exclusively | 10 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 9 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The audit office is accountable primarily to the parliament. | 8 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 7 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The audit office is not accountable to the parliament, but has to report regularly to the parliament. | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The audit office is governed by the executive. | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> |

M11.7

Ombuds Office

Does the parliament have an ombuds office?

This question asks whether parliaments have institutions that listen to the concerns of citizens, publicly advocate the issues raised by citizens and initiate governmental action to address them.

The term "ombuds office" is used here as a label representing these functions and may be institutionalized in different organizational formats. Please also consider possible functional equivalents and substantiate your answer.

- | | |
|---|-----------------------------|
| The parliament has an effective ombuds office. | 10 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 9 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The parliament has an ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited. | 8 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 7 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The parliament has an ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited. | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The parliament does not have an ombuds office. | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> |

M12.1

Media Reporting

To what extent do the TV and radio stations in your country provide substantive indepth information on decisions taken by the government?

This question seeks to assess the extent to which the media provide contextualized information, analysis and background information that enables the broader public to evaluate the government’s decisions. For reasons of comparability and simplicity, the question focuses on:

- (1) your country’s main TV and radio stations (excluding all other electronic and print media as well as pure news channels) and
- (2) decisions taken by the government (and not political issues or the political process in general). A lack of in-depth information is not tantamount to a complete lack of information but to the dominance of “infotainment programs” framing government decisions as personalized power politics and diverting attention from the substance of decisions to entertaining events and stories.

The main TV and radio stations every day produce high-quality information programs analyzing government decisions.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The main TV and radio stations produce a mix of infotainment and quality information programs. Programs with in-depth information on government decisions comprise between five and seven hours a week.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The main TV and radio stations produce many superficial infotainment programs. In-depth information on government decisions is limited to programs lasting between three and five hours a week.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The main TV and radio stations are dominated by superficial infotainment programs. In-depth information on government decisions is limited to programs lasting between one and three hours a week.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M12.2

Newspaper Circulation

M12.3

Quality Newspapers

M13.1

Party Competence

To what extent do the electoral programs of major parties in your country propose plausible and coherent policies?

This question seeks to assess the quality of parties' policy proposals by analyzing the electoral programs of parties. It is assumed that programs document a party's capacity to formulate policies and to engage in a programmatic competition with rival parties.

Two criteria of quality are given: a proposal is plausible if its underlying problem diagnosis, the suggested policy instruments/measures, policy objectives and expected policy impacts are reasonably linked with each other; a proposal is coherent if it does not contradict other proposed policies.

Your evaluation will imply an assessment about whether proposed policies are likely to work, although the question is more focused on the plausibility of policy proposals. Please avoid an assessment of objectives pursued by individual parties, their appropriateness, desirability etc. "Major" parties are conceived here as parties supported by more than ten percent of the voters in the last national elections.

Most electoral programs propose plausible and coherent policies.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Many electoral programs propose plausible and coherent policies.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Few electoral programs propose plausible and coherent policies.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Most electoral programs do not propose plausible or coherent policies.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M13.2

Association Competence (business)

To what extent do economic interest associations propose reasonable policies?

“Reasonable” policy proposals identify the causes of problems, rely on scholarly knowledge, are technically feasible, take into account long-term interests and anticipate policy effects. These criteria are more demanding than the criteria used to evaluate party programs as interest associations can be expected to represent a specialist, substantive policy know-how.

The assessment should focus on the following interest associations: employers’ associations, leading business associations, trade unions.

Most interest associations propose reasonable policies.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Many interest associations propose reasonable policies.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Few interest associations propose reasonable policies.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Most interest associations do not propose reasonable policies.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M13.3

Association Competence (others)

To what extent do non-economic interest associations propose reasonable policies?

“Reasonable” policy proposals identify the causes of problems, rely on scholarly knowledge, are technically feasible, take into account long-term interests and anticipate policy effects. These criteria are more demanding than the criteria used to evaluate party programs as interest associations can be expected to represent a specialist, substantive policy know-how.

The assessment should focus on the following interest associations: social interest groups, environmental groups and religious communities.

Most interest associations propose reasonable policies.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Many interest associations propose reasonable policies.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Few interest associations propose reasonable policies.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Most interest associations do not propose reasonable policies.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

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